

THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY

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Proem

A. Purpose and Usefulness

In order to be ready to treat suitably the problem of the necessity of logic in regard to art, there is a notion which we absolutely need, and which, moreover, deserves to be studied for itself. It concerns a problem which we have often spoken of, but which we believe we can now present under a light rather new. We wish to speak, to be sure, of the famous problem of analogy.

B. Its Place

Let us say at once that we find the doctrine concerning this problem with St. Thomas in the thirteenth century, but since that time, one can say, it has been purely and simply lost. According to an opinion commonly received in the Spanish school in the seventeenth century, in keeping with the teaching given a century before by Cajetan, whom all have followed to the letter, the problem of analogy would be a problem not logical but metaphysical. Cajetan, who lived at the end of the fifteenth century and during the first half of the sixteenth century, was found already breaking with the great tradition on this point, a great tradition which, through St. Albert and St. Thomas, goes back to Aristotle. With Cajetan, it is as another tradition which is established, since all those who have followed say the same thing as he upon this point. Nevertheless, numerous texts of St. Thomas and even, before him, of St. Albert are opposed radically to this opinion.

Cajetan, [and] then John of St. Thomas, Banez, and the rest mean to determine about analogy under a metaphysical light. From the moment one follows this trail, one is completely lost. There is nothing graver, when one determines about a problem, than to be mistaken about the light. If the problem is of the logical order and one views it under a metaphysical light, one purely and simply falsifies it [le fausse]. It is very important to know to what discipline it pertains to determine about the problem of analogy. For the representatives of the Spanish school, this was not a logical problem. Banez even says that to speak of analogy in logic is "extra chorum canere", that is, to sing outside the choir. [Now] that's a little comparison which clarifies not at all; it would have been much better to explain for us in what [way] it is not logical. That reminds us of another commentator of the same order who, just while speaking about the five proofs of God's existence, compared them to the five stones which David used to kill Goliath: that does not much clarify the subject.

To return to the representatives of the Spanish school, it is sure that the the word "analogy" has misled them. It must be acknowledged that the word is not a good guide [ne conduit pas]. Quite surely there is analogy in things, to the extent that one finds there inequality or certain relations [rapports]. One will also speak of a knowledge by analogy; analogy is then a species of mode, of quality which determines an act. And [supposing] that it is a matter of the analogy in things or the analogy which qualifies an act of knowing, it is not logical. But this doesn't mean to say that the problem of analogy, in the sense in which we say that analogy is opposed to univocity, or that the analogous is opposed to the univocal, is not a strictly logical problem. It is just because the word 'analogy' allows an ambiguity, because it is said of this, of that, etc., that it is not a good guide [ne conduit pas], that it risks leading [us] upon a false trail.

We do not know when exactly this [Latin] word 'analogum' has received this very determinate signification which it had at the time of St. Thomas. But we know that in fact it has been received with a very precise sense. Another word, better than 'analogum' --better "quoad nos" to be sure-- can in the meantime truly guide us. This word will arise as if naturally [comme naturellment] from the considerations which are going to follow.

C. Mode

Usually, when we have spoken of this question of analogy, we would comment on the written word of the great masters, starting from Aristotle and [going] up to St. Thomas, following the texts. It is quite surely necessary to always come to this sort of proceeding. Another sort [of procedure], however, proves itself preferable from the point of view of teaching. One knows that to divide the written word of the great masters constitutes the principal task of their disciples. The great master has his word, which is perfect, and the disciple ought, whatever its perfection, comment upon it, explain it. Thus St. Thomas, before a page of Aristotle, comments upon it --he has quite a commentary, moreover-- he explains it, says things which in fact are not said by Aristotle, for example. It happens, however, very often that the understanding [intelligence] even of this word presupposes certain truths, certain notions which it is preferable to establish right at the beginning. It will pertain to the spoken word to present these truths or notions according to the mode which is fitting.

That imposes itself particularly here, we believe, in the face of the numerous texts of St. Thomas on analogy or on the analogous. If the problem of analogy is truly a logical problem, there will be a question of knowledge, that is to say, at a given moment the analogous has been acquired. In the texts of St. Thomas, it is as if the analogous has been acquired, and one is defining it. But if we put the question: how has it been acquired? There is the new light of which we spoke above: it is a matter of trying to follow this process [processus], to go as if to the beginning of the generation of the analogous. As Aristotle says in the Politics, before treating of the city, the best way of contemplating a truth or grasping some thing is to see it in its beginning. In view of a better contemplation, then, we are going to approach [aborder] the problem of analogy in following the process by which the intelligence comes to form the analogous. In proceeding in this way, the intelligence finds itself already, even before entering into the explanation or into the commentary of the texts of St. Thomas, forewarned against the foundation itself of this very grave error of the disciples of St. Thomas of which we have spoken. In other words, in analyzing, in describing this process, one gets the idea [se rend compte] that the analogous is a logical problem. Those who are mistaken have relied on something else, on the word, which does not lead [us] directly, whereas the process in question, it leads, and directly.

THE PROBLEM OF ANALOGY

I. The process of generation of the analogous

A. From the beginning to the term of the first act.

Saint Thomas, on his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (Q. 6, a. 2), distinguishes between the beginning and the term of all knowledge. Let us notice that the concern there is with science; one is already situated there in the third act of the intelligence. "Principium cujuslibet nostrae cognitionis est in sensu" [The beginning of any knowledge of ours is in the sense]: the beginning is always the same, whatever be the knowledge. But the term of the knowledge is going to vary. Since he is concerned there with the third act, St. Thomas will say that in the science of nature, it is necessary to resolve [resoudre] in the external sense, in mathematics, in the imagination, in metaphysics, in the understanding [intelligence]. One can nevertheless make the same distinction --beginning and term-- in the first act. It is the process which results directly in abstraction. In order to see the beginning of it, one can refer to Lesson 20 of St. Thomas' commentary on the second book of the Posterior Analytics: "Ex sensu fit memoria, ex memoria ...experimentum, ex experimento ...universale." And St. Thomas adds: "universale quiescens in anima", the universal at rest in the soul. Since this is no longer man seen in Callias [for example], but man seen, abstraction [having been] made from the individuals.

B. The result of abstraction as proximate foundation of the logical order.

We shall see that the process which leads to the formation of the analogous is that, pushed farther. It's that there are beginning and term of the knowledge in the case of the first act also. With Lesson 20, we are in the course of speaking of the beginning, not of the term. The process in the case of the first act is the same as for the acquisition of the first principles; it is good [il vaut] for no matter what universal. The universal

is due to abstraction. However, when once one has disengaged man from Peter, John, James, and the others, one is not yet in logic. The same thing when one has come to animal, starting from such and such sensitive living things. To be sure, it is the term of abstraction, but there remain things to add. Why? Because even if these results of abstraction have the notion [raison] of terms compared to the singulars from which one has started, they are also the proximate foundation of an order which is not in the things. Man is in the things but abstract man is not. Abstract man, however, becomes proximate foundation of a certain number of relations called 'logical'. The analogous is exactly one case, the univocal another; subject is one, predicate is another, and so forth. If then in the first act the beginning of knowledge is always the same: the sense, the terms are not the same. It is in analyzing in just what [way] the terms are not the same that the problem of analogy becomes disentangled [se degage].

a) A double consideration of every nature.

We are now going to draw from the De Ente et Essentia an absolutely fundamental notion which we need to grasp what is going to follow. Saint Thomas distinguishes a double consideration of every nature or essence: an absolute consideration, where one considers a nature as separate [comme separée], without considering the state in which it can be found; and a consideration of a nature insofar as it has a certain existence in this or in that. A nature can in fact be in Socrates, in Plato, and also in the understanding, since as we have seen just now, man is abstracted from individuals, from singulars.

The nature or the essence ...can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to its proper definition, and this is an absolute consideration of the nature ...in another way, according to the existence which it has in this or in that. (De Ente et Essentia, Ch. 3)

According to the absolute consideration, one cannot say anything true about the nature except what concerns it purely and simply; one is held to its proper definition. From the moment one adds something which is outside this definition, for example outside of rational animal in the case the nature man, that becomes false.

...in this way (i.e. according to the absolute

consideration), nothing is true about this nature except that which belongs to it insofar as it is such [secundum quod hujusmodi]; whence, if anything else is attributed to it, the attribution is false. For example, to *man*, insofar as he is *man*, there belong rational and animal and other things which fall in his definition; but black or white or anything of this sort which is not in the definition [de ratione] of humanity does not belong to *man* insofar as he is *man*. (Ibid.)

If, for example, one asks oneself: this nature, considered absolutely, is it one or many? One should reply: neither the one nor the other. It can be one, it can be many --that depends-- but considered in itself, it is neither one nor many.

Whence, if it be asked whether this nature considered thus can be called one or many, neither is to be conceded, since either is outside the concept [intellectum] of humanity, and either can belong to it (as accident) [potest sibi accidere]. (Ibid.)

Unity and multiplicity are outside the definition of the nature *man* and, in addition [d'autre part] both can happen to that nature, can be added to it. On the supposition that plurality or multiplicity enter into the consideration of this nature, it could never be one. However, it is one in Socrates: each one has his individual nature. On the contrary, if unity entered into the definition of this nature, one would have the same individuated nature in Socrates and Plato. "Si enim pluralitas esset de intellectu ejus, numquam posset esse una, cum tamen una sit secundum quod est in Socrate. Similiter, si unitas esset de intellectu ejus, tunc esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis, nec possit in pluribus plurificari."

b) A double subject of existence for every nature.

St. Thomas speaks next of the universal; taken as a whole, this third chapter of De Ente et Essentia is devoted to the relation between the nature and the intentions of genus, species, and the rest. That is why one finds considerations there which interest the logician. St. Thomas says that if one considers the nature in an absolute way, one cannot say that it is universal, any more than one could say, as one has seen above, that it was one. One cannot say that the universal belongs to this nature considered absolutely, since "de ratione universalis est unitas et communitas." (Ibid.): oneness and commonness enter into the

definition of the universal. At the term of the process of abstraction of which we have spoken above, which comes to the universal *man*, we already have "*aliquid unum*" and "*aliquid communis*". In the case of *man* and of *animal*, one has a common [something] such that one can strictly give it the name of universal, because the unity is perfect and this common [something] can be defined, abstraction [having been] made from inferiors. There exists besides another common [something] which is not itself perfectly universal, is not perfectly one, but admits of diversity: this is the analogous common.

To return to the text of St. Thomas, it is interesting to see that since the universal cannot belong to the nature according to an absolute consideration, nor to the nature insofar as it is individuated in the singulars; since the universal demands unity, it remains that the universal (genus, species, etc.) belongs to the nature insofar as it is in the soul. *Man* inasmuch as it is abstract makes abstraction from the individuals and thus from diversity; it possesses a unity of nature. "*Et ideo habet rationem uniformem ad omnia individua quae sunt extra animam.*" (Ibid.) For example, the species *man* maintains a uniform relation to all singular human beings. Just now we had the process of ascent from sense to the understanding; now, once this term of abstraction [has been] reached, we refer it to its inferiors and discover that it maintains a "*ratio uniformis*" with the latter. In the case of the analogous, we shall have everything save that in the strict sense; there is no "*ratio*" truly "*communis*."

Citing Averroes and Avicenna, Saint Thomas recalls pertinently that "*intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus*": it is the understanding which forms, which makes the universal in the natures.

One has seen that once a "*universale quiescens in anima*" is disengaged, the relation between the abstracted nature and its inferiors is such that one finds a perfect equality between this universal and each individual. That is to say that each individual partakes equally in this nature. Seeing that, the understanding is going to give to the inferiors the same name, in spite of their individual differences. The inferiors will receive the same name and the same definition: that is the univocal. But it happens, above all when we rise in the order of intelligibles and go more and more toward the common, that one may come to a common [something] such that one may not be able to constitute a veritable universal. The genus can be a veritable universal, the species likewise; however, "*ens non potest esse genus.*" "*Ens statim est substantia, est quantitas, est qualitas, etc.*" Being

is found in a relation of inequality [en relation d'inégalité]. There is nevertheless a relationship [rapport] among the inferiors. Substance is a being [de l'être], accident also. Things very diverse as substance and accident are going to receive the same name, "ens"; these will be things of which the name is common but of which the definition is diverse. That's the analogous. In order to employ a formula which embraces at once the strict universal and the analogous, one could say: "intellectus est qui facit communitatem in rebus." The strict universal is so perfectly one that one does not have to make rational or irrational intervene. Although in the case of the analogous, one should descend all at once; for example, one should describe being insofar as it is substance. We say "describe" because one cannot define being.

Saint Thomas says somewhere [I Sent. D. xix, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1] that in the case of the univocal, the inferiors "parificantur in intentione communi" [are made equal in a common meaning]. The word "parificantur" is very well chosen for manifesting the relation of equality. With the univocal, there is no diversity on the side of the "ratio ipsa": all the sensitive living things are animal; even if in fact this sensitive living thing which you point out is a man, and this other, a brute, both are equally animal, sensitive living thing. It is well understood that the "ipsum esse animalitatis" differs in man and in brute; think, for example, of the very great difference between our internal senses and the internal senses of the brute, between the cogitative and instinct. When one speaks of the "ipsum esse", one is then in the things; but it remains that the "ratio animalis", the definition of animal is the same. The moment that "parificantur in ratione communi", "in intentione communi", that is enough for having the univocal.

One must never cut the bridges between logic and the real. One finds a unity in the things, one also finds a diversity there. As it is necessary to conform oneself to that which is, some one nature will lead to the univocal; if, on the contrary, there is diversity, that will be analogous. Thus, in order to show that metaphysics does not descend into the proper knowledge of natural things, Saint Thomas says, in the Sentences: "ratio ...entis cum sit diversificata in diversis"; that does not depend on the understanding, but is found thus in things. In fact, sometimes the diversity will be imposed purely and simply by the very nature of the things. For example, in the case of substance and accident, it is not possible to rise to something truly common; but it also happens sometimes that a first consideration of the understanding, and even a second, then a third, may be limited to one nature, and

that afterwards, at a given moment, the understanding introduces, so to speak, diversity or inequality. The word, from the univocal which it was, then becomes analogous.

II. The analogous and the order which it involves [comporte]

We have spoken of a diversity and a multiplicity with the analogous, but there is also an order. One will encounter multiple significations or definitions, but in a certain order.

A. "Per prius et posterius"

If there were as many words as there are things, it would not not at all be the perfection of the understanding. The understanding goes as much as possible to put many significations under the same sound of voice. The more it raises itself [s'élève], the more will have to do it. There will always be besides a first sense to which all the others will have to attach themselves in one way or another. This imposition of diverse significations is done, to be sure, "a consilio", deliberately and not by chance. The understanding would be able to choose another word, but it prefers to take the same. It is as if there were a discourse in the very interior of the formation of the analogous word. Moreover, the understanding rejoices in comparison and in collatio.

He who is docile in front of a great master ought to scrutinize the letter of the master with a great deal of solicitude. An attention to the letter of St. Thomas, when he speaks of analogy, furnishes easily enough a sign that this problem depends on [relève de] logic. When St. Thomas speaks about analogy --always insofar as it is opposed to univocity (we leave aside the other senses of the word 'analogy')-- we often find terms such as 'definition' and 'attribution', which pertain to logic. That is not for nothing.

One can see in the De Veritate (q. 1, a. 2) a sort of application of that. St. Thomas there puts to himself the question: "Is the truth found more principally in the understanding than in the things?" He says: "dicendum quod in illis quae dicuntur per prius et posterius de multis ..." Note that whenever one meets this expression, "dicuntur per prius et posterius", that is a sign of analogy. It's that many definitions

are attached to the same word. It is not, however, multiplicity pure and simple. The analogous word possesses many significations and thus multiple definitions, but in a certain order. The expression "per prius et posterius" exactly manifests this order. It is also that which wants to say inequality. As regards "de multis", that designates the inferiors, the "divisibilia", if you will.

St. Thomas goes on: " ...non semper oportet quod id quod per prius recipit praedicationem communis, sit ut causa aliorum, sed illud in quo primo ratio illius communis completa invenitur" ["...it is not always necessary that that which per prius receives the predication of the common be as the cause of the others, but that in which the complete notion of the common is first found"]. It is of small importance that it be cause or not; that is a digression [hors-d'oeuvre]. It is first on the plane of attribution, of definition, period, that's all [un point c'est tout]. What is necessary is not to be cause, since the fact of being cause is situated on the side of reality. But it is not a matter of a problem which one settles [règle] on the side of reality. It is a problem of definition and of attribution.

This text is moreover the only place to our knowledge where St. Thomas speaks of "ratio completa invenitur". This very interesting expression will be useful for us when we speak about art; we shall ask ourselves in what the "ratio completa artis" is found realised. St. Thomas takes the example of 'health': "since 'healthy' is said per prius of animal, in which the perfect definition of health is found first, even though medicine is called healthy insofar as it is productive of health." What is important is not the fact that health is a quality which does not exist except in the animal, but that the perfect definition of health is not verified except in the animal. That is not the same thing; if one puts oneself on the ground of the real rather than upon that of knowledge and of logic, one loses absolutely the sense of this doctrine. Medicine is cause and nevertheless it is called healthy "per posterius". On the side of the things, it is anterior; on the side of attribution or of definition it is posterior.

Applying this doctrine to his problem about truth, St. Thomas concludes: "therefore, since true is said of many things "per prius et posterius", it is necessary that it be said "per prius" of that in which the perfect definition [ratio] of truth is found." He goes on to show in what follows that as the understanding draws things to itself, it is in it that we shall be able to find the "ratio perfecta veritatis."

If one asks himself, before a word with multiple significations, in which is found the "ratio completa" or "perfecta", it will always be, from the point of view of the "ratio nominis", in the more manifest. The sense "notius quoad nos" will always be first. On the supposition that one has to do with something sensible, one will not be able then to find in the second definition all the elements which entered in the first. One will have to let something fall. Quite often this something will be the more manifest.

B. Two ways of understanding "per prius".

A point however to which it is necessary to pay close attention is that in analogy the "per prius" can be understood in two ways: either as regards us, "secundum rationem nominis", or "quantum ad rem nominis". If one asked us, for example, if the names which are common to God and to the creature, like 'science' and 'wisdom', are verified at first of God or of us. Our science involves [comportel] discourse, as well as involving distinct knowledge of the proper cause, in the case of demonstration *propter quid*. If, furthermore, one makes the comparison, one discovers that what man knows, the separated substance knows still better, and God, moreover, infinitely better. But if one tries to describe what is found in God, it will be necessary to let discourse fall, and other things as well. However, "quantum ad rem nominis", science is said of God at first [d'abord], even if "secundum rationem nominis", to wit, according to the imposition [of the name], science is said at first "quoad nos".

St. Thomas also speaks of this distinction in his commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians. He asks himself there if one can say that all created fatherhood derives from the divine fatherhood. "It seems that it does not, since we name things as we know them" (In Ephes. ch. 3, lect. 4, #169); but all that we can know about God, one knows in passing by the creature. It would seem, then, that it is wrong to say that the "per prius" is said univocally on the side of the knower and of him who is at the beginning of the imposition of the word; the latter, in making the imposition, is measured by the things, and ought to do it according to their mode. After having raised this objection, St. Thomas brings in a distinction: "I reply and I say that the name of a thing named by us can be taken in two ways. Since either it expresses or signifies what the understanding conceives, because the sounds of voice are the marks or signs of the passions or

concepts which are in the soul, and in this way the name is in creatures before it is in God; or (one can take the name) insofar as it manifests the whatness of the thing named outside, and in this way it is in God beforehand." (Ibid.) It is finally the things which we name; to be sure, the name signifies my concept, but my concept is the likeness of the thing.

St. Thomas next applies this distinction to the problem of fatherhood in God and in creatures: "whence this name 'fatherhood', insofar as it signifies the conception of the understanding which names the thing, is found in creatures before ("per prius") [it is found] in God, because the creature becomes known to us before God does; but insofar as it signifies the named thing itself, it is found in God before [it is found] in us, because surely every generative power in us is from God." (Ibid.) he says next that the fatherhood which one finds in the creature, if one compares it to the divine fatherhood, "est quasi nominalis seu vocalis". (Ibid.) This does not mean to say that fatherhood amongst us is not veritable, but that is said in order to manifest the infinite distance between our fatherhood and the divine fatherhood. The word "nominalis" is as it were borrowed from Scripture, which says: "(Pater Domini nostri ...) ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur".

Ordinarily, however, the "per prius" will be said of the "quoad nos". Thus, although poetry is a more noble art than that of house-building, it will never be called art "per prius". It's that the "ratio artis" is applied less perfectly there. They are two levels altogether different: the "ratio nominis" on the one hand, the "res nominis" on the other.

C. The two ways for one of the inferiors under the common to be anterior to the other.

It is necessary to know that among the inferiors or "divisibilia" --inferiors compared to the common, result of abstraction-- one can be anterior to the other in two ways: either in virtue of that which is proper, and that does not break the univocity with regard to the common; or in virtue of its participation in the definition of the common, and this anteriority breaks the univocity and causes analogy. St. Thomas brings in this distinction on the occasion of the problem of the division of the enunciation. He reports the opinion of Alexander, according to which the division into affirmation and negation would not be a univocal division, but that of a "nomen multiplex", that is

to say, of a name of multiple significations, or an analogous word. "For a genus is predicated univocally of its species, and not 'secundum prius et posterius'." (In Peri Hermenias, lect. viii. #5) St. Thomas then replies:

But it ought to be said that one of the things dividing something common can be before the other in two ways. In one way, according to the proper definitions [rationes] or natures of the things dividing; in another way, according to participation in the definition [rationis] of that common something which is divided into them. The first does not take away the univocity of the genus. (Ibid. #6)

For example, the enunciation is divided into affirmation and negation. Affirmation is moreover anterior to negation. But is it anterior insofar as it is affirmation, or insofar as it is enunciation? That's the problem. If it is anterior insofar as it is affirmation, this does not break the univocity, since the relation to the common remains equal: just as the "ratio animalis" is verified equally of man and of brute, so do affirmation and negation partake equally in the definition of the enunciation. It is only insofar as it is affirmation that the affirmation is first.

St. Thomas avails himself of an example taken from numbers in order to manifest this distinction. He says that two is prior [antérieur] to three according to its proper definition, and not insofar as it is number: in fact, two and three partake equally in the definition of their genus, namely, number. Two is no more or less than three a "multitude measured by the one"; they have, insofar as they are numbers, the same definition.

But when one of the inferiors is prior to the other in that the definition of the common is not equally verified of both, that breaks the univocity.

D. The character conferring on the things the aptitude to be signified by an analogous name.

If we should ask now: in what [way] is a thing susceptible to being signified by an analogous name? In what does it lend itself to extensions of its signification? For our reply, we are going to avail ourselves of a text of St. Thomas, drawn from the second book of the Sentences. There St. Thomas asks himself if the word 'light' is said properly of spiritual things.

...in this there seems to be a certain diversity among the saints. For Augustine seems to want that light be found more truly in spiritual things than in bodily things. But Ambrose and Dionysius seem to hint that in spiritual things it is not found except metaphorically. (II Sent. D. xiii, q.1, a.2, c.)

+ [The question is in fact theological, but one will find in the reply of St. Thomas a great deal of light concerning the problem which interests us now. Here it is necessary to know that in Scripture, given the great elevation of the subject, God calls upon likenesses which will be metaphors, in an improper, parabolic sense. These likenesses have their usefulness and even their necessity. Even in the cases where the extension can be made, we ought, we believe, when we comment on these texts, respect the mode which Scripture employs. If Scripture has used a word in a metaphorical sense, we should at first study it in its metaphorical sense, even if the extension can in fact be made. One knows that in the case of the metaphor, there is not an extension; there is but a new improper sense. +

The opinion according to which the word 'light' would only be said metaphorically with respect to spiritual things seems truer at first sight, since light is a thing which is sensible of itself.

And this indeed seems more true, because nothing which is of itself [per se] sensible belongs to spiritual things except metaphorically, because although something common can be found analogically in spiritual and bodily things, nevertheless not anything determinate [and] of itself sensible, as is clear in being and heat. For being, which is common to each [the spiritual and the bodily], is not of itself sensible; but heat, which is of itself sensible, is not properly found in spiritual things. (Ibid.)

A thing can be properly called "per prius et posterius" when we have a common [something] which allows the extension to be made. Thus, "ens" admits [comporte] a community so great that one can affirm it both of substance and of accident, although with "heat", that doesn't go, Heat does not lend itself to analogy. With the thing signified by the word "heat", even insofar as it is abstracted, it is not possible to extend the signification to the spiritual. Why? One can here make comparison with the singular. One knows that that which makes Socrates to be Socrates is incommunicable, contrarily to that which makes Socrates a man. Certain things are bound to such a concretion that one cannot

disengage an element which would permit a second imposition. Take, for example, the word "rose", which designates such a flower. The reason can take hold of the sense given to this word, in view of signifying something else, but that sense will be improper and figurative [figure]. One will be able to meet it again in a metaphor or in a poetic comparison, but no more [than that]. Likewise, the word "lion"; one will say of Achilles: this lion was rushing forth. It's that "lion" signifies a very determinate animal, "aliquid per se sensibile"; it is so bound to concretion that it does not allow enough of the common. In short, it is absolutely necessary, in order to pass from one sense to the other and thus in order to form the analogous word, to have a common [something] which permits it to be done. With what is immersed in matter, to the point of being altogether individuated and concretized, that is not possible.

St. Thomas puts the question somewhere: "Utrum magnitudo competat Deo?" With the genus quantity one cannot make the extension in such a way that one would have a word which would be common to God and to the creature. And no more with the species. But even if one lets the genus and the species fall, there remain certain characters, certain elements of a more common order. Thus, "magnitudo" will be able to signify perfection; one then lets the aspect continuous quantity fall, while keeping entirely the aspect perfection. But that is not opposed to the fact that [il n'empeche quel certain things, by reason (as one has said) of their concretion, constitute an obstacle absolutely insurmountable to the extension of their signification. We ought then to hold ourselves to their unique sense; beyond that, one will meet only metaphorical senses, which the poet, to be sure, will largely make use of. When there must be a metaphysics to explain a poem, watch out! That tends to mean that it is not rich.

After having made the opposition between the "per se sensibile" and the "commune", the first constituting an obstacle to analogy, the other, not, St. Thomas adds:

Whence, since light is a quality of itself visible, and a certain determinate species in sensible things, it cannot be said in spiritual things except equivocally or metaphorically. But it must be known that bodily things are transferred unto spiritual things through a certain likeness, which is, indeed, a likeness of proportionability [proportionabilitatis].

"Transferre" can be understood in two senses. It is not necessary to limit it to "translatio" in the sense of metaphor.

Whenever the understanding passes from one sense to the other, there is "translatio", whether it passes from one proper sense to another proper sense (the case of the analogous word), or it passes from a proper sense to an improper sense (the case of the metaphor). In one case as in the other, the rule stated by St. Thomas is verified: "transferuntur corporalia in spiritualia per quandam similitudinem ..." "And this likeness," continues St. Thomas, "must be reduced to a community of univocity or of analogy." (Ibid.)

This is what is brought forth in the case of St. Augustine, who says that light is found more truly in spiritual things. Instead of considering light as a sensible species, St. Augustine sees in this sensible thing a common element, to wit, the element manifestation. It is this common element which permits [one] to make the passage from bodily light to spiritual light. Whenever one has light, one will have manifestation, and inversely. One is not then bound to light as to something of the bodily, but one discovers a common element, the aspect manifestation, which permits one to make the analogy.

And thus it is in this problem [propositio]; for that is called light in spiritual things which has itself toward intellectual manifestation just as bodily light toward sensible manifestation. But manifestation is more truly in spiritual things, and as regards this, what Augustine says is true, where above [he says] that light is more truly in spiritual things than in bodily things, [yet] not according to the proper definition [propriam rationem] of light, but according to the definition of manifestation, forasmuch as it is said in the canonical [epistle] of John: "everything which is manifested is light." [?? Ref. is Ephes. v.13] In this way, everything which is manifest is called clear, and everything hidden, obscure. (Ibid.)

It will be the same thing in the case of art, defined as "recta ratio factibilium": "factibile" designates something extremely restricted; it is limited to transitive action. But the notion of "opus" or "operatum" does not involve this limitation. Thus, one will be able to extend the signification of the word "art" to designate all that which keeps an aspect of 'opus'. That will be able to go as far as logic, since, as St. Thomas says, "etiam in speculabilibus est aliquid per modum operis." (IaIIae, q.90, a.1, ad 2)

E. The attitude of the strong intelligence facing the analogous

word.

When we have spoken about logic, understood above all in the strict sense (M. Dionne La Nécessité de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, Tome I. Québec 1980), we have seen that logic ought to direct: "logica ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta". The analogous is exactly one of these instruments and even one of the most precious which the understanding needs. Already in the first act, our understanding has need of it, by reason even [en raison même] of its weakness. It is inclined to univocity, because it is a great deal easier to confound than to discern. It is astonishing enough to see how people like John of St. Thomas, who are quite mistaken on the very nature of the problem of analogy, have a tendency to explain particular problems in a univocal way.

Among the instruments which logic can furnish to the understanding, already in the first act, the analogous occupies, we insist, a very important place, because it can govern, if not all, at least a good part of the life of the understanding. And the more one rises [s'élève], the more one has need of it. For example, why has Aristotle devoted a whole book, in the Metaphysics, to distinguishing and ordering the significations of terms which he needs for his discipline? Because by reason of the elevation of his subject, the terms, far from being contracted as they can be (for example) in the science of nature, are very common. Common in such a way --one knows that the subject of metaphysics is being-- that the terms studied in the fifth book are all analogous. When one knows the doctrine of analogy, one is at least acquainted [avertit] with that.

Before a particular problem, when (for example) the great masters have not pronounced on a division, one is going to put the question: is it a matter of analogous or of univocal division? When a problem has not actually been studied by the great masters, it is in our view the last question which one must try to answer, because it is very difficult.

One can see from what preceded that a true [véritable] understanding is that which has enough discernment to delight in an analogous word and which sees by the context the precise sense which the word possesses. Although someone whose understanding is weak is brought to confusion, because he cannot discern enough. And if he is brought to confusion, he will be inclined toward univocity. He will see the common universal everywhere with the same relation vis-a-vis its inferiors.

The more an understanding is weak, the more it needs to be directed. When one knows well enough the doctrine of analogy, one is, as it were, warned [comme averti]. Knowing the conditions, one can judge if a word is analogous or not.

a) St. Thomas in front of the word "sign".

The very strong understanding of St. Thomas knew how to judge about an analogous word. Thus in the Sentences, with respect to the word "sign", St. Thomas faces the following objection: "It seems that sign is badly defined, when it is said that 'a sign is that which, beyond the species which it brings into the senses, from itself makes something else come into knowledge.' [Def. of St. Augustine, II De Doctrina Christiana, ch.1, n.1] According to the Philosopher, in the Prior Analytics, every effect can be a sign of its cause. But certain effects are spiritual, which bring no species into the senses. Therefore, not every sign brings some species to the senses." (IV Sent. D.1, q.1, a.1, obj. 2 of 2nd grp.) St. Augustine's definition would be bad, since one cannot disassociate sensible from sign as such according to this definition. Let's see St. Thomas' reply:

...sign imports something known to us (quoad nos), by which we are led as by the hand (manuducimur) to the knowledge of another thing. But the things first known to us are the things falling under the sense, from which all our knowledge has its origin. And therefore sign, as regards its first institution, signifies some sensible thing, insofar as through it we are led (manuducimur) to the knowledge of something hidden.

But it sometimes happens that something more known to us, even if it is not a thing falling under the sense, may be called a sign, as if by a secondary signification (quasi secundaria); as the Philosopher says in Ethics II [1104b4], that "the sign of a habit engendered in us should be taken [to be] the pleasure in the act", which is not sensible pleasure, since it is of reason. (Ibid. ad 2m q.)

Notice this very interesting expression: "Institution of a word". The word is formed from an act of understanding which one can call "impositio", but also "institutio". From the fact that the word once formed possesses a certain permanence, something like an institution is involved. When the word is instituted for the first time, when such a sound of voice is destined by the practical intelligence to signify such a reality, one will speak

of "primam sui institutionem". When the word acquires a second signification, it becomes analogous. Thus the word "sign", when it no longer designates something sensible, is not employed in its first sense but in its second sense. For example, when Aristotle says about pleasure that it is the sign of an engendered habit, the word "sign" is then taken in the second sense. In fact, the pleasure which follows upon the possession of the habit does not fall under the external sense; one experiences it in oneself. It cannot then be a matter of a first sense, since the notion of sign is too much bound to the manifest, to that which is first manifest, namely, the sensible. This does not exclude, however, calling what is not sensible a sign, on condition, however, that it always involve a "praecognitum" and a "notius". Thus, the pleasure of which Aristotle speaks is more known than the habitus; otherwise, it absolutely could not be a sign of it.

One finds the same doctrine again in the Summa Theologica, IIIa, q.60, a.4, ad lum. There St. Thomas puts to himself this truly theological question: Is a sacrament always a sensible thing? Here is the first objection:

According to the Philosopher in the Prior Analytics [70a8], every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are certain sensible effects, so also are there certain intelligible effects, just as science is the effect of demonstration. Therefore, not every sign is sensible ...

And here is the reply:

Each thing is principally denominated and defined according to that which belongs to it *primo et per se*, but not by that which belongs to it *per aliud*. But a sensible effect has *per se* [the power] to lead to the knowledge of something else as if [quasi] becoming known to man *primo et per se*, because all our knowledge has its beginning from sense. But intelligible effects do not have the power [non habent quod possint] to lead to knowledge of something else, except insofar as they are manifested *per aliud*, that is, through some sensibles. And thence it is that first and principally are called signs the things which are offered to the senses, as Augustine says in II De Doctrina Christiana [ch.1], that "a sign is that which, beyond the species it brings into the senses, makes something other come into knowledge." But intelligible effects do not have the notion [rationem] of sign except insofar as they are [themselves] manifested through some signs. And through this mode also, certain things which are not sensible are called sacraments in some way, insofar

as they are signified by some sensibles.

b) The language to be held in speaking of an analogous word.

Let us add again another text along the same line, interesting because of the way St. Thomas names the analogous word. It is important to know, in fact, what language to hold when we speak of the analogous word. We have already spoken of a certain inequality in the relationship [rapport] between the common [something] and its inferiors, in opposition to the relationship of equality which one finds in the case of the univocal. Inequality, from which "dicitur per prius et posterius", an expression which constitutes a manifest sign that one is concerned with [il s'agit de] an analogous word. But there also exists another way of speaking of it. St. Thomas uses this in the De Veritate, q.9, a.4, ad 4um. Let us first see the objection:

Does one angel speak to another? It seems that he does not ...4. All language (locutio) is through some sign. But sign is [found] only in sensible things ...therefore, since the angels do not receive science through sensible things, they do not receive knowledge through any signs, and so neither through language.

If there is not any sensible thing involved, neither, it seems, is there any sign.

Here is St. Thomas' reply, along with the expression we have mentioned before [annoncée]:

A thing cannot be called a sign, properly speaking (proprie loquendo), unless from it one come into knowledge of something else, as in discoursing [quasi discurrendo]; and according to this, there is not any sign among the angels, since their science is not discursive ...And on account of this, also among us signs are sensible, since our knowledge, which is discursive, arises from sense.

Without seeing what follows in this text, without even knowing the doctrine of analogy, or that of the sign, what would one say "proprie" is opposed to, in the expression "proprie loquendo"? At first sight, one might say that it is opposed to "improprie". One knows that as regards the sense or the signification of words, one speaks of the proper sense and of the improper sense. The improper sense will sometimes be called the

metaphorical sense. In Scripture, one will say parabolical sense; it comes back to the same. So then, proper is opposed to improper. But proper can in its turn be subdivided. To be sure, if the word is univocal, there is then no problem; that word will have only a proper sense. But in the case of the analogous word, one recognizes many proper senses, as opposed to improper. Then how [will one] signify "per prius et posterius"? In the case of the "per prius", because one is concerned with the complete, perfect, and proper definition, one will say "proprie loquendo". "Proprie" then means to say "ratio propria".

For example, "sanum" is said of the animal and also of the medicine. But the definition of health is not verified except of the animal. However, because the medicine (medicina) is connected with health, one attributes the same name (healthy) to it. However, the "ratio propria sanitatis" is only verified of the animal. Animal is then said to be healthy "per prius"; one can also say: "sanum proprie loquendo dicitur de animali". One will call healthy "per posterius" that which is sign or that which is cause of health. But sometimes, instead of saying "per prius et posterius", one will make use of this expression, of this division of St. Thomas: "proprie loquendo" and "communiter loquendo". "Communiter" is then opposed to "ratio propria"; it means that one has had to let fall something of the perfect definition. As St. Thomas says, "Si aliquid eorum quae sunt de ratione propria auferatur, jam non erit propria acceptio" [If something of those which are of the ratio propria be taken away, the taking (of the word) will already not be proper] (De Veritate, q.4, a.2, c.): if one lets fall an element in the perfect definition, one will no longer have a proper sense. One will then be able to speak of "per posterius" or of "communiter". Sometimes, when for example an analogous word has four senses, it is better to reserve the expression "communiter" for the very last. Thus logic will be called art "communiter loquendo", because one then lets fall too many things from the first definition of the word "art", in order to keep only the aspect of opus. Logic bears upon the necessary, which art cannot; it is science, speculative virtue, etc., which art cannot be.

In the case of the sign, "signum proprie loquendo", that means to say "signum quantum ad rationem propriam", and also, "non invenitur nisi in sensibilibus". Although "communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur" (De Veritate, q.9, a.4, ad 4): we can call sign, communiter, anything known in which something [else] is known. One then truly has something common; that guides us to something "per posterius". One has something which one can call a sign, but it is not sign in

its "ratio propria".

One must not understand by *communiter* the *ratio communis* according to which animal, for example, is said [to be] common with respect to its inferiors. "*Communiter*" here possesses a very particular sense; it is opposed to "*proprie loquendo*", which signifies "*per prius*". Moreover, one remains always in the proper sense and not in the metaphorical sense.

In this regard, St. Albert has some very interesting formulas, and furthermore, he speaks of the analogous word there where one must speak of it: in logic. And more precisely, since it concerns the first act of the reason, in regard to the treatise of the Predicaments, though as a notion required beforehand, since only things signified by a common name, whose definition is the same, will be able to be arranged under the predicaments. Each predicament is, to be sure, a genus; the supreme genus and that which follows upon it are of the univocal, pure and simple. Though if one wishes to go above the ten supreme genera and obtain something more common, one arrives at once at the analogous.

One knows that often one will reserve the expression "*nomen multiplex*" for the analogous word, because the latter is a word of multiple significations and admitting [comportant] a certain order, "*prius et posterius*". But sometimes the word "*multiplex*" does not signify that. This is what happens in the case of the predicament quality, which is divided at once into four species:

Quality, according as it is taken here in a common way as predicament, is one of the things which are said in many ways (*multipliciter dicuntur*). "*In many ways*" (*multipliciter*) is not however understood as the equivocal or the analogous which is said "*per prius et posterius*", but it is understood as the genus, which is divided with diverse differences, which are under it equally (*aequaliter*), in such a way that they proceed equally (*aeque*) from it, and not one member by another (*unum per aliud*). (St. Albert, In Praedicamenta, Tract. V, c.2)

The differences proceed from the genus as from a beginning [principe] and proceed from it equally. Although in the case of the analogous one recognizes [retrouve] inferiors, still, one is named [denommé] by reason of the other, "*unum per aliud*". Accident could not be called "*being*" if it were not as about substance [comme par la substance].

The problem of analogy, as we have seen summarily, is a logical problem. Aristotle speaks of it in the Predicaments; it is quite the first proposition, and even definition, which he has given us in this treatise: ὁμώνυμα λέγεται... [homōnyma legetai ...]. The Greek word ὁμώνυμα [homōnyma], the Latin translates, as if copying, by "aequivoca". But in order that there might not be ambiguity, the Latins have taken the word "analogum" to signify "aequivocum a consilio". They distinguish, then, "univoca", "aequivoca", et "analogia". For example, on the question: is science said of God and of the creature?, they will say: "non univoce neque aequivoce sed analogice". (Ia, q.13, a.10)

In French, the word "équivoque" is to be excluded as a translation for *homonymon*, since it is so much bound to ambiguity that it is not possible to make it signify "per prius et posterius". It is, we believe, the same thing in English: the word "equivocal" does not appear to be able to be used to signify "analogous". If we had to translate this first phrase of Aristotle's (homōnyma legetai), what would we do? There's a problem ...

Note that sometimes Aristotle will say "homōnymōs" (aequivoce) to show the great distance between two significations of a same word, while one knows very well that it is not a matter purely of the equivocal. Thus substance and accident are not called "being" purely equivocally. In the case of [the purely] equivocal, one cannot pass from the one sense to the other, there is no order.

It suffices sometimes [to have] some well chosen formulas to put us altogether on the trail. Thus St. Albert says: "Dicuntur aequivoca quasi nomen (quod secundum vocem est) ex aequo quoad imponentem habentia" [Things are called aequivoca as if having the name (which is according to the sound of voice) equally as regards the one imposing [that sound of voice]]. The inferiors, in the case of the analogous word, of an analogous common, "aequantur in voce tantum". We have spoken of a relation of inequality, but there is beyond this a veritable community; however, it is only a community of word.

Note that when Aristotle says: "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen commune est ...", it is the things which are called *homonyma* or *univoca* [synonyma]. One could object: But logic does not concern itself with [the] things! St. Albert then has reason to make precise: "Et isti sunt res non a vocibus vel dictionibus absolutae sed per voces significati" [And such are things not loosed from words and sayings, but signified through

words]. (In Praedicamenta, tract.I, c.2) The things as such belong to the science of nature or to metaphysics, because they are as it were detached from the understanding which knows them; there is no concern there, in fact, with things insofar as they are known. However, one is accustomed to say [a l'habitude de dire] that logic is concerned with things insofar as they are known; but here, one is concerned with things which are not detached from words. That's why some have said that the *skopos* of the predicaments is the words ("voces"), while others have said that it is the concepts, while still others, the things. Most of the Greek commentators have said: if it were the words ("voces"), it would belong to grammar, if it were the concepts, it would belong to the science of the soul, and if it were the things, to metaphysics. It is necessary, then, that the purpose [propos] ("skopos") embrace the three: the treatment bears upon things insofar as they are signified by words which signify concepts.

F. An important rule concerning analogy.

a) The text of St. Thomas

In the *Prima Pars*, when he raises the question: is there only one truth according to which everything is true?, St. Thomas gives a very important rule concerning analogy. He says that "when something is attributed in a univocal way to many things, that thing is found in each of them according to its proper definition (ratio), as animal in no matter which species of animal. But when something is said in an analogous way of many things, that thing is found according to its proper definition in only one among them, from which the others are denominated." (Ia, q.16, a.6) In the case of the univocal, the definition is verified of all the inferiors. The common, the universal is something perfectly one which is defined [with] abstraction made from the inferiors, and [which] is verified of all. All the inferiors have in common the same name and the same definition. Note that we speak in logical terms, in saying that the things signified univocally have the same name and the same definition. The rule stipulating that the univocal common is said of any whatever of its inferiors is universal, absolute --it allows no exception. In the case of the analogous, however, the "ratio propria" cannot be attributed except to one alone of the inferiors. Thus, for example, "ens" will not be said "secundum rationem propriam" except of substance; "ars" (recta ratio factibilium) [will not be said] except of the art which concerns matter, since "factibile" is the term of a transitive action. There is a first "institutio", a first

imposition; and here it is that a thing maintains a certain relation [rapport] with that [other thing] which I come to name. For example, the medicine maintains with health a relation of cause to effect. One goes on, then, to name the medicine "healthy", going from the health which one had first defined as verified of the animal. Let us remark one more time that the analogous is defined in terms of signification, of definition, of attribution; one must never define analogy by bringing in words or notions which signify reality pure and simple.

[Thus] "healthy" is said of animal and urine and medicine --not that health is in any but animal alone-- but from the health of the animal, medicine is denominated healthy, insofar as it brings about that health, and urine, insofar as it signifies that health. And although health is not in the medicine, nor in the urine, nevertheless in either there is something through which the one causes [facit] and the other signifies health. (Ia, q.16, a.6, c.)

St. Thomas next proceeds to the application of the rule which he has stated concerning the analogous to the problem of the unity of truth:

It has been said, however, that truth is first (per prius) in the understanding and secondarily (per posterius) in things, according as they are ordered to the Divine Understanding. If therefore we are speaking about the truth insofar as it exists in the understanding, according to its proper definition (secundum propriam rationem), thus in many created understandings there are many truths, and even in one and the same understanding, according to many things known... But if we are speaking about truth according as it is in the things, thus all things are true by one First Truth, to which each single thing is likened [assimilatur] according to its being [secundum suam entitatem]. And thus, although there are many essences or forms of things, yet the truth of the Divine Understanding, according to which all things are denominated true, is one.

According to the first sense of truth, there are as many truths as there are understandings. When your understanding tells you that man is animal, and I conceive the same thing for myself, my understanding is true, and yours also. And even in one understanding alone, there are many truths, in the sense that the understanding grasps many objects. If, however, we take the word "truth" "communiter loquendo" or "per posterius", it is the things that are called true. But all the things, possessing their proper

form, are as likened (comme assimilées) to the Divine Understanding which constitutes their principle. They are also called true insofar as they are conformed to the Divine Understanding. In this sense, there is only one truth.

b) Cajetan's commentary

Let us now go into the commentary which Cajetan has made on this article. Cajetan raises the following difficulty: If we admit, on the one hand, in conformity with the rule stated in Question Sixteen, that the definition is verified of all the inferiors in the case of the univocal, but is not verified of more than one of them in the case of the analogous; [and] if, on the other hand, all the names common to God and to the creature are analogous, as St. Thomas has shown in Question Thirteen, and [thus] the name "truth" also will be, it follows that truth will not be found except in one alone. As a consequence, there would not be more than one truth.

If the analogous is not saved according to its proper definition except in one alone (of its inferiors); and it appeared from Question Thirteen that all the names common to God and to other things are analogous, and consequently, that truth is found analogically in the Divine Understanding and other understandings, it follows that in many understandings there are not many truths, but that all the understandings are true according to one truth alone, namely, that of the Divine Understanding. (Cajetan In Iam Partem Summae Theologiae, supra q.16, a.6)

If however the truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of understandings, there will be as many truths as there are understandings. Then the word "truth" is not said "per prius et posterius", since if that were the case, truth would not be found formally except in one alone. In short, it would seem that in Question Thirteen one was tending towards the unity of truth. In order to maintain the analogy, one ought to deny the multiplicity. But on the other hand, if one departs from the multiplicity, one denies the analogy.

And inversely, if truth is multiplied according to the multiplication of true understandings, it will not then be said of them according to a certain order ("per prius et posterius"), because what is said according to a certain order ("per prius et posterius"), is not found formally

except in one (of the inferiors), as the letter indicates.
(Ibid.)

It is to be remarked that there is no question here of the truth in the creature, when Cajetan, basing himself on Question Thirteen, says that there is only one truth. You admit the rule of Question Sixteen, as well as the conclusion of Question Thirteen. How could it happen that Cajetan would arrive at the unity of truth in joining these two texts? Something doesn't go ...

Let us read Cajetan's reply, which in my opinion is much too short. But let us first put this question: can one, in reading the text of Question Sixteen, have the least doubt as regards the universal bearing of the rule stated by St. Thomas?* It is a matter, we are convinced, of two absolutely universal logical rules, which allow no exception. One cannot express himself more clearly [nettement] than St. Thomas has done. Let us now see Cajetan's reply:

This rule concerning the analogous given in the letter is not universal for every mode of analogy; furthermore, properly speaking, as was evident in the first book of the Ethics [ch.6], it does not belong to any analogous [name], but belongs to names "ad unum" or "ab uno", which we call analogous abusively [abusively]. (Ibid.)

For Cajetan, not only is the rule stated by St. Thomas not universal, but it does not apply, properly speaking, to any analogue. It would be an abuse [abusif] to say that the word "sanum" is an analogous word, because it is said "ab uno", going from the health of the animal. It is a "nomen ab uno" but not a "nomen analogum"; but what is it then?

In our opinion, the discourse made by Cajetan is bad because he makes a second problem come in between. First paraphrasing the letter of St. Thomas, Cajetan says (as we have seen): "si analogum in uno tantum secundum propriam rationem salvatur". That means to say that truth is found according to its proper definition "in uno tantum", to wit, in the understanding,

*Let us recall this double rule: "Quando aliquid praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum propriam rationem invenitur ... sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo alia denominantur".

then "per posterius" in the things. Has Cajetan thought at once of that? Why make the problem of the names common to God and the creatures come in between? The concern [in q.13] is with another problem: the Divine Understanding and human understanding, two understandings so different that the definition of truth with us is other than the definition of truth with God. In order to grasp the text of St. Thomas [here], it suffices to consider the relation [between] understanding and things, and not [that between] God and creature.

In philosophy, the word 'truth' is said "per prius" of the understanding and "per posterius" of the things. But see now that one is employing the analogous word in theology, where one puts the question to oneself: is that which is attributed to God as being common to Him and to the creature said "univoce", "analogice", or "aequivoce"? One will say: "analogice". This involves another application of the doctrine of the analogous word. Cajetan begets a confusion in making a second problem come between. He says (one has seen) "*constat omnia nomina communia Deo et aliis esse analogia, et consequenter veritatem analogice inveniri in intellectu divino et aliis intellectibus*" [it stands firm that all names common to God and to others are analogous, and consequently that truth is found analogically in the Divine Understanding and other understandings]. In this case, the inferiors are the understandings. In the other case, the inferiors are the understanding and the thing. In both cases, one has a "per prius et posterius". In the first [q.16], it is the thing which is called true "per posterius"; in the other [q.13], everything will depend upon the order: for the "ratio nominis" the creature is first, while for the "res nominis", it is God. Thus two problems are involved, two sorts of inferiors, and thus two sorts of relations. However, there is the analogous in both cases.

What does St. Thomas do when he asks himself if the truth is one or not? In his reply, at the end [q.16, a.6, c.], he will not speak of the truth insofar as it is in the understanding as such but insofar as it is in the things. It is no objection that [il n'empêche quel] the inferiors, in his consideration, are the understandings and the thing.

A plurality of inferiors to which a definition is applied can be considered as something one, in opposition to the things to which this definition is not applied except "per posterius". Thus 'sign' is said properly of the sensible, but there exist many sorts of sensible signs. St. Augustine, for example, divides them into "signa naturalia" et "signa data" (signs which living things

give one another [se donnent] insofar as [they are] sensible). One finds a plurality there, and nevertheless St. Augustine's definition is applied to all the inferiors, which are considered as something one, in opposition to "intelligible". That one should have one definition alone does not mean to say that one would have only one inferior. The definition will be said of a group of inferiors. Whether it involve the track which an animal leaves or the moaning of the animal, in both cases St. Augustine's definition is verified. And one will be able to say: "ratio propria salvatur in uno" [the proper notion is saved in one]. What does "in uno" mean here? It means: that which is sensible [and] which leads to something else.

Likewise, truth is said first of the understanding, and when one puts the problem, the concern is with ours. Each individual has his understanding, each individual forms his concepts, his enunciations. There are then as many truths as understandings. Likewise also: as many healths as animals; and nevertheless the same definition is involved. That's why one must hold oneself, for speaking about the analogous, to the logical terms definition, attribution, and also signification. It is not because health as a quality does not exist except in one that the word 'sanum' is analogous; it is because the definition of 'sanum' is not said except of one.] +

Cajetan here tries to join two problems. In the first case, the first analogue is truth in the understanding (by opposition to truth in the things); in the second case, the first analogue is either the understanding of the creature (or the truth of the creature's understanding) or the truth of the Divine Understanding. Two problems are involved and thus two sorts of inferiors and two sorts of relations. But in fact both pertain to analogy.

In Question Sixteen, the problem is put with respect to the truth as such: does it concern a univocal word or an analogous word? It has been established some articles before that 'truth' was an analogous word. From this fact, the logical rule is imposed and the definition is not verified except of one alone. One alone -- that is the understanding; the other-- that is the thing. It is about [avec] that that St. Thomas is arguing; there is no question of truth insofar as it is common to God and to the creature.

In bringing in this other problem, Cajetan at once arrives at many understandings and concludes that it is not analogous, since the definition is not verified except of one alone. In the

first problem, the concern is with the perfect definition of truth; in the other case, the concern is with the perfect definition of truth in the understanding, which with us involves composition and division, while with God, it doesn't. There will consequently be a first and a second. As regards the imposition [of the name], ours will be first, God's afterwards, since we name things as we know them. This order is "quoad nos" "Quoad se", clearly God surpasses.

c) John of St. Thomas

Cajetan and John of St. Thomas ought to have analyzed Question Sixteen of the Prima Pars as strictly as possible. But they have not done it. John of St. Thomas puts an objection to himself taken just from Question Thirteen: "in illo loco ...agit de analogia magis dialectice quam metaphysice, scilicet ut tenet se ex parte nominum, non ex parte rerum" [in that place ...he deals with analogy more dialectically than metaphysically, that is, as he holds himself on the side of the names, and not on the side of the things]. (Cursus Philosophicus, Logica P.II, q.xiii, a.4) He says that St. Thomas in Question Thirteen speaks of analogy in a way more dialectical than metaphysical. One recognizes here the very faithful disciple of Cajetan. What Cajetan has not said in so many words [tel quell] --that analogy is a problem which relates to metaphysics-- his disciple goes on to say. The disciple is going to go farther, as usually happens in the case of errors. At the very beginning of his consideration of the analogous, John of St. Thomas says that the difficulties concerning analogy are "rather metaphysical": "Difficultates de analogia, quae satis metaphysicae sunt, ita copiose et subtiliter a Cajetano disputatae sunt in opusculo De Nominum Analogia, ut nobis locum non reliquerit quidquam aliud excogitandi" [The difficulties about analogy, which are sufficiently metaphysical, have been discussed so fully and subtly by Cajetan in his little work On the Analogy of Names, that he has not left us a place to think out anything else]. (Ibid. a.3) For him, Cajetan has said everything; it is him whom one must follow as faithfully as possible. So he follows him.

When he refers to Question Thirteen of the First Part, John of St. Thomas says (one has seen) that St. Thomas treats of analogy "rather dialectically than metaphysically, that is to say, for holding himself on the side of the names and not on the side of the things (he then treats of the names of God)." He adds: "Sicut autem ad analogiam metaphysice attenditur inaequalitas ex parte rerum, ita in analogia dialectice considerata attenditur

inaequalitas in modo significandi et nominandi" [Just as for analogy taken metaphysically one attends to inequality on the part of the things, so in analogy taken dialectically one attends to an inequality in the mode of signifying and naming]. (Ibid. a.4) It's true that there is analogy in the things. Furthermore, it is altogether right that in the problem of analogy one consider an inequality in the mode of signifying and of naming. Why, then, has he not applied that? Notice finally that, faced by the text of Question Sixteen, he too says that that rule is not universal: "In loco autem ex q. 16 non loquitur universaliter de omnibus analogis et sic non cogit" [In the passage from Q. 16, he is not speaking universally about all the analogous, and thus (the objection) is not conclusivel. (Ibid. a.4) Once more he purely and simply follows Cajetan. So much for analogy [Voilà pour l'analogie].

G. An understanding too much drawn to univocity.

We would now like to take note of two points raised by John of St. Thomas. This relates to a remark which we were making above, to the effect that the understanding, as if by nature, is rather inclined toward univocity. It is a lot easier to see everything as if in one genus, only one definition, etc. When the analogous word is involved, which requires a discernment, it is a lot more difficult.] +

a) John of St. Thomas and demonstration.

The first point concerns demonstration. For John of St. Thomas, the division of demonstration into *propter quid* and *quia* is univocal. That is altogether mistaken. Let us consider indeed the order of proceeding adopted by a great master such as Aristotle. One knows that in the Posterior Analytics, the question is of demonstration. But what does Aristotle do? Does he define demonstration as one could define animal, that is to say, as a univocal word? No. He descends immediately to the first analogue, demonstration *propter quid*. If this word 'demonstration' were univocal, one could define demonstration, abstraction [having been] made from the inferiors. But one cannot do it. When one is in front of a great master and one sees that in place of defining a common [something] he descends immediately to the first analogue or inferior, that is a sign of the analogous word. We are speaking, to be sure, of a master who knows how to

proceed, no matter who.

It is interesting to observe that John of St. Thomas gives good reasons to show that the word 'demonstration' ought to be analogous; nevertheless he will say that a univocal division is involved.

Concerning the quality of this division, whether it be univocal or analogous, the whole difficulty is brought back to this: whether either demonstration causes science simply, or only demonstration *propter quid*. For it seems that to it alone belongs the definition given above, that to know scientifically (*scire*) is to know the cause on account of which the thing is, and that it is the cause of that thing. Therefore that demonstration which does not know the cause on account of which the thing is does not simply cause knowing scientifically, and thus in the notion of scientific demonstration it agrees [*convenit*] analogically with demonstration *propter quid*. (op. cit. q.25, a.4)

Aristotle defines demonstration: "*syllogismus faciens scire*". And he defines "*scire*": to know the proper cause. Thus the demonstration which would not proceed from the proper cause would not engender this act of science and the word 'demonstration' would not be applied to it except in an analogous way.

John of St. Thomas then gives an argument according to which it would seem that the division of demonstration is univocal:

But on the other hand, demonstration *quia* and *propter quid* seem to agree [*convenire*] univocally, if, to be sure, demonstration *quia* has certitude and evidence about its object. Then it will be opposed to opinion just as science *propter quid* is. For opinion is uncertain and not evident. Therefore it has the substance and essence of science, if, to be sure, it has the substance and essence of evidence and certitude, by which it is opposed to and destroys opinion, and thus it pertains to science. (Ibid.)

Having thus proposed an argument for and an argument against, John of St. Thomas decides in favor of a univocal division: //

Nevertheless it ought to be said that demonstration or science *quia* intrinsically and substantially has the notion [*rationem*] of demonstration, inasmuch as it has certitude and

evidence, and thus absolutely is demonstration univocally, according to the formal mode of proceeding with certainty [certo] and evidently; but it imperfectly partakes of the notion of science, since it is not concerned with an object perfectly scientific, which is the essence (quidditas) and what follows upon the essence, but is concerned with the whether-it-is [an est] itself, in not attaining the root and cause of the truth on account of which it is. (Ibid.)

Note well the expression "sed imperfecte participare rationem scientiae". One must refer here to the expression of St. Thomas in his commentary on the Peri Hermenias, with respect to the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. St. Thomas says, one recalls, that one of the members which divide something common can be prior [antérieur] to another in two ways: either "secundum proprias rationes, aut naturas dividendium", or according to participation in that common [something] ("secundum participationem rationis illius communis quod in ea dividitur"). When one of the inferiors is first with respect to the other, as regards the specific differences and thus as regards the proper definitions of those inferiors, such as affirmation with respect to negation, the division remains univocal. But when the priority is on the level of the "participatio illius communis", the univocity disappears. But "scientia" properly makes up part of the "ratio communis" of demonstration; if "imperfecte participat", it's finished and done with univocity.

In fact, what are the principal elements attached to the nature of demonstration? In quite the first place, there is: to know the proper cause. There is also "ex uno in aliud", the passage from premises to conclusion, as well as evidence, certitude. In the case of demonstration quia, it is necessary to let fall the most important element, since this sort of demonstration does not make one know the proper cause. In consequence, "jam non erit propria acceptio" [there will no longer be a proper taking]. That is what it means to say "imperfecte participat rationem demonstrationis" [it imperfectly partakes of the notion of demonstration]. And because demonstration in science quia imperfectly partakes of the definition of demonstration or of science, the "ratio propria demonstrationis invenitur in uno tantum" [the proper notion of demonstration is found in one alone], namely, the demonstration which proceeds by the proper cause.

Once the distinction between the two sorts of demonstration has been well established, once all risk of ambiguity has been averted, one can always define demonstration quia also as a

"syllogismus faciens scire", on condition of then understanding the word "scire" in a broad sense. This demonstration remains, indeed, in the line of the third act of the reason and it makes one know. Furthermore, it is this which is the more numerous [qui l'emporte quant au nombre].

Notice that instead of examining the letter, as St. Thomas did for Aristotle, for example in the Peri Hermenias, or the Posterior Analytics, John of St. Thomas proceeds by disputes and by articles. In proceeding in this way, he is not as measured by the very letter, he does not try to examine the letter, to see what is the order which Aristotle follows. If he had been attentive to this order, if he had noticed that Aristotle at once defines demonstration *propter quid*, and if he had asked himself why, perhaps John of St. Thomas would have seen that an analogous word was involved.

b) John of St. Thomas and sign.

He commits a still more serious mistake as regards sign.
This will be our second point.

We have seen above, about signs, three texts which are in our opinion the most manifest. But John of St. Thomas makes use of these three texts as objection. He tries to establish his theory, interpreting these texts of St. Thomas in his own light. According to him, sign is divided univocally into instrumental and formal.

One can ask why John of St. Thomas brings in as he does a long consideration of the sign in his treatise on logic. One sees why at the outset, when he gives the definition of the sign:

A sign is that which represents something other than itself to a knowing power. We have given this definition thus, commonly, that we might embrace all the genera of signs, both formal and instrumental. (op. cit., Logica II P., q.21, a.1)

By "signum formale", he means the concept. It would have been worth more to say that the sensible sign is sign "per prius"; one has in what follows a secondary signification, indicated by the notion of "defectus intelligibilis".

[Signum] addit super repraesentare et formaliter dicit
repraesentare aliud deficienter vel dependenter ab ipsa re

significata et quasi vice illius substituendo.

[Sign] adds on to representing and formally means representing something else deficiently or with dependence on the thing signified, and as it were standing in its place. (Ibid., emphasis ours)

But in both cases one has all the same a thing which is first known and leads to the knowledge of another. Whereas in the case of the concepts, the understanding forms the concept, but does not see the concept, but sees that which the concept represents; it [the concept] is not that which being known leads to another thing.

According to John of St. Thomas, we have said, the division of sign is univocal. To be sure, one must admit that the concept is sign, but "communiter loquendo". Further, it is to be noted that St. Thomas would always say "similitudo"; he reserved the word 'sign' for the word. But John of St. Thomas says that he is going to define sign "in communi", abstraction [having been] made from the inferiors. Which goes back to saying that one is concerned with a univocal word.

We have defined the sign commonly ("in communi"), in abstracting from the formal and instrumental sign, as "what represents something other than itself". (Ibid. a.6)

For him, St. Augustine's definition is not a definition of the sign.

But that definition, which is carried around from St. Augustine: "a sign is that which, beyond the species which it brings into the senses, from itself makes something else come into knowledge (in cognitionem)", is only given for the instrumental sign. (Ibid.)

That is not true. The sensible sign "magis habet rationem signi", quite as "substantia est magis ens". For John of St. Thomas, again, St. Thomas' definition in the fourth book of the Sentences and in the De Veritate, Question Nine, Article Four, is a definition of the sign "in communi", in a sense in which he himself was intending it above.

But the definition put is given by St. Thomas in IV Sent. (d.I, q.1, a.1, q1a.1, ad 5) where he says that "sign imports something manifest to us by which we are led as if by the hand [manuducimur] unto the knowledge of something

else". And in Question Nine of De Veritate, a. 4, ad 4, he says that "sign commonly speaking (communiter loquendo) is any known thing whatever in which something else is known, where the "communiter" is the same as "in communi". (Ibid.)

There's the big mistake: "communiter", in Question Nine, does not at all mean to say "in communi". "In communi" will be said, for example, of the way in which one considers animal in regard to its inferiors. But "communiter", that means to say that one has let things fall in such a way --[has let fall in such a way] principal elements in the perfect definition-- that one will still speak of sign, but "communiter loquendo"; this will be one of the last analogues. Although for John of St. Thomas "communiter" does not mean "improprie". St. Thomas says "signum proprie dicitur de signo sensibili"; according to John of St. Thomas this is opposed to "in communi", in such a way that the non-sensible sign will not be any more improper.

So where St. Thomas says "we can say sign commonly etc." (De Veritate, q.9, a.4, ad 4), "commonly" is not the same as "improperly and not truly", but [is] according to the common notion of sign, which is nevertheless true, though not under that appropriation by which we use signs according to our mode of knowing. (op. cit., q. 22, a.1, c.

Because we make use of signs according to our mode of knowing, the sensible sign is as appropriated to us; this is what "ratio propria" means for John of St. Thomas. Thus he has not grasped either the "ratio propria" or the "communiter", nor the "per prius et posterius". To be sure, it is true that the angels make no use of sensible signs; in this sense, the genus of signs is "proprie nobis". But for John of St. Thomas, that corresponds in names to "ratio propria". Furthermore, he has not grasped "communiter" as synonymous with "per posterius".

III. Some considerations about words

At the occasion of our study of the analogous word, it will be good to make some considerations on words in general. We shall make some rather general considerations at first, next we shall treat of the words one uses in philosophy, and then we shall finish with some particular cases.

A. Words in general

The word is defined as an artificial sign. We prefer to say artificial rather than conventional. It is evident that the practical intelligence is the efficient cause of the word. But in the case of a word employed in philosophy, one must go farther: the practical intelligence forms the word, but it is also subordinated to the speculative intelligence. The latter should respect the movement, the natural process of the reason. It is moreover the respect for this natural mode which makes the perfection of a language.

a) Superiority and perfection of the word.

Let us insist first of all upon the superiority and the perfection of this sign which is the word. As Plato has said so well, "not every man is able to give a name, but only a maker of names ...who of all skilled artisans in the world is the rarest". (Cratylus, 389a) Farther on, Plato wishes to show that the names given by the gods surpass the names given by men. Why? By reason of the superiority of the understanding of the gods. (Ibid. 391d)

In the Timaeus, when he analyses or describes the different organs in the animal or in man, Plato says with respect to the mouth --we use Jowett's English translation since it is that which in our opinion best renders the thought of Plato here-- "the framer of us framed the mouth ...with a view to the necessary and the good", in view of the necessary on the one hand, [and] of the good (optimum) on the other hand. In effect, the mouth affords "the way in" for the necessary, and "the way out" for the better, i.e. "the river of speech which flows out of a man", that which signifies the understanding; this is why Plato calls it "the rarest and noblest of all streams". (Timaeus, 75d,e)

St. Augustine also speaks of the superiority of the word. He says that "verba ...prorsus inter homines obtinuerunt principatum significandi" (De Doctrina Christiana, L.II, c.3): on the level of signs, the word occupies the first rank. In fact, they can signify "quaecumque animo concipiuntur": the word can signify all that can be conceived in the soul. The word thus appears as a universal in *causando*. It will be able to engender either persuasion or conviction, according as one has (for example) a poetic or philosophic word [verbel]. Moreover, of all the signs, it is the word which manifests the most objects; from this point of view, it partakes in a very particular way of the nature of the understanding. The word is as an effect which proceeds from the

(Aristotle) says that what the aforementioned Hesiodists wanted to signify by these names 'nectar' and 'manna' was known to them but not to us. And therefore, how such causes may be brought forward to solve such a question and to bestow incorruption on such things, they said above our understanding. For if such words be understood as they sound, they seem to be of no efficacy. (St. Thomas In III Metaphysicorum, lect. xi, #470)

It is necessary all the same that a master, when he uses a sign, make himself understand. The sign is made just to manifest some thing. That's why to teach in hiding the truth under certain images is either rather laughable or leads to almost nothing.

(Aristotle) excuses himself from a more diligent investigation of this opinion; and he says that as regards those who have cultivated philosophy by way of fables [fabulose], hiding the truth of wisdom under fables, it is not worthwhile to intend with zeal. For if someone should dispute against the things they say, according as they sound outwardly, they are laughable. But if someone should wish to inquire about these things according to the truth hidden by the fables, it is not manifest [immanifesta est]. From which one may take it that Aristotle, disputing against Plato and others of this sort who handed over their doctrine hiding it under certain other things, does not dispute according to the hidden truth, but according to what is outwardly put forth. (Ibid. #471)

In our opinion, what is bad in the case of philosophy is when the image or the metaphor hides the truth from us. But if the image, far from hiding, more reveals and manifests, we see no reason then for not using it. Thus when Plato speaks of the "river of speech", one knows quite well what he wants to say. It involves a style with imagery [un style imagé], evidently, but that does not go against philosophic understanding. There can likewise be, on the side of the hearer, a reason to employ a metaphor. But there still, it will be necessary all the same that he who listens to a metaphor know of what you are speaking. This is to say that at that moment you do not hide the truth; you lead him along -- a species of manuductio is involved. There's the doctrine in general. Notice however that in the case of the analogous word, when it's a matter of manifesting the very great distinction between an altogether proper sense and the last sense, one will be able to qualify this last sense as metaphorical, on condition that it come after the others. However, that does not happen very often. One finds an example of this in the treatise On the Soul, in regard to the word 'movement'. One (1

says there that movement is encountered in three ways in the operations of the soul: "proprie", "minus proprie", and "minime proprie". (St. Thomas In I De Anima, lect. x, #157) One finds movement in the proper sense in the operations of the vegetative soul and [in those] of the sensitive appetite. (Ibid. #158) One finds it according to a less proper sense in the operations of the sensitive soul, since movement does not occur there physically ("secundum esse naturae"), but according to a spiritual existence ("secundum esse spirituale"). Thus, when a man sees a rock, it is not the rock which enters into the eye; the rock exists in a certain way in sight, but according to a being altogether particular. But from the fact that the subject of sight is bodily, this operation remains bound to mobility. Thus there is movement in the operations of the sensitive soul, but "minus proprie". For one has movement more or less properly in the measure that one has the bodily more or less properly. The union is not material in the case of sensitive knowledge itself, but the faculty of seeing resides in a body, and who says body says mobility. However, in the case of the operation of the intellectual soul, not only is the union made not "secundum esse naturae" but "secundum esse spirituale", but it involves as well an act which is done without the concurrence of a bodily organ. One ought then and there let fall entirely the definition of movement, except for the passage from potency to act. That is why St. Thomas says: "minimum autem de proprietate motus, et nihil nisi metaphorice, invenitur in intellectu". (Ibid. #160) This is a way of marking the great distance between movement in the strict sense and movement applied to the operation of the understanding.

Likewise, in the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics, when Aristotle distinguishes and orders the different senses of the word 'nature', he says at the very end that nature is said of every substance, [and] is said even of the spiritual substance, "secundum quendam metaphoram". (St. Thomas, In V Metaph. lect. v, #823)

b) Poetic word and philosophic word [verbel].

Consider now the opposition between the poetic word and the philosophic word. Let us speak first of the poetic word, to which the use of metaphors is particularly appropriated.

1. the metaphor, rapid transport.

Paul Valéry, in his Variétés, recalls that Maréchal Foch "gladly made use of images, which which are the means of transport most rapid, if not the most sure, between two flashes of the

spirit". (L. I, ed. de la Pléiade, p. 1123) And Aristotle, in his Poetics, says that one must prefer the metaphor (μεταφορά) to the comparison (εἶκος); one of the reasons for that is that it is a lot swifter with the metaphor. For example, it is worth more in speaking of Achilles, to say "that lion leapt forward" than to say that "he leapt forward like a lion". With the metaphor, the understanding sees more rapidly, all the more because the understanding loves that one should say of things that which they are.

2. the formation of the analogous word, a slow transport.

Because the choice of a metaphor admits something like a discourse [comporte comme un discours], the expression "means of transport" is quite suitable to designate it. Note that one will also be able to speak of transport (translatio) for the formation of the analogous word, but an altogether different case is involved. While the metaphor constitutes a transport more prompt, the formation of the analogous word is in the opposite way [à l'opposé]. one of the most interesting examples, in our opinion, of this "slow transport", is the case of the word argumentum. Commenting on the Sentences, St. Thomas is concerned with explaining the sense of the word argumentum, as it enters into the definition of faith given by St. Paul. At first sight, it could seem that argumentum is proper to the understanding which is convinced, which has evidence. But faith involves lack of evidence [comporte inevidence].

Faith is about the things which are above reason. But argument is an act of reason. Therefore faith is not an argument. (In III Sent. d.23, q.2, a.1, obj.4)

Now see the reply:

Argument properly means a process of reason from things known to the manifestation of things unknown, according to what Boethius says (Lib. I, De Differentiis Topicis, L.64, 1174) that it is "reason making belief about a doubtful thing". (Ibid. ad 4)

Note that "belief" here does not at all have the sense of faith. According to a first sense, argumentum is said of the third act of the reason, or of that which is formed by this act. See now how a first "translatio" is going to be done, a first transport in view of a second sense.

And because the whole force of an argument consists in the

middle term, from which one proceeds to the proof of things unknown, therefore the middle term itself is called the argument, whether it be a sign or a cause or an effect. (Ibid.)

Because all the virtue of the syllogism, for example, resides in the middle term, one is now going to call "argument" the middle which constitutes the principle of manifestation, thanks to which one unites the extremes in the conclusion. But that is not all. A second transport is added.

And because in the middle term, or in the principle from which one proceeds by arguing, is contained in power [virtute] the whole process of argumentation, therefore the name of argument has been drawn to this: that any brief announcement [praelibatio = foretaste] of a telling to come is called an argument, as in each of the epistles of Paul the arguments are sent beforehand. (Ibid.)

That's the word one would employ in poetry; in the case of a tragedy, for example, there would be at first an "argumentum", which would say in a some brief words what would be going to follow. Note that the notion of proem [proeme] is tied to that: "brevis praelibatio futurae narrationis".

Finally, a third transport is added:

And because the middle or principle is called an argument insofar as it has a power of manifesting the conclusion, and this is more truly in it from the light of the agent intellect, of which it is the instrument, since "all things which are argued are manifested by the light", as is said in Ephesians v. 13., therefore, that very light by which the principles are manifested, just as by principles the conclusions are made manifest, can be called an argument of those very principles.

Then St. Thomas goes on to resolve the objection in showing that it is the three last senses that one can apply to the faith, and not the very first.

Is it not extraordinary to see the complication of the senses? One has here a beautiful example which shows that the means of transport is slow. This is truly the reason which discourses --one is far from the "means of transport very prompt between two flashes of spirit". The opposition is very clean between the process the reason ought to follow in order to effect

multiple transports and, on the other hand, the means of transport extremely prompt of the imaged word [verbe image].

c) The sensible, principle of formation of abstract words.

Let us now speak a little about words in philosophy. We touch here a point which at some places Valéry has seen very well. Paul Valéry is an author whom we would not so much recommend the reading of, as a general rule, since as he himself also says, he is not a philosopher (which, curiously enough, does not prevent him from being in admiration before Descartes). But when he has truly seen something, Valéry knows how to say it in a marvelous way, which, for us, is important. We are going to examine two texts of Valéry. The first is taken from his famous *Discourse to the Surgeons*. It contains in particular extraordinary things about the acts of the hand:

I will go so far as to say that a reciprocal relation of the most important sort ought to exist between our thought and this marvelous association of properties always present which our hand fastens to us. The slave enriches his master, and does not confine himself to obeying him. (Oeuvres I, Variété, Discours aux chirurgiens, Bibl. de la Pléiade, Gallimard 1957, p. 919)

Valéry speaks of a reciprocal relation between the hand and the understanding. The hand is as the slave of the understanding, who "enriches his master". He wants to say by that that the hand, or the act of the hand, will serve as an object which can cause in us certain very precious knowledges. Not only does the hand obey the understanding (the practical understanding, evidently), but the hand can be a certain principle for the understanding:

It suffices for demonstrating this reciprocity of services to consider that our most abstract vocabulary is peopled with terms which are indispensable to the understanding, but which could not have been furnished to it except by the most simple acts or functions of the hand. Send, grasp, seize, place, hold, set ; and behold! synthesis, thesis, hypothesis, supposition, comprehension. ...Addition is brought back to giving, as multiplication and complexity to folding. (Ibid.)

One can untangle from that a rule altogether general: the acts most simple, most elementary, the things altogether sensible will

be at the beginning of the formation of words in a very abstract sense. This abstract sense will be the result of those multiple transports of which we have spoken above. A word will be able to convey a very abstract logical sense, but this signification is attached to the same sounds of voice which first signify sensible things, [or] very concrete acts. There is a great advantage for the reason in conserving this whole process. Thanks to all the first certitudes tied to the first imposition, very certain though tied to the sensible order, the understanding can resolve in the "notius quoad nos" [the more known to us]. At a given moment, a word will be found to imply at once something "notius quoad nos" and something "notius quoad se". One will be dealing then with the philosophic word at its most perfect. A word which would have none but a logical sense and which one could not attach to something inferior, would not possess this perfection. The French word *syllogisme* is of this kind, although the word *syllogismos* in Greek is not, since the latter word first signified calculation, or account; that is another thing than this argumentation so difficult to analyze which is the syllogism. Sensible things at the beginning of the formation of abstract words --that then is like a description of a perfect language.

Let us see another text pretty nearly in the same line:

It is known that all our abstractions have such personal singular experiences for their origin; all the words of the most abstract thought are words drawn from the simplest, the most common [vulgaire] usage, which we have enticed away [débauchés] in order to philosophize with them. Do you know that the Latin word from which we have drawn the word *monde* signifies simply 'apparel' ['parure']? But you certainly know that the words *hypothesis* or *substance*, *soul* or *spirit*, or *idea*, the words *think* or *comprehend* are the names of elementary acts as *put*, *send*, *seize*, *breathe*, or *see* ... (Valéry, *Oeuvres I, Variété*, pp. 1093-94)

It is difficult to comprehend the choice of the word *debaucher*. Most of the time, in French, this word has a very pejorative sense. Sometimes one can take it in good part, but that is very rare. Valéry does not himself seem to give it a pejorative sense, if one judges by the context. But what is important above everything here is the general idea to be disengaged: we name things as we know them. Just as the sense is the principle of understanding, the sensible is the principle of the formation of words. Instead of saying "enticed away" ["débauchés"], we would rather say "enobled": "words taken from the most simple usage which we have enobled in order to philosophize with them". It is

more fitting to express oneself thus, since in giving to a word a sense more immaterial, more elevated, one renders the sign more perfect.

One knows that philosophy is defined "intra limites intellectus", in contrast to poetry or rhetoric. The understanding has as object the true, "verum absolute". This truth implies universality [universell]. But the universal cannot be acquired or engendered except as deriving from sense. That is to say that the signs which philosophy makes use of ought to have had a concrete sense at the beginning; this concrete sense constitutes a sort of foundation, the root sending nourishment on the way to the understanding. A perfect language, a language which philosophy can make use of, ought to abound in signs of this kind. To apply anew the famous rule which Aristotle gives in his Politics, one can say that one must contemplate the formation of the word in its beginning, resolve in the beginning of the formation itself. And if this principle belongs to the same language as the term, it is this language which can qualify as a "per se sufficiens", and not a language which starts midway. If the principle which allows one to resolve does not belong to such a language, one must then make appeal to a foreign language. We shall give cases presently.

d) The ordering of the most common words, work of the wise.

Here is the place to remark that only the wise man has been able to write the Fifth Book of the Metaphysics. The word, such as we are coming to describe it, is the instrument of the wise man. Let us not forget that the acquisition of metaphysics or of wisdom presupposes the acquisition of the particular disciplines. But what does one find in the Fifth Book? One has one word, but there has been a question of it in the science of nature, there has been a question of it in mathematics, there has been a question of it in logic. Then the the understanding of the metaphysician who possesses these different intellectual virtues goes to put them to the service just of the signs. That's why this book is so important. Beyond the acquisition of the particular disciplines, there must be discernment. Let us not forget that Aristotle distinguishes the different senses of the words which are very common. But the more the word is common, the more senses it possesses, and the more there needs to be discernment and order to distinguish these senses.

e) Relative perfection of different languages, insofar as [they are] principles of manifestation.

Note however that the language in which philosophy is expressed can be either matter of discovery or matter of teaching. Language is at first discovered --that is evident, but there can also be progression in perfection. But once constituted or formed, a language can be matter of teaching.

The understanding which discovers a language ought to submit itself, just as we said above, to the speculative understanding. This in turn ought to respect the natural process of the reason. This language can evidently make the object of teaching, not only as mother tongue, but also as a foreign tongue. That is very important, since the very particular problems which will now be raised will consist principally in the relation of one language to the other, in the passage from one language to another. If a foreign language surpasses in perfection by reason of its excellence, it is, as we said above, comparable to a superior light. It will be necessary to bear it in mind.

In the order of the signs, the analogous word is like an imitation, evidently very distant, of the universal "in repraesentando" of the angel. What is it that allows the superior angel to illumine the inferior angel? We say "illumine", since there is no question of the superior angel only speaking to the inferior angel: the superior angel cannot address himself to the inferior angel without teaching; whereas the inferior angel can speak as much as he wants, but he cannot teach. (Cf. St. Thomas De Veritate, q.9) But the relation between the more universal intelligible form of the superior angel and the less universal intelligible form of the inferior angel can be compared to the relation of a perfect language as principle of manifestation to another, more limited language as principle of manifestation, because it [the latter] lacks something.

- f) Three ways of supplying for the neediness of one's mother tongue.

Certain languages actually involve a certain neediness. It is thus necessary to try to supply for this neediness. Here are, at least as far as we see now, in this season, what would be the three cases to look at.

1. exploitation of the possibilities of one's mother tongue.

The first is the case where the possibilities of one's mother tongue have not been exploited. For example, the Greek word *κατηγορία* [categories] has with Aristotle a logical sense very precise, very determinate; the first question to be put then would be the following: would there not be a French word whose signification would be logical and which would lead to the logical understanding without multiplying one's efforts. Up to now, one has contented oneself with an imitation, with a copy of the Greek, in saying "categorie". To be sure, with many efforts it is perhaps possible to catch up with the precise sense. Nevertheless, what we have always feared is that a principal element escapes us: the word categorie makes us think of the integral whole, when here the concern is with a universal whole. In our opinion, there is something infinitely better to be done than the French copy of the Greek word. We should here thank M. Yvan Pelletier, who has suggested to us the word attribution. We believe that this is altogether the word which must be used. Instead of saying "the book of the Categories" we would say "the book of Attributions: that is French and that is logic. Of these two qualities, the latter is above all necessary. One must in fact never sacrifice the truth, whatever it be, in logic or elsewhere, in order to save the elegance of the language. But when one can both speak in French and make use of a perfect sign, why ask for anything better? To be sure, by dint of reflecting, one can arrive at passing from one language to another; thus the word accusation, one of the first impositions of the Greek word *κατηγορία* [category], will be able to add something. But it remains that with attribution one has, substantially, something "per se sufficiens".

2. appeal to another language, by etymology.

Let us pass to a second case: the word exists, one has given it a logical sense and one uses it currently. We would not say that this word is truly "per se sufficiens". So it is that the word genre does not cast the same light as the word genus: who, in hearing the word genre, thinks of generation? One could say as much about *espèce* [species]. The genus [genre] is more than that notion which many unfortunately have, the notion of class; it is also the first universal, from which the others proceed. One will say that the differences proceed from the genus as from their principle. This notion so important of principle is given by Porphyry: *γένος* at first signifies "principium generationis". Thus, sometimes one must go to a first sense, and sometimes even to the etymology and see how the word is formed. All that is

and therefore difficult.

One can improve a word such as *genre*, in the sense that in employing it one can think of another language, one can make appeal to a foreign tongue.

3. formation of a new word.

Finally, the most deficient case. The word does not exist, the language does not know the precise sense of the Greek word, for example. It is thus that neither Latin, nor French nor English possesses a word which signifies precisely, exactly what the Greek word *προοίμιον* [proemion] signifies. Words such as *introduction* or *avant-propos* are fairly close, but there must be more than that, since *προοίμιον* includes an extremely important notion. In such a case, there is but one thing to do: form the word. In forming it, it is preferable to give it an articulation as similar as possible. From this point of view, the Latins had a word. One sees it in Quintilian, Institutions of Oratory, when he speaks of the *exordium* [l'exorde]. He says: "That which we call *exordium*, the Greeks *magna vi ratione* call *προοίμιον*". Why "*magna vi ratione*" [by a reason great in power]? *Exordium* means beginning [principe] or that which is at the beginning, whereas *προοίμιον* adds to that the notion of tracing the road, tracing the way, a notion which is not rendered by any of the Latin words. What have the Latins done? They have kept *exordium*, but have also formed another word. Not only the orators but also the philosophers have done it. The orators have said *proemium*, a word which the Latin philosophers have then received, purely and simply.

This case is interesting for French, since our language has also fashioned a word for itself: *proème* --one finds it in the Dictionary [le Littré]-- but one has not given it any sense but the rhetorical. Further, the word is out of use [désuet], it no longer exists in contemporary French. What must be done, then? It must be put back in use. That is all the more easy in that it was already incorporated in the language, although the articulation of it be altogether foreign; it is a matter of a strange word and not of a word truly French. It was the same for the Latin word *proemium*: *exordium* is a word truly Latin, *proemium* is a copy of the Greek. What do you want? There is nothing else to be done. In the case of the French word, it is very easy; it is only necessary to make the extension to give it a philosophic sense. This is a transport which has not been done. In sum, there are two things to be done: put the word (*proème*) in use, since although it had first been incorporated in the language, one

has abandoned its use; then, give a philosophic sense to this word which had only a rhetorical sense, by a transport, an extension of its signification.

It is a matter, then, when the word does not exist, of forming one in the image of the superior language. Mark here the wonderful pride [l'admirable fierté] of the Latins: Cicero, in his didactic works, and above all in [those which are] moral, encounters a great number of names in Aristotle's Ethics which signify such and such a virtue. These names did not have corresponding ones in Latin; it was necessary to find words truly Latin to signify these virtues. But Cicero strains himself to find a word truly Latin. A certain pride was pushing him. He would say: the Latins are not just anybody, we are capable of doing something. It is thus, likewise, that in place of employing the word syllogismus, which is a copy of the Greek word, the Latins are going to employ the word ratio; that is not at all stupid [bête]. St. Thomas will do the same thing. Thus, for example, in his commentary on the Physics, when Aristotle proves the necessity of a first subject in natural beings, St. Thomas will say that it pertains to the metaphysician to prove this necessity "per rationem", to the naturalist, "per inductionem". "ratio" there means syllogism. There again is a beautiful case which manifests that language, if one exploits its possibilities, can give something. To be sure, there has to be an understanding fine enough [assez délié], a lot finer to grasp the sense of the word ratio than that of the word syllogismus; one sees at once that it involves an operatum, a work of the reason, whereas ratio, just as λόγος [logos] in Greek, is one of the most difficult words, since it brings along with it a multiplicity of senses.