

sujets traités

documents datant de  
1946-47 surtout

(2)

- Certitudes, opinio, fides
- Définition dialectique
- Evolution-
- Infini
- Sobriété

~~Articles~~

lettres, articles

Leo Camp → mathématiques (proportion)

Sister M. Jocelyn - That man might speak - 6 pp.  
(main-language)

inspiration: CDK.

Peter Hausmann - infini (limites)

lettres de KOCOUREK  
BELLEPERCHÉ.

CAMP, Leo

Jan. 17, 1947

Feb 4, 1947

Dec 8, 1946

Jan 18, 1947

Aug 14, 1946

Sept 4, 1946

March 28, ?  
46 ou 47.



UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL  
FACULTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE

Cabinet du Doyen

Qal.

- Objective being of man.

cf. Pascal, a. 6, §§ 7, 14. §§ 7-14; 25-26

It is "extrinsic". Show ambig. in contemp. phil. literature on "object" & "subject".

- Justice: Surrender to absurdity.

- Why not try St. Thomas?

On intellectual humility. On false intellectual humility:  
they not only want their "right", but want their achievements  
to be recognised as being just that.

- The general pop of "being".

Edl. pour vol. II n. 3

Notre modèle de l'homme  
concernant le sens physique - 1/2  
Nombre, c'est le point de la chaîne  
de Proclus, éternellement habité par le  
vrai, car c'est le vrai et non  
la pensée telle que l'homme en la  
considère. La réalité de la chaîne  
est plus réelle que la métaphase.

1. Sur infinité de la raison et non
2. Définition d'été { dial. rati.  
dial. prob.
3. Sur finalité et causalité -

4. Métaph. et reconnaissance.

ind. corr. après.  
fin et prés. pluriq.  
e. pour actualité  
sup. du corr.  
non corr. d'été  
si doit se définir  
en fin: corr. - Etant  
d, le mode de corr.  
plus corr. ven  
pér.

Des Mots se révèle à nous l'acte. - Le voyage - L'acte du mot plus facile, entraîneur. Nous  
mûr, la parité et en un temps, a acte. Vitalité mixte. - Acte mot ment compréhensif à nature potus.  
Egrouvons éloignement du non-être. Nous fit cela: l'expérience d'"être", de l'"impossible".  
l'être pur ne nous va pas ici. Comparer aux deux, séparés, et impossibilité de voir totalité  
de leur univers intelligible dans simultanéité.  
Rapports ne courent.  
Comparer à  $\mathcal{E}$  Eth., t. 10, n. 2093.  
[Mot local - déjà perf. du mot. - mode plus...]  
monat. né. en us contre le déprimement. Lie et apud angelos. Hém. ai  
insuffisant - demande t discret, sicut subr.  
et intellectus demande précis autres choses.

5. Rex. Ad intell, non ad volunt. C. Th., I 595, n. 10

Cur à  $\mathcal{E}$  S. Th. de actu voluntas, ibid. 603, n. 28

Non perpétuée par promulgation, sed per actum <sup>ordinatorem</sup> ~~promulgationem~~. ibid. VII 749, n. 23.

6. Only in nature, felix & knowledge for us - i.e. all faculties employed. - Note passages  
of text - spec. last para - bond, certitud. semit. p. p. mod. - sem. no distrib. -

7. En marge de l'existentialisme - aversissement. Il engage 3 probl.

- contingence irrationnel. Mais très rationnelle pour Dieu.
- être absolument  $\neq$  bon absolument. <sup>indivisibilité</sup> ~~indivisibilité~~ <sup>clairement</sup> ~~clairement~~ : passage objet de l'indivisibilité.
- distinction du spéc. et du pratique.

6. Développer tout des  $\mathcal{E}$  Bergson dans  $\mathcal{E}$  Dialéctique des Amis : rationnel en soi et pour nous  
Parler aussi de Bergson. Eternité et durée ; liberté et enchaînement dans pensée conceptuelle.  
Ceux qui, borne intuition, sans doute, tout critique, n'ont pas de trille à le mesurer quand à l'idée  
fondamentale qui menait Bergson.

7. Note des Pensées et Mouvements de Bergson.

8. Cantini

9. Trepanier

10. Simard

11. Jacques!

12. Utrum gratia gratum faciens ordinatur

ad bonum commune. (I II III 5/1 m & ad 3 m)

13. Quomodo spes respiciat proprium bonum. (II II 17/3;

6/3 m; 8, c. 1 m; III 7/4/5 m; QD de spe, a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p, q, r, s, t, u, v, w, x, y, z;  
3, c, j, 4 m; j, l, 1, 2 m; Caj. II II 17/5;  $\mathcal{E}$  Th. de spe. Fasc.  
II II

1. Sur aptitude de la raison et nom "ad placitum"
2. Définition d'eter { dial. retr.  
dial. prob.
3. Sur finalité et causalité -
4. Metaph. et reconnaissance.

Quid erat. spēs.  
In et pō. pōpō.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
hōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.  
In. pōm. et hōm.

Donc Mot se révèle à nous l'acte. - Le voyage - l'acte du mot plus facile, entraîneur. Nous  
mûr, la parité et en m temps au acte. Vitalité mixte. - Acte mot meut comprément à nature potentielle mobile  
Eponoms éloignement du non-être. Nous ft cela: l'expérience d'"entier", de l'"impensé".  
l'île pur se non en pas ici. Comparer aux dubit. séparés, et impossibilité de vivre totalité  
de leur univers intelligible dans simultanéité.  
Rapproch. us courants.  
Comparer à J. E. H., t. 10, n. 2093.

5. Rex. Ad intel, non ad volunt. C. Th., I 595, n. 10  
Cur in L. S. n. d. d. e. h. voluntas, ibid. 603, n. 28  
Non perfructu per promulgationem, sed per actum <sup>ordinatum</sup> ~~promulgationem~~. ibid. VII 749, n. 93.

6. Pōpō in natura, felix et knowledge for us - i.e. all pōpōs employed. - Note pōpōs  
of dōm - spec. lōm gōm - lōm, certitud. lōm pōpō. mōd. - dōm, no dōm -

7. En marge de l'existentialisme - avortement. Il engage 3 probl.
  - contingence irrationnel. Mais très rationnelle pour dōm.
  - être absolument ≠ bon absolument. <sup>volonté d'absolument: passion objective d'absolument.</sup>
  - distinction du spēs. et du pratique.

6. Developper l'art des Dreyer dans Dialychique des Amis: rationnel en soi et pour nous.  
Parler aussi de Bergson. Eternité et durée; liberté et enchaînement dans pensée conceptuelle.  
Ceux qui, bonne intuition, sans doute, sont critiqués, n'étant pas de l'île à le mesurer quand à l'idée  
fondamentale qui menait Bergson.

7. Note sur Pensée et Mouvement de Bergson.

8. Cantini
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12. Utrum gratia gratum faciens ordinatur  
ad bonum commune. (I II III/5/1<sup>m</sup> & ad 3<sup>m</sup>)

13. Quomodo pōpōs respiciat proprium bonum. (II II/17/3;  
6/3<sup>m</sup>; 8, c. 2<sup>m</sup>; III 7/4/3<sup>m</sup>; QD de spēs. a. 1, c. 2<sup>m</sup>; 3<sup>m</sup>;  
3, c. 4<sup>m</sup>; 1/1, 1, 2<sup>m</sup>; 2<sup>m</sup>; 3<sup>m</sup>; 4<sup>m</sup>; 5<sup>m</sup>; 6<sup>m</sup>; 7<sup>m</sup>; 8<sup>m</sup>; 9<sup>m</sup>; 10<sup>m</sup>; 11<sup>m</sup>; 12<sup>m</sup>; 13<sup>m</sup>; 14<sup>m</sup>; 15<sup>m</sup>; 16<sup>m</sup>; 17<sup>m</sup>; 18<sup>m</sup>; 19<sup>m</sup>; 20<sup>m</sup>; 21<sup>m</sup>; 22<sup>m</sup>; 23<sup>m</sup>; 24<sup>m</sup>; 25<sup>m</sup>; 26<sup>m</sup>; 27<sup>m</sup>; 28<sup>m</sup>; 29<sup>m</sup>; 30<sup>m</sup>; 31<sup>m</sup>; 32<sup>m</sup>; 33<sup>m</sup>; 34<sup>m</sup>; 35<sup>m</sup>; 36<sup>m</sup>; 37<sup>m</sup>; 38<sup>m</sup>; 39<sup>m</sup>; 40<sup>m</sup>; 41<sup>m</sup>; 42<sup>m</sup>; 43<sup>m</sup>; 44<sup>m</sup>; 45<sup>m</sup>; 46<sup>m</sup>; 47<sup>m</sup>; 48<sup>m</sup>; 49<sup>m</sup>; 50<sup>m</sup>; 51<sup>m</sup>; 52<sup>m</sup>; 53<sup>m</sup>; 54<sup>m</sup>; 55<sup>m</sup>; 56<sup>m</sup>; 57<sup>m</sup>; 58<sup>m</sup>; 59<sup>m</sup>; 60<sup>m</sup>; 61<sup>m</sup>; 62<sup>m</sup>; 63<sup>m</sup>; 64<sup>m</sup>; 65<sup>m</sup>; 66<sup>m</sup>; 67<sup>m</sup>; 68<sup>m</sup>; 69<sup>m</sup>; 70<sup>m</sup>; 71<sup>m</sup>; 72<sup>m</sup>; 73<sup>m</sup>; 74<sup>m</sup>; 75<sup>m</sup>; 76<sup>m</sup>; 77<sup>m</sup>; 78<sup>m</sup>; 79<sup>m</sup>; 80<sup>m</sup>; 81<sup>m</sup>; 82<sup>m</sup>; 83<sup>m</sup>; 84<sup>m</sup>; 85<sup>m</sup>; 86<sup>m</sup>; 87<sup>m</sup>; 88<sup>m</sup>; 89<sup>m</sup>; 90<sup>m</sup>; 91<sup>m</sup>; 92<sup>m</sup>; 93<sup>m</sup>; 94<sup>m</sup>; 95<sup>m</sup>; 96<sup>m</sup>; 97<sup>m</sup>; 98<sup>m</sup>; 99<sup>m</sup>; 100<sup>m</sup>.)

Qd.

- Qd. n° 3 - suite
- "Halitus" 10<sup>m</sup> fred.
- Fr. Haeremarm
- Quatuor circa indetermin.:
  - (a) in motu
  - (b) in indiv. corrupt. - conting.
  - (c) in group:
    - { in natural, subst. manifold;
    - { in constituent elements.
- Futurus quis incidere non incedit. I Peril. 13/8; II de gener., l. 11.
- Anni une irregularité macroscopique: les montagnes, l. 4.

- Duplex intellectus: { intellectus accipit illud quod parum distat, ac si nihil distaret, sed jam  
Et qui distinguit. Ha. exp. macroscopique + gr. realité; etc. habitus, "II Phyl.  
l. 9, n. 7.

- Scientia dei et beatorum: cf. III<sup>a</sup> 9/2; 10/1.

Item, theol. subalternatur scientia beatorum ut beatorum. Hanc autem et visio creaturæ  
divinæ sub lumine gloriæ qd. est finitum & creatum.

Subalternatur scientia sec. qd. hæc est in cognoscente, non immediate ei de  
quo est scientia absolute sec. se. Secus, scientia beati, cum sit immediatè  
de deo viso, nec etiam infinita (et comprehensiva) & parte videns.

~~Theologia "procedit" a principiis per se actis, terminis beatis" l. 11, p. 1, a. 8~~

I 49, g. 9, a. 3<sup>m</sup> (1)

II d. 24, g. 2, a. 2. ad 2<sup>m</sup> (2)

de Ver. g. 15, a. 2. (3)

Ethic. VI, lect. 2, med. (4)

Sc. et rat. diversae potentiae:

III d. 17, a. 1, g. 3, 3<sup>m</sup> & (5)

de An. II, l. 2, cap.

Ethic. VI, l. 1, ca. 7; l. 2 med.

de An. III, l. 8, med.; l. 16, fin.

cap. } II de An. 296  
act. }

841 def. collat. infat.  
individualium.

Scientiae operativae sunt iustissimae: Met. l. 2, fin.

Spec. rationis modi vel finis. I g. 14 & 16 c; de Ver. g. 3, a. 3, c; g. 2, a. 3, c.

ratio et cogitatio de Ver. 14/1/ad 9  $\angle^+$

~~III S., d. 23, g. 2, a. 2, l. 1, ad 3, l. 127~~

~~différents sens de Cogitatio: II II a. 1, g. 1, c.~~

La raison pour laquelle l'intelligence reste elle-même dans l'état de cogitation, c'est que la cogitation ne peut pas mener à son terme la collatio intentionum individualium.

L'expérimentation scientifique est une œuvre dans laquelle  
nous tirons les choses à nous; nous devons mesurer  
pour être mesurés.

Une théorie scientifique, dans la mesure où elle suggère  
et dirige une nouvelle expérience, est opérative. Sans doute,  
l'opus n'est pas <sup>la</sup> fin, mais il est une condition d'y atteindre.

échelle des premiers

Certitudo Formelle

Sent. III d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, gl. 3  
d. 26, q. 2, a. 4.

JS th. - C. th. I p. 389

Cogitativa III 427: est in confinio sensitive et intellective  
partis. (cf. Egit. I II p. 57, a. 5. Comm.) § III 425.  
Composuer de Anima III

Auri, def. III 428.

Pour Garrigon, dist. Certitudo fidei & Certit. spec. III 843

Natura sapaciter operatur - III 842.

Quomodo cognitio probabilis et scientia in unum  
possunt convergere: "magis cognoscuntur signa  
probabilia x cognitione scientifica." JS th. C. Phil. I 810 a.

G. Garduel: de Certitudo Probabilis,  
Rev. ~~Monist~~ de Kain, 1911 -

JS th. C. th. II II § 1, disp. 3, a. 1.



38/11/20

don't know.  
just in relation  
to nothing  
(unconscious)  
(negative)

## de certitude Métaphys.

certitude absolue - s'il n'y avait pas une telle certitude, on ne pourrait ni pas parler de certitude, et ni l'incertitude serait impossible.

## de certitude mathématique et hypothétique à la fois et absolue.

des mathématiques pures n'étant qu'un système, hypothético-déductif, leur vérité ne peut être hypothétique. La vérité consiste dans les axiomes sont des hypothèses. La vérité consiste dans la déduction. Il arrive ~~soient~~ que des propositions axiomatiques dans un système peuvent être démontrées dans un autre système. Mais il est impossible que cela soit universellement vrai de tous les axiomes, ce qui constituerait un cercle vicieux. Il est impossible que les mathématiques soient entièrement vaines, pour se rattacher à deux premiers principes à portée ontologique.

Cette situation des mathém. est de découverte assez récente. Elle balance l'idée populaire que les mathématiques sont de toute la sc. la plus certaines.

## de certitude

En physique il ne peut y avoir de certitude proprement dite.

Les choses les plus <sup>connaissables</sup> ~~certaines~~ par rapport à nous sont les moins connues, elle-m. - Et la certitude en politique.

Il est ~~est~~ impossible d'être absolument incertain.

Certitudo

absoluta

{ intrinseca: Deus et miseris.  
extrinseca: Mundus a Deo  
creatus et P.

conditionata

{ mathematica  
physica

probabilia

{ naturalis  
moralis

---

Dans la mesure où réellement  
notre nature est informe, la com.  
doit participer à cette informité:  
quasi informis et nondum ad veritatis  
certitudinem pertingens. (~~Ex Boet. de Trin.~~  
~~Proem. Iphig.~~)

Si nous considérons cette certitude objective selon sa  
capacité de déterminer l'intelligence environnante  
certitudo <sup>purement conceptuelle</sup> ~~scientia~~ <sup>la certitude subjective propre à</sup>  
~~scientia~~ <sup>deus misericors</sup>

absoluta { ex causa intrinseca : ~~ammonitione~~  
ex causa extrinseca : ~~quod mundus a deo~~ <sup>quod mundus a deo</sup> ~~creatus~~ <sup>creatus</sup>

conditionata { mathematica : la certitude des déductions  
faites à partir d'axiomes  
physica : la certitude concernant

probabilis { naturalis : circa ea quae in rebus  
naturalibus se habent ut in plurimum.  
moralis : circa ea quae in rebus  
humanae se habent ut in plurimum.

certitudo fidei { ~~naturalis~~  
~~supernaturalis~~

La certitude où la seule intelligence est  
mise en jeu peut ainsi se distinguer  
suivant l'objet.

La certitude morale ne peut être que probable,  
puisque de quoi elle ne serait plus morale.

Certitude physique du futur, ou certitude  
morale spéculative sont des contradictions dans  
les termes.  
Ainsi la certitude historique peut être morale ou  
physique.

## Certitudo, Opinio, Fides

Jsph C. Ph. I 803

Opinio: assensus alicujus rei ob rationem et motum  
probabile cum formidine partis pyroptae.

Fides: cogitatio cum assensu sive assensus cogitatio  
ob auctoritatem dicentis.

### Certitudo 2x

1) Causata seu formalis ex parte actus

2) causans quae est <sup>sive</sup> ex parte objecti seu subjecti

intellectus  
principii  
Scientiae  
per se habet.

a) objecti quando certitudo causatur ex objecto cogito  
quod sufficit determinare intellectum;

b) subjecti, scil. ex voluntate, quae tenet se ex  
parte subjecti, quia objectum per se non  
sufficit determinare: voluntas imperat  
intellectui.

### Certitudo ergo 3x:

1. formalis in actu;
2. objectiva ex parte objecti convincentis;
3. Subjectiva ex parte voluntatis adherentis et facientis  
adhaerere intellectum. Haec est sine  
evidentia cui supplet voluntas.

Triplex modus evidentiae (III Sent. d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, gl. 1)

Et hanc conclusionem certum est esse incertam. Jsph C. Ph. I 812 a. 6.

① Pour Odé sur définition  
dialectique.



Cabinet du Doyen

UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL  
FACULTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE

le 25 janvier, 1947.

Cher monsieur l'abbé Dolbec,

Il me fait plaisir de vous exprimer brièvement une opinion touchant le problème théologique et philosophique que soulèvent les théories d'évolution. Mais, sachez-le bien, mon opinion ne vaut que les raisons que j'en puis fournir.

Etant de nature spirituelle, l'âme humaine, à la différence de celle des brutes et des plantes, ne peut pas être produite d'un sujet (ex quo), mais elle vient à l'être par création. Cependant, comme elle est aussi, à la différence des esprits purs, une âme au sens strict, elle est, comme celle des plantes et des brutes, l'acte premier, la forme substantielle, d'un corps naturel muni d'organes (i.e. d'instruments d'opération). Par conséquent, elle est créée dans un sujet (in quo); ~~W~~ non pas dans un sujet quelconque, mais proportionné, apte à la recevoir par sa disposition prochaine, par son organisation particulière.

Voilà pourquoi Dieu dit (Gen.I,24): "Que la terre fasse sortir des êtres animés selon leur espèce, des animaux domestiques, des reptiles et des bêtes de la terre selon leur espèce." Mais, de la formation de l'homme, l'Ecriture dit (Gen.II,7): "Yahweh Dieu forma l'homme de la poussière du sol, et il souffla dans ses narines un souffle de vie, et l'homme devint un être vivant."

Voici maintenant la différence entre la formation du premier homme et celle des hommes qui proviennent de parents. Dans le dernier cas, il existe déjà dans la nature des causes proportionnées et suffisantes à disposer la matière en vue de l'âme que Dieu crée dès que cette matière est suffisamment organisée. (Nous disons "dès que" en égard au temps où il y a succession.) Mais dans le cas du premier homme, ces causes suffisamment proportionnées n'existent pas encore. Ici se pose le problème: Les causes naturelles ont-elles eu leur part dans la disposition de la matière? Quelle pourrait être cette part?

Vous savez que la plupart des auteurs ont cru que Dieu seul est la cause de cette disposition de la matière depuis son état inorganique jusqu'à la haute organisation du corps humain. Il convient cependant de noter ici que l'autorité



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## UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL FACULTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE

théologique la plus redoutable — S. Thomas —, pouvait à peine soutenir autre chose, attendu l'opinion commune en son temps (et qui se maintint encore au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle) sur la durée du monde, durée si courte que l'hypothèse d'une lente et progressive maturation du cosmos était d'avance exclue. Les hypothèses sur les corps célestes, elles aussi, mettaient un monde radicalement évolutif hors de propos. Mais, remarquez-le bien, les opinions sur la durée du monde et sur les corps célestes — pour ne mentionner que celles-ci — plausibles pour leur temps, mais qui écartaient toute hypothèse d'évolution, n'étaient, elles-mêmes, que des hypothèses.

Il est vrai que certains auteurs modernes ont cru voir dans S. Grégoire de Nysse (330-400) et S. Augustin (354-430) des précurseurs des théories d'évolution. Sans doute leurs conceptions regardent-elles la formation du monde, mais elles n'ont aucun rapport direct avec des hypothèses dites "scientifiques". Elles sont formées en dehors de toute investigation strictement naturelle. S. Thomas adoptait la théorie de S. Augustin ("magis mihi placet"), et pourtant on ne peut pas dire que son traité de la production du corps du premier homme (Ia Pars, q.91) soit le moins évolutionniste.

Maintenant que les hypothèses mentionnées plus haut ont été écartées et qu'il existe actuellement des théories plus ou moins évolutionnistes et provisoirement plausibles, il nous faut tâcher de répondre à la question: Répugne-t-il, a priori, que des causes naturelles et inférieures à l'homme, aient contribué à une organisation progressive de la matière en vue du corps humain? — Ainsi formulée, la question demeure très générale et, apparemment peu compromettante.



avoir tenté de répondre dès l'abord à des questions  
précises, de détails, ~~la plupart des scolastiques~~  
~~modernes (je ne dis pas tous il y a des exceptions, Gardait les Pères~~  
~~Gardait et Tertullien, p. 12.)~~ qu'on ne peut approcher sans  
avoir résolu la première, la plupart des scolastiques  
modernes se sont montrés aussi déconcertants qu'intransigeants.  
Malheureusement, c'est la scolastique elle-même qui en a  
souffert, puisqu'on attribue leur rigidité toute négative  
à la philosophie et à la théologie dont ils tiennent  
leur nom de scolastiques. Et pourtant, il me ~~semble~~  
paraît bien certain que leur stérile étroitesse provient  
très nettement de certaines conceptions fondamentales  
qu'ils avaient faites au naturalisme. Le fait est ni  
plus ni moins paradoxal: ~~la position de ces scolastiques,~~  
~~qui paraît communément pour traditionnelle nous~~  
prenons la position de ces scolastiques pour une application  
de la doctrine scolastique traditionnelle, alors qu'elle n'est que  
~~et qu'une conséquence d'une~~ la conséquence d'une  
doctrine tout à fait contraire à celle de la tradition.  
Je m'explique.

Par naturalisme j'entends la doctrine  
selon laquelle les phénomènes naturels doivent être  
expliqués ~~et~~ par des causes qui sont elles-mêmes  
~~des phénomènes du domaine qui font partie de ces~~  
~~phénomènes~~ définies en termes d'expérience.

théologique

Vous savez que la plupart des auteurs ont cru que Dieu seul est la cause de cette disposition de la matière depuis son état inorganique jusqu'à la haute organisation du corps humain. Il convient cependant de noter ici que l'autorité la plus redoutable - S. Thomas -, pouvait à peine contenir autre chose, attendu l'opinion commune en son temps (et qui se maintint encore au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle) sur la durée du monde, durée si brièvement connue qu'elle ne permettait guère que l'hypothèse que la possibilité d'une lente et progressive maturation du cosmos était d'avance exclue. Les hypothèses sur les corps célestes, elles aussi, mettaient un monde radicalement exclusif hors de propos. Mais, remarquons-le bien, les opinions sur la durée du monde et sur les corps célestes - pour ne mentionner que celles-ci - qui étaient plausibles pour leur temps, mais qui écartaient toute hypothèse d'évolution, n'étaient, elles-mêmes, que des hypothèses.

Il est vrai que certains auteurs modernes (Bressanges, entre autres) ont cru voir dans S. Grégoire de Nysse (Ca. 330-400) et S. Augustin (354-430) des précurseurs des théories d'évolution. Sans doute leurs conceptions, ~~en ce qui~~ regarde ~~elles~~ la formation du monde, mais elles n'ont aucun rapport direct avec des hypothèses dites "scientifiques". Elles sont formées en dehors de toute investigation strictement naturelle... S. Thomas adoptait la théorie de S. Augustin ("magis mihi placet"), et pourtant on ne peut pas dire que son traité de la production du corps du premier homme ~~est~~ (La Paro, g. 91) soit le moindre évolutionniste.

Maintenant que les hypothèses mentionnées plus haut ont été écartées et que qu'il existe actuellement des théories plus ou moins évolutionnistes et provisoirement plausibles, il nous faut tâcher de répondre à la question: Répondre-t-il, a priori, que des causes naturelles et internes à l'homme, aient contribué à une organisation progressive de la matière en vue du corps humain? - Ainsi posée, la question demeure très générale et, apparemment, peu compromettante.

Le 25 janvier 1947

Cher monsieur l'abbé Dolbec,

Il me fait plaisir de vous exprimer brièvement une opinion touchant le problème théologique et philosophique que soulèvent les théories d'évolution. Mais, sachez-le bien, mon opinion ne vaut que les raisons que ~~je puis fournir~~ j'en pourrai fournir.

## que de la foi et de la théologie

Etant de nature spirituelle, l'âme humaine, à la différence de celle des brutes et des plantes, ne peut pas être produite d'un sujet (*ex quo*), mais elle vient à l'être par création. Cependant, comme elle est aussi, à la différence des esprits purs, une âme au sens strict, elle est, comme celle des plantes et des brutes, l'acte premier, la forme substantielle, d'un corps naturel donc muni d'organes (i.e. d'instruments d'opération). Par conséquent, elle est créée dans un sujet (*in quo*); et non pas dans un sujet quelconque, mais proportionné, apte à la recevoir par sa disposition prochaine, par son organisation particulière.

Voilà pourquoi ~~l'écriture (Gen. I, 24) dit~~ Dieu dit (Gen. I, 24): "Que la terre fasse sortir des êtres animés selon leur espèce, des animaux domestiques, de: reptiles et des bêtes de la terre selon leur espèce." Mais, de la formation de l'homme, l'Écriture dit (Gen. II, 7): Yahweh Dieu forma l'homme de la poussière du sol, et il souffla dans ses narines un souffle de vie, et l'homme devint un être vivant.

Voici maintenant la différence entre la formation du premier homme et celle des hommes ~~provenant de parents~~ qui proviennent de parents. Dans le dernier cas, il existe déjà dans la nature des causes proportionnées et suffisantes à disposer la matière en vue de l'âme que Dieu crée dès que cette matière est suffisamment organisée. (Nous disons "dès que" en regard au temps où il y a succession). Mais dans le cas du premier homme, ces causes suffisamment proportionnées n'existent pas encore. Ici se pose le problème: les causes naturelles ont-elles eu leur part dans la disposition de la matière? Quelle pourrait être cette part?

## St. Th. on Virtual quantity.

- 1) Ia, Q. 42, a. 1. ad 1.
  - 2) "Quantitas virtutis attenditur dupliciter: vel quantum ad numerum obiectorum, et hoc est per modum quantitatis discretæ; vel quantum ad intensionem actus super idem obiectum, et hoc est sicut quantitas continua."  
I Sent. dist. 17, q. 2, a. 1. ad 2.
  - 3) De quantitate quæ sit in Deo: I Sent. dist. 19, Q. 1, a. 1, ad 1 et ad 4; q. 3, a. 1; dist. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3; Ia, Q. 10, a. 2, ad 3.
- 

## St. Th. on God's knowledge of the infinite.

- 1) de Veritate q. 2, a. 9.
  - 2) Ia, Q. 14, a. 12
  - 3) C. S. 3 K. I, ch. 69.
  - 3) Quodlib. 3, q. 3.
- 

Quantity: predicamental as opposed to transcendental.

1. I Sent. Dist. 19, Q. 1. a. 1. ad. 1<sup>m</sup> pp. 461-62

Proportion based on equality peculiar to quantity.

P. 462. above. Cf. also Metaph. BK XI Lect. IV

Cf. especially BK. V Less. XVII!

## 3 Plurality of number - formal division?

Formal div. difference of form. Difference of form ~~or basis~~ means heterogeneity of constituents. But this contrary to definition of quantity. Indeed, although different numbers are formally divided, the constituents of any single number must be ~~the~~ homogeneous; yet, number could not ~~be~~ i.e. the elements, the elements, must have same form. Yet, this similarity of form cannot ~~constitute the principle~~ be the formal principle of the unity of number. ~~For, the form~~ The inherent form of the elements is multiplied in the elements. Hence this form is numerically many. But we ~~are~~ are trying to determine whether or not any number is one per se or per accidens. If we compare numbers to the inherent of the elements, we would say that any number is but one per accidens. However, this would make number indistinguishable from a plurality whose elements are formally and essentially divergent. What, then is the proper principle of the difference between the accidental whole of parts and ~~the~~ horse and the so-called

accidental union of two homogeneous elements of a whole?  
Surely the homogeneity is not indifferent to the  
type of whole it makes up, as is shown by the  
~~fact that~~ essential difference between the ~~result of~~  
~~adding~~ sum of formally different things and the  
sum of formally homogeneous things, such as horse  
and point and horn and 3 horse. If number  
is indifferent to ~~accident~~ the heterogeneity of its  
~~elements~~ or homogeneity of its elements,  
number can never be but accidentally one.

But this leaves the homogeneity unaccounted for.  
The 5 does not explain how 1 horse + 1 horse =  
2 horses, where "horse" is predicated univocally  
of each member of the whole, differs from  
the inapplicable sum of 1 point + 1 horse. If  
we prescind from the formal difference ~~the~~  
~~would still not have~~ would have either  
and called them 2 "terms", we would have  
either a purely logical univocity leaving us with  
nothing according to reason only, and therefore again  
accidental, or we would have a really accidental  
whole. Hence the whole remains simply accidental -  
which gives us two different meanings for  
the same thing, leaving the problem of the  
difference between our two sums.

Pop. 11th.

Miseri humani — deamoris, misericordi prima radij.  
Quid misericordi  
vires superioris.

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Modern art — not just ridiculous — but awareness of otherness. Things  
as different from what they appear to be. Attempts to express the  
humanly in effable. Some for signs. Perceiving purpose.

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Many images: —

Insecurity of earth flying around — No foundation —  
instability.

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(1) Il est vrai qu'Aristote et ses commentateurs ont parsemé les traités les plus généraux d'exemples tirés d'un ordre de concrétion déjà très poussé où, nous le savons désormais, la plupart des notions et des principes ~~demeurent provisoires~~ ne sont qu'une manière de sauver les apparences telles qu'elles sont connues à l'heure; elles demeurent extrinsèques et provisoires. A parler historiquement, les anciens avaient des raisons plausibles de croire que certaines de leurs ~~théories~~ théories, prolongements d'une expérience ~~dont ils pouvaient à peine~~ qu'ils pouvaient à peine soupçonner d'~~être~~ être aussi rudimentaire et strictement phénoménale, étaient plus qu'une première approximation. Il faudrait manquer singulièrement d'imagination pour les accuser d'en avoir manqué.

En réponse à Thompson.

**Idéal.** : Son univers est nécessairement suspendu à l'hypothèse "Si... alors".  
 Note : dans proposition conditionnelle, l'antécédent atteint une certitude à propos d'objets qui peuvent ne pas aller ensemble en soi.  
 Il est donc, au moins apparentement d'indépend. et d'antériorité de l'opération et de l'œuvre de l'intellig.

L'idéal ne peut pas rejoindre les choses en soi. (Kant)

Son antériorité (idéaliste) aux objets entraîne nécessairement son assujettissement au polv. action. Kant reconnaît cela dans ses obscurités mais tout autant impératif catégorique : Les choses en soi (opposés, réfractaires à pénétration par pure pensée - l'appel des choses contingentes) ont donc ici nettement l'antériorité.

is "en" - "d".

2.

incap.

ex. gr. rien existe, l'âme est immortelle, sans quoi ~~par conséquent~~ la vie pratique deviendrait impossible

**Marx.** : Les choses en soi, matérielles, sont antérieures (Kant) à la pensée idéal, prise en elle-même, est vide rationnelle "Si... alors..." Cependant, même dans l'action, il y a une antériorité de la pensée pour Marx : Car l'œuvre de l'architecte existe d'abord "d'une manière idéale" dans la représentation - où diffère avec abeille construisant cellules (cf. Lévy, dans Th., n°1, p. 153)

Alors, négation de la pensée idéal, mais type antériorité relative de pensée, mais pour la chose en soi : instrumentale, brute, encore dialectique, mais matérialiste. Matière antérieure et, en même temps à transformer ; le moi antérieur, mais en même temps de matière. Ce moi est commun à l'idéal et au matériel.

est incomparable. ionnelle "si".

, cependant

Le marxisme se tient entre l'hypothèse "Si..." inavouée, et un objet en soi mis dans son objectivité. Il nie les deux, mais ne peut sans enfreindre.

et notions et vérités antérieures : profondes, impossibles pour

Le matérialisme pour un objet semblable ? quand il lui accorde, alors que toute existence se situe en face de rien (donc n'est acte libre), une antériorité... Si je pense, je suis. l'objet devient alors antérieur à la science complète pratique, i.e. chose en soi idéal et matériel.

C'est-à-dire, il faudrait prouver Maj. de B par A.

Matériel. peut s'insérer des décrets identifiés aux choses, comme si elles étaient antérieures à la pensée, comme si, dans leur être propre elles n'étaient pas postérieures à la science complète pratique.

A { Penser c'est être. (Nota: "penser" c'est "erre", et être "erre")  
 Or, je pense. i.e. non participatif → quod est, sans "erre" —  
 donc, vérité, et pas simplement "quid".  
 Donc, je suis.

Bien. Mais, on présuppose ici "penser" comme acte, et "erre" comme acte.  
 La vérité de la Mq. est condition de la vérité de la conclusion.  
 C'est donc dans la Mq. même que se trouve implicitement le premier principe.  
 Donc, ceci ne répond pas à l'intention de Descartes.

B { Si je pense, je suis  
 Or je pense  
 Donc je suis.

Ceci pas principe — car infér.

S'il faut ici principe pour Descartes, nominati: je pense.

Comment passer légit à: je suis?

~~Faut-il~~ 1° je suis, dit être "mon être" dans son indéfini incomparable.  
 2° où prend-on le "ergo"? grâce à ~~une~~ conditionnelle "si".

S'il faut, pour nos besoins d'analyse, mettre le Epit. en forme, on peut  
~~choisir soit~~ deux formes sont possibles: { catég. A  
 condition. B

Or, A est impossible pour Descartes — p.e. q'il suppose ~~des~~ notions et vérités antérieures:  
 p. ex., impossible de penser et de n'être pas; plus profondément, impossible penser  
 et pas penser; être et pas être...

Donc, B. — Or, le principe supposé, c'est d'hypothèse, si je pense, je suis.

Or, comment prouver cela? Car, toute hypothèse doit être vérifiée.

C'est-à-dire, il faudrait prouver Mq. de B par A.

Matériel. peut s'inférer des décrets identifiés aux choses, comme si elles étaient  
 antérieures à l'être pensée, comme si, dans leur être propre elles n'étaient  
 pas postérieures à la science complète pratique.

## College of St. Thomas

St. Paul 1, Minnesota

Jan. 17, 1947

Dear Charles:

I have not written earlier because I know that you have entirely too much to do to be bothered with purely "social" letters. However, at the present writing I have a very real difficulty that I hope you will have time to resolve for me. I suppose that you have already given me the answer to this one but I cannot find it in my notes nor could I find out from Fr. Dillon, whom I just talked to.

The difficulty comes up on the passage in I Physics, Lect. 14, n. 6. There St. Thomas says, "Unde per se hoc animal quod est canis, fit ex non hoc animali, idest ex non cane. Sed si fieret animal per se et non per accidens, oporteret quod fieret ex non animali."

But this seems to be against what he has just said in n. 5, namely, "...quia quod est, idest ens, per se quidem non est ex privatione." This was also brought out earlier in Lect. 13, n. 3, where he showed that privation is a per accidens principle of mobile being.

The only way that I could think of to resolve the thing sounds very weak. It might be said that when he says, "...ens per se quidem non est ex privatione.", the per se refers only to ~~those~~ principles which, as he says, "intrat essentiam rei factae; ex hoc autem aliquid fit per se, quod inest rei postquam iam facta est." Then, when he says, "Unde per se hoc animal quod est canis, fit ex non hoc animali, idest ex non cane," the per se refers to the distinction between per se and per accidens made in n. 4 of Lect. 14. Then, it seems that one could say that when he says that privation is not a per se principle, this is to be taken to mean that it is not a per se principle of the thing which comes to be. And, when he says that this animal comes to be per se from non-this-animal, this is to be taken to mean that non-this-animal is a necessary principle of the becoming, even though it is not a per se principle of the thing that becomes.

But, as I said, this solution seems very weak. It seems very much like some made by certain modern scholastics who cover their ignorance by "subtle" distinctions of this kind. I would very much appreciate it if you can find time to relieve me of my ignorance in this matter.

I suppose you have heard something about the "Convention" at "Plaza della Toro". Some really wonderful things were revealed. In the opening address we were informed by the Rev. Phelan that the "existential" metaphysics of St. Thomas were so different from the "essential" metaphysics of Aristotle that one doubted if it would be valid to try to apply the logic of Aristotle to the metaphysics of St. Thomas. After that, things got worse! With characteristic ambiguity he then stated that of course he did not mean to use the words he did use, and that he was really talking about something else. The other meetings that I was able to attend were of the same caliber. The only exception was one in which Fr. Dufault of Natick gave a paper on the object of logic. It seemed to me to be a very good resume of what L'abbe Dionne gives in his courses. He based himself almost exclusively on the text of John of St. Thomas in the Logic.

*Circle 14, n. 4, distingue { meaning  
truth  
Hoc est idem quod hoc quod ita dicitur et  
intelligitur sit verum.*

Dec 8, 1946  
In Fest. Immac. Comc. BVM.

Dear Chas:-

Yours received. Some two or three months ago I received from Father Hausmann three pages of discussion of Lalor's paper, sent on here from West Baden Indiana, where Hausmann is now stationed. I sent the thing on to Lalor, with the remark that he might like to answer H. directly by letter or send it to you for the Quodlibeta. On Nov. 14 he wrote me to the effect that "double dose of classes (to say nothing of matters extra-curricular) has prevented me from framing a reply to Fr H's. objection". He goes on with a general disclaimer of ~~the~~ the validity of H's criticism, which I didn't think it wise to send to H., merely telling him by letter that I had heard from L. and saying that he would take the matter up when he could get round to it. Had I borne in mind that you might be looking for it for the next number of the Q. I should have sent you a card to say how the matter stood. Anyhow, Lalor has the matter in hand and will, no doubt, follow any direction you give him.

As for questions for the Q. from me, Jeez, the guy wants not only to give the answers but to dictate the questions I should ask! Suppose you answer some questions first which I am really interested in, a practical way, i.e. with a view to my current teaching and intradepartmental discussions. Parenthetically, mon fils, I'm in little danger of piles. ~~The~~ About the only time the seat of my pants gets in contact with a chair is when I throw them over the latter at night, and then my seat aint in 'em! Dont forget, mon fils, that we have 7619 students on this campus, which, last spring, we thought was crowded with 4200. Because of the illness of one of our staff which will prevent his teaching any more this semester, I am now teaching six days a week, not all day everyday, but every day some. Each section runs fifty or over, which multiplies the paper work, especially in logic and ethics, the latter being case-work. If you dont make the bastards write they dont do anything, especially when, on account of the size of the groups, you cant cover the classes by oral quiz. Turner has one section of logic which has 200 in it.

As for questions, here's one: I've often heard that you and Dionne are very critical of Maritain's Petite Logique, D. having been reported a few summers ago as saying, apropos a part of it, that "that's not logic". Thompson here, who, as you know, is a graduate of Toronto, and I were discussing logic in general and the Petite Logique in particular, when I made some reference to this criticism. Thompson's comment was that he was puzzled, since John of St Thomas' Logic is looked upon at Laval as omni exceptione major; and, according to Thompson, Maritain's Petite Logique is simply JST boiled down. Now I dont know either of them well enough to check that statement without a good deal of search which I simply havent time to do, so it would help me very much to have the discrepancies between JST and Maritain pointed out. You can pass this one on to Dionne, if you wish, and he can answer it in French. Or you can put it in the Quodlibeta, if you prefer. I shall rephrase it for that purpose, if you like.

Another point: I cant begin to tell you how valuable the stuff on the Common Good has been to me in my ethics course. It gives the whole course a new slant, and a slant which is very acceptable to the kids. Naturally, with these kids, many, if not most of whom are completely innocent of any philosophical background, -- even if they have had the other courses, such a logic and de anima, they know them hardly more than by rote, -- ~~it~~ it is necessary to begin with familiar illustrations such as the CG of a football team, etc., in order that they have some glimmer of what I am talking about. The group I teach are, most of them, not candidates for degrees in arts, but for degrees in Commerce, if any; many of them are not candidates for any degree here at all, being GI's who are taking two-year pre-legal, pre-medical, or pre-dental programs as a requirement for entrance into one of those professional schools. They have lost from two to four years on account of the war and are impatient to get to their professional studies and out into practice to make a living. Very many of them are married, and not a few have a youngster or so. It is a common thing to have some kid walk up to you with a cigar and say "here, Father, it's a boy!"

Anyhow, to come to the point of my question: I have found it helpful to

Reference to the English translation of "Petite Logique" would be a contribution to logic.

diagram the relationship between the individual and the various common goods in which he participates, and use that as a basis for the lectures I give on the subject after the chapter on *Finis Hominis* in ethics. The diagram is first worked out on the board, and then I give them a single mimeo page carrying the same as an aid to the memory. I enclose a copy <sup>with this letter</sup> and this is where you come into the picture; i.e. I should like to have an opinion from you as to whether I have grasped your idea correctly, whether there are any egregious errors or omissions, etc. Never mind criticizing the thing as a pedagogical device; I know more about that end of it than you do, mon fils, at least in regard to the particular type of kids that I have to deal with. Incidentally, I gave you a copy of this last summer for the same purpose, i.e. to have it criticized, but you brushed it off, as, some years earlier, you brushed off my recommendation of Hack's book, which turned out not to be so negligible after all! If you brush this off you can go chase yourself, in re questions for the *Quodlibeta* or anything else.

Another question: discussing one day with Thompson and Turner the incident of last summer concerning whether the category of "habitus" applies to the relation between a floor-covering and the floor which it covers, -- it was a nun sitting behind me who asked the question; ~~she~~ she had got it, I think, from Hartman's "Logic", -- Thompson brought up the passage from JST, *Logica II*, q. XIX, a. 4, which contains the sentence: "*Reducuntur etiam ad hoc praedicamentum ornamenta parietum, quae proprie non sunt vestes*". I enclose the passage as he gave it to me typed, to save you the bother of turning to the page. What about this? I gathered from your answer to the nun that "habitus" applies only to ~~vestimenta~~ *vestimenta hominum*. Does this passage in JST allow a modification of that statement?

As to the questions you suggest, I hadn't thought of any of them; except, to some extent, of number two, i.e. "Experimental sciences as both 'natural' and 'dialectical', which seems contradictory", at the time that I made a translation for my own use of your "*Les Sciences Experimentales, sont-elles dialectiques?*" But, since my teaching is not, nor has been, nor is likely to be, concerned with either philosophy of nature or philosophy of science, I haven't given much further thought to the point. However, if ~~these questions~~ my asking these questions is *ad bonum commune quodlibetorum*, or *magistrorum philosophiae*, I'm quite willing to ask 'em. You can phrase them as you wish and put my name to them, or, if you prefer, I shall write them out myself and send them along.

I shall also drop Lalor a card, telling him of your letter, to expedite matters.


Winel tells me that your article which is to appear in the Journal of Mathematics, -- <sup>spring</sup> the one you mentioned to me last ~~summer~~ <sup>summer</sup> when you were here, or maybe the previous ~~summer~~; ~~that~~ as being "the greatest discovery in philosophy of the past three hundred years" as "completely illuminating Hegel", etc., -- has not yet appeared in the Journal of Math. When it does, I expect a notice of it, and also an off-print.

Have not been able as yet to locate a copy of the pamphlet dealing with law, by M. Pigeon, which you mentioned to Mulligan and me last <sup>spring</sup> ~~summer~~. He and I looked for it last summer in Quebec, but couldn't find it. I am asking Mary Kowalski ~~whether~~ <sup>whether</sup> (Mrs Corbett), or Winel, or somebody to ~~pick~~ <sup>pick</sup> one up for me if they can locate one. Mull. needs it for his studies in jurisprudence. I mention it to you because whoever I get to look it up for me will probably ask you the title, etc., and this will aid your memory, possibly.

You would be proud of me the way I treat the pre-Socratics in my course in Introduction to philosophy. Reith's dissertation has been very helpful. By the way, I hope it reached you safely. We follow out, as much as time allows, the hint in Comm. in Met. #342, to the effect that "*necesse est eum qui debet audire philosophiam melius se habere in iudicando si audierit omnes rationes quasi adversariorum iudicantium*". The kids love it and it makes every meeting of the classes a pleasure. Now please don't tell me I've misunderstood this passage or am doing some fool thing I shouldn't do, and so take all the joy out of it! -- Regards to everybody,

Bell

Read diagram from bottom upwards



NOTES: 1. The diagram is meant to illustrate graphically how each man can be considered under different aspects or "formalities" (according to each of which he is or can be "named", e.g. "tall", "bearded", "citizen", "father", "quarterback", etc) and that his "proper" good will differ from the viewpoint of each "formality" or aspect. Considered as an individual, his "proper" good will be his various singular, incommunicable goods. Considered as quarterback, member of family, citizen, man; etc., his "proper" good, i.e. the good "proper" to each of these several aspects, will be the "common" good corresponding to each aspect. And, in every case, the common good corresponding to any formality is prior to any singular good which he may have under the aspect of that formality. For example; the common good of the team is prior to the fun which Jones has in playing on it, the common good of the family is prior to the pleasure which the father gets from playing with the children. IT IS A PERVERSION TO SAY THAT THE FAMILY IS A MEANS TO THE FATHER'S PLEASURE OR HAPPINESS AS FATHER, THOUGH IT MAY BE AN INTERMEDIATE END TO HIS HAPPINESS AS MAN, i.e. inasmuch as he is ordered to a higher common good. The diagram is meant to illustrate St Thomas: On Charity, q. 2, c (De K: note 19): "The good of man is to be understood diversely, according as man is understood diversely. For the proper good of man as man is the good of reason, since, to man, to be is to be rational. The good of man as artist is the good of art; and so also according as he is a citizen, his good is the common good of the city (or state)."

2. ".....when a man, by divine grace, is admitted to participation in heavenly beatitude, which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God, he becomes, as it were, a citizen and fellow of that blessed city, which is called the heavenly Jerusalem: 'You are fellow-citizens of the saints and members of God's family'." (St Thomas: De Caritate, a. 2, c.

3. "As one man is part of a household, so a household is/part of the state... And, therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good, so the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community." Summa Theologica: I-II, 90, 3, ad 3.

4. The common good on one level may be subordinate to private good on a higher level.

PS. I have added and enclosed my version of the questions you propose. You can make what use of them you wish, just so you don't make me out a jackass. I don't know whether I quite get your ideas or not, but you can re-phrase as you wish, with the above indicated limitation.

h Another question, not for treatment in the Bulletin, but a very practical one to me, viz., if you had to give a course in logic to a lot of people, adolescents and older, ~~and~~ some of whom can't tell a noun from a verb, hardly any of whom can really get much out of a book, and if you were limited to sixteen weeks, three fifty-minute periods per week, in order to cover the ground, what would you give them? I asked you a similar question once, while I was at Cleveland, about "epistemology", and your answer, which was, in effect, to give them IV Met. with the commentary on the same, was very fruitful as I worked it out, so I'm hoping for some equally fertile suggestion from you on this matter of logic. Hardly any of the English texts are satisfactory. The good ones are too difficult for such students to cover in the time allotted, and those which are compressed into a sufficiently small compass are so jejune that they are hardly worth using. Many of these kids will take two or three 16 week courses in philosophy and then be on their way to a professional school with the aim of making a living. The formalities of correct reasoning ~~and~~ etc will soon be erased from their memory, for most of them would not be taking the subject at all if it were not a "required course". It would be of some advantage to them and to the common good if they could be taught to read even ephemeral literature critically, but the brevity of the time allowed hardly ever allows us to get to that. I have the feeling that much of the time spent on the formalities of reasoning and the proposition is wasted, as not meeting their particular needs, while the discussion of the term, in any solid way, is over their heads. I give the course in Introduction to philosophy as a course in dialectic, tying it in as much as possible with contemporary errors, such as Marxism, positivism, etc., and I feel they get a good deal out of that; but most of the course in logic appears to be a lot of wind.

Bell



# College of St. Thomas

St. Paul 1, Minnesota

One other thing occurred. On the train from Toronto to Chicago I met a Fr. Davitt, S.J. from St. Louis. He is a student at Toronto and, as he told me, one of the men responsible for Fr. Ig. Esch.'s attack on you. It seems that after Fr. Baisnee's article, which unintentionally, so Davitt said, attacked M. Maritain, Fr. Davitt wrote immediately to Maritain asking him what could be done about it. M. Maritain, busy with the Pope's conversion, had no time to chastise Fr. Baisnee and advised that either Phelan or Simon take on the task. Well, Simon was elected. But then, it seems that Simon got an attack of rationality and charity (which he has since regretted, says Davitt) and wrote the review for the Review of Politics. This was so scandalous to the disciples that again the cables to Europe hummed with activity. Phelan must immediately write something to lay the "foul dragon of Quebec". Meanwhile, disciple Simon was sentenced to sack-cloth and ashes. Unfortunately, Phelan was not able to take up the lance. His seat at Toronto was not too secure and he had his hands full looking for a place to light. Davitt and others, then, importuned Fr. Esch. to take up the cause; because, as Davitt says, Esch. had explicitly repudiated the Creed of Maritain in his German work on the question. But, since the cause seemed urgent (the dragon was becoming bolder), he agreed to write the article. Your "Reply", while it is to be disregarded by the ordinary acolyte, has caused some uneasiness in the ranks of the more important disciples. Davitt says that "since Maritain has now come out again in the Review with the same old distinction between person and individual, we can no longer consider him as the leader of modern thought". His reasons were none too clear, but it seems that Maritain "does not keep abreast of the times". I suppose the fact that he has held the same doctrine for more than six months he is unqualified to lead the disciples of modern scholasticism.

In all of Davitt's discussion of the question it was impossible to get any statement from him on the question itself of the common good. The whole issue was a matter of your attacking Maritain without naming him, etc., etc., etc. The question of the common good was merely peg on which they hung the whole question. As far as I could find out, these men are not at all interested in any philosophical question. Philosophy is something to be used by the individual for his own ends.

Well, give my regards to Zoe and the children. Also tell Bertha hello for me. Give my boy Rudolph an extra pat on the head. Tell Fr. Flynn and the others hello. And tell Bernie that we are anxiously awaiting his assistance here. There is entirely too much work. I haven't even had time to look at my thesis, much less revise it. I'll have to talk to you about that when I see you, if you get down here in March.

As ever,

Ray



Cabinet du Doyen

UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL  
FACULTÉ DE PHILOSOPHIE

Mense Januarii, die 28, anni 1947.

Illustrissimo in philosophia loquenti, fortis pede percussio  
necnon strangulatio tentissima.

Nunc breviter, deinde prolixiori sermone in "Laval théol...", difficultati tuae respondetur. Et considerandum est primo quod ea quae dicuntur in fine numeri quarti, eadem lectione decimaquarta, ibi: "Unde manifestum...", non sunt de veritate sed de significatione. — Secundo, in numero isto sexto, illud "non hoc animal", sicut nec istud "non ens hoc" nondum sumuntur determinate pro eo quod est non ens simpliciter nec pro eo quod est non ens secundum quid. Et ideo ubi legis: "Unde per se hoc animal quod est canis, fit ex non hoc animali, idest ex non cane", ne intelligas illud "per se" de eo ex quo fit hoc quod fit, quasi dictum fuisset: "hoc animal fit ex eo quod est per se non hoc animal, seu ex non hoc animali inquantum est non hoc animal". Hoc enim, ut tibi metipsi visum est, in contrarium esset ei quod prius determinatum fuit. Sed oportet intelligi illud "per se" de eo ipso quod fit, ut patet diligenter inspicienti ea quae in eadem hoc numero jam dicta sunt. Legas ergo, novitiae, ac si scriptum fuisset: "Hoc animal non potest fieri secundum quod est hoc animal, seu canis inquantum est canis non potest fieri, nisi ex non hoc animali, seu ex non cane, quia hoc animal jam est, idest canis jam est." Nam, impossibile est quod illud quod jam est fiat per se, id est, quantum ad hoc quod jam est. Fieri enim est transmutatio ex non ente in ens, et nihil potest fieri nisi secundum hoc quod nondum est. A.v., omne quod fit per se, scil. secundum hoc ipsum quod est, non potest fieri nisi ex non hoc quod est; et id ex quo fit, non potest jam esse illud secundum quod fit hoc quod fit, quia sic hoc quod fit jam factum esset.

Tota difficultas tua procedit ex hoc quod intelligis illud "per se fieri" de eo <sup>ex</sup> quo fit hoc quod fit, sicut sumitur in fine numeri quarti, quasi dictum fuisset: "hoc animal fit ex non hoc animali, inquantum non hoc animal est non hoc animal." Nec multum ergo te de hac prima admiratione. Sed postea debuisses diligentius literam inspicere et vidisses primo quod ista apparens contradictio multo magis invenitur in ipso eodem numero sexto, ubi etiam dicitur quod non fit aliquid "per se ex non ente"; secundo, quia in eadem propositione ex qua verba quae modo citavi deprompta sunt, invenitur solutio difficultatis, scil., ubi addit auctor: "hoc enim per se significat aliquid fieri ex non ente, si fiat ex non ente inquantum est non ens, ut dictum est," scil. numero quarto.

; tertio, et maxime, quod totus processus est ordinatissimus:  
nam, postquam in numero quarto determinatum fuit  
quod quid sit proprie et per fieri ex aliquo, duo  
remanebant probanda: ~~et~~ primum (n. 5) quod  
impossibile sit aliquid fieri ex eo non ente inquantum est  
non ens; secundum (n. 6) quod impossibile sit aliquid  
fieri ex ente inquantum ~~est~~ est ens. ~~Et ad hoc~~  
~~ultimum probandum, debet considerari~~ Et nota  
quod in isto ultimo casu

# College of St. Thomas

St. Paul 1, Minnesota

Feb. 4, 1947

Dear Charles:

Thanks a lot for the explanation of the difficulty in the Physics. (The slight pause you hear is the complete absence of any consideration of the Flemish "humor" contained in the Regali cuidam notho.) I am looking forward to seeing you in March for a further discussion of the point.

The present letter is in regard to the subject of your talks here at the College. Okie has asked me to write and ask you if you would give us something on the liberal arts. There would be a general discussion for the students in the A.M. and a more detailed exposition for the faculty in the evening.

In order to let you know why the question is apropos, Okie asked me to give you some of the background here. He is, as you know, attempting to make all the programs here more liberal. There is, however, much opposition. Most of the men here do not understand the question. They get confused with the trend towards the "humanities" which is taking place in many of the other institutions. They have a tendency to think that a liberal education means a sort of general knowledge covering everything.

Another group seems to feel that the liberal program is aimed primarily at making philosophers and possibly theologians of all the students who register. This group usually expresses itself by saying that there are too many "Laval" men around here. They feel that by importing some men from Louvain, C.U. and other places we would get a healthy difference of opinion on this question. The "Healthy difference of opinion" would, of course, result in leaving the status quo unchanged, they feel. Okie comes in for criticism from this group because of his affection for you and what you are doing in philosophy at Laval.

The last group finds common cause with another group representing the various courses for pre-med., pre-engineering, pre-law, etc. This latter group feels that if the boy is forced to take the liberal subjects which Okie feels are necessary, he will not be able to get in the required courses for entrance into his particular school for advanced study. Of course, they always cite the requirements of the University of Minnesota in this respect, leaving out all the other schools in the country which do not have such rigid requirements.

# College of St. Thomas

St. Paul 1, Minnesota

There is, finally, the group who hold that a liberal education means a classical education. They mean by this that the boy must have latin, greek, literature, etc. as the core of his program, if we are going to call his education liberal. They, of course, confuse the means with the ends.

Overlaying all these is the confusion as to just what a Catholic College should attempt to do in the way of education. Many of the men have said that the only purpose a Catholic College has is to give the boys some sort of Catholic "atmosphere" while they are receiving the same kind of education given at any other institution. Having made a statement like this, they proceed to argue that only a practical education is possible, if the boy is to earn a living in the world of today.

This background is only to show you why Okie wants you to discuss the liberal arts. You are not expected, of course, to refer to any of the positions involved. However, he felt that if you would explain the real notion of the liberal arts, much of the confusion would be taken away. He leaves the whole question of what you are going say to your good judgment. If you think any other topic would be better to clarify these confusions, he would be happy to have that. If you find time, you might drop him a note on the subject.

I hope that when you come down in March you will be able to stay with us. We have a room for you and you can use my automobile (antonomasia) to get from place to place.

Say hello to all up there.

Best regards,

*F. Ray*

Prof. Hausmann.

— série infinie en puissance :  
lors on règle de progression — définitive.  
— ~~malheureuse~~ infinie en acte ~~par~~, m si elle  
est en son contrad. mais qu on n'a  
my n'a pas la contrad., peut être  
signifiée et ainsi distinguée d'une  
autre suite. Or, on prétend en infesse  
~~discontinues~~ détermination de propriétés  
dialect., v. p., qu'elle n'est pas en nouvelle  
etc.

BADEN COLLEGE  
BADEN SPRINGS  
INDIANA

October 14, 1946

ed quite some time ago to put on paper  
cle, "Notes on the Limit of a Variable",  
er of the Laval Theologique et Philo-

Since the second installment of that article has as yet  
not appeared, I shall confine my comments at this time to a single  
paragraph of that article. In that paragraph the author condemns  
in passing the whole theory of infinite sets. I shall quote the  
paragraph (page 140):

"If we do not make this distinction between the respect in  
which every class is an exclusive and perfect whole, and that  
in which some classes are essentially imperfect wholes, we might  
refer the potential infinity of a class merely to our inability  
to reach the class as a perfect totality, both as to form and  
as to matter. In other words, we might suppose that any in-  
finite class is fundamentally a perfect class, i.e., that in  
itself, apart from our consideration, any infinite class has  
an actually infinite multitude of members, but that we, for  
some reason or other, cannot actually exhaust the actually in-  
finite multitude. This would lead us into a maize of contra-  
dictions which some authors have heartily accepted. It is said,  
for instance, that the class of even numbers, or the class of  
odd numbers, has as many members as the class of integers of  
which it is a part. This is either a careless statement of the  
fact that both classes have the same power (which might be an  
unavowed way of reintroducing the concept of potency), or, at  
best, a good inference from a false notion of infinity. It is  
difficult to see how this contradiction could be avoided without  
the distinction of act and potency. But then, of course,  
Aristotle must be avoided, even at the cost of accepting a  
contradiction as a marvellous achievement. If the failure to  
make this distinction were logically carried through, it would  
be difficult to see how one could avoid destroying the very  
foundations of the method of limits."

Now the theory of infinite sets is too vast a theory to be  
condemned in a passing sentence or two. No doubt much has been written  
on the subject which needs the corrective criticism of scholastic  
philosophers, but more harm than good is done by blanket condemnations  
unsupported by solid arguments. It does little good to shout con-  
tradiction when there is no contradiction. My purpose in what follows  
will be to make clear to you two things: first that his distinction  
between potency and act does not remove what he calls a contradiction;  
and secondly that his contradiction is no contradiction at all.

*Dear Father to RFB 9/1*

WEST BADEN COLLEGE  
WEST BADEN SPRINGS  
INDIANA

October 14, 1946

Dear Father Belleperche,

I promised quite some time ago to put on paper my criticism of Fr. Lalor's article, "Notes on the Limit of a Variable", which appeared in the first number of the Laval Theologique et Philosophique. Since the second installment of that article has as yet not appeared, I shall confine my comments at this time to a single paragraph of that article. In that paragraph the author condemns in passing the whole theory of infinite sets. I shall quote the paragraph (page 140):

"If we do not make this distinction between the respect in which every class is an exclusive and perfect whole, and that in which some classes are essentially imperfect wholes, we might refer the potential infinity of a class merely to our inability to reach the class as a perfect totality, both as to form and as to matter. In other words, we might suppose that any infinite class is fundamentally a perfect class, i.e., that in itself, apart from our consideration, any infinite class has an actually infinite multitude of members, but that we, for some reason or other, cannot actually exhaust the actually infinite multitude. This would lead us into a maize of contradictions which some authors have heartily accepted. It is said, for instance, that the class of even numbers, or the class of odd numbers, has as many members as the class of integers of which it is a part. This is either a careless statement of the fact that both classes have the same power (which might be an unavowed way of reintroducing the concept of potency), or, at best, a good inference from a false notion of infinity. It is difficult to see how this contradiction could be avoided without the distinction of act and potency. But then, of course, Aristotle must be avoided, even at the cost of accepting a contradiction as a marvellous achievement. If the failure to make this distinction were logically carried through, it would be difficult to see how one could avoid destroying the very foundations of the method of limits."

Now the theory of infinite sets is too vast a theory to be condemned in a passing sentence or two. No doubt much has been written on the subject which needs the corrective criticism of scholastic philosophers, but more harm than good is done by blanket condemnations unsupported by solid arguments. It does little good to shout contradiction when there is no contradiction. My purpose in what follows will be to make clear to you two things: first that his distinction between potency and act does not remove what he calls a contradiction; and secondly that his contradiction is no contradiction at all.

In the first place I shall have to explain what is meant by a one-to-one correspondence on which the whole theory of infinite sets is based. Suppose that we have two sets of objects, a corridor full of students and a class room full of chairs, and suppose further that we wish to know not how many of each set we have but rather whether we have the same number of objects in both sets. A simple experiment will determine the answer and there will be no need to count either set. We tell the students to enter the class room and to take seats. After all have entered, we glance over the room to determine first whether there are any vacant chairs, and, secondly, whether there are any students who are not seated. If we find that there are no empty seats and that there are no students who are not seated, we conclude that the number of chairs and the number of students is the same. There are exactly as many students as chairs. We say that both sets are equal, or, in more technical language that both sets have the same cardinal number.

It is to be noted that counting objects is nothing else than setting up a one-to-one correspondence between the objects counted and the set of numbers used in counting them. Moreover, the method of setting up a one-to-one correspondence is more fundamental even than counting. We cannot count objects without setting up such a correspondence, but we can set up such a correspondence without counting.

Infinite sets, and I speak only of potentially infinite sets, cannot be counted, since they contain no last element. Yet two infinite sets can be compared if a one-to-one correspondence can be set up between the elements of such sets. Suppose we wish to compare the potentially infinite set of all positive integers with the potentially infinite set of all negative integers. The most obvious correspondence in this case is to let the negative number  $-n$  correspond to the positive number  $n$  as illustrated in the following scheme:

1	2	3	4	...	$n$	...
-1	-2	-3	-4	....	$-n$	...

Then to every positive number there corresponds one and only one negative number and conversely. We conclude therefore that there are as many positive integers as negative integers. The two sets have the same cardinal number.

In a similar way we can compare the set A of all positive integers with the set B of all even positive integers. Every integer of set B is of the form  $2n$ , where  $n$  is a positive integer, while every integer of set A is of the form  $n$ . We will have a one-to-one correspondence if we correlate the integer  $n$  of set A with the integer  $2n$  of set B as illustrated in the following scheme:

1	2	3	4	...	$n$	...
2	4	6	8	...	$2n$	...

Then to every integer of set A corresponds just one integer of set B and conversely to every integer of set B corresponds just one integer of set A. The conclusion, though surprising, is inevitable.




There are as many even integers as there are both even and odd integers; a part of a set is equal to the whole set.

This is only one of many instances where a proper part is equal to the whole of which it is a part. In fact so characteristic is this property of infinite sets that it is used to define an infinite set. Nor is this property an obvious contradiction. When we examine the theorem that a part is never equal to the whole of which it is a part, we see that its evidence consists entirely of the notion of whole and part and that the definitions of whole and part used in the theorem are the definitions of perfect whole and perfect part, i.e. wholes and parts which are bounded, in a word, finite. But obviously not every whole and every part is a perfect whole or a perfect part. We have potentially infinite wholes and parts. Hence it should surprise no one that a theorem which applies to finite sets should not apply to infinite sets. It is impossible to set up a one-to-one correspondence between a part of a finite set and the whole of that set. Hence no finite part can ever be equal to the whole of which it is a part. On the other hand, we have just seen that it is possible to set up a one-to-one correspondence between a part of an infinite set and the whole set. Hence a part of an infinite set is equal to the whole of the set. They both have the same cardinal number. Both theorems are perfectly consistent with each other since they are verified of different classes of objects. There is no contradiction.

The author's position on the theory of infinite sets is the more surprising when considered in the light of a sentence in his first paragraph (page 129). He writes there: "Here we are interested in the notion of limit, particularly in the limit of a variable, in so far as it may contribute to a better understanding of certain philosophical positions that the contemporary scholastics all too promptly and too enthusiastically reject as utter nonsense." He seems to have fallen into the error which he so much deplores in modern scholastics. He has rejected too promptly and too enthusiastically as utter nonsense much of the theory of infinite sets.

Sincerely,



B.A. Hausmann, S.J.

Qall

Dear Mr De Koninck:-

I should like to submit the three following questions for discussion in the Quodlibeta Department of Laval Theologique et Philosophique. In my opinion there is still room for considerable clarification of each of these three points. The first question concerns Philosophy of Nature, the second Philosophy of Experimental Science, and the third language in its logical dimension:

1. In the discussion of finality in nature, the objection against universal finality drawn from waste, especially waste of living things, plant seeds, animal embryos, human lives, ~~waste~~ embryonic or mature, is frequently thought to be answered by the dictum that such waste is per accidens. This answer does not appear to be quite adequate, for it can be subsumed that such waste is, with regard to many species, at least, "ut in pluribus", and, in nature, whatever is "ut in pluribus" is traceable to nature itself. I have in mind the fact that, with many students, the usual answers may appear even to the questioner to be intellectually satisfactory, but there remains sometimes what may best be described as a "feeling" that the argument is not as cogent as could be desired. The entire discussion of finality has received such scant and inadequate treatment that I believe further treatment of this point would not be superfluous.

2. Referring to a piece of yours published some time ago, entitled "Les Sciences Experimentales, sont-ils dialectiques?", the view that the experimental sciences are at once "natural", i.e. are on the same level of abstraction as philosophy of nature, and also "dialectical", i.e. conclude with probability only, seems to present some difficulty to many minds. Might it not be necessary to make a further distinction on the ~~same~~ first level of abstraction between experimental and philosophical physics, in order to justify and clarify the use of the adjective "natural" as applied to the experimental sciences, since a strictly "natural" conclusion should be capable of demonstration, rather than remain in the dimension of dialectical probability? It is possible that the method of limits would afford a solution of the difficulty, but I should like to have a statement from you in regard to it.

3. In logic, the definition of the term: "vox significativa ad placitum", while satisfactory for purely practical purposes of logic, nevertheless appears to leave something to be desired theoretically, inasmuch as it seems to connote an arbitrariness in the nature of language which would render it an unfit instrument for the conveyance of philosophical truth. Is not the phrase "ad placitum" in need of further qualification and precision, in order that the uniformity and laws of development established by philosophy be not sacrificed?

Sincerely yours

R J Belleperche, SJ  
University of Detroit

non secundum quantitatem, sed  
etiam determinatam." 2<sup>e</sup> 2<sup>ae</sup> q. 152, a. 2  
pour la justice ou le "medium ratio."  
"medium rei."

elle acquise par des actes répétés  
portant sur une matière déterminée. Les actes choisis  
pour cette vertu, une fois acquis, seront donc nécessaire-  
ment des actes portant sur cet objet spécial.

D'après l'adage "in medio stat virtus" cela  
indique l'usage de cette matière. L'usage sera réglé  
par cette vertu selon la quantité, le temps, le lieu, la  
personne qui boira. Celui qui fait abstraction de tout  
cette matière ne pourra donc pas être dit sobre au  
sens strict. Car s'abstenir ou ne pas s'abstenir  
totalement est, de soi, indifférent. C'est l'inten-  
tion de l'agent qui en fera la moralité.

"Oportet ergo quod virtus sit conjuncta passio-  
ni et effectum illi conjunctum producat." J. de St-  
Thomas, Cursum philosophicus, T. II, p. 452 l. 30

"Finit autem virtus cum sit habitus operativus  
est ipsa operatio." 1<sup>o</sup> 2<sup>ae</sup> q. 55, a. 4. Et l'opération de  
telle vertu ne peut s'exercer que sur son objet spécial.

"Dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae  
potationis consistit in defectu ordinis rationis." 1<sup>o</sup> 2<sup>ae</sup>,  
q. 55, a. 3 ad 2.

Pour quelques uns il pourra être prudent de  
s'abstenir totalement pour une raison ou pour une  
autre; mais alors la recta ratio et le medium rationis  
sont du ressort de la vertu de Prudence, non de la  
sobriété comme telle, qui, elle, mesure spécialement l'usage  
modéré quand il s'agit de la boisson "capax est et perturbabilis".  
ou encore, on s'abstiendra totalement, c'est-à-dire on

## Quelques textes sur la sobriété

"Medium virtutis non secundum quantitatem, sed secundum rationem rectam determinatur." 2<sup>2</sup><sup>ae</sup> q. 152, a. 2 ad 2. Il y a exception pour la justice ou le "medium rationis" doit se conformer au "medium rei."

Sobriété, vertu naturelle acquise par des actes répétés portant sur une matière déterminée. Les actes élicités de cette vertu, une fois acquise, seront donc nécessairement des actes portant sur cet objet spécial.

D'après l'adage "in medio stat virtus" cela réclame usage de cette matière. L'usage sera réglé par cette vertu selon la quantité, le temps, le lieu, la personne qui boira. Celui qui fait abstraction absolue de cette matière ne pourra donc pas être dit sobre au sens strict. Car s'abstenir ou ne pas s'abstenir totalement est, de soi, indifférent. C'est l'intention de l'agent qui en fera la moralité.

"Oportet ergo quod virtus sit conjuncta passio ut effectum illi conjunctum producat." J. de St-Thomas, Cursum philosophicus, T. II, p. 452 l. 3<sup>o</sup>

"Finis autem virtutis cum sit habitus operativus est ipsa operatio." 1<sup>o</sup> 2<sup>ae</sup> q. 55, a. 4. Et l'opération de telle vertu ne peut s'exercer que sur son objet spécial.

"Dicendum quod malum ebrietatis et nimiae potationis consistit in defectu ordinis rationis." 1<sup>o</sup> 2<sup>ae</sup> q. 55, a. 3, ad 2.

Pour quelques uns il pourra être prudent de s'abstenir totalement pour une raison ou pour une autre; mais alors la recta ratio et le medium rationis sont du ressort de la vertu de Prudence, non de la sobriété comme telle, qui, elle, mesure spécialement l'usage modéré quand il s'agit de la boisson "capax spiritus perturbat", ou encore, on s'abstiendra totalement, c'est-à-dire on

fera le sacrifice (qui n'est pas, de soi, vertueux)  
pour un autre motif vertueux: charité, économie (vertu  
de libéralité qui tient le milieu entre prodigalité et  
avarice), raison de santé (alors se rattache à la vertu de  
justice et spécialement à cette partie subjective de la justice  
qui défend le suicide ou la mutilation). Mais cela  
peut être un acte formellement élicite de la sobriété.  
Admettons que quelqu'un, désirant être sobre, mais  
ne le pouvant sans être abstinent, choisit pour  
le motif de sobriété d'être abstinent. C'est alors pour  
un motif de sobriété qu'il s'abstient, mais son acte  
d'abstinence ne peut être un acte élicite et immédiat  
de la vertu de sobriété. Ce sera formellement et  
immédiatement un acte de prudence dans ce cas  
particulier, mais qui aura le mérite de la vertu  
de sobriété. Et on peut dire dans ce cas  
que cet abstinent est plus sobre que prudent.

Enfin, il peut n'y avoir aucun motif rationnel,  
témoin, mais on le fait exclusivement comme  
un sacrifice offert pour l'amour du Bon Dieu,  
comme cela peut arriver aussi bien à celui qui prend  
la résolution de ne pas manger de jommes pour  
l'amour de Dieu. Cet acte, indifférent de soi, tombe  
sous la vertu de charité et en a le mérite.

Quant aux deux façons de faire: boire modérément ou s'abstenir absolument, l'une et l'autre sont  
bonnes; et le Christ lui-même nous a donné l'exemple  
des deux: "Dicendum quod Dominus in sua conversa-  
tione ~~dans ses relations sociales~~ exemplum perfectionis dedit

in omnibus, quae per se pertinent ad salutem; ipsa autem abstinentia cibi, et potus non per se pertinet ad salutem... quia scilicet "sancti Apostoli intellexerunt regnum Dei non esse in esca, et potu, sed in aequanimitate tollendi: quos nec copia sublevar, nec deprimat egestas; et... in omnibus talibus non usus rerum, sed libido vitantis in culpa est; utraque autem vita est licita, et laudabilis, ut relinquit aliquis a communi consortio hominum segregatus abstinentiam servet, et ut in societate aliorum positus communi vita utatur; et ideo Dominus voluit utriusque vitae exemplum dare hominibus" (Brire et ne fas boire; v.g. les Noce de Cona. En a dit de lui qu'il faisait bonne chair comme, aujourd'hui encore, les uns le disent des autres. "Venit Filius hominis manducare et bibere." II Matth.

3<sup>a</sup>, p. 40, a. 2, ad 1.

"Cesse de ne boire que de l'eau et prends un peu de vin à cause de ton estomac et de ta fréquente indisposition". St Paul à Timothée, I, 5, v. 23

... Et ideo (Christus) familiariter cum hominibus conversando, conveniens fuit, ut hominibus fiduciam daret ad se accedendi." 3<sup>a</sup> p. 40, a. 1, c.

7 ad Coloss. ii, 16

~~"Dicendum quod anima consistit quidem in anima, sicut in subiecto: sed materiam habet in corpore. Pertinet enim ad essentiam sit secundum iudicium rationis et electionem. Tantum si quis moderatus usus corporis membrorum"~~  
~~22 ad p. 157, a. 1, ad 1.~~