

Le rôle de l'intellectuel est de se faire entendre, d'être entendu, d'être compris, d'être aimé, d'être respecté, d'être craint, d'être adoré, d'être méprisé, d'être haï, d'être tué.

On se ne peut pas philosopher sans se faire entendre, sans se faire comprendre, sans se faire aimer, sans se faire respecter, sans se faire craindre, sans se faire adorer, sans se faire mépriser, sans se faire haïr, sans se faire tuer.

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;;Politics

...the Generic being of man

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The popular interpretation of Marxism is that it is a collectivist theory alone. This is disproved by a consideration of the notion of the generic being of man which Marx borrowed from Ludwig Feuerbach. When this is understood one cannot say the communists advocate that the individual lose his personality and freedom in collectivism - on the contrary they give absolute dignity of the human person; it is an excessive personalism.

Political history can be read as a progressive emancipation of man by himself - Marxist communism can be seen as the end product of this process away from Aristotle. According to Aristotle, all men are in bondage due to the contrary of reason and sense. Communism is the logical outcome of the long revolt against this natural bondage.

It is the primacy of the practical intellect over the speculative. As in the 17th century presentation of the Natural Law, the appeal was to the human mind - the practical intellect - made everything operable by it.

With Marx it is the production of things that makes man the author of himself. Man produces the means of his own subsistence - this makes him author of his own history and even his life. Work is what distinguishes man from the brutes. Men can be distinguished from brutes by religion, politics or anything you like, says Marx, but they begin to distinguish themselves when they begin to produce their means of being. By producing their means of subsisting they are actually producing their own substantial life. Men define themselves by what they produce and how they produce.

Marx: in working on inorganic nature man proves that he is a cause, a generic being - relates himself to the species as to his own proper being or to himself as a generic being. Animals also produce but on ly for their own needs - they produce unilaterally; man produces universally, not only for his own species. Man produces even when free from physical need and he can be said to produce free only when free from need. Man can dominate his production.

All of this specifies man. Work unites human nature and the whole of nature.

If it is true that man is distinguished from animals by the fact that he produces - then if man is seduced into thinking that there is a spirit who governs the universe, he is alienated from his generic being. If we grant this notion of the generic being we can see all history as an abstraction or alienation of man from his generic being.

July 11, 1950

This notion of the generic being is not fully explained in Marx. He borrowed it from Feuerbach. There is much irrationality in Marx, but there is more rationality in him than in Feuerbach. It is quite difficult to take these men seriously because they are so confusing; irrational and superficial - yet they are significant in their effect.

We will present this notion as Marx did. "Don't try to find out precisely what it means for him, for it is very confusing in theory."

Marx: start with a man conceived as a conscious generic being. All history as read in the light of historical materialism has been a progressive alienation of man from his generic being due to a fundamental contradiction: between human thought and matter. This has produced various alienations: a) religion b) phil. and morals c) politics or the state. To rid man of these alienations and return him to himself as an individual generic being is to strike at the fundamental conflict between thought and matter. The last thing to

be destroyed must be religion and philosophy (for by them man is alienated in an abstract way which is the worst way); politics and economics are also alienating but they are material exterioration as opposed to abstract. Private property, e.g., man being is exteriorated by material.

Abstract: Religion and philosophy.

Alienation
Material: Politics and economics: take place in the real order, exteriorations.

Private property and state are defended by setting up the common good as prior to the individual good. This of course alienates man from his generic being.
In the last phase of the social evolution this contradiction will be resolved - the individual good will become the common good. When man has been proclaimed God there are still contradictions; politics, economics, etc. The next step is to show the identity of the individual good and the common good.

Feuerbach did not consider this notion of the generic being as new - he regarded it as the logical outcome of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Both Feuerbach and Marx despise crude materialism: They are materialist looking backward, not forward. Ahead they see finer and finer developments in materialism.

Marx: Generic being - man, unlike other animals, produces his own means of subsistence. With Feuerbach the notion was theoretical only, he proclaimed that man's intellect was infinite: to Marx this was another alienation. For Marx it all had meaning in relation to production.

Man is distinguished from brute according to his intelligence in making things. - not shackled to producing merely for his own species (this sounds like Aristotle)

From Das Kapital: Work - man controls matter. In transforming the nature outside of him man is changing his own nature in the process. Before working he is not yet a man, he becomes a man only by work - and not mere animal work - specifically human work (Marx says even spiders spin like weavers and bees build like architects) Man differs in that he has the idea in his head before he begins to work. The work realized first in head and then in matter. Man realizes himself in nature. Humanism is perfectly achieved in nature as naturalism is perfectly achieved in humanism. (Aristotle sees nature as a substitute intellect - for God) Marx has man impregnating nature with his intellect - for Marx man holds the place in the universe that belongs to God.

Evolution: Man evolved from the monkey by learning to speak. His hand was his first tool. Made tools other than his own limbs and made his stamp on nature - all this thanks to the hand. Concomitantly with his hand his brain was developing: one sees the other is useless. By domestication and breeding, man has radically changed animate nature too. He turns all to his own end.
Work or labor is the principle of all history. History begins with man.

Selon Marx, human work is the principle of all history. History begins with man and man begins when he first begins to work and produce his own means of subsistence - due to his intellect man can create and infinite number of needs and means which results in an infinite division of work.

Contradiction: the fecundity of the intellect in producing all this work deludes man into thinking that the intellect is primary - the primordial reality. Intellect separates him from the brutes, but intellect must be the servant of production. When it is separated, civilization is on the way to corruption and death.

The alienation of man begins with the division of work into (a) intellectual and manual. In this primary division is found the cause of all further alienations: religion, etc. "Consciousness can flatter itself that it is something other than consciousness ordered to work." - from German Ideologies.
The course of history is determined by forms of human production. For the mind to suppose that it is independent of production is folly and alienation - only in the service of production is it specifically human.

From the division into intellectual and manual labor rises the economic system of exploited and exploiting classes. Intellectuals will invent all sorts of reasons entirely extraneous to what they are defending in order to stay in power. They will say that the existing social order will be justified in some hereafter.
Those who hold the means of production also control ideas, for others are dependent on those means. The ruling class itself becomes divided into thinkers who perpetuate the system by ideas and the active members who passively accept the ideas and rule.
Rulers defend themselves by various immutable principles of theology or the like. The ruling class can manage to keep some semblance of their generic being - the poor exploited are really lost. This dilemma is resolved in the subordination of the intellect to material production.

It is in the state that we find the last alienation of man from his generic being - religion being gone, the last emancipation will be from the state. Now the state tries to rub out the distinctions between men, all are considered equal before the law, all can vote, etc. The state is a sort of political emancipation, yet it is not absolute for they can exist in it some who are religious, some philosophers and other crack-pots. Although politically emancipated, these poor people are still alienated. And the state in abstracting from property differences seems to imply that these differences are in themselves ok. And as the state is extraneous to the individual, it can not completely emancipate him.

In THE JEWISH QUESTION Marx speaks of man's emancipation from religion - and goes on to speak of other emancipations. In a country of political emancipation there can still be found religion - the two seem to go together. Therefore both must go, if only for that reason. Political emancipation from religion is only to the degree that those that make up the state emancipate themselves from religion. Even in an atheistic state, man is an atheist by detour - through the intermediary of the state. As men gave all their divinity to Christ, so they have given all their humanity to the state.
The perfect state is the generic being of man. To live in a state merely as a part and look on others only as means and be looked on by others as such is no good.

July 13

HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: the development of humanity by reason of its own proper cause - defines itself by reason of the difference between man and brute. Man by his intellect produces his own means of subsistence - produces his own specifically human life. The origin of man is man. From the point of view of historical materialism we can see what Marx means when he says that man causes himself.

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM: all development whether natural or human takes place because of contradiction - man produces himself but almost immediately alienates himself. Contradiction arising from the fact that intellect puts itself in contradiction to matter. The fecundity of the intellect deludes man into thinking that because intellect adds him in becoming himself, it is primary. Results into division of speculative and manual work. The generic being must be returned to itself.

1. Dialectical Materialism embraces two fundamental ideas:
 1. all reality rooted in matter - distinction in historical materialist intellect and matter? but intellect is just a superior kind of matter. The sole moving force is material needs. Spirit is Stalin: historical materialism sees nature as it is. Spirit is merely the superior product of matter. Matter nature, being these are the first given things. Spirit, conscious and the psychological forces - these are among the second given things. all progress in nature or in human affairs realized by way of contradiction.
2. Stalin: contrary to metaphysics, the dialectic tells that all things apply a contradiction: change and the like are examples of this. Dialectic studies the struggle of these contraries that are contained in the very essences of things. Rev. is natural and inevitable. From capitalism to socialism to the emancipation of the workers is something that can't be realized by slow change, but by revolution. In politics we must be revolutionists, not reformers. Put the contradictions of capitalism into play, excite them - bring about the final phase. No compromise - revolution!

Communists say that the final phase will be perfect. They cannot, however, explain what will become of this inherent contradictions in things and yet their whole view is based on this. History: contains all sorts of contradiction - violent overthrows that happen naturally - these transitions and emancipations are leading naturally and inevitably to the last phase. But within his generic being man has mere material power - he can produce and infinity of food, drink and housing.

Man is God. All hitherto divine attributes can be predicated of man. Thus man is a universal cause - he is infinite. But this infinity is a potential infinity that is related to matter. Man is the kind of God that he is - with his intellect subordinated to his material needs he can produce, produce. Rah, rah.

Human Emancipation:
 The state is the last form of alienation - man emancipated, but thru an intermediary. Ignores differences, doesn't destroy them. The total human emancipation must do away with private property. This is even closer to man than God and the state - exterioration.

July 14

The total human emancipation must do away with private property, for it is closer as an alienation than God or the state - it is a material exterioration. It is a real material expression of human power. But because material property is looked on as something to be possessed it alienates. As for atheism, communism doesn't need it. Atheism is negative, communism is affirmative: it affirms God, for man is God. Feuerbach, in a blasphemous similitude proves man's divinity by using Christ as an expression of it.

Although atheism is essential to Marxism, it is not enough. Atheism is satisfied with a negation of God, but it doesn't affirm man as God. The final stage no longer needs the intermediary of atheism - the affirmation of man as God will suffice.

Marx in POLITICAL ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY: just as atheism (the suppression of religion) is no longer necessary in the final stage, so neither is communism, which is the suppression of private property, necessary. The real life, the generic being of man not based on these negations which are suppressions of alienation will be had. Religion and private property will be self-evident as exteriorations - no suppression will be necessary.

Lenin: in the final stage the necessity of observing these simple and fundamental rules of society will pass very rapidly into a state of habititude. Which is a vague enough statement. These suppressions and negations are necessary in the interim. Communism is not the goal, not the real form of human society - merely a means. The final, human emancipation isn't to be looked for in communism - the form of society is this state of habititude (supra), where man has become a generic being. Marx is vague, but he is sharpened by the fact that the final phase will come when work isn't considered as a means to an end (of procuring the needs of human life) but where WORK ITSELF BECOMES THE FIRST NEED OF LIFE. It is by this conception that the final phase is defined.

What's work? It is usually for the sake of the first needs of life. Here it transcends human needs - man is his own need. Man is divine - he needs nothing. Generic being consists in this attitude on work. This conception of work seems, vaguely enough, to be the final phase.

A relevant (but not necessarily intelligible) point: in the final phase society won't be placed vis-a-vis the individual as now - an alienation, abstraction. Man is a social animal selon Marx, but before common good put before individual good. In final phase there will be no society as we know it but the private good of every individual will be absolutely identical with the common good. Society will be a conglomeration of individual wholes.

This whole tremendous German philosophical buildup peters out into the plain little working man working with frenzy.

When man sees that all the things that have been taken from him are himself he sees himself as a generic being.

Man to whatever degree he's an individual - no matter if his particularity is the thing that makes him an individual - is all the more the totality. He feels and thinks this generic being for its own sake.

Private property has warped us, we think something ours only when we possess it. But things are nothing - what counts is that one has produced them. Whether I think all this (consciousness of generic being) or live and work it...

Final phase: the appropriation of the substantial forces of man which have become alienated.

- In a way, it is hard to see why the suppression of private property is necessary for emancipation.
- the property of the final stage will be neither private nor communal.

((July 15))

The first step of the appropriation of human forces that have been alienated. In thought - conscious. Marx attributes this to Hegel's Phenomenology, "decomposition of philosophy and reinstatement of existing empiricism" is latent in the work of Hegel says Marx.

Religion, wealth and property are merely the reality of the objectification of man alienated into these exteriorizations. The appropriation of these spiritual things - products of the abstract spirit. All elements of criticism are found in the Phenomenology says Marx. Hegel says men as alienated even though he emphasized spirit. All these things are different exterior forces of the consciousness of self. Marx says that Hegel saw man as a real generic being.

With Hegel this appropriation is first in the conscious. Man sees that all these things are himself alienated. But this appropriation is carried out in the realm of pure spirit. Marx: Hegel begins with religion (extraneous government), destroys it, puts the concrete material world in its place, suppresses that and reinstates religion because the concrete world is essentially spirit - the consciousness of self.

Feuerbach brought about the complete appropriation of human powers. Marx: Ludwig alone made true discoveries, for he saw Hegel's negation of a negation as philosophy contradicting itself.

According to Marx Feuerbach did this:

1. Said philosophy equals religion put into thought and is therefore to be condemned equally with it.
2. Founded materialism on real science.
3. Man a negation of a negation which returns to the positive absolute. Feuerbach opposes affirmation and manifestation of self.

Marx: the forms of things have no existence in a creative intellect as might be supposed, that is in an exemplary fashion in the creative intellect, for that makes such a creative intellect the primary reality. Things exist as they are - that is their full reality (Got this from Hegel) But then Hegel denies all this and all that he denied in respect to the primary reality he denies to the human mind. He brings religion into philosophy by asserting the spirit. But little old Ludwig saw this as a negation of a negation, so he denies it and reasserts the primacy of material reality. He identifies the entitative with the intentional.

Man is what he knows. The soul is in a way all things. This identification makes man all things - man knows all and is what he knows so man is all things. (selon Aristotle man is infinite in an intentional manner). The nature of man is sensible. The intentional order is a derivation from the last given things. Therefore, the sensible nature of man is the generic being.

Whereas Feuerbach asserts the primacy of sensitive passivity, Marx on the other hand has four fingers a thumb and a wart and asserts the primacy sensitive activity.

The Essence of Christianity:

Man differs from the brute by the fact that he has religion. Why does man have religion? Because he is conscious of himself; and this is consciousness in the strict sense, consciousness of his essential being; his species is an object of thought - he is a universal, a generic being. Brutes aren't aware of themselves as a species. Man has science (which is a knowledge of species) - only a being that knows his own species can know those of others.

Feuerbach goes from man's ability to grasp a universal, to the statement that man sees himself as a universal, making science possible for him. But how does self-awareness differ from our knowledge of other things? The implication is that man knows others indirectly thru knowing himself.

But how do we know our own soul? St. Thomas tells us that we know we live and that we have a soul quite certainly - man both knows he has a soul and that its operations are within him. But it is not an object of direct experience. (De Veritate, q.1, art. 9 - I-II) no one perceives that he thinks except by thinking. This experience of ourselves as thinking is not the same as thinking.

((July 17th))

Marx uses the term generic being is a simple, borrowed way - man produces his own existence. In Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity is had a complete explanation of the term:

Man distinguished from brutes by religion and man has religion because he is conscious of himself as a species, which is necessary ground for religion. Religion is consciousness of the infinite: man is conscious of the infinity of his own species. Briefly that is Ludwig's thesis.

Ludwig immediately gets confusing by the identification of (a) knowledge of self as a species and (b) the fact that man can know universals. Says, man knows what he knows thru knowing himself. But man only knows his soul indirectly thru others. Man knows himself reflectively, and does not see himself as a species but as belonging to one.

We can know this white thing, and we can know that we know this white thing. These are two different experiences: in the latter the object is given indirectly. The same is true of the knowledge we have of ourselves in any self-conscious activity. To know ourselves knowing something, that something must be other than ourselves. The experience of knowing ourselves knowing a universal has the act of knowing, not the universal, as object.

Man doesn't know himself as a universal but as belonging to one. Man is not Sortes and Sortes knows it. No being composed of matter and form can be its own species. (meta. VII, #1520-2) Universals are taken from individuals. Universal man is not a principle of existence nor a substance.

Our knowledge of man thru the universal, animal, is quite confused. "That which is common to many is not something beside these many except logically."

cf. Contra Gentes I, cap. 26:

universale in praedicando (a re) - aside of many and is in many in essendo.
universale in causando (in re) - not in many, but its power extends to many.

Around other things, Feuerbach confused these two types of universal.

(cf. meta VI, lec. 3, "1207-9) Universale in causando = universale in re and not a re.

Man can produce many, many things. He is a universal cause, but not a proper one. He can produce Sortes, Jr., but not the universal man - if he could he would be the cause of himself.

In the order of causality: the more universal is the more determinate and distinct.
In the order of predication: the more universal is less determinate and more confused.

Man and brute are subjective parts of animal. Animal, in the logical order is as form to them. Plato confused these universals, too. He gave his universal a separate existence and individuals were only weak participations of the universal. Thus Plato rendered real the universale in praedicando which is only an instrument of knowledge.

Feuerbach gives the single material individual a concrete universality. "Man aware of himself as a universal." And F. takes this single material individual a univ. in causando. "Man" can be considered a univ. in causando as the formal cause of singular material individuals. But "man" hasn't concrete existence.

((July 18th))

The first confusion in F. is between univ. in praedicando et in causando. He tried to make man the latter: man knows he belongs to species and is not in se the species, however.
Univ. in praedicando et essendo has no reality outside of the many in which it is. Univ. in causando: power extends to many effects and it is not opposed to singularity as is the first.

univ. in praed.: said of many

Man (species)

univ. in causando: the formal principle of sing. existence.

Now what is Ludwig's reason for making the material singular individual a universale in causando? He is interested in reversing the relation of proper and common being. St. Thomas of course named God as the universale in causando, for He is the most determinate and proper being. And this is what Ludwig would make man.

As we proceed from the proper to the common, we do so by means of specific determination. Animal can't be without the differences rational or irrational. Considered in their very universality specific natures can have things added to them, and because they can receive they can't be lost in causando.

Little Ludwig takes that which receives the last addition as the most proper 1st he makes individual man a universale in causando and then 2nd he identifies the proper being of God with the proper being of man. Proper being of God: nothing can be added.
Proper being of man: the most proper and determinate of material things.

The common or universal can't be without some addition: e.g. animal + rational and irrational.
The idea of proper being must be analogical. In the order of imposition, man is first called proper-being, more known quoad nos. BUT AS A PROPER BEING HE CONTAINS SOMETHING COMMON, i.e. animal; he is proper 1st in imposition, but not in reality. The common has no existence outside of material singular determinations.

*3rd Ludwig says that the nature of man is formally infinite. "The essence of man consists in the consciousness of his own infinite self." Religion is, then, an expression of man's self-consciousness of his own infinity.
"The form by which man exists is the same as that by which he knows all things." F. (cf. Ia, q. 3, art. 5)

Already seen that Feuerbach has confused the universal in predicando with the universal in causando.

His next step: that cause which is 1st in predicando and causando (according to St. Thomas=God) man is the most proper and determinate being. (God-since he cannot have addition or multiplication to exist). So man according to his species exists without further multiplication or addition.

Universal in predicando (for Feuerbach) and then he paradoxically says: it does not exist except by abstraction. Thus, in the order of material things the last differentiation is found in the animal. Thus specific nature considered in abstraction of universality cannot be conceived without addition.

Man has a common genus with animal although he be the most determinate and proper being, is not strictly speaking the most determinate and proper for he contains this common genus with other species.

The idea of proper being must be analogical. A proper being, in respect to the imposition of the name, has something in common; it is that outside of any genus and species. Proper here not first in the nature of reality, as the last determinate being in some common genus (analogy in re).

Man being then (to Feuerbach) the most proper being should then be the infinite. The perfection of that being proper must contain the perfection of all genera (again intentional confused with the entitative)

Consciousness of the infinity of one's nature is the object of his consciousness. The form therefore by which he exists is the form by which he knows all else (always based heavily on St. Thomas) c. 1e, q. 54, art. 2.

Man's act of understanding by remaining in the agent's nature; denotes the agent's very being. The being of man is rational. By extending to the true, convertible with being, man has a nature of some nature of infinity."

Feuerbach shows that man's nature itself is infinity.

St. Thomas, "all man's acts of understanding has respect to infinity absolute; it is not restricted to his nature, since that being is restricted to one in genus and species."

Feuerbach is interested in establishing the point that man is universal in causando. Man conscious of himself as infinite and thereby knowing all things. At this point he rejects the fact that a universal exists apart from any determination. If that cause in universality is the most proper and determinate cause, how can it exist except to be made individual.

As most proper and determinate being, Feuerbach will make use of the other notion of God, unrestricted in genus and species, a cause absolutely first. He knows all genus and species, infinite knowledge.

What Feuerbach does: He eliminates God; he predicates of man that is said of God. Absolute, first, infinite, and conscious of himself. But to

do this, we not only have to predicate of man the things said of God, we must predicate of God the things said of man.

Then common genus is still said of man as existing outside of any genus and species. (Feuerbach complete confusion and paradox...)

1.) The being which divides into genera. the being to which something is added, everything contained under a genus is composed of the genus and of the difference which, added to the genus, makes the species and makes them differ in being.

2.) The being which is predicable of all things. (being in general) said to have nothing added to it in the sense that it does not require that anything should be added to it. As for example: the essence of animal is without reason and does not require that anything be added to it yet reason may be added. This has no real existence as such apart from the specific natures of which it is predicated. If one wishes to consider it as having existence of itself it is by negative abstraction.

3.) The being of God. said also to have nothing added to it in the sense that it's essence precludes any addition. Because being and essence are in God the same, the being of God is said to have nothing added to it but the being which divides into genera has being and essence that are not the same for all members in a genus differ in their being.

cf. Br 1, chap. 25, 26. Contra Gentiles.

Being predicable of all things is not the cause of the distinction of all things. The being pred. of all things has no formal term except attached to finite and specific natures but the infinite (of Feuerbach) he is interested in fixing upon the form of man conceived as its own essence and existing outside of a genus.

Feuerbach doesn't say that God is the common being or pred. being, but man is God.

St. Thomas citing the mistake of many- "some realizing that there is a Divine Being to which nothing is added say that it exists as the common being of all things, but fail to see that to this common being something is added."

The relation of man's intellect to the most common being.

The latter is the 1st object of human mind; so a certain adequation between most confused and universal with man's intellect. It is the most purely potential concept (no actuality apart from consideration of specific natures) which best reflects the pure potentiality of the most perfect intelligences.

Feuerbach's Irony: to take that which is the least in intellectual existence and crown it as the highest of intellectual existence.

If the last of the differentia of genera is proper being, how is this proper being going to rise above the genera and species except that its intellectual power be recognized as a universal cause of the genera and species.

Since the being in pure community is the 1st object of the human intellect in the procession of human knowledge, since removed from all genera and species by negative abstraction (though not existing

without finite beings) since the human being knowing this 1st knows all the genera included and therefore the human intellect then is the plenitude of being where thought is identified with being.

--That belongs to man's operation?

Feuerbach: Man's nature - power of knowing, therefore immanent operation of knowledge. "Science is a cognizance of nature etc." Sete brute a simple, and man a twofold life (inner and outer) inner life-relation to man's species.

St. Thomas (quoted by Feuerbach) Ia, q. 14, art. 1.

"We must note that knowing beings are distinguished from non-knowing for the latter have only their own forms, and the former can have other forms. That is why the Philosopher says the soul contains all things."

Feuerbach says two things:

1. With man it is by his own species by which other things are so.
2. That is so because the species of man is infinite in its nature.

There is a relation between the infinite and cognitive power for Feuerbach and this has reference in some manner to universal forms.

A caterpillar does not extend itself beyond its narrow domain. The limit of the nature is the limit of its consciousness. Contraction of a form comes through matter. Cognition comes from degrees of immateriality.

St. Thomas Ia, q. 14, art. 1.

The eye does not become colored from seeing color.

Feuerbach: It is one thing to have some knowledge of an infinite being and another to know one's own species.

1. not to know an infinite being.
2. has a knowledge of an infinite being.
3. consciousness of himself as an infinite being.

Feuerbach says "the caterpillar has no admiration (faint resemblance) of an infinite being, but man has consciousness of himself as such a being." Really the caterpillar hasn't an admiration and that is all man has.

((July 20th))
The relation between infinity and cognitive power and universal form:

Ludwig: Man is infinite because he can know universals, knows self as a universal species. Man expresses himself fully when he knows his own nature.

- a) man knows everything thru his own species.
- b) and this, because his species is infinite.

(In his reasoning, F. is avowedly making use of traditional doctrine)

The example of man and the caterpillar:

Man can know all things and can therefore be all things. The degree of immateriality is the degree of cognition. Man can naturally receive the forms of other things, and the nature of non-knowing beings is more restricted and limited. The contraction of form comes thru matter - Ludwig says that man, because he can know the universal, is higher. Insofar as forms are more immaterial they approach infinity. The immateriality of a thing is what is knowable.

Species can be received without matter selon three degrees:

Natural and intentional immutation: the latter is not a substantial change. When I see color, the eye doesn't actually receive the form of color, doesn't become green. Color is received in a corporeal organ but not according to a corporeal qualification. The living thing operates thru a corporeal organ but not with corporeal qualification - this is the lowest immateriality.

Ludwig: caterpillar has neither an admiration nor a consciousness of an infinite being. The implication is, you must have an infinite nature in order to know one.

One notes the ready ambiguity of Feuerbach's terminology: later on he says that no being is to itself limited. "The least on which the caterpillar lives is for it an infinite space." But a finite being can't have even an admiration of infinity? If you know the infinite, you are infinite.

Now, it is true that only a being that can know the specific forms of things can know infinity. The sense-knowledge of the caterpillar is limited to individual forms as existing in individuals, and he can't possibly have knowledge of the infinite. Its action is terminated by corporeal matter.

But in man, says Ludwig, there is no such contraction of the matter. Because unrestricted by matter, man can know the infinite, universal

St. Thomas: The power of the intellect has infinity absolutely when compared to sense-knowledge - can extend to all beings. The intellect is infinite in power, but only potentially. A material infinite.

I, q. 86, art. 2: can our intellect know the infinite?

Infinity: with regard to matter (imperfect)
with regard to form (perfect)

The more immaterial things approach a more perfect infinity.

No matter

Intelligible matter

Common matter

sense-knowledge

- a form not contracted by any matter, nor in any species would be pure intellect, absolutely infinite: God. F. would make man this.
- but man can know his own form only by regarding it as knowing something else. Can't know himself thru himself.

to be able to know } both due to immateriality.
to be able to be known }

The forms of natural things aren't subsistent - they are contracted by matter in varying degrees. (contra Gentiles I, cap. 44) The whole of nature is a participation of intelligence.

If the forms of natural things were subsistent:

- 1) they would be actually intelligible.
- 2) would be their own formal principle.

((July 21st))

Essence of Christianity by Ludwig Feuerbach.

part one: The essence of man.
All things that were formerly predicated of God can be properly predicated of man. God is man.

part two: The essence of religion.
What is specifically human is properly divine (the opposite of one) F. hails gross, sensuous qualities as proper to God. He doesn't want an infinite God, but a finite, sensuous, material god. Human attributes are divine.

Recapitulation

1. F. confuses the being of common predicability (the being of pure community) with the being of God.
2. Since the mind first knows being of pure community, F. identifies it with that plenitude of being where thought = being.
3. His identity of the being of pure community with the proper being of God was not accomplished by those who gave the incommunicable names to wood and stones; F. sees that God is universale in causando, not universale inpredicando - so he makes man the univ. in caus. which is God.

Ludwig doesn't scruple to exploit the indeterminateness of the being of pure community. If it = God and it is the first thing known by the intellect and man is God then man is the 1st universale in causando. He sees that the being of pure community has no formal term except as attached to individual natures. It is infinite only when separated from formal termination.

There remains nothing, then, but determinate natures and man has the most proper being; he is absolutely infinite because he can know all things. But man's infinity is tied to individual things.

If the formal infinite (God) is unknowable in se, so also material infinity is unknowable in se - infinite only when freed from termination.

So God is unknowable. But material infinity is knowable to our intellect because of our intellect's infinity. But this material infinity is only potential in things - has no actual existence. The formal infinity of God becomes more indeterminate.

Man can potentially know the infinite. This infinity depends on our knowledge. Formal infinity is caused by man. (the wedding of the real and intentional orders.)

The predication of gross, sensuous qualities of God. (cf. I-II, q. 22 and 23).

Selon Ludwig the more active a thing the more passive it is. And the sensitive is more passive than the intellect - hence higher. Passion is the epitome of perfection - both the sufferer of pain and of pleasure.

Generic being of man:

1. Ludwig: SENSIBLE PASSIVITY * UNIVERSAL PASSION.
2. Marx: disagrees with Ludwig - for him the stress was on man as an agent. Calls Ludwig too contemplative..

That which is more active by the potency of man - man's divinity is pure potency; pure act is really what is most potential - intellect? No, the sensible appetite is even more passive. Intensity depends on both the power of the agent and the passivity of patient.

...sic transit gloria mundi.

THE PREDICAMENTS

Texts for the course:

-Cajetan "Commentaria de Predicamentis Aristotelis."
-John of St. Thomas "Cursus Philosophicus" tome 1, part 2, 9. 13-20
-St. Albert "Opera Omnia" tome 1, book 2 Liber Predicamentis

(use of Cajetan primarily; also comparison of other authors)

First Consideration:

The nature, object and division of Logic. A brief consideration of the first operation and also Porphyry's "Predicables".

Nature of Logic.

Cf. St. Thomas Post. Analytics, Bk. 1, les. 1, paragraph 1.

Logic is an art. Man lives by reason and art. Hence, there exists a number of arts to direct reason. Art is the ordering of reason by which acts can be directed to their ends.

For man to proceed easily and without error in his own reasoning=Logic

St. Thomas also calls logic a science; scientia rationis.

Cf. J. of St. Thomas, "Ars Logica" thome 1, part 2, 2. 1, art. 2

Scientia=habitus which is required and applies demonstration. Logic is a science and an art (yet liberal). Logic has demonstrative acts so it is a scientific habitus. e.g. proven by the 1st principle that a thing is either true or not true.

There is a great difficulty here; i.e. in being an art and a science. Since logic is an art directing the intellect it can be said to be only an instrument of science.

J. of St. Thomas answers: it is "objective, not formaliter" an instrument of science.

Object of logic=the instrument for which we have science. Formally a science which comes from demonstration by mode of science. The two are formally distinct and irreducible.

Cf. Ethics, bk. 6, les. 3, no. 143.

Intellectual virtue=that by which the soul is said to be true.

1. art 2. prudence 3. science 4. wisdom 5. understanding (of principles)
Practical virtue=art and prudence; speculative virtue=wisdom, understanding and science.

Logic seems to have two habitus. One practical, and the other speculative. If this were true it would destroy Logic.

It must be an art of such a nature as to still be a science. An art which is still a habitus of the speculative intellect.

The liberal art (opposed to servile art) is concerned with the speculative intellect. Art=recta ratio facillimum.
So, logic as liberal art is only art according to analogy.

...logic.

...the predicaments

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St. Thomas: Art-application to things made. Because the speculative reason makes thing, i.e. syllogism and propositions etc. (the immanent operation of the mind) it is a speculative art. Not "primo et per se" though, which is servile art.

Logic, then, is primarily a science and not opposed to art. To know its nature it is necessary to examine its object.

The Object of Logic. (sciences are specified by their objects)

The formal object opposed to the material subject. (It is the "light" and the material subject is studied. The quod, the ratio quae attingitur. 2nd intentions.

Cf. St. Albert: Argumentation is the subject of Logic. The end of Logic to make known what was previously unknown. Argumentation: any discourse whether it produces what is certain, probable, or only seemingly true, i.e. either demonstrative, dialectic, induction, enthymeme, example or metaphor.

Anything used in the make-up of argumentation is included in Logic, so also the simple comprehension and judgment.

We must study these in a different aspect than the natural Philosopher for apprehension, judgment and argumentation as operations of the mind are pertaining to the "de Anima."

The formality concerned in the operations of the mind must be deduced from the end of Logic (unknown becomes known). End-to direct the mind that it acquires knowledge easily and without error.

Because of its imperfection, human reason, the mind, must use an apparatus of relations in regard to the objects of knowledge. (as opposed to the intelligence of angels).

e.g. enunciation-man is rational (judgment here)

-subject-man; species

-predicate-rational; difference of species.

These are not real relations affecting man's existence but they come from our mode of knowing.

(major) Since logic is the art of directing reason to truth- (minor) and reason makes relations as to objects of knowledge.

(concl.) True knowledge follows the correct use of these relations.

This conclusion is based on Ethics bk. 1, les 1, no 1-3

To order belongs to the wise man. If sensitive power can know things for certain, then wisdom can order these. Four kinds of order:

1. order which reason doesn't make but only considers. e.g. order of natural things; they already exist.

2. the order that reason introduces in the act of consideration, in the act of knowing.

3. the order that reason introduces in the operation of the will.

4. the order that reason introduces in the things of which it is the cause. e.g. artificial things.

There will be as many habits, sciences, as there are orders.

Rational Philosophy: to consider the parts of discourse in respect to the conclusion. The order that reason makes in its own act of knowing.

of considering. This order is not the same as the order in the things, or the order in the will or artificial things. "It is the order of the This order is well described by St. Thomas. "It is the order of the concepts one to another." - "it is the order of the parts of discourse one to another and to the conclusions."

To know is to become the other through representation. The apprehension is done in a concept. The concept represents the thing known.

The judgment is the affirmation or negation of a subject and predicate in a uniting fashion (of two or more concepts).

Argumentation-syllogistic discourse.

This representation must follow a certain pattern, order. This happens by the making of relations by reasoning.

These relations order the representation of the object, not the objects themselves. These are fictions; they are not real. They are not arbitrary; they are somewhat based on reality.

If the material subject is the operations of the mind, the formal object, the ratio quae attingitur-the relations which reason form of the objects known as known.

Cf. Prior Analytics bk.1, les. 20, no. 5.

Common principles in metaphysics-being, its parts and passions. In logic all this with the intentions of reason which contains everything.

The object of Logic-those intentions of reason which concern everything. Intention= (in-tendere) the term of the act of knowing. So any representation of the object is called an intention.

Yet St. Thomas does not ascribe all intentions to the object of Logic Only those that concern everything.

Intention can represent an object in two different ways:

-as it is in itself.

-as known, already represented.

e.g. man-represents this man (non-logical intention) other intentions represent the objects as known, as already represented. Species under a genus.

Logic will consider those intentions which concern everything. They order the objects, the 1st intentions. (another example of 2nd intentions) subject and predicate.

This text supported the previous text, i.e. the Ethics.

To order the act of knowing is to order the representations that reason makes of the real objects.

Since it is an ordering by reason, it will be as an ordering by further representation, intentions. They extend to many objects implied by the 1st intentions and will necessarily be by means of relations.

Another text: Meta. bk. 4, les. 4, no. 574.

Metaphysics considers common things in a demonstrative way, and so there is certainty. Being of reality.

Dialectic from same things has only probability. Ens rationis; proper

subject of logic extends to everything to which real being is predicated. The object of logic here: those intentions that reason discovers in the objects considered. Not found in the nature of things but found in the consideration itself.

Since logic is the liberal art which directs the mind in its operation to attain the truth, apprehension, judgment and argumentation will concern the logician but from another aspect as the Natural Philosopher. Nat. Phil. treats them as operations and parts of the soul.

These will concern the logician only as they are artificially ordered by the mind itself in order to obtain the truth. This can be deduced from the end of logic. Artificial-made by reason.

-3rd day-

It is necessary to know the object of logic to place the Predicaments. They are not 2nd intentions but still are contained in logic by Aristotle.

Logic=the order that reason makes in its own act of knowing (St. Thomas)

John of St. Thomas He is precise in defining 2nd intentions. They signify certain relations which do not affect the objects as such but follow the consideration of reason.

These relations are not real, but owe their existence to reason itself and are properly called "ens rationis."

Being is of two kinds: real being and being of reason. Being of reason is that being which depends somewhat on the reason. This dependence may be in two different ways:

1. as an effect from its cause, either efficient or material cause. e.g. the artificial thing with reason as the efficient cause; habitus, act of the mind, science, with reason as the material cause.

2. as for its own nature of object so that it has no being outside of reason that forms them. This being is called most properly "ens rationis" as opposed to real being. This is of two kinds: (De Veritate, q. 21, art. 1)

a. Negations and privations as its make-up.

b. Made up of relations. Relation is an accident; this accident in order to be one of reason must exist only in the apprehension of the objects and not in the objects themselves.

These relations are of two kinds:

1.) some relations, although completely made up by reason and corresponding to nothing real in the object are yet applied to the object as object.

e.g. God as creator of creatures. (The causing of relations are in the first place due to our imperfection in the way of knowing.)

2.) applied to the object known as known. Since these order the representations of objects, these take the name logical relations of reason.

e.g. man is a species, noun.

Since the word "intention" signifies the term of the act of knowing, any representation of the object by the mind is called intention.

These are of two kinds, called 1st or 2nd intentions according to posteriority in the act of knowing, representing.

1st intention=any intention representing the object as it is in itself or as we conceive it to be in itself. e.g. God as creator.

2nd intention=any intention representing the object as known, precisely as known. This is to show a second, posterior step in knowing. So, it is called a logical relation of reason, for they alone are formed over intentions.

So, also 2nd intentions can be ordered by other second intentions; we proceed "modo logico."

Hence, the definition of 2nd intentions: A relation of reason based on the object known as known." (J. of St. Thomas)

Therefore, logic= the liberal art which considers 2nd intentions. liberal art=habit of the speculative, and so a science which considers 2nd intentions; the end specifying this science.

This definition explains the full nature and object of logic. The other definitions were given not signifying the full nature.

* The Division of Logic:

I Since the act of knowing is terminated in the 1st intentions and 2nd intentions are relations of reason based on 1st intentions; according as there can be distinguished in the 1st intentions a matter and a form, we shall distinguish two groups of 2nd intentions which shall accordingly be studied in two different parts of logic.

Material Logic; Formal Logic.

Second intentions - (Material and formal logic)
First intentions (matter and form)

* I

The first division of logic corresponds to the division of the material subject of logic. The second intentions shall be divided according to the acts of knowing themselves.

1. simple apprehension
2. judgment
3. argumentation

So logic of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd operations of the mind.

To know is to become the other by representation. This means that objects in simple apprehension are represented by concepts. In the 2nd operation the connection or disconnection of concepts are represented by the composition and division that the mind makes of the concepts done with the copula "is". The co-existence of real objects is represented by the inferential movement of argumentation.

matter=thing signified as signified
form=the representation, signification

In all operations of the mind there will be two sets of 2nd intentions

ions. Some: based on objects signified as signified; others: based on the mode of signification through which the object is signified.

Form--

1st operation: signification
2nd operation: enunciation
3rd operation: syllogism
-object signified as signified
-proposition
-demonstration

Cf. Laval Theologie & Philosophie. Vol II, no. 1, p. 181.
"Notion of Formal Logic" by Bernard Flynn (St. Thomas College, Minn)
e.g. material logic-the logical universal, species
formal logic-noun, predicate.

III

Logic of the third operation is divided further into four parts. For the act of argumentation may take place in different matter, i.e. necessary (analytics), probable (dialectics) true-seeming (rhetoric and poetics) and false (sophistic elenchus).

1. Demonstration-science-dém. syllogism
2. Dialectics-opinion-dial. syllogism
3. Rhetoric-persuasion-enthymemes and example.
4. Poetics-metaphor, minima doctrina
4. Sophistic refutations: although reason is directed to truth, falsehood is possible-the will enters in with reason. The Sophist-intention to appear to be true regardless of where the truth lies.
Logic must in searching for truth know how to avoid and refute error.
1. Logic of 1st operation: Predicaments (Porphyry's "Predicables")
Both material logic.
2. Logic of the 2nd oper.: Perihemenias
Formal logic.
3. Logic of the 3rd oper.: Formal-Prior Analytics (syllogism)
Material-Posterior Analytics (demonstration)
Poetics, Rhetoric & Dialectics.
4. Sophistic Refutations.

As far as "ordo procedendi" is concerned, logic is in any other science must begin by that which is more known to us as well as that which is more general so as not to repeat ourselves constantly.
(cf. Bk. 1, Physics)

It is clear then that logic of 1st operation precedes the 2nd, and that the 3rd. It is clear also that formal precedes the material.

Question: does one proceed by the formal part of each operation and then material; or by each operation in which is formal

the 1st course-followed by J. of St. Thomas (Ars Logica) as well as by most manuals.
the 2nd course-advocated by St. Albert from the end of logic. "Liber Predicabilium" les 1, pp. 5.

"The function of logic to determine the principles by which that unknown may become known. Things that reason knows are complex and

incomplex; the complex are made up of incomplex things.

The understanding of incomplex things is terminated in the definition which gives the nature, quod quid est, quiddity. So, logic must direct this understanding with the art of definition. The Predicables and Predicaments are part of this art of definition. Now, this belongs to material logic as the ordering of the definition gives the parts of the nature.

About the complex things: a complex thing is nothing more than two or more incomplex things put together by reason. Reason knows an unum not quod sunt. In this way differing from the first operation it is then said to be true or false insofar as it signifies "what is" or "what is not".

Logic must determine the rules which determine these compositions of the mind, first insofar as the interpretations of these are concerned-it does so in the Perihemenias. Secondly as far as the justification of those compositions and divisions as used in the syllogism-logic will regulate first the form (Prior Anal.) and then matter of argumentation (in the remaining books).

In the 2nd operation; form-enunciation, matter-proposition. This gives us rules for the attainment of truth. It seems that regulating from the form will in the 3rd operation be the only source of rules for truth because the justification of the judgment follows the third operation. So it seems that there is no book for the formal part of the 2nd operation.

St. Albert's division suggests that we must study each operation in order and what is formal in each. If no formal book, then we begin with the book of material logic. An example and sign of this: it is impossible to study the Prior Anal. (formal part) without the study of the Predicables (material part).

6th Day-----

NEW REMARKS ON LOGIC OF THE FIRST OPERATIONS:

The only logical book of 1st intentions-the Predicaments (mat. logic). Porphyry felt the need of the Predicables for an understanding of Arist.

Should these two be preceded by a book of formal logic of the 1st operation? John of St. Thomas seems to think so; the first part of "Ars Logica" is presented as an introduction- the "Summulae"-three parts. Second intentions which concern the first operation-the definition of the term, definition and division of the sign, the divisions of the term; noun and verb. It is clear that the noun and verb are 2nd intentions which regard the first operation; they are symbols of things.

Signs-generic notions by which we define each of the three. As the first operation can be considered in itself, or accidentally, in relation to another operation, so the 2nd intentions can concern these likewise. In the latter case; those second intentions must be studied in relation to the other operations in view of which they are of themselves formed in the first place. If not, in a special book of the 1st operation. Now, to decide in which book of logic we shall study the second intentions-noun, verb, and sign.

e.g. subject and predicate. If the concepts are not composed or divided in the mind, noun and verb concern the 1st operation but only in relation to interpretation or enunciation of which they are composing parts. Hence the Perihemenias (cf. bk 1, les. 1, no. 3) as it belongs to any science studying the parts.

Term-major and minor of argumentation-must be studied as parts of the syllogism in Prior Analytics. So, the term, noun, and verb cannot be considered in the 1st operation but in these other books.

-----Consideration of how the 1st operation is capable of direction and regulation at all.

Cajetan "Introduction to Predicaments" makes some consideration of the intention, division, utility, order, place and mode of proceeding of the book.

Intention must be taken from the General intention of Logic of which in it is a part. Logic-to make operation of reason correct, easy and prompt (main intention). The function of any art, as a virtue-to rectify the operation, as a habitus-to render it easy and prompt. It is rather difficult to see how the first operation can be directed or regulated at all since simple understanding doesn't involve truth or falsehood and truth is the proper perfection of the mind. The operation of the mind will be rectified, correct, when true.

If it has relation to true only in so far as pertaining to truth in 2nd and 3rd operations, then no proper directing or regulating. It is difficult to see how the Predicaments could do just so.

Cajetan suggests and answer: if per se understanding of objects needs no regulation or direction since there is not possibility of error, yet there can be a directing and regulating on the part of the object understood so that their understanding be made easy and prompt. The according to Cajetan this is exactly what the Predicaments do. The objects are presented by the senses to the intellect in a confused way; so if we classify them under distinct genera, their passions etc their understanding will be made easy and prompt.

So, by accident, in relation to the second operation, the 1st operation shall be regulated by the art of definition, of which the book of the predicables is a part also.

The place of this book in logic is "first simpliciter". It precedes the art of the definition. Its utility is taken in view of the art of definition and demonstration.

Its mode of proceeding is inductive rather than demonstrative.

John of St. Thomas in the Ars Logica is similar to Cajetan and is Cajetan's authority.

St. Albert-Liber Pred. chap. 1

He differs from Cajetan to the place of this book considerably. Incomplete-knowledge of the unknown by definition. Complex-knowledge of the unknown by demonstration.

1st act-ordering of things one to another.
2nd act-composing " " " "
3rd act-reasoning " " " "

1st act-simple understanding, act of reason which orders things one to another. It is perfected first by forms capable of being ordered. In the Predicaments we must order all things capable of predication.

This ordering is done in two ways:

1. forming of forms by which to order things (treats of universality and predicability).
2. ordering of things according to those forms (predicaments).

According therefore to St. Albert the Predicaments follows the predicables and does not precede it as says Cajetan.

It is clear then that Logic of the 1st operation must direct, i.e. give rules and principles by which the mind can obtain perfect knowledge of incomplete and indivisible things (as both Cajetan and St. Albert say).

There exists perfect knowledge of things when the mind obtains easily and promptly the truth. But since there is no composition nor division in itself operation; no question of truth, therefore no regulating at all is possible. If there is to be any direction it will be from the part of the object known to render understanding prompt and easy. By accident (in relation to truth) it will be directed by the art of definition.

Cajetan was inexact in his direction per se and per accidens, i.e. he was mainly in error in his division per se and per accidens of the 1st operation.

M.B. St. Thomas, Meta. bk. 9, les. 11, no. 1901, 1909.

St. Thomas shows that intelligence in the understanding of simple things can be said to be "quodam modo" (in a certain way) true. True? when it obtains the quiddity of a thing-this is given by the definition, the term of the first operation. Not true in the strict sense; that is why the definition is good or bad, not true or false.) quodam modo true-the verification of the thing can only be made in reference to the defined. Only true in potency as it can be composed with the defined; e.g. man is rational animal.

But the goodness of a definition is called "quodam modo" veritatis. (St. Thomas) and everything that can obtain this goodness, truth, belongs to the first operation per se, not by accident as Cajetan says. That which would belong to it per accidens would be its relation to the 2nd or 3rd operation.

M.B. The act of understanding (1st oper.) described in the "De Anima" as being the informing of the possible intellect by the "intelligible species" which represents the object.

The intelligible species is formed by the "illumination" intellectus agentis on the phantasm. This simply means that the intelligible species is formed by the universalization, immaterialization of the phantasm by the agent intellect.

The object is still sensible in the phantasm.

To understand, or define a thing is nothing but to order things in their immateriality and universality. Cf. St. Albert; to understand=to order thing one to another.

The regulation of logic of this order will follow those two steps:

1. must determine the forms or relations of universality (Predicables)
2. logic must consider the objects themselves under the relations of universality.

All this is per se - it directs the ordering of understanding itself. So the art of definition does per se and in itself direct the 1st operation.

The first operation in relation to the 2nd and 3rd operation can be regulated by accident. e.g. since the proper passion of universality is predicability, in relation to the 2nd oper. it is accidental. Logical universal in the 2nd operation=predicable.

July 16

Logic renders act of mind right. And truth is the rightness of the mind. To know a thing is to know what it is - its definition. Logic regulates the operation of the mind so that it attains good definition. And it is necessary to order out act of understanding.

The intelligible species are drawn from the phantasms - a universalisation.

- We must know:
1. the forms by which things are understood: determination of the intentions of universality.
 2. then we determine things according to these intentions.

To be more complete, the book concerned with the 1st operation should include a work on definition - for a full understanding. For logic orders the understanding so that we know a thing completely and fully. To know a stone merely as a hard object, is not complete knowledge of it, and is indeed potentially false, in the minor proposition of a demonstration, for instance, it could lead to error

Full and complete and correct definitions are essential to demonstration. Definitions are quodammodo veritas. If they are false, conclusions will be false

To define a thing is nothing else but the ordering of something in its proper degree of universalization. The definition is made up of the genus and specific difference.

In order to arrive at what the stone is the ordering of logic is necessary. The subject of the book of the Predicables is made up of those things by which the ordering is done. Porphyry studies these universals as predicables (ordered to the 2nd operation) and deduces the rules of predication that follow the use of these.

The book of the Predicaments is not concerned with 2nd intentions as such, but with real things - 10 categories. However, the consideration remains completely logical, for it studies real things only in so far as they are ordered by the relations of reason (predicables).

The aspect of the categories that interest us is the fact that they are supreme genera. And when we talk of 1st and 2nd substance we will

define them in terms of predicability (in a subject and not predicated of a subject). So that the ratio quae attribuitur (the formal object: quod) is always the ordinabilitas of things - hence remains logical.

The Predicaments, then, follow the Predicables and precede the non-existent book on definition. These 3 books belong per se to the 1st operation because they enable us to ~~define~~ use our understanding completely and correctly.

Predicables:

relations of universality. What is the notion of universal? (Ars logica, part 2, article 3): the concept 'universal' signifies a relation to many and is opposed to the singular which is not communicable to many. This notion is realized in three kinds of universal:

- a) universale in significato - the sign which signifies the universal itself - e.g. man.
- b) universale in causando - the cause by which a virtue extends to many ethics - e.g. God
- c) universale in essendo seu praedicando - had a relation to many in which it is and of which it is said.

Is defined: unum in multis est de multis.
unum = subject of universality. This unity is necessary, must be distinct/and separate from many.
in multis = term of the relation.
de multis = proper passion; predicability follows universality as its proper passion.

That which is apt to be in many is a nature. Hence the name, metaphysical universal - a nature abstracted from the singulars and having consequently an aptitude of communicability to those singulars. In the metaphysical universal the universality is only a condition of the nature following its state of being known by the mind. The relation of universality founded on a nature known as known is nothing but a logical universal. Metaphysical universal has a relation to many.

The metaphysical universal is a nature in the state of universality - in a state of abstraction from singulars in which it is found. This state follows our way of knowing. The logical universal is that because of which a nature is said to be in the state of universality - the efficient cause of this is our way of knowing. De Ente, cap 4: Nature found in three states or conditions:

1. That of a nature in se when considered only what essentially constitutes this nature without its accidental predicates - a state of indifference to universality or singularity.
2. Nature existing as singular.
3. As existing in mind: metaphysical universal. Neither sing. of univ. are essential predicates of the nature itself.

Any relation that happens to the nature from the fact that it is known is necessarily a relation of reason. e.g. logical universal = nature as known.

Two aspects of the same thing:

- a) metaphysical universal: the nature in se object.
- b) logical universal: ordered to the 2nd operation.

We study the predicaments as capable of being ordered by predicables.

Individuum vagum: to a certain extent it is a logical universal, but not strictly. If, e.g., "a man" = universal nature, it does so according to a mode of individuation which doesn't realize fully the in multis of the notion of universality.

Equivocal (man in many) and analogical aren't strictly speaking universals either.

aequivocans (canis)

aequivocum

aequivocata (that which is signified)

The analogical is signified partly under one reason and partly under another: e.g. being of substance and accidents.

Logical universals are restricted to natures which are one in many in such a way that they are said of those many univocally. Happens in five ways (predicables). Logical universals are signified by the name: PREDICABLES.

The division of the logical universals into five will be good if it proceeds by immediate members opposed by contradiction.

St. Albert, De predicamentis, cap. 9: that which is in many and said of many can be so either according to something substantial in the thing of which it is said or according to something accidental.

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St. Albert: (contd) 1. If it is something in many things and said of many things according to something substantial, the predicate gives either the whole essence (species) or part of it (potential part=genus; actual part=spec. difference).

Those are immediate members of the division of universals. Everything that is either substantial or accidental. It is either as principium (act) or principiatum (whole) the effects of principles, the composition of mobile being.

2. Something in many things and said of many things as accidental: it can be as accident of the common nature (that which is not substance) or accident of the individual (predicable accident, common accident, accidental predicate).

Accident as opposed to substance = a being.

Accident as in a substance = a mode of being.

So, there are five predicables.

CF. ISAGOGE (Introduction) to Predicaments.
Porphyry gives definitions of each predicable, gives their properties and deduces rules of predication.

As to the definitions of the 5 predicables many things must be taken into consideration-remember therefore:

1. The logical universals are relations of reason. Since being of reason is conceived in the manner of real being it has a certain nature or essence which can be expressed in a definition in the same way as for the real beings. Consequently it must be defined by a genus and specific difference or that which takes its place.

2. That being a relation it is an accident, but accordingly are not defined the same way as substances. Cf. Ieta. (Only substances defined primo et per se; the accidents, since their essence consists in being in a subject, there is necessary that there enter into the definition of accident something not of the essence of accident). Consequently, the metaphysical universal shall enter into the def. of the logical universal since it is the subject in which it is found. Now, the subject of an accident may enter into the def. in 2 ways:

--in the capacity of genus if we define the accident "in concreto" e.g. a body which is white.

--in the capacity of difference if we define the accident "in abstracto" e.g. a color in a body.

3. That the predicable is a relation; relation is an accident of a special nature for it consists in being "ad alterum". The whole being is "ad alterum" so that the term of a relation must enter into the def. as to that which is taken the difference.

4. It is impossible to assign a common genus to the five predicables and consequently impossible to assign a specific difference to each one So a strict def. is impossible and the best we can do is to proceed by description.

St. Albert- The notion of universal is realized primarily by genus and analogically by the rest.

Description includes that which is analogically common instead of a genus and properties instead of specific differences.

Cf. Meta. bk. 7, les. 4, no. 1352. 53.

De anima, bk. 2, les. 1, no. 213.

Summa, part 3, q. 77, art. 1, ad 2.

Periherm. bk. 1, les. 4, no. 2.

Post. Anal., bk. 1, les. 10, no. 2, 3, 4.

St. Albert, Lib. de Predicabilibus, tract. tert., chap. 3.

Keeping all this in mind we see that Porphyry has many descriptions for each predicable. For no one description alone can signify the whole nature of a predicable. It is necessary for him to bring forth many properties since by these only do we distinguish them.
Each description includes a subject as genus (relation in concreto) a property and the term of the relation defined.

Cf. Porphyry's text.

Genus: est universale respectu plura specie distincta in quid. That which (subject) is predicated (metaphysical universal) of many differing in species (term) in answer to "what is it?". (property).

To define it in abstraction-Genus is that relation of predicability etc.

Species: est universale respiciens plura numero distincta in quid.

Difference: est universale respiciens plura specie distincta in quale.

Property: est universale quod habet respectum de pluribus in quale accidentali et necessario. It is what is accidental to some one species, to all those in it and at all times. Convertible

Accident: est universale quod adest aut abest sine subiecti corruptione it is what becomes and passes away without the destruction of the subject.

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Finally, Aristotle's Book of the Predicaments. Three parts: 1. Antipredicaments 2. Predicaments proper 3. Postpredicaments.

Antipredicaments- those things which are necessary to know in order to understand the predicaments, a kind of introduction. He first defines the equivocal, univocal and denominative. Secondly gives the divisions of these things which are and things which are said - "ea quae sunt et dicuntur." And thirdly, two rules of predication.

Equivocal things: equivocum extends to two things: either to the name signifying different things (equivoca equivocans) that causing. Or, the many different things signified by the name (equivoca equivocata). Since we are speaking of incomplex things we must define the things not the names.

Therefore, those things are called equivocal of which the name alone is common, the substantial reason signified by this name being different in each case. e.g. man and pictured man.

Diversity of reasons here must be understood as any diversity, whether simpler or secundum quid, whether total or partial. The definition extends to things both equivocal and analogical (a consilio).

Univocal things: those things called so which the name is common and the substantial reason being the same in each case signified by the name. e.g. animal of man and brute.

Denominative things: those things are called denominative which receive their name from something from which they differ by the case only. e.g. whiteness and white.

1. The form which denominates. whiteness-form from which things are called white.
2. The thing which is denominated. man is denominated white.
3. The denominative or the denominative forms which signify coming from the form which denominates white. (receives their name from something which differ by case only.)

White and whiteness signify the same thing and they differ only by the case or termination, ending. Both signify the same accident but not in the same way.

--Whiteness, in abstracto;--white, in concreto.

The concrete accident signifies the accidental form precisely in forming the subject in which it is. While the abstract accident signifies it as a nature differing from the subject in which it is.

An accident therefore is called denominative when it is signified in concreto by a name which is obtained by changing the ending, case, of the name which signifies the same accident form but in abstracto.

Denominative predication then is the mode of predication of the accident ording to the substance. accidental form as a nature cannot be predicated of a substance as it differs. e.g. man is whiteness. Otherwise there would be identification of two natures.

Denominative predication is the mode of predicating an accident of a subject.

Two Divisions:

1. Things said are said in either a complex or incomplex way.
 2. Things that are said of a subject without being in a subject, as a universal substance.
- Or are not said of a subject without being in a subject; particular substance.
- Or said of a subject and are in a subject; universal accident.
- And, are ~~not~~ not said of a subject, but in a subject; particular accident.

Two rules of predication:

1. When something is predicated of something else as of a subject, i.e. as the superior of the inferior, anything said of the predicate must also be said of the subject. e.g. animal, man.
2. The species and differences of diverse and not subalternated genera are also diverse.

The reason Aristotle makes this introduction; he proposes to treat the things in as much as they are ordered by the relations of universality and predicability in view of the regulation of the 1st operation. If the things must be divided not as they are in se but as understood by us, and since our understanding of them is by comparing one to another, it is necessary that this division be made by something one.

But the relation of one to many are of many kinds. That is why Aristotle has to define the equivocal mode of predication, which is the mode by which all the things are brought back to being. (Being-analogous)

The univocal mode of predication is the mode by which all things are established under the 10 supreme genera.

The denominative mode, since it is the mode by which the accidents are reduced to substance as their one subject.

Next step: Aristotle enumerates ten predicaments or supreme genera of things-substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position, place, time and possession.

He studies four (1st) in detail; the remaining six are discussed in a single chapter. They are known enough.

For substance, quantity, quality and relation: 1st, he defines, divides them and gives their properties.

Definitions are as such: relation consists ad alterum, quality is that by which we are said such, quantity doesn't define, and substance defines only 1st and 2nd substance.

His divisions: logical, divides them as genera in species. e.g. kinds of quality etc.

Properties: there are many given for each, but they are not always properties in the strict sense, real property.

We see that his mode of proceeding is not really scientific but that is due to the fact that the supreme genera cannot be defined since one can't assign any genus and spec. difference. They must be defined as "Being" differing from others by properties.

The intention of this logical book is that of a logical book. The direction of the 1st operation requires a book in which things must be distributed according to relations of universality as known by us. The mode of proceeding must follow this intention. If we treat of substance etc. in logic it is not as the metaphysician does whose intention is to find out what those things are in themselves. Any definition of those things must express the "quid rei" therefore substance=ens per se subsistens. Logician on the contrary is satisfied to give the "quid nominis"-his intention merely to form definitions, help understand things.

Helpful to read the commentary of Cajetan.

Now, the explanation of Being into 10 predicaments. Cajetan and John of St. Thomas-

St. Albert's given: chap 7

"All universal and particular substance and all univ. and part. accidents are reduced to 10 supreme genera."

There are certain things not reduced, i.e. ens, unum, aliud, res-not called genera but said of all ten, analogical.

Other things found in many or all predicaments-prius, posterius, simul and motus.

DIVISION: anything univocally predicable of a subject is either a substance or an accident. (per se or in aliud)

1. The per se being which is predicable of a subject is substance, the 1st genus and principle of everything.

2. All not per se is necessarily accident. In accident happens to a subject either secundum inesse or secundum cooperationem.

a. if an accident happens to a substance according to an absolute inesse this accident is in the subject either as matter or form.

1.) according to matter in potency to divisi-bility=quantity.

2.) according to form which perfects the matter to act in operation=quality

b. If on the contrary an accident happens to the subject on the fact that the substance is taken in relation to something else, "secundum cooperationem." (this happens in two ways)

1.) The accident is caused either by the comparison of substance to something else, i.e.

a.) simple comparison=position.

b.) comparison of parts to the whole: 1-from the part of form-action.

2- " " " matter-passion.

3- " " " the whole as whole-relation.

2.) or an accident cause by a comparison to something extrinsic to substance.

a.) if the extrinsic is adjacent only to substance it is either:

1-with movement=time.

2-without movement=place.

b.) if the extrinsic is applied to the subject the accident resulting is possession.

fin de cours!!!!!!!!!!!!!!afin.