

245

PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

ON THE NATURE OF CONTINGENCY

Summer School July 1953.

## PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

### ON THE NATURE OF CONTINGENCY

#### 1st Course

The problem of contingency will comprise five parts:-

1. PHYSICS, Book II, on Chance and Fortune; (briefly)
2. The logical aspect of Contingency, basing ourselves on the PERIHERMENIAS;
3. Then, from the metaphysical point of view;
4. From the moral point of view; and, finally,
5. quite briefly Contingency from the theological point of view.

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited and with an introduction by Richard McKeon.

PHYSICS, Book II, chapter 4. (pp. 243-244).

MM. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye translate  $\alphaὐτόματον$  by "spontaneity"; whereas Chance, *casus*, is better;  $\τύχη$  means Fortune or Luck. For then, "Chance" should be read as "Fortune" for the most part.

Why is there a treatment of Fortune and Chance in the PHYSICS? - Book II is concerned with the principles of nature, and Book I was concerned with the principles of the subject of the science. Book II is not of the principles of the subject of the science, but of the principles of the science itself. In chapters 1, 2 and 3, Aristotle treats of determinate causes. In nature, some things are due to no determinate causes, but rather to indeterminate causes. There are enough things "caused" by chance to warrant an investigation of it. We must determine what are Fortune and Chance, in what do they differ and how do they fit into the various kinds of causes?

The question : Can things occur in nature which are not due to determinate causes? belongs in Book II. Fortune and Chance, says Aristotle, are numbered among the causes.

Why do we treat of Fortune and Chance in that order instead of treating of chance first, or even better, treating the common genus first? - Fortune is a kind of chance found in human affairs. But, this is a treatise on nature;  $\therefore$  we should first examine Chance in nature, or, in general, prescind from the species, Chance and Fortune. But Aristotle speaks first of Fortune:  $\τύχη$  καὶ  $\alphaὐτόματον$ . The reason:- Fortune is the kind of Chance better known to us. In examining Chance in nature, we do so in the light of Fortune, the kind of Chance we know best. The reason is quod nos, extrinsecus to the treatise as such.

CASUS :	Fortuna (better known than casus as genus)	Man
	Casus	ANIMAL : Animal
	(The name of genus sometimes becomes the name of species).	

## THE EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY OF FORTUNE AND CHANCE:

Not too long ago most philosophers as well as most scientists held that all was due to per se causality and thought chance was a way of saying we were ignorant of per se causes. The objection is raised that chance events are caused by some event or action that is done for a purpose. A chance event: Socrates goes shopping and meets his debtor. Can this be reduced to the per se cause of his going shopping? - Only philosophers could offer such an explanation. Another objection is that the philosophers never mentioned or better, never formally treated of fortune and chance; the implication is that they realized that they do not exist. They held the obscure to be clear; so too do many today, e.g., Descartes. Empedocles uses chance and contingency in a pinch, but does not study it; this is true of Hegel, as well. Empedocles ascribes a great deal to chance, e.g., the parts of animals.

Another inconsistency that Aristotle raises is that people will attribute the vortex to chance, and the plant and animal order to mind because of the order which exists in these orders, i.e., olive seed - olive tree; human seed - human being.

The Ancients held that the heavens were "divine"; here, we should think of the first attribute of divinity among the Greeks: INCORRUPTIBILITY. Extreme regularity. Even today astronomy is the most exact of the sciences whereby eclipses can be foretold centuries before they happen. But the most regular things would above all seem to have a determinate cause; yet some have ascribed them to chance. (Sophocles was one Greek who recognized the role of fortune in life: - Cf. Oedipus Rex). Aristotle often quotes a poet in the establishment of a principle.

A further objection states that fortune is indeed a cause, but is inscrutable to human understanding. Others believe that fortune is a cause, but is a mystery. We can understand Fortune, its nature, in universal, but this leaves us just as much in the dark before any singular fortuitous event. We must distinguish: we can understand the nature of fortune and chance, but we still be baffled in a particular case, to determine that this or that is by chance or not.

What are chance and fortune? Where do they fit in the division of the modes of causes? (Chapter 4).

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Wednesday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 1st, 1953.

### 2nd Course

Cf. PHYSICS, Book II, chapter 5. (pp. 244-246).

"First then we observe that some things always come to pass....."  
Those things that happen always or for the most part are not due to chance. Think not of nature, but of human affairs, because they are better known to us. Events can be seen in a threefold division: (1) those that happen always, or ut in pluribus, and consequently, (2) those that happen ut in paucioribus or raro. There is no demonstration here; merely a pointing out to identify the names.

Second paragraph : another division: (3) those happen by luck or fortune. Among the things that happen rarely, some we attribute to fortune.

Cf. In II Physicorum Aristotelis - Commentaria by sancti Thomas - Lesson VIII, no. 8. (pp. 26-27 de l'Opuscula no. 112).

Either some things are not willed for their own sake, but for something else as means and ultimate end; or, we can understand this division as: some things are done deliberately, others indeliberately. When we know the end we do this for the sake of. This raises a difficulty: does not every agent act for an end? If we consider this as a division between things that are deliberate and things that are not, we do not violate the principle. Indeliberate things are not for an end in the sense that no end is specifically intended when they are done, such as idly scratching one's beard.

Some things that happen ut in paucioribus can be for the sake of something: if we knew, we would have acted for the end. It happens ut in paucioribus that I find a treasure in my backyard. But if I knew a treasure were there, I would dig for it. As it is, I dig for water and find the treasure.

We know that a cause is accidental if it is not per se the cause of something, as when the flute-player builds a house. Now, when a per se cause is the accidental cause of something which has the nature of an end, it is a fortuitous cause. The flute-player builds a house. It is as a builder (essential cause); the flute-player is an accidental cause of the per se effect.

Up to "To resume then; when a thing of this kind...." - We have the impression that every accidental determination of the agent is an instance of fortune. But now we see that when a per se cause is the accidental cause of that which could be done as an end, - we have chance or fortune. The event must have the nature of a good to be pursued or an evil to be avoided.

There are two kinds of accidental causes. Not every per accidens cause is fortuitous, though every fortuitous cause is accidental. Finality makes the difference.

- (1) - per accidens ex parte causae : the union is in the cause - the house-builder is the per se cause of the house; he happens to be a flute-player. So, per accidens, the flute-player is the cause of the house. This is not fortune.
- (2) - per accidens ex parte effectus : the joining is in the effect, - i.e., the effect of his per se causality is joined to some other effect, as when the house-builder builds a house, and the family who moves in it, has a quarrel that results in a broken home. The house-builder is per accidens the cause of the discord. In this case, if the accidental effect has the nature of an end, it is fortuitous. Finality must enter in, or it is not fortuitous.

So, the accidental event can be considered either *ex parte causae* or *ex parte effectus*. "*Musicus aedificat*" - *causa per accidens ex parte causae*: no question of chance or fortune. But, when something happens to the effect which is intended *per se* which is not intended *per se* - then there can be question of chance or fortune. Otherwise it will not differ from *causa per accidens* like *musicus aedificat*. E.g., I intend this and in achieving it something happens which I did not intend and which affects me as a good or evil. This must be something which happens rarely: if it happens for the most part one cannot prescind from it as effect. I cannot say I do not will something which always or for the most part is conjoined to a willed effect.

Finality is absolutely essential to chance and fortune.

Both chance and fortune are in the sphere of things done for an end: this is essential. Where something occurs accidentally which doesn't effect me as a good or an evil - it is not a fortuitous event. E.g., Socrates does not care to have his debt paid, we won't call it "fortune" to meet his debtor.

So now, we can lay down two conditions for an event to be fortuitous, or casual, as the case may be (we may note here that FORTUNE happens to a free agent acting freely; CHANCE to an animal or plant or inanimate being or to a child or imbecile).

1. it must be an end: a good to be attained or an evil to be avoided.
2. it must happen ut in paucioribus (rarely). If it happens for the most part, even though accidentally, the *per se* and *per accidens*, are as one; we cannot have the one without the other, no matter what is our intention. Though we drink whisky to cure a cold, knowing that it regularly makes us drunk, we are not blameless for our drunkenness, on account of this unity.

Fortuna is *causa per se*, acting as a *causa per accidens*: Socrates who, for example, is fortunate, because he is the *causa per accidens*.

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle by Richard McKeon, page 245, line 197 a 8.

We tend to view fortune as outside the *per se* cause. There are good reasons for considering fortune as something external, irrational, divine, as we shall see.

Infinity and indefiniteness are quite essential to chance. This indeterminateness can be considered in two ways:

- (a) - *ex parte causae* : the infinity of possible purposes to which the same chance event may occur - an order, of course, of the more and less likely; but not in Socrates' intention. Socrates goes to the market place in order to buy something definite (potatoes) - as an accidental effect, he meets there his debtor. The purposes he may have in mind are "infinite". He might have gone there for any number of reasons.
- (b) - *ex parte effectus*: What may happen to Socrates by accident? - An infinity of things can happen. If they were limited and one

could know them practically, one would never be exposed to chance.

Gf. In II Physicorum Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae - Lesson VIII, no. 9. (p. 27 de 1<sup>a</sup> Opusculi no. 112).

There must be a desire on the part of the agent for those goods which happen because of fortune. Causa per accidens in his quae fiunt ad propositum: FORTUNE. Saint Thomas gives a definition of fortune: causa per accidens eorum quae sunt propter aliquid. Then, he brings up a point that is not in Aristotle: "Fortuna et intellectus sunt circa idem". The infinite intellect will be in no way subject to chance and fortune. So, only God - the infinite Intellect is above chance and fortune.

The greater the knowledge and scope of the intellect, the less subject to chance and fortune. The more experience we get, the less we are subjected to fortune. The children are more exposed to accident because they have less experience.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Thursday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 2nd, 1953.

### 3rd Course

Gf. In II Physicorum Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae - Lesson VIII, no. 10. (p. 27 de 1<sup>a</sup> Opusculi no. 112).

"..... Et licet ea tantum ..... " The divine Intellect is in no way subject to chance and fortune. Fortune is a sign of limitation of intelligence. Even the limited experience of which we are capable gives a certain freedom from the casual and fortuitous. Whatever happens in creation happens by God's will. If there are fortune and chance in creation, they are under the control of God.

But, this raises a problem:

Question: Is ignorance, unforeseeableness, unpredictability essential to fortune?

Answer : YES. Another can foresee my fortuitous happening, but if I foresee it, it is no longer fortuitous. Hence, the metaphysical problem: How can the fortuitous event be foreseen and not lose its fortuitous character? - God's foreknowledge (God does not strictly foresee) of the future contingent of which fortuitous events are the extreme cases.

Gf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, page 245, line 197 a 8.

"It is necessary, no doubt, that the causes..."

In the sense in which we are taking chance and fortune, there is no chance "in the strict sense" in games of chance (jeux de hasard); but there is a certain comparability. The probability of winning is slight. It is rare.

Actual ignorance or what is going to happen is essential to luck or chance. Chance is an accidental cause. Fortune is not a causa per se. Fortune, as such, is the cause of something definite, but not a per se cause of something definite. Chance is contrary to rule, is irrational.

There is a certain order of things which may have happened to us by chance. Some of them are more probable than the others. Some accidental causes are more relevant than others.

Cf. Physics, Book II, chapter 6, (pp. 246-247).

#### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FORTUNE AND CHANCE:

Chance is the wider term. In inanimate things there are limited causes too. There must be chance there too.

Every fortuitous event is from chance, but not vice versa. Some fortuitous events in the past must be responsible for our existence. We speak of fortune only "à propos" of intellectual beings. Chance belongs to the sub-human world. (When Aristotle says "lower animals" he does not use that term in the same way in which we use it today. He refers to all animals - that are not men).

It is easy to give examples of chance in animals and even plants, but it becomes exceedingly difficult in the realm of the inanimate nature, because we don't know enough about the appetite of the inanimate world. What, for example, is the good of a rock? Nevertheless, one is sure of the existence of chance in the inanimate realm; for one reason because it is question of limited causes.

Happiness, as such, cannot occur for animals. Any animal is capable of pleasure and pain.

We can posit two requirements:

1. What happens by chance must be of desirable nature.
2. It must be extrinsic to the per se cause, as an effect. What was done, and resulted in the chance effect, was not done for a casual purpose. Had it had that purpose it would have been "in vain", in that there is no rational connection between the cause and the effect.

Cf. Physics, Book II, chapter 6. (page 246, line 197 b 17).

The tripod's finality is with reference to the man finding it ready to be sat on. When Aristotle gave the example of the tripod, he referred it to the end of man. This was for clarity of the example, and did not mean that every instance of chance in inanimate nature must be referred to the good of a higher order. This points up the fact that it is extremely difficult if not impossible to point to any single event in nature as casual.

The meeting of the debtor is extrinsic to the purpose the man had in mind.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Friday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 3rd, 1953.

### 4th Course

The thing intended per se may or may not happen with the chance event.

We may compare the "vain" and the "casual".

"In vain" - the greek says μάτην; "in vain".  
αὐτό+ματην; casus or chance.

EXAMPLE: Socrates goes to the market place to buy potatoes. But, there, no potatoes are. His activity has been "vain", - but this is not "in vain"; he meets his debtor.

1. The VAIN : what is done and results in a chance event would have been done "in vain" if done expressly for that purpose.  
Per se vanum : something comes about not as a result of purposeful action. The purpose was not achieved. What was intended did not happen.
2. CASUS : αὐτό+ματην; the achievement was not purposed. Something is done for a purpose but something else happens. Here what was not intended happened. The stone that falls on a man - is by chance.

Cf. Physics, Book II, chapter 6. (page 247, line 197 b 35).

When we distinguish chance from fortune as one species from another, we distinguish them as an extrinsic versus an intrinsic principle. The difference involved is between nature on the one hand, and intellect and will on the other. Things which are from fortune are from an extrinsic cause - from intellect.

Intelligence always is an extrinsic principle of that which it effects: as mind to the "objet d'art". But nature is an intrinsic cause. (We digest by nature, but we do not write by nature).

Something contrary to nature is attributed to chance. EXAMPLE: A cat with two heads. Nature could not intend that.

The cause of the "casus" is internal, intrinsic, while the cause of the "fortune" is external, extrinsic (to what he had in mind).

∴ Nature is an intrinsic cause;  
Art is an extrinsic cause.

Intellect and will differ from nature. But generically, every chance event is extrinsic to the per se intention or purpose.

What kind of causality do chance and fortune have? - We must keep in mind constantly that they are accidental and extrinsic causes. They are reducible to efficient causality because an agent may be an accidental cause. The agent intends something and acts for it. Accidentally the chance event comes about. So, chance is an infinite cause in the genus of causa movens, but a causa per accidens.



But, you cannot prescind from finality in these matters. Chance is also in the realm of final causality. The chance event must be of such nature that we would have acted for it, did we know it were possible.

Two orders of causality are necessary for chance: that of finality and that of efficient. In most text books, CHANCE is dealt with only in terms of efficient causality: an accidental efficient cause: chance - but good and evil must figure in, essentially necessary. We are accidentally infinite causes, because our per se causality is limited. If we are exposed to fortune or misfortune it's because of the limitation of our causality. In other terms: we must consider the problem in the light of good or evil. Our per se causality is so limited that we can be per accidens causes of fortune. Something fortuitous happens to us when we are causa per se of something else. Fortune supposes intelligence; casus supposes action for a good. Things that are by chance must first be by intelligence. We owe our existence to chance, but chance presupposes nature.

If we take all the natural causes together, is there still chance? Is an "ensemble" of limited causes unlimited? The "ensemble" is still subject to chance. If an "ensemble" of limited causes is still limited as an "ensemble" the result will still be chance. One must have a universally creative intellect to be above chance and fortune. To be a per accidens cause one must first be a per se cause.

EXAMPLE : The multiplicity of bullets: perfectly reconcilable with the finality - kill the duck.

Because they presuppose finality, fortune and chance presuppose intellect, i.e., before anything can happen by fortune or chance, things must happen first by intellect.

We may conclude from the Physics, then, that if there seems to be chance and fortune in nature, it is because of the limitation of causes.

-O-O-O-O-O-

Le mouvement naturel de l'arbre, nous l'attribuons à un principe intérieur à l'arbre. La cause de l'événement casuel c'est précisément cette nature, mais en tant que limitée. Elle est exposée au hasard en tant que "limitée". Tout n'est pas sous son contrôle.

Notre causalité est limitée. Des choses peuvent se produire constamment, lesquelles sont en dehors de notre contrôle. Notre connaissance est limitée. Il faut considérer que dans notre expérience, nous sommes constamment exposés à la fortune bonne ou mauvaise, et cela en raison de la finitude de notre connaissance.

Un accident se produit. Je suis "sans le vouloir" la cause fortuite de cet accident. Le résultat est pourtant réel, - mais quelle est la nature de ma causalité? - Je suis la cause accidentelle de cet événement. Je n'ai pas voulu ce résultat, je ne suis pas cause per se, car je n'ai pas agi en tant qu'agent libre; je n'ai fait que subir les conséquences de l'accident.

Ce qui est caractéristique de la volonté de Dieu, c'est de vouloir, d'être causa per se d'une cause accidentelle, et par là causa per se d'un événement accidentel. Dieu est cause de l'être tout entier, lequel se divise en "nécessaire" et en "contingent". Rien n'est contingent par rapport à Dieu.

Supposons un maître qui, à l'insu l'un de l'autre, envoie deux de ses serviteurs querelleurs à un endroit précis, afin qu'ils aient l'occasion de vider leurs querelles. Par rapport au maître, - la rencontre des deux serviteurs n'est pas fortuite; tandis que pour les serviteurs, - c'est par "hasard" qu'ils se trouvent face à face. Le maître est borné dans sa causalité parce que l'un des serviteurs aurait pu être empêché de poursuivre sa route.

Lorsqu'on parle d'événement fortuit, - il faut le rapporter à un agent qui n'en connaît pas le résultat. Il faut que ce soit imprévu pratiquement.

En résumé: CHANCE se dit des êtres irraisonnables. E.g., un chien vient au monde avec cinq pattes. On dit communément: cet animal n'a vraiment pas eu de chance.

FORTUNE se dit des êtres raisonnables qui agissent en vue d'une fin.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ , Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Friday, from 5 to 6 P.M., July 3rd, 1953.

#### 5th Course

Cf. PERI HERMENEIAS, "On Interpretation", chapter 9. (pp. 45-48).

There are five divisions of the enunciation:

1. one based on UNITY : simply one, or one by conjunction;
2. by reason of QUALITY : affirmative or negative;
3. by reason of QUANTITY : universal, particular, indefinite, singular;
4. by reason of the MATTER : impossible, possible, necessary.

Cf. Ibid., chapter 9, chapter I.

Aristotle will insist on the point that the future proposition bearing on singulars cannot be determinatively true or false. Otherwise, everything would be predetermined.

IN MATERIA :  $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{necessaria} \\ \text{impossibilia} \\ \text{possibilia} \end{array} \right.$  (We must note that in regard to the 5th division, the term "possible" must be distinguished : there is a possible which is opposed to the impossible, and a possible opposed to the necessary).

God is possible as opposed to impossible. If He is impossible he could not possibly be. God is absolutely necessaria.

• Possible can be predicable of everything - to impossibilia  
- to necessaria (x)

(\*) - necessaria convertible with "contingency".

In the first sense "possible" is a genus, and can be predicated of everything except that which is impossible. The second is a species, and can be said only of those things that are not necessary. It can be said only of that which at the same time has the capability of either being or not being. I.e., hic et nunc a thing may either be or not be, happen or not happen. To-morrow, when it happens, then the possibility exists no more. I can sit or not sit. But when I sit, I cannot stand. (Although at any time I may cease to sit, and begin standing). We must determine whether such a possibility exists or not.

Socrates shall die because it seems impossible that he be immortal. His death is possible, yet it is necessary.

Socrates may be killed by a car : possible

In a week, Socrates is killed by a car : becomes necessary.

Is there such a thing as a possible as opposed to necessary? - Aristotle will defend this, here.

Paragraph 2 : "When the subject, however, is individual ....."

" 3 : "Thus, if it is true to say..... "

The third paragraph seems to give us the impression that all propositions (even of the future) are true or false.

In the text, Aristotle uses fortune as the genus. There is no contradiction. In the Ethics, the genus takes the name "fortune", for our principal consideration is human acts. In Physics, where our principal consideration is natural acts, the genus takes the name "chance".

IN THE PHYSICS : CASUS { fortuna  
casus - In the Physics, we are concerned with "casus".

IN THE ETHICS : FORTUNA { fortuna - Here, we are concerned with "fortune".  
casus

The connection in Saint Thomas to this passage is :

Cf. In PERI HERMENIAS Aristotelis, - Commentaria by Sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIII, nos 8 and 9. (pp. 58-59 de l'Opuscule no. 101).

Saint Thomas explains how Aristotle proceeds in this paragraph. If every affirmation or negation in future things be true, then everything is necessary.

Saint Thomas gives us two divisions:

1. - A DIVISION OF CONTINGENCY.

There are three kinds of contingency: { a casu  
ex electione - things depend upon choice.  
ex natura - hold only for the most part  
a pluribus.

These three kinds of contingency would be excluded if a proposition affirmative or negative, - something of the future were necessary.

When I say: "Today I shall give a lecture" - the truth or falsehood of that, today, does not depend on the reality of the truth to-morrow. It is the most probable today. It refers to determinate will. The proposition does not mean more than that. If it is true that "I shall give a lecture to-morrow" then - the contrary could not be possible.

When a thing has a being in the present, then we say a thing is true or not. When we say: a thing that is to be, it has not its being yet. If we can say something about it that is true now, then it is true about something it is now. What it has now is its cause. So, it is true in its cause. If a thing is predetermined in its cause to be or not to be, then, we can have a proposition determinately true or false concerning the future.

## 2. - A DIVISION OF HOW A THING CAN BE PRESENT IN ITS CAUSES :

- a- ex necessitate
- b- ut habet inclinationem
- c- pure in potentia (which we can identify with ex elections).

A little explanation of the second division might help:

- a- ex necessitate: it must happen and cannot fail. Of these things we can say that they will be in the future, and the statement is true. E.g., Socrates will die.
- b- by way of inclination: The thing should happen and probably will, but nevertheless it may fail.
- c- pure in potentia: Here it is ad utrumlibet - it could just as well come about as not come about. It makes no difference.

Now, the first of these give us necessary things;  
the second gives us contingency ex natura; and  
the third gives us contingency ex elections.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Monday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 6th, 1953.

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### 6th Course

The treatment of Contingency is found in the chapter 9 of PERI HER-  
MENEIAS.

Read carefully this chapter, as well as Saint Thomas' Commentary on it. Note first that there is a possible which is perfectly compatible with the necessary, since the necessary is possible. If that which is necessary were not possible, it would have to be impossible. But the impossible is that which necessarily cannot be. Therefore the necessary is possible.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by saint Thomas d'Aquin, Book III, chapter 86.

Cf. In PERI HERMENEIAS Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomas, Book I, Lesson XIII, no. 11. (page 59 de l'Opusculum no. 101).

"Uno modo....." Effects necessarily contained in their causes; of which effects there can be true statements in the present with regard to the future. "Alio modo....." An inclination, that is not absolute, but one that can fail; the predetermination of inclination is a preponderance of one alternative but not to the exclusion of the other. This is the case of nature. It is true to say of these that they will be, if we are cognizant that it is only high probability. In other terms: we can say - "This shall be" with truth but without absolute certitude. ∴ there will always be indetermination in this sort.

"Tertio....." ex electione. How does this division in no. 11 compare with that in no. 9 ?

- In LESSON XIII, paragraph no. 9 : CONTINGENT :
  - 1. a casu
  - 2. ex electione
  - 3. ex natura
- In LESSON XIII, paragraph no. 11: FUTURES :
  - 1. ex necessitate
  - 2. ex natura
  - 3. ex electione

In paragraph no. 11, nos. 2 and 3 - are contingent. But, what happened to the "a casu" mentioned in paragraph no. 9? - It is implied in paragraph no. 11, in that the ut in pluribus of the ex natura allows for the ut in paucioribus of a casu.

Many great happenings come about due to chance and fortune. Must we then attribute to chance and fortune a fecundity greater, than that of nature? Not at all, but they show the fecundity of the Divine Omnipotence which can make use of chance and fortune.

TWO MAIN GENERA OF CONTINGENCY: 

- Ex natura (Intrinsic contingency) - Contingency (a casu implied) is in the cause. Causa contingens contingenter causans.
- Ex electione (Extrinsic contingency) - Contingency (a fortuna implied in the imperfect agens a proposito) is in the effect.

"Natura est principium eorum quae fiunt ut in pluribus". Nature succeeds only ut in pluribus. (La nature réussit la plupart du temps, mais pas toujours. Règle générale, elle admet le plus souvent pour le moins souvent). - Nature, then, is an imperfect cause; not completely ad unum - because of this we can have the extreme kind of contingency that is "chance". Nature can be cause ut in pluribus because it is not completely determined.

Contingens ex electione is to that ex natura as a perfect to an imperfect cause. The ad utrumlibet bespeaks no imperfection (the will of God is ad utrumlibet). One should note here that all the texts on free will oppose it to nature which is determined ad unum - but this "ad unum" is only ut in pluribus.

The difference between contingency ex natura and contingency ex elec-

4-11-30  
tione is that: the cause of contingency ex natura is the imperfection of the cause itself - intrinsic contingency. It succeeds only ut in pluribus, but not necessarily always. It is due to the imperfection of the reason that we have this sort of causality. If not, we never have a casu.

The cause of contingency ex electione implies no imperfection on the part of the cause, but rather indetermination on the part of the effect. There is contingency in the effect, not in the cause. This is extrinsic contingency.

The cause is a very perfect one; it is a free cause, a self determinate cause. The indetermination is on the part of the thing that depends. However, if the agent a proposito is not God, but is a limited cause, something can happen to it, and this gives another kind of contingency - FORTUNE.

The thing common to all these kinds of contingency is possibilitas esse vel non esse.

So soon as the agent a proposito is less than God, he will succeed ut in pluribus : a fortuna enters in.

Saint Thomas refers to both of the following as contingent :

1. causata a natura ut in pluribus;
2. causata a agente a proposito.

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, by Richard McKeon, In PERI HERMENEIAS, "On Interpretation", chapter 9. (page 47).

"These awkward results....."

Cf. In PERI HERMENEIAS Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 6. (page 64 de l'Opusculum no. 101).

"Deinde cum dicit....." Those things which are not always can be or not be.

PROBLEM : Could there be such a thing that at one time it necessarily was not and now necessarily is? - (Note that contingency is a possibility of the contrary at the same time).

REPLY : Such a thing would be determined in its cause and it would always be true to say it would be.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by Sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 86. (page 328).

"Aliquis autem forte dicat quod necessarium est ut effectus caelestium corporum compleantur, nec tamen per hoc tollitur possibilitas a rebus inferioribus, eo quod quilibet effectus est in potentia antequam fiat, et tunc dicitur possibilis, quando autem iam est in actu, transit a possibilitate in necessitatem; et totum hoc subiacet caelestibus motibus; et sic non tollitur quin aliquando effectus sit possibilis, licet necessarium sit effectum illum quandoque produci: - sic enim Albumasar, in primo libro sui Introductorii, defendere nititur possibile".

Some people try to say : there is a sufficient possibilitas in nature even if all is necessary. E.g., in a necessary revolution, the earth at a given time would be in potency to another place. This is not the natura possibilitatis referred to by Saint Thomas in the PERI HERMENIAS. The natura possibilitatis is the possible opposed to the necessary, not the possible compatible with it. Posse ad esse et ad non esse - this is the essential nota of contingency. The confusion is between the possible compatible with the necessary and the possible opposed to the necessary.

Possible ←————→ Impossible  
          ↓  
Necessary. ————— Possible sive contingens.

Possibile esse "opposed to the necessary".

The possible opposed to the necessary is that with which we have affair in contingency: both this possible and the necessary are included in the possible opposed to the impossible. Natura possibilitatis: quod potest esse et non esse.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>e</sup>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Tuesday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 7th, 1953.

### 7th Course

The effects of free agent are contingent; the effects of chance are contingent.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 86.  
The Basic Works of Aristotle, by Richard McKeon, In PERI HERMENEIAS, "On Interpretation", chapter 9. (page 47).

"Yet this view leads to an impossible conclusion....."

Cf. In PERI HERMENEIAS Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 8. (page 64 de l'Opuscule no. 101).

(Saint Thomas explained Aristotle, he gives the truth of Aristotle, but also a consideration of his own. He teaches Aristotle. Saint Albert makes Aristotle's works available).

Saint Thomas gives two opinions: (1) "Quidam enim....."

(2) "Stoici vero....." This is the opinion held by many modern Scholastics. Both positions could be interpreted correctly, but as they stand they are ambiguous, incompetens. Hypothetical necessity "chez" Modern Thomists is a non-thomistic position. They say that the laws of nature are hypothetically necessary, i.e., they can be impeded. This can be reduced to a tautology: if they happen they will happen. This is an extrinsic denomination of necessity. The necessary is not necessary because it is not impeded; because it is necessary it cannot be impeded. Many treatises on Apologetic, in dealing with miracles, assume this position. They do not sufficiently distinguish between the a casu and the a causa prima. "Et ideo alii melius...." (no. 8, last line): is there an ad utrumlibet in matter? - A magis ad unum in nature is inaequaliter ad utrumlibet; as in freedom there is an aequaliter ad utrumlibet.

There is a possibile ad utrumlibet in matter but more for one side than the other, but the major does not exclude the other.

Saint Thomas continues in nos. 9 and 10.

No. 9 - In order to account for contingency, it is not sufficient to consider the potency of matter only in itself, but also the act due to which matter has its potencies. Because this act is not wholly determined to one, there is contingency. There is but one cause above contingency, as we can see in Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 86.

No. 10 - If we consider the whole constellations "dans leur ensemble", there is a causa per se. Everything is always determined to be. Each cause must have a per se cause.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 93.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Wednesday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 8th, 1953.



### 8th Course

Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, by Sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 93. (page 337).

On fate and Boethius. A good use of a bad word.

Cf. In *Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis*, - *Commentaria* by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 11. (page 65 de l'Opuscule no. 101).

The per accidens does not have a cause per se. The cause will be per accidens - a cause must be proportionate to its effect. In no. 11 the two previously stated positions are refuted :

1. "omne quod fit habet causam" (per se);
2. "posita causa etiam sufficienti, necesse est effectum poni".

Cf. *PRIMA PARS*, question 115, article 6, - on sufficient cause.

If everything could be explained in terms of per se causality, all would be necessary.

Cf. In *Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis*, - *Commentaria* by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 12.

"Putat, si comedit sitiet: si sitiet, exhibit domum ad bibendum..... "

Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, by Sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 94. (page 337), In *Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis*, - *Commentaria* by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, nos. 13 and 14. (page 65 de l'Opuscule no. 101).

No. 13 - The reduction of the per accidens to the per se. The causa per accidens accidit causae per se; the causa per se is also the causa per accidens but in different respects. The reduction is not identification.

The per se cause is not the per se cause of the per accidens. This, - because it is a limited per se cause, thus unforeseen things can arrive. If there is no accidental cause intermediary between the per se cause, there can be no accidental effect.

No. 14 - "..... Similiter nec in aliis....." Even if one knew all the causes at the beginning of the world, he could not predict (in natural things): One can predict from the cause only that which is necessarily predetermined in the cause. Chance is not canceled out in natural causes - not at all. Some have said the initial constellation is such that knowing it and prescindig from free acts of men, we could predict infallibly. This is a denial of intrinsic contingency.

If nature is the cause of something accidental it is not it as per se cause.

Some today reduce all casual and fortuitous events to a concursus of different causes - It can't be just this kind.

In other words, - some reduce intrinsic contingency to an extrinsic contingency because God could have chosen to make a different world - This world is contingent. No natural cause as nature - determinated ad unum - can be per se cause of something casual. E.g., the cat with five legs - it is not with intention of nature - an accident. But, with regard to ulterior nature, this was perhaps intended. But still this would not be "fortune".

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 92.


"Contingit autem homini..... "

Cf. In Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, nos. 15 and 16. (page 66 de 1<sup>o</sup> Opusculi no. 101).

No. 15 - A fortuitous event can be foreseen to one to whom it does not happen.

We can fall into determinism by predicating the ability of the mind into nature: things are in the mind in the mode of the mind. E.g., health and sickness cannot be united in a man, but may be united in the mind.

No. 16 - The absolutely Universal Cause - God - can be the cause of the whole of Being, of which one of the first divisions is into per se et per accidens. God is the cause of the TOTUS ENS.



He must be cause of the both but not an accidental cause of the contingent. He must know the contingent.

Cf. PRIMA PARS, question 14, article 13.

" " question 22, article 4 ad tertium.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Thursday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 9th, 1953.

### 9th Course

Something can be fortuitous with regard to the proximate, but not with regard to the remote cause: e.g., the master who sends two servants intends their chance encounter. The question arises: can this be true in nature, namely that something be casual with respect to the proximate cause and not with respect to the remote cause? - In replying, we must distinguish: is the remote cause, intellectual? If the remote cause is an intelligent one, then this could be true. But not if nature is the remote as well as the proximate cause.

An intelligent cause can be a per se cause of a fortuitous effect, not because it is intelligent but because it is limited. It can be the per se cause of a fortuitous event. Contrary can't exist in the intellect. The mind is above the contrary and the accidental event.

Nature is determined ad unum. It cannot be the ultimate per se cause of a fortuitous event. Nature is not intelligent. So, we cannot find in nature a per se cause of an accidental event. Nature is determined to one thing. Any fortuitous event cannot be referred to a per se cause. If we want to refer it to a per se cause we must refer it to God.

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 92. (page 334).

"Oportet autem....."

One who acts by intellect may be the cause of an accidental connection. E.g., the master who organizes meeting for his servants. Nature, however, cannot be such a cause. That is, an intelligent agent can intend an accidental connection; the mind can thus unite disparate elements. If an event is to lose its fortuitous character, we must refer it to some deliberate agent for this particular purpose.

Cf. In Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 16. (page 66 de l'Opuscula no. 101).

God is the per se cause of all contingent events. Only Him can be this, "Ejus virtute activa...." Most important. God is not waiting for things to happen. We must exclude God from every passivity. He is "activa". We cannot have God expecting something fortuitous. His virtue "activa" is perfectly known to him. He will know with perfect knowledge the events as necessary.

The contingency and necessary is within the active power of God. God's esse power hold everything. He is intelligence, will, by his esse. So, everything remains within his power.

God knows perfectly the future contingents. He cannot be, in no respect, an accidental cause. He is a per se cause.

Human being in one respect is a per se cause, and, in another respect, is an accidental cause. He can be both. E.g., Socrates goes to the market: per se cause; Meeting his debtor : accidental cause. Things always happen "intended".

There is necessity even in contingent things - when a contingent thing is, it necessarily is; i.e., it cannot simultaneously not be. We may note that the distinction between sensus divisus et sensus compositivus is already in Aristotle.

To say of something that it either will or will not take place implies real contingency. Neither is determinately true or false; what is true is the either/or.

Sic terminatur Peri Hermeneias.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>3</sup>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Friday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 10th, 1953.

#### 10th Course

FORTUNE : accidental cause, indeterminate, infinite, something which happens rarely.

## Contingency ex elections :

Two billiard balls are sent down an inclined plan. (I could have sent them in another direction).

To speak of CHANCE, we must have the good concerned. I could have intended something else. In this sense, everything is contingent. If I send the billiard balls, not to meet, and they meet; - then, we may have a contingent accident or fortuitous.

EXAMPLE : Squirrel sitting on a tree in this position, at this time, on this branch, etc... On what condition could this be impeded? - If there is intrinsic contingency, then, this may be impeded.

Contingent causes, as we said, always refer to an accidental cause. By contingent cause, we mean an accidental one.

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, by Richard McKeon, In PERI HERMENEIAS, "On Interpretation", chapter 9. (page 48).

"Now that which is must needs be when it is,..... "

Connected with that paragraph, -

Cf. In PERI HERMENEIAS Aristotelis, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Book I, Lesson XIV, no. 8 - corpus. (page 64 de l'Opuscula no. 101).

Being and not being cannot be attributed simultaneous to the same thing.

Back to Aristotle, -

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, by Richard McKeon, In PERI HERMENEIAS, "On Interpretation", chapter 9, line 19 a 30. (page 48).

"Let me illustrate....."

For a free agent, - to do or not to do - want to be or not to be.

Something happens which was intended.

The question of knowledge of God : God's knowledge of future contingents.

Cf. The Basic Works of Aristotle, - by Richard McKeon, - METAPHYSICS, Book VI, chapter 2, line 1027 a 8. (page 781).

"Therefore, since not all things..... "

## THE CONSIDERATION OF CONTINGENCY IN THE METAPHYSICS:

Cf. In IV Metaphysics, - Commentaria by sancti Thomae, Lesson 2, no. 1186. (Edition Catala).

DE VERITATE, question 2, article 12.

We cannot have the certitude of future contingents. Angels do not know all contingentia. Even the most perfect angel cannot foresee all future events, all fortuitous. Yet, Saint Thomas insists that the angels are incapable of any speculative error, even in the realm of the practical and contingent. How reconcile this? - Gabriel can predict from the knowledge which he has, and what he has predicted does not come about. He sees the highly probable. Is there error in this case? - The point is he would so predict that the event is not seen as about to be necessarily; Gabriel would not claim to have this kind of certainty. It is a question of being certain that ut in pluribus this will follow; the ut in pluribus does not destroy the law, for the law takes into account that ut in paucioribus the law does not hold.

The angels know the things as they are, i.e., contingent.

There might be a disorder within thousand of years. But, perhaps on a larger scale, it might be a span that is repeated - so it might be an order on a larger scale. An objection: perhaps FORTUNE is in this case?

"Regularity" is in the mind of Saint Thomas.

Many things appeared to us as irregular must be directed by a regular law - We observe that so many phenomena have been, for ages, attributed to chance. Today we say that they were governed by law.

What is essential to *casus*? - It's a good. We see this in animals or plants. The animal did not go there to be struck by lightning. Here is an evil. ∴ there must be "chance".

Some intellectual agent might have wanted this for a greater good, but it remains an evil for the animal.

With regard to the "concursum" of agent causes in the casual event. But chance is inexplicable on the plane of efficient cause alone. Final causality must enter in or no satisfactory explanation can be had. FINALITY : action for an end.

Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, by sancti Thomas, Book III, chapter 92. (page 334).

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>e</sup>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Friday, from 5 to 6 P.M., July 30th, 1953.

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#### 11th Course

Cf. *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, by Richard McKeon. - METAPHYSICS, Book XI, chapter 8. (pp. 862-863).

"Since being in general has several senses,.... "

Some things come about rarely but are intended. Classical example: The jumper, trained for a high level, who makes an exceptionally high jump does not

do so by "chance", for it is what he intended all along. This sort of rare occurrence must not be confused with the rare occurrence which arrives *praeter intentionem*, and which is "chance". The rare may happen through a *per se* cause. The jumper jumps a hundred times, but just once does he attain the high mark. The many was in view of the rare, which was intended. This is not "chance".

Thus, the use of hundreds of pieces of shot in shooting a duck - it is not accidental but intended that a few of them bring down the fowl. The *ut in pluribus* in nature must not be understood in too simplistic a manner - many spermatozoa are set into motion so that one will fecundate the ovum.

The contingency dont il s'agit in chapter 8, - line 1065 a 7 (page 862), - is that of chance and fortune and not of the *ad utrumlibet* of a free will. The causes from which lucky results might happen are indeterminate.

Note there (line 1065 a 7 - page 862) the insistence on PURPOSE. Nature is such a cause that it must work for an end. If it is the accidental cause of that which might have been done for an end, we can speak of chance. *Natura est principium motus et quietis in quo est primo et per se et non secundum accidens.*

Cf. In duodecim libros METAPHYSICORUM ARISTOTELIS, - by sancti Thomae, - Book XI, lesson 8, no. 2286. (page 541 of the Edition "Marietti").

"Ostendit, quod fortuna est incerta; dicens, quod infinitae sunt causae, a quibus aliquid potest fieri a fortuna, sicut patet in exemplo posito. Potest enim aliquis invenire thesaurum fodiens in terra, vel ad plantandum, vel ad faciendum sepulchrum, et propter infinita alia. Et quia omne infinitum est ignotum, ideo fortuna est incerta humanae cognitioni. Et dicitur esse causa secundum accidens. Nullius autem est causa simpliciter et per se".

Ens per accidens is a kind of non ens; and thus chance and fortune are kinds of non-causae.

#### ETHICAL CONSIDERATION OF CONTINGENCY:

With regard to :

Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 92. (page 334).

The first example of a fortuitous event without a "concursum" of agent causes : this is to be understood in the sense that other agent causes are not ACTUAL at the time of the fortuitous event. There may have been an agent cause in the past - someone, for example, buried the treasure.

The point from which to begin is that of purpose and that which happens *praeter intentionem* involving good or evil. We must beware of a mechanistic interpretation of chance and fortune.

Cf. ETHICA EUDEMIA, (translated by J. Solomon), Book VII, chapter 14. (page 27 des notes intitulées: ON LUCK AND CHANCE).

This section from the Eudemian Ethics is the basis for Summa Contra Gentiles, by sancti Thomae, Book III, chapter 92, (page 334).

"But since not only prudence and virtue....."

When we consider fortune in the practical realm, the note of often, of frequency is added. The fortunate man is he to whom good fortune continually happens.

There is a certain irrationality in prudence (which differs from that involved in fortune) in the prudence is conformity with rectified appetite.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>a</sup>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Monday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 13th, 1953.

### 12th Course

In the case of "fortune" in the strict sense, if it happens once, what is to prevent it from happening again and again establishing that pattern in a man's life which leads us to call him "fortunate"? This would no longer be fortune in the strict sense, for it must be ut in paucioribus.

Cf. Plato's Euthydemus, page 279, division "d".

Aristotle is striving dialectically in the Eudemian Ethics to find a determinate cause for a man's being "fortunate".

Cf. ETHICA EUDEMIA, (translated by J. Solomon), Book VII, chapter 14. (page 28 des notes intitulées: ON LUCK AND CHANCE).

"..... Perhaps, however, good fortune....."

He brings the discussion down out of the air. "Fortunate by nature" - of this, fortune in the strict sense could not be the cause. Aristotle describes it as a right instinctive desire.....

rare (fortune "au sens strict").

FORTUNE dupliciter : by nature (has in common with real fortune a certain irrationality. "Fortunate" men are not thus by fortune au sens strict).

Fortune, then, is not the cause of all things attributed to fortune. But, there is the similarity of contrariness to reason.

Chance, as the genesis of thought - this cannot be attributed to chance for it is for the most part that men begin to think.

In this text from the Eudemian Ethics, FORTUNE "au sens strict" is almost wholly avoided. In this text, "fortune" is so used that we might see it as an argument for ruling out fortune in the strict sense.

In Physics, - "the laws of chance" - in this imposition, chance does not

mean causa per accidens in his quae fiunt secundum naturam (vel propositum) propter finem in minori parte. There is however a kind of irrationality in the application of these laws to particular events, the calculus of probability when applied to nature has an element of irrationality. But, the exceptions are accounted for in a most determinate way in the calculus itself.

Faculty of Philosophy, Laval University, 2<sup>d</sup>, Ste-Foye Road, Québec.  
Tuesday, from 4 to 5 P.M., July 14th, 1953.



Perih. lect. 13 - 8 pp. (1957-1958) manusc.  
14  
15

Phys. I, lect. 12. - 8 pp.

Phys. I, lect. 13. - 11 pp.

Phys. I, l. 12 (c.7) } 5 pp. manusc.  
l. 13 (c.7)

Phys. II, lect. 1 } 5 pp. manusc.  
lect. 2

~~De Phys. I, lect. 12. 1 p.~~

Phys. II, lect. 12. 1 p.

Phys. II, l. 4, ~~after~~ 2 pp.

(Sur la Contingence) 3 pp. manusc.

~~De Trinitate~~

~~De Trinitate~~

# Physique I et II

Forment introd. générale à l'étude de la nature.

I livre : détermine et justifie le sujet de l'étude de la nature.

Ici considéré dans sa très complexe généralité : la réalité assujétie au changement.

cette réalité très difficile pour nous, non autant que le changement <sup>est</sup> difficile à définir.

aisément constatée,

Le changement paraît facile à concevoir, en raison de sa certitude. Nous voyons que toutes les choses qui composent le monde où nous vivons subissent sans cesse des changements : elles changent de lieu, de dimensions, de qualités, elles commencent à être et elles cessent d'être.

Premiers phil. "alteritas", ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα, inégalité.

576-480

Héraclite : πάντα ῥεῖ. Il n'y a rien de stable, d'immuable. Rien de vrai.

Le mot comme coordonnée, dimensionnelle, et une abstraction. Id. par le t. Mais nécess. Cependant que le mot et le temps ne sont pas que des quanta.

(Bergson & Whitehead) Mathématicisme depuis Archimède → fin 18<sup>e</sup> s. En mathém. pas de devenir, génération, mort, sinon par métaphore.

Sens original du mot.

Usque modo: three div. of enunc.

1<sup>o</sup> as to unity { simple  
by conjunction

2<sup>o</sup> as to quality { affirmative  
negative

3<sup>o</sup> as to quantity { univ., partic.  
indef., singular. [When quid praedicatum de universis  
non universaliter: totum...]

Now, 4<sup>o</sup> as to time { of present } S. Th. (n. 3): this already heard  
of past from 'every enunc. from verb or  
of future from a tense of the verb': significat  
cum tempore.

S. Th. n. 3 → [5<sup>o</sup> as to matter  
& habit. & ad S { in necessary or natural matter; } Third found  
in the singular  
only - temp.  
not qua sit;  
in impossible or remote matter;  
in possible or contingent. ]

This introduces a diff.: while enunc. about present or past  
are determinately true or deter. false, enunc. about  
the future singular diff. from all others, unless all  
future necessary, unless there were no 'potentia simul  
contradictionis', i.e. no possible as opposed to necessary.  
N.B.: this possible introduces succession: while Socr.  
is seated, it possible for him to stand, but only thereafter,  
not while seated.

"Possible" here regarded with respect to truth: if every enunciatio  
determ. true or false, this implies that there is no possible:  
if Socr. can only sit, it is false to say that he can stand.  
A.v., circa possibile, prop. can neither be det. true nor  
determ. false. Otherwise, "necesse est omnia determinate  
esse vel non esse", i.e. & necessitate.

Which (P. Th. 9) would exclude three kinds of contingency:

- quae ut in paucioribus: a case vel fortuna.
- quae ad utrumlibet: & electione.
- quae even. ut in pluribus: causantur & materia.

Note S. Thomas's 'considerandum', n. 9, last §.

(2)

Then (n. 10) goes on to show that ideas of propos. de futuro with those de praesenti would mean that "omni quod ad verum esse, verum fuerit determinate dicere esse futurum".

Note S. Th's 'Ad cuius evidentiam...' (n. 11)

Futurum aliquatenus in causa:

del. { - determinate  
- quae habet inclinationem ad suum effectum, sed mutabilitatem  
non { - pure in potentia

lect. 14.

Alia duo inconvenientia:

- consilium
- actiones humanae.

(n. 6) Sed "ostendit idem in aliis rebus", scil. naturalibus, ubi

\* quaedam quae non semper actu sunt: ergo in eis contingit esse et non esse: alioquin vel semper essent vel semper non essent. Sed in his contingit fieri et non fieri. Ergo et in eis natura possibilitatis.

Sensibilia exempla: vestis nova: possibile incidi et non incidi.

→ 'Est autem considerandum...' (n. 18...)

Diversae opiniones de possibili et necessario:

Quidam { - impossibile = qd nunquam erit.  
- necessarium = qd semper erit.  
- possibile: qd quandoque erit, quandoque non.

Primi: dist. sec. exteriora prohibitionis:

{ - necessarium: quod non potest prohiberi quin sit verum  
- impossibile: quod semper prohibetur a veritate.  
- possibile: qd potest prohiberi vel non prohiberi.

Prima dist. et a posteriori: vera aliquid semper quia verum  
Secunda et ab exteriori et per accidens: quia verum, impediri non potest.

Alii melius { - neces.: qd in sua natura determin. solum ad esse  
Philos. { - impon.: ... solum ad non esse.  
- possib.: quod ad neutrum omnino.

Vd. n. 9

'Sed videtur haec ratio insufficientis.' (n. 9)

(3)

In corporibus, cael. potentia ad ubi, tam ex necessitate.

Dicendum: possibilitas naturae ad utrumlibet, si  
communiter loquamur ... nisi potentia activa  
non omnino determinata ad unum. (E.g. potentia visiva.)

Vd. n. 10

Circa hoc, quidam: potentia in naturalibus determinatur  
ad unum ex facto. Stoici ex serie, seu connexione ...

Sed hoc rejicitur ab Arist. Meta vi, c. 3, qd videtur.

13 XI

Vd. n. 14

Quidam omnes effectus hic inferius possum. reducere in causas  
~~per se~~ ut virtus cael., ut positio siderum ...

Sed ex hoc non in omnibus acceditur: scilicet:

(a) non in his quae ab intellectu et voluntate.

(b) nec in aliis corporalibus ... Vd. n. 14, 3<sup>o</sup> fin. "Similiter."

Vd. n. 15

→ Nunc 'ratio' sive intellectus, is not only above  
contraries, but also transcends 'unum per accidens'  
inasmuch as it can be grasped and intended  
per se. (Appl. to symbolic construction.)  
Thus nature cannot be causa per se of accidental.  
cf. eq II 92.

Vd. 16

Application to God.

Note priority of 'esse et virtus' with respect to 'intelligere  
and intelligibile'. (Nota: videt possib. in sera trinitate  
de Trin. II, 8, c.)

(17)

Ex quo videtur omnia ex necessitate piri, saltem quae bona.

(18)

{ 1<sup>o</sup> Ex parte scientiae ejus, quae non potest falli.  
2<sup>o</sup> " " voluntatis: dei vol. inefficax esse non potest.

(19)

Resp. anthropomorph. Sed multo dissimiliter:

1<sup>o</sup> Ex parte cogn. vel sciae: aliter ea quae ordine temporis  
eveniunt { cognoscere vi cogn. quae sub ordine temporis  
aliter illa quae habentur extra ordinem temporis

Sed cognitio nostra cadit sub ordine temporis, vel per se  
vel per accidens: unde cognosc. sub ratione praesentis,  
praeteriti et futuri;

- praesentia eorum. in actu existentia et sensu categorialiter posita;
- praeterita ut memorata;
- futura, non in seipsis, sed in causis suis:
  - per certitudinem, si totaliter in causis determinata;
  - per conjecturam, si ut in pleuritis, ubi susp. possum;
  - nullo modo, quae ad utrumlibet.

Et haec dicuntur 'in potentia omnino'. Vol. p. 1.

(20) Sed aeternitas tota simul, ubi simplex intuitus, et sic unumquodque ut in seipso existens, non futurum expectu intuitus, quasi sibi futurum in ordine causarum, quamvis deus ordinem causarum videt. Sed sicut oculus humanus videt Socratem sedere in seipso, non in causa sua, ut quando Soc. dicit se senurum.

(21) This does not destroy the contingency of his sitting when viewed in the order of cause and effect. Still, iudicium de senectute praes. infall. Ita deus infall. de contig.

20 XI

(22) 2<sup>o</sup> Ex parte voluntatis similiter differentia:

Vol. div. 2<sup>a</sup> "extra ordinem entium" existens, ~~appet~~ as a cause "profundius totum eius et omnes ejus differentias", not only categorical, but also predicable; also necessary and contingent. (cf. Meta vi, l. 3, p. 1220 sq.) Transc. ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae. This already found, quous, in human intellect. however, effectus potest deperire, omnino necessary.

d. [Ia 14, 13; 22, 4.]  
de Ver. 2/12  
8/12  
Aug. [Ia 57/3  
cf III 74

var. 101  
102  
103

3 XII 58

(23) Some try to destroy Aristotle's argument from 'consilium': alleging that the will, in choosing, is necessarily moved by the good: thus annulling will to intellect.

(24) Resp. distingo, primo circa verum:

- quoddam verum per se notum: quib. intellectus & voluntas <sup>concordat.</sup>
- quaedam vera non per se, sed per alia nota:
  - horum quaedam ex necess. conseq. & principiis: cond. dem.
  - quaedam non, sicut opinabilia, quae possunt esse falsa & principia vera.

Secundo, similitudo circa bonum:

- quoddam bon. propter se appetibile: ut felicitas, quae ult. finis: bono huiusmodi vol. & necessitate inhaeret.
- quaedam bona, appetibilia propter finem, ut conclusiones ad principium. (II Phys. fin.)

Unde, si esset aliqua bona sine quibus non posset quis esse felix, essent & necesse appetibilia... ut forte esse, vivere, et intelligere, et si qua alia sunt similia.

Sed, particularia bona, in quibus actus humani consistunt non sunt talia... vid. text. Non sunt ibi media determinata. (cf. III Eth., l. 7) de Ven. 22/6/0  
Cp. III 97

Nota valde ult. S: ad salvandum radice, contrahentem.

Reet. 15: Concludit veritatem.

- ① Usque modo asp. ab enunciationibus ad res, remotionem inconvenientiam quae circa res sequebatur.
- Nunc, ordine converso, ost. qualiter se habeat veritas circa res.
- [qualiter veritas circa enunciationes.]

② (I) 1<sup>o</sup> Qualiter se habeat veritas circa res absolute consideratas:

~~Ex~~ Ex inconvenientibus concludit: circa res, omne qd est, necesse est esse quando est, et non esse qd non est. [Quia impossibile est simul esse et non esse. (Note diff. p. om. 'affirmare et negare')] Et haec est necessitas non absoluta, sed & suppositione. Nam & 'necesse quando' non sequitur necesse simpliciter et absolute.

Id. de non esse.

2<sup>o</sup> Qualiter veritas et necessitas circa res per comparationem ad sua opposita: eadem ratio est in contradictione, quae est in suppositione:

(6)

Sicut illud qd non est necessarium, fit necessarium  
per suppositionem ejusdem, quia necesse est esse  
quando est;  
ita etiam illud quod non est in se necessarium  
absolute, fit necessarium per disjunctionem  
oppositi, quia 'necesse est de unoquoque  
quod sit vel non sit', et 'quod futurum sit  
vel non sit', et hoc sub disjunctione, et  
non copulatione vel conjunctione. ~~Per~~ hoc pertinet  
ad necessitatem <sup>quand</sup> sub disjunctione.

(II) Ex eo quod se habet circa res, ost. qualiter se habeat circa ~~rationes~~  
rationes.

1<sup>o</sup> Quomodo uniformiter se habeat in veritate rationum,  
sicut circa esse rerum et non esse:

Vd. n. 4, "scit ergo..." Nota valde "sive aequaliter  
sive alterum ut in pluribus..."

So, note that Arist. does take into account the  
"ut in pluribus", to show that this does not prevent  
that "sub disjunctione" one part of the contradiction  
be true or false: "non tamen haec vel..." Vd. text.

2<sup>o</sup> Concl.: non est necesse in omni genere affirmationum  
et negationum oppositarum, alteram determinari...  
Ratio: non esse et non esse.

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(7)

The first cause of contingency is intellectus:

pot. simul  
causae. { (a) of extrins. : rational appetite as per se cause: de Pot. I, 3.  
(b) of intrins. : { proximate: { nature qua not entirely det. ad unum  
will, insofar as the intell. does not have  
sufficient scope.

remote, per se cause, intellect & will. in this cause,

the contingent is just as rational as the necessary

Besides, the cause is intell. & ordinans:

sapientia & ordinare. The order is one which

cannot be conferred upon nature, nor even,

ultimately, upon finite intell. & will.

"Intelligentia est multa  
ordinare in unum",  
a many that is not  
per se one. Ep. III 92.

Practical reason is such a principle: qua compassing  
an order which is not dictated by the nature of  
the things that enter into it.

Thus reason can be a deliberate principle of an order  
which, in itself, is disorder. Memo the lion blind,  
and the race not to the swift. Here absurdity, but  
it is not absolutely so.

de Fato Ep. III 93

Nature a participation of reason widely diff. from anything  
properly reason. Both, 'per certa media ad finem.'

Thus nature imitates reason. But reason, going,  
does not imitate ~~reason~~ nature in the sense that reason  
would be bound to 'vrae determinatae' as nature is.

Art imitates nature: God's works imitate God's nature.  
Here an imitator naturam divinum.

Our art imitates, proportionally, the works of God. But  
there are not only 'nature'. The div. ord. shown  
more perfectly in its cause. where there is no nature,  
as in 'homo albus' - or even in absurdity. That is,  
largely, what our art imitates: we bring together  
things that nature does not bring together, as in  
melodrama and tragedy.

Contingency is in the practical order. As we shall see later, it is always related to the good.

But note the diff. between our position and that of Leibniz. Cf. *Mar.* p. 172-173; 177.

Paradoxe: excludes art, compositive mode.

Yet, in the beginn. and end, all would be dominated by 'ars combinatoria'.

This whole phil. rests on the exclusion of an undiscussed 'potentia simul contradictionis,' which pot. refers either to will, to nature or chance, or to will as fortune.