

tially limited, and intrinsically directed towards its "ideal," as its completion. The author would have easily avoided this confusion, if he had considered more carefully love as such, of which human love is but a particular case.

The author severely criticizes the "biological language" which sees in love only an instinct (p. 21). He is right if he here takes the instinct in the sense which e. g., Freud gave it. He is wrong if he rejects the existence of the superior instincts which are proper to the human nature. Love can have different meanings and some of them can be called "instincts." Unfortunately the author did not sufficiently see this point. And this is precisely, according to us, the principal reason for some obscurities in his book, which, we repeat, remains in spite of these imperfections an excellent study.

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***Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy.* By John F. Callahan, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 209. \$3.00.**

The perennial problem of time has acquired fresh vitality by becoming deeply involved in two of the most significant contemporary questions: the philosophical interpretation of physical science, and the nature of history and historical knowledge. Because no attempt to face up to these modern questions (about which scholastics have, as a whole, been singularly reticent) can afford to ignore what the great philosophers of the past have had to say about the nature of time, Callahan's study of the views of the four outstanding philosophers of the ancient world, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, and St. Augustine, has much more than historical significance.

This is a competent book which goes simply and cleanly and neatly to the heart of the matter, without any excess baggage of pedantic scholarship, without any imposing outworks to obscure the central issue. In order to follow step by step the analyses of the philosophers themselves, the author goes directly to the main treatises in which the doctrine on time is worked out most explicitly and most fully. No attempt is made to take into consideration all the incidental texts which might have some bearing upon the problem, and one could easily think

of a number of relevant questions which do not receive any explicit attention. But the substance is there, carefully formulated, lucidly worked out, and accurately integrated with the philosophers' views of reality as a whole and with their characteristic methods of philosophic investigation.

After a close examination of the different doctrines, the author crystallizes his findings by contrasting and correlating the four views. He arrives at the conclusion that the problem of time is an entirely different problem for each of the four philosophers. Plato's metaphorical treatment of the question in the *Timaeus* (where an attempt is made to bridge the chasm between being and becoming) presents time as a moving image of eternity which renders the motion of the sensible universe harmonious and intelligible and thus makes the world of becoming resemble the world of true being. Aristotle's literal and physical approach in the fourth book of the *Physics* is as characteristically aristotelian as the metaphorical approach is platonic. The Stagirite does not attempt to relate time to the whole of reality through a series of analogies; his aim is to determine by means of a strictly scientific analysis the meaning which time has in the study of mobile being. The fruit of this analysis is the familiar definition: the number or measure of motion according to prior and posterior. Plotinus' consideration of time in the seventh treatise of the third *Ennead* is distinctly metaphysical. In accordance with his doctrine of divine hypostases, he tries to discover a time which is in some sense substantial. With Plato he agrees that time is an image of eternity; but unlike Plato he sees this image less as a mathematical series than as the flow of the activity of soul which is the source of the motion of the universe. For Plotinus time is, in fact, the productive life of soul in the universe. In the eleventh book of the *Confessions* St. Augustine approaches the problem from the psychological point of view, and sees time as a distention of man's soul. For him as for Plotinus time is a vital activity; but unlike the latter he looks upon this activity as something that measures the motion of the universe and not as something that produces this motion. In this he is more like Aristotle. At the same time, he puts much more emphasis upon the activity of the soul than Aristotle does. Callahan is quite correct in bringing out this difference of emphasis, but since psychology for Aristotle is a branch of natural philosophy, it seems ambiguous at the least to say that the Stagirite passed over the psychological aspect of time because it does not belong in natural philosophy (p. 76).

In the last pages, the author brushes lightly the question of how these ancient doctrines might be expected to stand up in the light of more recent investigations of the nature of time. But the problem is dismissed as being beyond the scope of the book. It would be interesting to try to determine how much relevance these doctrines have for contemporary problems and which of the four views would have the greatest contribution to make to their solution.

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***Nicolaus of Autrecourt.* By Julius Rudolph Weinberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948. Pp. ix + 242, with index. \$3.75.**

Dr. Weinberg's *Nicolaus of Autrecourt*, though not a sequel to his *An Examination of Logical Positivism* (New York, 1936), moves under its shadow. The author seems to write secondarily as the historian. His chief interest, some readers may feel, is to voice his own polemic against Aristotle.

This is more than hinted at in the author's explanation of why the little-known fourteenth century anti-Aristotelian deserves attention. One reason is that Nicolaus' criticism was so annihilating. Another is that his condemnation by the Avignon Curia, in 1346, was an important event in the intellectual history of the fourteenth century. And finally Dr. Weinberg thinks Nicolaus' writings valuable not merely on the negative side of criticism but also for the permanent worth of ideas which he commends as being centuries ahead of Leibniz and George Berkeley.

On the negative side Nicolaus rejected evidence as representing anything certainly apprehended, along with certitude about causality, the existence of God, the human soul, and substance. Certitude embraces only the mind's content and man's subjective states. Propositions can be certain, if they rest in the law of non-contradiction—which has only logical value. Dr. Weinberg concedes that those who wish may call Nicolaus a sceptic. But, he adds, it seems better to call him a critic. "He explicitly rejected ancient scepticism. He believed that knowledge of principles and conclusions and of appearances was possible; and, in addition to all this, he had a theory of probability in terms of which an explanation of nature was plausible" (p. 30). It may be