

giving, photographed by her sister Naomi. Bob's gifted artist wife Beth designed the cover of the book, and on the back we see the author enjoying the art of fencing.

Not until the penultimate chapter is there a clear statement of the ground of seriousness in moral reflection: the author accepts, in some sense, what all Puritans stressed, the sinfulness of man before the divine majesty and perfect righteousness. "People must accept their limitations with humility. Not to do so, to condemn oneself, is the greatest sin of pride, at once assuming God's bench of judgment and denying the hand of providence" (p. 200).

The book is not solely based on the seriousness derived from Puritanism: kindness and irony would be lacking, as work without play, if there were not also Liberalism and Confucianism. It is philosophically reasonable to pair these latter ideological movements because where one is weak the other is strong. One exaggerates the self-sufficiency of the individual, the other the dependence on relations within the family. The dialectical critique is to abandon "what is dangerous or unduly limited in each" (p. viii).

Because the method is to confront the emphasis on particulars (nominalism) with the emphasis on wholes (Hegelianisms), legitimate integration with a moral conclusion most resembles F. H. Bradley's *Ethical Studies*. But the author fights off any hint that he might, in spite of the Confucian element, support anything so conservative as "My Station and Its Duties." Neville accepts "hierarchically related social classes . . . explained and partially justified as a function of reciprocal duties. The Puritan correction of Confucian elitism is that the culture must be accessible to all, and that the poor not be excluded from public life" (p. 39). This is the deep connection between Puritanism and Democracy, which Perry stressed. Perhaps Neville would admit that he is writing a Christian philosophy.

Our Smiling Puritan is serious, but not "humorless, interfering, and [imposing] restrictive authority" (p. 41). He responds to "the passion for order-building" while recognizing "the limits of any order" (p. 42, n. 19). Neville is noted for his deep concern with philosophic systems, and this book accordingly makes its contribution to the study of categories, as in his previous books.

What he has made more clear than in earlier writing is that his theory of virtue rests on a response of man to divine imperative. The key commandment seems to me to be: "to be created is to be obligated to be a creature with a creature's finite nature" (p. 199). Rather than going on to discuss the first Confucian virtue of filiality, the smiling Puritan might admit that he has made the transition from "I am the Lord thy God" to "Honor thy father and thy mother."—Paul G. Kuntz, *Emory University*.

OSTENFELD, Erik, *Ancient Greek Psychology and the Modern Mind-Body Debate*. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1986. 109 pp. \$12.00—Erik Ostensfeld's hundred-page book, of which only seventy-

one are text, would likely have been several times as long if it had been written by a good many other contemporary philosophers. It is refreshingly concise, clear, and well argued, and his delineation of Plato's doctrine especially in the later dialogues as well as Aristotle's in the *De Anima* is detailed and careful beyond what one finds in most recent authors on these subjects. He argues persuasively for a similarity of teaching in the later Platonic dialogues and in Aristotle. Other Greek philosophers are treated only in passing.

The issue Ostenfeld faces is whether Plato and Aristotle have anything intelligible to say on the mind-body problem as framed by Descartes and pursued by philosophers and psychologists ever since. He makes a penetrating analysis of Descartes' teaching and the reasons for it as well as the several criteria of the mental (Brentano, Chisholm, Armstrong, Putnam, Fodor, Dennett). He believes it is a mistake to assimilate Plato's views to Descartes'.

In his analysis of Aristotle, Ostenfeld appreciates that psychology is a part of the philosophy of nature and why. He confuses essence and form, however, failing to distinguish the sense of form which can be equated with essence (the *forma totius*) from form as a part (the correlative of matter). After all, the essence of a material thing embraces both form and matter. This is a curious lapse, since he does understand that Aristotle describes the soul as a principle of the living body. He does express accurately Aristotle's description of knowledge as becoming other and of intellect as a power that becomes all things, but he attributes to the active intellect some of the knowing functions which properly belong to the passive intellect in an Aristotelian account.

Ostenfeld very perceptively rejects opinions which interpret Aristotle as a materialist, notably J. M. Randall's view that Aristotle was a "functional and contextual behaviorist," Wallace Matson's claim "that mind-body identity was 'taken for granted' in Greek literature including Aristotle," and Hilary Putnam's theory that psychological properties are identical with functional properties. The last named is treated at length.

Ostenfeld sees that Plato and Aristotle were concerned with the contrast between particular (sense) and universal (intellectual) knowledge, or, in other terms, the one and the many. "They are not brooding over the mental-physical distinction," but Ostenfeld concludes that the modern debate on the mind-body problem might benefit from a renewed study of the ancients' general-particular and form-matter contrasts. He has made a significant beginning.—Henri DuLac, *The College of St. Thomas*.

SAVILLE, Anthony. *Aesthetic Reconstructions: The Seminal Writings of Lessing, Kant and Schiller*. Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 8. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. ix + 261 pp. \$45.00—The present book contains purportedly independent studies of three classics in the his-