

his moral dignity which enables the scientist to purify the sensible world so that it can be interpreted in mathematical symbols" (p. 71).

The theme of Kroner's final chapters is the ultimate, irreducible duality between subject and object, and the role which this duality plays in man's ethical life as conceived by Kant. To Kant life has meaning only as long as the will seeks its object. It was this idea that led him to describe "the thing-in-itself" as enshrouded in metaphysical twilight, beckoning to the will but forever eluding its grasp.

This short work of Kroner is certainly important, and it undoubtedly brings us a deeper insight into many parts of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. It is not, however, and perhaps was not intended to be a complete answer to the opposing views held by such representative commentators of the Marburg school, as Cohen and Cassirer, who stress more the epistemological concerns of Kant, rather than his anxieties to establish a coherent system of ethics. Possibly a more satisfactory interpretation of Kant could be had if the critics of both schools re-examined the theological sources of Kant's thought, especially the eighteenth century Protestant notion of man's fallen nature, for, in the reviewer's opinion, it was this that shaped Kant's problematic more than any other single force. In any case, *Kant's Weltanschauung* is a work of considerable value; and the author is to be congratulated for having found such a competent translator.

R. W. MULLIGAN, S. J.

Loyola University,
Chicago, Illinois.

***An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology.* By Herman Reith, C.S.C. Foreword by Jacques Maritain. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956. Pp. xii + 305, with index. \$2.95.**

Three years ago one might have deplored the scarcity of English textbooks on Thomistic, or what is practically the same thing, philosophical psychology. Meantime, several have come to market, of which in my opinion the present is, if not the latest, certainly among the best. About equally apportioned to Author's exposition (145 pages) and illustrative readings from Aristotle and St. Thomas (135 pages), it is in four parts: 1) an introduction setting forth the method of philosophical psychology and its principles (soul and its powers in gen-

eral); 2) the study of the sensory powers; 3) of the rational powers (intellect and will) and their habits; 4) the nature and origin of the human soul. Readings, which for uniformity's sake have all been retranslated by the author, occur after each part rather than all at the end. This arrangement may have its advantages but calls for more pains to keep author and sources apart. There is also a select bibliography after each part. The index is ample and well-prepared, the glossary of terms and proper names a well-inspired addition. Perhaps a less satisfactory aspect is the organization of the whole into Parts and again into Sections instead of the simpler and more usual Chapters, though this may be a matter of taste.

In a book of this kind one does not look for great originality, and Fr. Reith is not original. In fact, he is refreshingly traditional and single-minded. What I mean is, he does not set out to remake the psychology of Aristotle and St. Thomas to his own philosophical image. He is content to leave it in the traditional setting of the philosophy of nature, and proceeds to develop it accordingly, from the more to the less universal, from the definition of the soul in general to the investigation of the rational soul in particular. Nor is his book a melting-pot of the older doctrine and the ever-shifting newer psychologies. Not that the moderns haven't anything to offer; but he believes, and the reviewer agrees, that the constant intermeddling of Freud and company with Aristotle and St. Thomas is more confusing than constructive, at least with the beginner. Though more recent thought is occasionally introduced, as in the discussion of the uniqueness of intellectual knowledge, basically the volume is a presentation of St. Thomas' psychological philosophy; and it is a faithful and thoroughly digested account, written in a style which, while not elegant, is simple and direct, with, here and there, even a sally into the colloquial.

This is the over-all impression. As for particulars, suffice a few, both pro and, mildly, con. The difficult notion of knowledge as immaterial and intentional union is well handled. Still good, though they might have been better, are the remarks on error in the sense. The essentials, however, are here, and it is not the author's fault that current Thomistic literature is almost completely silent on this ever-vexing problem. Thorough enough also is his treatment of the intellect and its operations, though he might have hammered away a little more on the irreducibility of intellect to sense, since this has become a most crucial point. And while he shows that the basis of freedom lies in the infinite capacity of the will, more emphasis might have been laid on the indif-

ference of the judgment that makes free will possible. Here again, though, it is a matter of stress, since for the present life indifference and infinite capacity go hand in hand. His analysis of habits, intellectual and moral, is both theoretically and practically sound; and his final pages on the nature and origin of the human soul are adequate and to the point, ending with a stimulating excursus on evolution from a Thomistic viewpoint. Typographical errors are now and then encountered, but neither these slips nor the aforesaid limitations, if this they are, detract from the comprehensive excellence of the work.

In a recent interview Bishop Fulton Sheen reportedly said that some Catholic schools "may be contributing an incorrect idea of man through omission of courses in rational psychology." To which, in conclusion, it may be added that if any schools are in search of a textbook for such courses, Fr. Reith's *An Introduction to Philosophical Psychology* can be very highly recommended, indeed.

JOHN A. OTTO

*St. Ambrose College,
Davenport, Iowa.*

***Scientific Method in Psychology.* By Clarence W. Brown and Edwin E. Ghiselli. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1955. Pp. ix + 368. \$6.00.**

When human beings find it too difficult to deal with something directly, they devise a substitute or vicar and deal with the original problem vicariously. Thus, language becomes the vicar of things in ordinary human intercourse. Number becomes the vicar of things in commerce and many other everyday enterprises.

The ideal vicar or substitute is the one which can be manipulated with the greatest amount of articulation.

The distinctiveness of modern science lies not in any essential difference from earlier forms. It lies rather in the devising of more articulate substitutes or vicars of reality. Arabic numerals are more articulate than Roman numerals. Analytic geometry is more articulate than plane or solid geometry. The calculus is more articulate than previous algorisms.

Because it had fewer and less articulate substitutes, the science of earlier ages had to deal with reality in a more direct and cumbersome way. The discoveries which it did make are a tribute to the genius and ingenuity of great men.