

There are sufficient indications that psychology itself is turning back to a personalistic, a psychosomatic, a purposive, and do we dare say: Aristotelian? concept of man. But it is only the first nostalgic impulse of a prodigal son, beginning to become conscious of the emptiness of his superficial life. It will be a long, hard trek of psychology back to its father's house. Is it too much to ask that the father go out in search of the prodigal son and lead him back gently, sympathetically and reasonably to the security and peace of his true home?

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#### COMMENTARY

The topic of Fr. Glutz, broad though it is, is still a particular problem under the general problem of the relation of philosophy to experimental science. There is no more challenging problem than the relation and distinction of philosophy and experimental science, a problem that cannot be solved by a few strokes of the pen or even by a few choice distinctions. The only approach toward a solution is to break the problem into specific points, analyze them sufficiently, and then work toward the solution of the general problem.

Fr. Glutz is well qualified to work on specific problems with an eye toward the general solution. We are familiar with his painstaking and comprehensive work in the book entitled *The Manner of Demonstration in Natural Philosophy*. The paper today is an approach from another direction, which can best be summarized by stating the basic question Fr. Glutz seeks to answer in his paper: Is empirical psychology a distinct and autonomous science or is there a mutual relation between it and philosophy such that each has intrinsic need of the other? The title of Fr. Glutz's paper, "Toward an Integrated Psychology," indicates the direction of his answer. As he argued for the integration of experimental physical science and natural philosophy, so now he argues for the integration of philosophical and empirical psychology.

For purposes of discussion, let me make only a few summarizing remarks which will lead to questions that may aid discussion. My role, as I understand it, is to promote discussion rather than to defend or attack.

Psychology needs philosophy. This is the first general point Fr. Glutz argues. The underlying reason appears to be twofold: 1) psychology needs philosophy in order to have a scientific status; 2) without a philosophical knowledge of man's nature and his operations, psychology cannot have an integrated knowledge of man and human personality. By itself, empirical psychology tends to leave man in fragments. But since man is not just a bundle of events, as Bertrand Russell once observed, nor does

he act in fragments, as Fr. Glutz notes, then the philosophical conception of man as an ordered totality is indispensable.

One specific area for discussion is the following. Is not, after all, the term "science" equivocal when speaking of philosophical science and experimental or empirical science? Do not contemporary scientists in whatever field eschew certainty, quidditative knowledge, essential definitions, and *propter quid* demonstrations? If they do, and nevertheless seem to get along satisfactorily, should we not then recognize that "science" is an equivocal term, and therefore philosophy and experimental psychology are quite distinct, each valid in its own sphere and hence not needing integration? Affirmative answers to such questions would be given by some Catholic philosophers and scientists.

The second major contention of Fr. Glutz is that philosophy needs psychology. One of the arguments that Fr. Glutz uses is that philosophy needs the factual data that psychology supplies. He enlarges this argument to say that the richer the empirical data the more perfect will be the philosophical knowledge.

A point for discussion could arise with respect to the meaning of "fact" for philosophy and psychology. Does "fact" or "data" mean the same in the two disciplines? For philosophy, fact seems to be established by ordinary sense observation used as a basis for arriving inductively at principles and argumentation. For an experimental science, "fact" takes on a quite special and restricted meaning. Are not facts approached in a quite different manner in an experimental science than in philosophy, e.g., not as starting points grasped in ordinary observation but as derived from hypotheses by way of highly developed techniques of observation? Is the starting point of philosophy and an empirical science the same? Finally, even if there is a community of facts, does it follow that the broader the empirical basis is the more depth and richness philosophy will have?

The third general point made by Fr. Glutz refers to how philosophy and empirical psychology are to be related to each other. He rejects subalternation and subordination. His answer is integration, a process to be carried out at the level of general psychology. Such a general course, in his own words, has to "provide a synthetic survey of the whole field of psychology, with a strong philosophical orientation." Presumably, then, the various parts of empirical psychology will have to be located within this unified science.

The question for discussion here may simply be this: Is this integration? May it not rather be a case of subalternation, i.e., of empirical psychology to philosophical principles? And in any case, what happens to philosophical psychology? Is it to be identified with general psychology which, however, is to be a survey of the whole field of psychology? If it is to be distinct from general psychology, what precisely is philosophical psychology and how does it differ from the usual course presently offered in the present college curriculum? One final question on the relation of empirical psychology to philosophy. Does not the mathematical character of empirical psychology make psychology a *scientia media* and, if so, does not this suggest the relation psychology might have to philosophy?

These are some areas of discussion which might be profitably entered into in the light of Fr. Glutz's paper and which may induce further helpful comment from Fr. Glutz. I add only that the paper is so clearly presented, so forthright in its manner of presentation, and so intelligible in what it proposes that it merits serious consideration and careful discussion, not only here today, but also back in our own colleges and universities in rooms set aside for academic soul-searching, i.e., for curriculum study and reform.

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Problem (a): *The Deadlock Among the Non-Scholastics Concerning the Definition of the Good*

For more than fifty years the non-scholastics have been inquiring whether ethical values are in any sense real and present in the world, and if so, what their nature and status is. From the multitude of answers given a deadlock has ensued which paralyzes present thinking about ethics. A many-cornered fight carried on by naturalists, intuitionists, and emotivists, has resulted in a standoff. Here is a field difficult to survey and summarize. While we may state the main divergences of opinion, we have not avoided all over-lapping in classification nor identified all contestants with labels which are completely accurate. The best we can do is to isolate three foci of opposition and offer a brief comment on the whole situation. The opposition is between: (1) those who assert and those who deny that ethical good is a natural property; (2) those who assert and those who deny that ethical good is objective; (3) those who assert and those who deny that ethical good is cognitive or knowledge-imparting.

I. *Is ethical good a natural property?* Many non-scholastics adhere to naturalism, a doctrine which springs from nineteenth-century evolutionism, and which holds that the visible world is the whole of reality, that it has no ultimate explanation, that it cannot depend on supernatural entities, that within the course of nature there does not exist freedom, purpose, and transcendental destiny. Naturalists, in treating of ethics, often call themselves empiricists. Whereas naturalism is an ontological system purporting to explain reality, empiricism is the epistemology which has come down from David Hume, asserting that knowledge is limited to experience and denying the existence of absolute and necessary truths. According to this theory, moral phenomena are purely natural phenomena and therefore amenable to interpretation only by scientific means. Ethics must follow the procedures of the empirical sciences because its sources are observation and introspection and the criterion of its effectiveness is accurate prediction. Hence the naturalist considers ethical goodness to be a physical