

## A Note on Demonstration

by Ronald McArthur

THE HUMAN mind, though it produces various operations to attain scientific knowledge, yet by nature attempts to know with the fewest possible concepts. Logic, therefore, by facilitating the acts of reason should help us here as elsewhere. It is possible, however, that in our zeal to unify our knowledge, to see more with fewer concepts, we subvert the art of demonstration, our only means of knowing.<sup>1</sup> It is necessary, then, to pay the closest attention to the fundamental principles of demonstration, for a small error in the beginning becomes great in the end.<sup>2</sup>

### I

There is, among other errors of its kind, one which, by misunderstanding the distinction of reasoning reason, eliminates one kind of immediate proposition without which demonstration by proper cause (*demonstratio propter quid*) is impossible. Since the demonstration of a proper passion of its subject is the first meaning of demonstration, any doctrine which considers it illusory attacks the very meaning of knowledge itself. Such an error is committed not only by those who wish to eliminate all philosophical discourse in favor of an existential metaphysics based on intuitions, but even by purportedly traditional philosophers and theologians, such as Suarez and more recently Marin-Sola.

<sup>1</sup> I am using "scientific knowledge" and "to know" in the traditional Aristotelian sense, where knowledge results from demonstration of the reasoned fact. Cf. *Post. Anal.*, I, 1, 71a26-28.

<sup>2</sup> St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, ch. 1.

My purpose, which is to defend the traditional doctrine of demonstration, will best be served by first stating Marin-Sola's doctrine and its consequences, and by then examining this doctrine in the light of the tradition it denies; the doctrine of demonstration will thus become clearer.

Marin-Sola<sup>3</sup> distinguishes three degrees of distinction in this way. Every distinction, he says, exists either in an object before any operation of the knowing subject, or it is made by the subject without really existing in the known object. The first is called an objective distinction, while the second is called a subjective distinction or a distinction of reason. The subject, however, can make distinctions with or without a foundation in the object; if there is a foundation in the object the distinction is called the distinction of reasoned reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*), while if there is not a foundation in the object the distinction is called the distinction of reasoning reason (*distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*).

There are, then, three species of distinction: a) real or objective; b) virtual or conceptual; c) logical or nominal. The first, he says, is a distinction of objectivity; the second is a distinction of aspects or partial concepts of the same and unique objectivity; the third is a distinction of names or formulas not only of the same objectivity but also of the same and unique concept of this objectivity. The first is objective and completely independent of the knowing subject; the second is subjective while being founded upon its object; the third is so exclusively subjective that it has no foundation in the object and is but the product of the subject.

Furthermore, the third distinction is, according to Marin-Sola, improperly called a distinction, for it is purely nominal and does not augment our knowledge of an object. The first and second distinctions are proper distinctions because they increase


<sup>3</sup> *L'évolution homogène du dogme catholique*, 2nd. ed. (Fribourg, Switzerland, 1924) I, 24.

our knowledge. The second manifests new aspects of the same object, while the first leads us to knowledge of a new object.

After stating his doctrine, Marin-Sola gives examples of these three distinctions. The distinction which exists between the concepts "man" and "rational animal" is an example of a nominal distinction. An instance of a virtual distinction is that between the concepts of immateriality and intellectuality or between the different attributes of God. The concepts of soul and body, or of accident and actual inherence in a subject are his examples of the real distinction.

Finally, he states that in the nominal distinction, the concepts are at the same time really and logically or formally identical; in the real distinction they are really distinct; in the virtual distinction they are formally distinct but objectively identical.

A diagram will clarify Marin-Sola's position:



If this doctrine is true, there follow certain disturbing consequences regarding the traditional doctrine of demonstration. A demonstration by proper cause (*demonstratio propter quid*) is a syllogism which makes us to know. To know means not only to know the fact but the reasoned fact, to know that a property inheres necessarily in a given subject through knowledge of that

subject's nature. Such knowledge is attained by conceptual progression from what is actually known in the premisses to new knowledge in the conclusion by drawing the consequence virtually contained in the premisses.<sup>4</sup> Now, if this progression were merely a nominal progression, a multiplying of words, in either premiss, there would be no real reasoning and hence no demonstration. If, for example, the proposition "man is risible" is not really a conclusion attained by means of the knowledge of man's nature, but merely another way of stating one of the premisses, there is no demonstration. This, however, is the necessary consequence of Marin-Sola's position. A diagram using his doctrine will illustrate:

Rational animal is risible — real distinction between subject and predicate

Man is rational animal — nominal distinction between subject and predicate

Man is risible — real distinction between subject and predicate

This group of propositions, which looks like a demonstration, would be symbolized by:

B is A

B is B

B is A

There is no discourse because there are not three terms or concepts but two, and hence no conclusion is possible. The apparent discourse is merely a conceptual restatement of the major premiss; no new knowledge is obtained for there has been no reasoning. Since all demonstrations by proper cause depend on minor premisses of this kind (that is, where the definition is predicated of the defined), if Marin-Sola is right there are

<sup>4</sup> Aristotle, *Post. Anal.*, I, 1, 71a26-71b8; St. Thomas, *In I Anal. Post.*, 3, n. 22 (ed. Spiazzi).

no such demonstrations; every such supposed demonstration, then, is a begging of the question, for we assume the conclusion in the major premiss. It is no defense of demonstration to say that demonstration by proper cause is really only nominal progression, for this is not reasoning, but a juxtaposition of words, and this kind of demonstration is supposedly the most perfect reasoning.

One other possibility remains. It is possible that Marin-Sola is right about the distinction of reasoning reason but uses a bad example. Our previous argument, then, is not against his doctrine but against his example. This supposes, however, that the predication of a definition of its defined is based on a distinction other than the distinction of reasoning reason. But on what other distinction would it be based?

I hold, then, that Marin-Sola's example is legitimate but that his doctrine is false. An attentive look at some of the fundamental notions involved in the logic of demonstration will, I think, justify my criticism.

## II

Since the conclusion of any demonstration is inferred from its principles, they must be more known than the conclusion, and since it is impossible to have an infinite regress, we must finally arrive at some principles which are never conclusions of a previous demonstration, but which are known by induction. If this were not true, science would be impossible.<sup>5</sup>

These principles are called immediate principles, for they are known not through an extrinsic medium which stands as a middle term, but through knowledge of their own composing terms. As such they are not the object of science but of understanding.<sup>6</sup> Another name for such principles is self evident propositions (*propositiones per se notae*).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>5</sup> In *I Anal. Post.*, I, 7, nn. 66, 67.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, n. 65.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 10, nn. 83-84.

St. Thomas divides the self-evident proposition (*propositio per se nota*) into the self-evident in itself (*per se nota secundum se*) and to us (*quoad nos*).<sup>8</sup> A proposition is self-evident in itself when an immediate objective connection is signified, whereas a proposition is self-evident to us when we see such a connection. It is possible, therefore, that a proposition be self-evident in itself and not to us: such as, for example, the proposition "God exists" which in itself is self-evident, but which requires a demonstration by effect (*demonstratio quia*) to become known to us. Another example is the proposition "man is risible," for the terms signify an immediate connection in the object, even though it is the conclusion of a demonstration by proper cause. St. Thomas' distinction is important, for if we confuse the self-evident in itself with the self-evident to us, we might think that every immediate connection in an object could be known only immediately by a self-evident proposition, with the consequence that demonstration would be unnecessary. The truth is that the principles of demonstration by proper cause are self evident both in themselves and to us, while its conclusion is self-evident in itself but not to us.

In order, I think, to avoid the possibility of confusion on this point, Scotus denies the proposition which is self-evident in itself. He states<sup>9</sup> that we know first principles by knowing the composing terms of these principles. As a corollary he states that the self-evident proposition excludes any cause or meaning which is outside the meaning of its composing terms. He therefore defines a self-evident proposition as a proposition which is evidently true from the knowledge of its proper terms. Having so defined the self-evident proposition, he then fixes his meaning of "proper terms," which determines his whole

<sup>8</sup> *Summa Theol.*, I, 2, 1; *Sum. cont. Gent.*, I, 11; *De Ver.*, X, 12; *In I Sent.*, d. 3, 1, 2; cf. also John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I, *Ars Log.*, P. II, Q. XXIV, a. 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Commentaria Oxoniensia ad IV Libros Magistri Sententiarum, In I Lib. Sent.*, d. 2, qq. 1, 2, sectio 1.

doctrine. To do this he shows that some propositions are self-evident when the terms signify confusedly, while other propositions demand terms which signify distinctly. An example of a proposition with confused terms is "the whole is greater than its parts"; the proposition "rational animal is risible" is an example of a proposition with distinct terms. Some propositions, therefore, are self-evident only when the terms are distinct, while confused terms are sufficient for others. The name "proper terms" then can mean either confused terms or distinct terms, depending on the proposition; it is only necessary that all proper terms signify an immediate connection. Scotus concludes, therefore, that the definition (which is a distinct term) and the name of the defined (which is a confused term) are not the same term whether the word "term" is understood for vocal sound or concept. His reason is that demonstration by proper cause would otherwise be impossible, for the quiddity of one extreme is the middle term of demonstration by proper cause; therefore one premiss does not differ from the conclusion except as definition from the defined; and, since the conclusion is not self-evident but demonstrated, the definition and defined could not be the same term. If they were the same term there would be a begging of the question. If, for example, the concept "man" and the concept "rational animal" in the demonstration of man's risibility are the same concept, the conclusion does not differ from the major premiss, for "rational animal is risible" means, with only a change of words, "man is risible." Therefore the concept "man" and the concept "rational animal" are not the same concept. Furthermore, if they were the same term, it would be impossible, according to Scotus, for the same nature to be conceived first confusedly (according to the name) and then distinctly (according to the definition). This is, however, what Aristotle means when he says that the name is prior to the definition. From experience, therefore, we can refute the position that the definition and the defined are the same terms.

From this it follows, according to Scotus, that, since a proposition is self-evident which is seen to be true from the connection of its own proper terms, and since the concepts of the quiddity distinctly conceived and confusedly conceived are different terms, a proposition which predicates a property of such a nature can be self-evident only when the nature is distinctly conceived; a proposition which predicates a property of a nature confusedly conceived must always be demonstrated.

Scotus concludes his doctrine by stating that that proposition alone is self-evident which, from the knowledge of its terms as used in the proposition, produces evident truth. The distinction between the proposition which is self-evident in itself and the proposition which is self-evident to us disappears, for there is no self-evident proposition in itself. What is self-evident is so by its own proper terms, and anyone so conceiving the terms sees the evident connection. Where St. Thomas states that it is possible to have a proposition which is self-evident in itself but not to us, Scotus states that the only proposition which is self-evident is so to us.

By insisting on the difference between the confused and distinct concepts of a quiddity, Scotus refutes Marin-Sola's position, for if such concepts were identical, a) there would be no demonstration by proper cause, and b) it would be impossible to know a nature first confusedly and then distinctly. Since both these consequences are false, Marin-Sola's position falls.

To understand better the root of Marin-Sola's error, however, I will briefly contrast the Scotistic and Thomistic doctrines on the self-evident proposition and show the root of Scotus' disagreement. By this means I can more easily deal with Marin-Sola's error.

St. Thomas' doctrine of the self-evident proposition, though it does not contradict that of Scotus, is superior, for it bases itself on the objects which measure our knowledge. While



Scotus uses the term "proposition" to mean the formal proposition in the mind, St. Thomas takes the word as referring to the objective proposition, the signified object.<sup>10</sup> A proposition, therefore, is self-evident when there is a necessary connection of terms in the signified object, where "terms" stands for realities in the object. If, then, a signified object has an immediate connection, there is a self-evident proposition; if that connection is so signified that it is seen, a proposition will be self-evident to us. The point to note here is the difference between the signified object and its state as signified. It is possible for a signified object to have an immediate connection without that connection's being seen in the signifying terms. "Man is risible," for example, can be called a self-evident proposition, for the signified object contains an immediate connection of the terms, but it is not self-evident to us, for, as it stands under those terms, that connection is not seen. Hence such a proposition is demonstrable.

Therefore, according to Cajetan,<sup>11</sup> we can speak of a proposition and of its composing terms either in itself or in relation to us; when we consider a proposition in itself the definition and the defined are the same term because the signified object is the same in both cases. He gives two arguments in support:

1. The definition and defined differ only insofar as one is a distinct and the other a confused concept. Since to conceive of something in a different way does not posit anything in the object, there is no real difference between them.

2. The process by which you prove a property of a nature through its definition is, when the proposition is considered in itself, a begging of the question, for you assume in the major

<sup>10</sup> John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Theol.*, I, In Quest. II, Primae Partis, d, 3, a. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *In I Anal. Post.*, 3; this whole chapter of Cajetan's on the self-evident proposition can be profitably studied by anyone wishing to understand the texts of Aristotle and St. Thomas on this point.

premiss what is to be proved in the argument. It follows, therefore, that the definition and the defined are the same term. As Cajetan points out, however, no fallacy is committed if the concepts are considered in relation to us, for then we have three terms.

Scotus' arguments, which are based on his meaning of the self-evident proposition, are not thereby refuted. When Scotus argues that the definition and the defined are not the same term and that if they were, demonstration would be a begging of the question he is right, for in relation to us there are three terms; taking "proposition" to mean the signified object, however, there are only two. A thing can be conceived first according to name and then according to definition and different concepts formed; but lest we forget the objective basis of knowledge, Cajetan insists on our seeing that such a process is necessitated by our intellect and not by the object. By taking "proposition" to mean the signified object, we understand demonstration better, seeing it as an instrument proper to reason enabling us to know discursively connections which are objectively immediate. In Cajetan's own words:

Because demonstration is an instrument of our intellect enabling us to conclude discursively in necessary matter, and an instrument ought to be fashioned for its user and proportioned to the matter with which it deals, it should conform to our intellect and to the conclusion precisely as conclusion. But seeing that there is no utility in an instrument except in its use by an agent, therefore in its preparation there must be omitted certain conditions arising involuntarily from the part of matter which would impede its use by an agent, and attention must be paid so that it be proportioned to the user. For it would be pointless to give to an inept artist an instrument that can be moved only with difficulty on the excuse that the matter demands that heavy instrument. It would be better to give him an instrument accommodated to him so that he could work to his full strength.

Therefore demonstration, although of itself (by reason of its matter, which is the same) requires that its conclusion be known from

from the understanding of its terms, nevertheless from that weakness on the intellect commonly found in man which leaves him ignorant of that in the defined which nevertheless is known in the definition, it follows that that demonstration fitting to our use is that one in which the middle term is the quiddity of another term, and it thus follows too that from it is omitted that which, of itself, it should include. Aristotle and others, setting up demonstration have told us what is useful for us to know nor were they silent about the fact that its conditions would be other if our intellectual weakness were not an obstacle.<sup>12</sup>

There is a disparity between the object of knowledge as a thing and that same object as it is signified. Sylvester of Ferrara<sup>13</sup> makes a distinction which reveals this disparity. He says that the signified object can be visualized in two different ways, either materially or formally. The object, taken materially, means the thing considered in itself and absolutely, while that same object, viewed formally, is taken as it substands signification. Materially, therefore, the definition and the defined are the same, for there is one object; formally, however, since that same object substands two significations, it is seen as many. The definition signifies distinctly, while the name signifies confusedly. If this were not true, we could know only immediately immediate connections; we would then, properly speaking, have no science, for all science is concerned with immediate connections in objects.

### III

Marin-Sola is aware of the difference between the object and the mode of signifying, but confuses, in the object, its status as a thing from its status as signified. A glance at his doctrine shows this. He says that in the real distinction the concepts are really distinct, while in the virtual distinction they are formally distinct but objectively identical. The reason seems to be that in the real distinction there are two objects, while in the virtual

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, translation mine.

<sup>13</sup> *In I contra Gent.*, XI, n. 5.

distinction there is one. The only way there could be a virtual distinction, according to Marin-Sola, is because an object is seen in two ways. If this were not true every distinction would be either real or nominal. In both real and virtual distinctions there are two concepts which signify, but one distinction is between two signified objects, while the other is between two formalities of one object.

But the object, as signified, is the basis of the virtual distinction, and because it is signified in two ways there are two objective concepts, not one. We recognize that it is the same thing which is signified, but this could found no distinction were it not signified differently in each case. When Marin-Sola states that the concepts are objectively identical, he must mean the signified object as such and not as it substands signification. But the objective concept is the object as signified, not the object as such; to distinguish or identify concepts by means of objects as things is to identify the mode of knowing with the mode of being, the result of which is that there could be no distinction without different objects. If there is only one objective concept there can be only one formal concept, and if that is so, the distinction cannot be a virtual distinction. Marin-Sola errs by failing to distinguish the object as a thing from its status as signified. That this is his error is readily seen from the character of his nominal distinction. Since, according to Marin-Sola, there is one object, the concepts are objectively identical; since there is only one mode of signifying, the concepts are formally identical. His reason here is that because there is only one formality which is signified, it can be signified only by one formal concept. But here again he fails to distinguish the signified object as a thing from its status as signified. Consequently, if one formal concept signifies an objective formality and a second formal concept, though expressed in different words, signifies that same objective formality, Marin-Sola is left with no alternative but to say that we have duplicated the

same concept and that our knowledge has in no way increased. If, however, we admit that two concepts can signify the same objective formality without demanding that the object be identically signified, it is possible that the concepts be different, for each concept can signify the object in a different way. Hence "man" signifies the same objective formality as does "rational animal" but not precisely in the same way, for the object as signified by "man" and the object as signified by "rational animal" are not identical. By the first concept the object is signified confusedly, and by the second it is signified distinctly. To deny this is to say that every self-evident proposition which is so by the predication of a subject's nature of that subject is a tautology.

When Marin-Sola says that the real distinction is purely objective and completely independent of the knowing subject, it is because of the disparity of the objects as things. When, therefore, the intellect unites in a proposition concepts of two different objects, it does not make the distinction. The conceptual or virtual distinction, however, is, according to Marin-Sola, the product of the intellect as it grasps two formalities in the same object by means of two partial concepts. Hence there is conceptual progression, for one concept signifies one formality while the other signifies another formality. The distinction is proper, for it is not exclusively subjective, based as it is on the supereminence of the object, which cannot be grasped in one concept. He characterizes the third distinction as nominal, however, because there is not only one object, but only one concept. The reason is that both concepts signify the same formality (in his example the essence) and not different formalities, as in the virtual distinction. But the crux of the problem lies here. The formality of an object is not the same as its status as signified. While every object is signified with a formality, it does not follow that the formality will be identically signified. It is possible to signify one and the same formality (an essence)

without signifying that formality identically. If we confuse the formality of an object with its status as signified, we will always commit Marin-Sola's error, which implies that the same formality must always be identically signified.

What Marin-Sola fails to grasp is the immediate objective basis of knowledge, which is not the object as such but the object as signified. There are different objective concepts in the real distinction, not because there are different objects, but because these objects are signified as different. There are different objective concepts in the virtual distinction because the object as it substands signification is not the same in each case. It is not because different formalities are signified that there is a distinction, but rather because the object as signified is seen as different; that each formal concept signifies a different formality only makes it a virtual distinction. In the distinction of reasoning reason, therefore, the fact that the same formality is signified does not mean that the objective concepts are identical, for here too the same object, as signified, is not identical. Consequently, the formal concepts are also different, and the distinction is not purely nominal.

Perhaps we could interpret Marin-Sola in another way. The concept taken objectively is the thing, while the concept taken formally means the thing as signified. When he then says that the virtual distinction has an objective identity of concept he means that there is one object; when he says that the concepts are formally distinct he means that the object, as signified, is different because two formalities are signified. Therefore, the concepts of the nominal distinction are formally identical because the same formality is twice signified. Still, the confusion between the formality of an object and its role as a signified object remains, for he would be saying that the same formality could only be signified in the same way. However he is interpreted, the same confusion results.

I maintain, then, that the virtual distinction has different

formal concepts, different objective concepts, but the same object, as opposed to the real distinction which has different objects. Furthermore, I maintain that there is no nominal distinction in Marin-Sola's sense, for even here the concepts are formally and objectively distinct.<sup>14</sup> The difference between the two distinctions of reason is that in the virtual distinction the object is signified under a different formality in each case, while in the distinction of reasoning reason there are two different significations of the same formality. Marin-Sola, by confusing the object as such with its role as signified, must say, on the other hand, that the signification of the same formality in an object necessitates its being identically signified. Therefore, a proposition which predicates the definition of the defined is a tautology.

#### IV

Marin-Sola's doctrine is a repetition of the doctrine of Suarez, who describes the *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* as follows:

. . . the distinction of the reasoning reason consists in an order relating to an adequate or simple concept of the same thing, where there is only a certain repetition or comparison of it, which is made by the mind. In this way Peter is distinguished from himself, either in the aspect of subject and predicate, when he is predicated of himself, or in the aspect of subject and term of a relation, when he, as one thing, is said of himself; in these and similar distinctions of reason there is one sole concept of Peter, and a repetition and comparison of it.<sup>15</sup>

Suarez, because he fails to distinguish the object as such from its status as signified, erroneously thinks that because one formality is signified (and hence each concept is adequate) it must be identically signified. There is, therefore, only one formal concept in such a distinction. John of St. Thomas,

<sup>14</sup> John of St. Thomas, *Curs. Phil.*, I, *Ars Log.*, P. II, Q. II, a. 3. John's whole treatment of the difference between the distinction of reasoning reason and the distinction of reasoned reason should be read for the light it throws on these distinctions relevant to this problem.

<sup>15</sup> In *Meta. Arist.*, d. 7, sect. 1, translation mine.

however, takes issue with him by distinguishing what he calls material and formal identity in the signified object.<sup>16</sup> Formal identity is that which is expressed by the formal concept, while material identity is the object as such. Hence those things differ formally which differ in definition, while material difference implies different objects. The distinction of reasoning reason, according to John of St. Thomas, is merely a distinction in the mode of signifying, for the signified object is materially as well as formally identical. In the distinction of reasoned reason, on the other hand, the object, though entitatively the same, is formally different, for that which is expressed by one formal concept is not the same as that expressed by the other. The two distinctions are alike in signifying one object, but differ in that one signifies two formalities and the other only one. For this reason, the distinction of reasoning reason originates solely in the intellect, while the distinction of reasoned reason is founded on the object.<sup>17</sup>

Now, according to John of St. Thomas, both distinctions have different objective concepts, for in both cases the object is not identically signified. He does not confuse the formality of an object with its status as signified. He says that there can be diverse objective concepts in the virtual distinction because the object, though not actually containing the signified formalities, is yet signified differently by each concept. It is not the difference of formality, however, which makes the distinction, but the fact that the object is signified differently. If this were not so, the virtual distinction would imply actual formalities in the object, which would make it a real distinction. As proof that the distinction need not be actual in the signified object he notes that apprehension of an object does not cause something in the object as such, but only as it is signified, which, he says, takes place in both distinctions:

<sup>16</sup> *Curs. Phil.*, I, *Ars Log.*, P. II, Q. II, a. 3.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*



... consider that apprehension does not cause, in the apprehended object, any feature pertaining to the order of things, but only features pertaining to the order of the known object as such. This holds both for the distinction of reasoning reason and for that of reasoned reason.<sup>18</sup>

He maintains that there are diverse objective concepts, and hence formal concepts, in both distinctions, but they differ because one expresses two formalities while the other expresses only one:

The difference is that the distinction of reasoned reason treats the extremes in such fashion that not all features revealed by one concept are also revealed by the other; in one concept there appears some intelligibility or formality which does not appear in the other concept, the reason for this situation being that the object, in relation to the light and way of knowing supplied by a particular concept, cannot be manifested in all its parts and formalities. Now, whenever there is diversity in the manifestation and in the manifestable, there results a diversity of objects in objective existence, i. e., in the way of existing proper to the knowable and the manifestable (I do not speak of the existence belonging to the thing as thing), and thus diverse objects correspond to the concepts involved in the distinction of reasoned reason. On the other hand the distinction of reasoning reason is not concerned with diverse manifestations of the objects; of its extremes it cannot be said that one is manifested by one concept and the other by another concept; it is the same extreme, the same object, which is manifested by both concepts so far as the intrinsic essence of object is concerned. Indeed, if diverse formalities or intelligible aspects were represented by the two concepts, they would not be identical according to their formal ideas, but would differ in this respect and consequently would be different in objective existence.<sup>19</sup>

Notice that he makes clear the difference between the objective concept, or the signified object, and the formality which is

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*; the translation for this and the following passage from John of St. Thomas is taken from *The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas*, transl. Y. Simon, J. Glanville, and G. Hollenhorst (Chicago, 1955), pp. 76-88.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

signified. If they are identified, the same formality would demand the same objective concept, with the result that the distinction of reasoning reason would be reduced to a repetition of the same formal concept. He assigns such a confusion as the root of Suarez' error:

This consideration seems to have moved some authors like Suarez and Vasquez to say that the distinction of reasoning reason does not properly concern the objective concept, but is nothing else than the repetition of a formal concept in relation to an entirely identical object.<sup>20</sup>

This, however, is not the case, for to conceive the same object twice does not suffice for such a distinction. The intellect, in order to make the distinction, must apprehend an object as two, not because of different intrinsic formalities, but from an extrinsic comparison. When we say "Peter is Peter," we compare the same thing with itself, and apprehend it in a twofold way, resulting in two objective concepts. Where Suarez sees such a proposition as expressing merely a duplication of a formal concept, John of St. Thomas sees different formal concepts.<sup>21</sup>

If a proposition expressive of this distinction whose terms are not related as clear and indistinct, as definition and defined, has different objective concepts and hence different formal concepts, so much the more will it be true of propositions stating the definition of the defined. While it is true that no new knowledge is gained about Peter, it does not follow that no new knowledge is gained in any such proposition. The basis for this doctrine, however, comes from maintaining, in such a distinction, a difference of objective concepts, the denial of which is the root of the Suarezian error which Marin-Sola repeats.

The predication of a subject's nature of that subject, there-

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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

fore, is not conceptual repetition. Rather, it leads the mind to see the causality of the formal cause.<sup>22</sup> When the mind grasps "man" as a universal, it does not see clearly what the formal cause of man as such effects; this defect is remedied when we grasp that nature distinctly and predicate it of the defined. This is most certainly intellectual progression, and without it no demonstration by proper cause would be possible. Those who deny such a doctrine, since they seem unaware of the meaning of a self-evident proposition, fail to understand demonstrative reasoning. Such a conclusion would perhaps be as unacceptable to its proponents as it is to traditional Thomists, yet it is the inescapable result of their doctrine.

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<sup>22</sup> St. Thomas, *In I Anal. Post.*, 10, nn. 83-84.