

Article

"Whether Everything That Is, Is Good: Marginal Notes on St. Thomas's Exposition of Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus* (II)"

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Whether Everything That Is, Is Good

MARGINAL NOTES ON ST. THOMAS'S EXPOSITION OF BOETHIUS'S *DE HEBDOMADIBUS* *

II. EXPOSITION OF PRINCIPLES **

Boethius now brings forward certain principles that are fundamental and necessary to the solution of the problem. These he states without further explication, as being evident to the wise—a tribute, indeed, to the mind of the deacon, John, as well as a response to his request for brevity. We shall seek their fuller meaning where it is made more explicit: in the exposition given by Saint Thomas, and in other related texts.

Principles that are self-evident to the wise are derived from notions that are universally understood, as we have seen. The notions in question here are: *being*, the *one*, and the *good*; these, and in that order, provide the starting point for the proof that follows. For if we would come to see how created substances are good, we must first have clear in our minds several principles concerning the being of things. Hence, we begin with a consideration of the differences between *to-be*¹ and *what is*: "*To-be* is different from *that which is*."²

* The title of BOETHIUS's work: *De Hebdomadibus*, has given rise to considerable conjecture among scholars. We have kept the title of the opusculum as given in the PARMA edition, while adding the one that SAINT THOMAS used in referring to the work of which he wrote an exposition, namely, *An omne quod est, bonum sit* (*De Ver.*, q.21, a.1, *sed. con.*). The latter title seems to be the correct one according to the content. An article published in the *Bulletin Thomiste* sustains this opinion. It provides the best answer we have found to the question of the significance of "*de hebdomadibus*" and explains the confusion that has arisen: "The opusculum of Boethius which bore the title *De Hebdomadibus* is not the one that bore this name in the Middle Ages and was commented on, notably by Saint Thomas. This latter work is a letter destined to shed light on certain difficulties raised in the mind of a deacon, John, by the reading of the *De Hebdomadibus*, a lost work. The mention of this lost work which figures at the beginning of the letter, was without doubt the occasion for giving—by mistake—to the letter itself, the title of the work that it was to explain. It would be more exact to call it: On the goodness of substances. As to the name *De Hebdomadibus*, we need not see in it either the meaning of *conceptiones* with Gilbert de la Porrée, nor of *editiones* with Saint Thomas, but no doubt an allusion to the division of the work: the chapters or questions were probably grouped in it by series of seven, according to a method of which Boethius was not the originator." Cf. *Bulletin Thomiste*, VI, 1940-1942, p.116; DEGL'INNOCENTI, O.P., *Nota al "De hebdomadibus" di Boezio*, in *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) XLII (1939), pp.397-399. We are grateful to the Reverend J.-M. Parent, O.P., for calling attention to this article.

** The first series of notes, covering Chapter One of SAINT THOMAS's exposition, appeared in *Laval théologique et philosophique*, Vol.III, n.1 (1947), pp.66-76. The present series concerns Chapter Two.

¹ For greater precision and clarity, we have translated the *esse* directly, and not by the present participle *being*, since the latter is here used as distinct from the former, i.e.: *ens* and *esse*. When we use an expression such as "*that which is to be*," it might be understood in English as "*that which is going to be*"; therefore, we shall hyphenate *to-be*. The hyphen will help to reduce the complexity of the English infinitive to the simplicity of the latin *esse*.

² "*Diversum est esse, et id quod est...*"—BOETHIUS, *De Hebdom.*, cap.2.

The notion of *to-be* is the most formal, the most universal, the most actual of all notions; for it is the *to-be* that brings to perfection all other perfections. Unless these receive the actuality of their *to-be*, they remain in a state of potency only; and on the other hand, once they are, absolutely, they can not exist more. In the *De Potentia*, Saint Thomas writes:

This that I call *to-be* is the most perfect of all: a fact that is obvious, since act is always more perfect than potency. Now any designated form whatever is not understood to be actual except through the fact that it is posited in being. For humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the power of the agent, or again, as in the intellect; but that which has its *to-be* is rendered actually existing. Hence, it is clear that this that I call *to-be* is the actuality of all acts and therefore, it is the perfection of all perfections.¹

And elsewhere: "*To-be*, itself, is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that which is act; for nothing has actuality except in so far as it is. Hence, the very *to-be* is the actuality of all things, even of forms themselves."² As Cajetan says, speaking of *to-be* in its composition with essence: "...It is the ultimate actuality of that genus; for after the existence of *Sortes*, nothing more comes to him substantially."³

On the other hand, the *to-be* of created things is in itself nothing unless it be received into something else and be specified by some nature, as Boethius states: "*To-be* is not as yet anything."⁴ And Saint Thomas continues in the passage quoted above from the *Summa theologiae*:

Therefore, it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received, but rather as the received to the receiver. When, therefore, I speak of the *to-be* of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, the *to-be* is considered as a formal principle, and as something received, and not as that to which *to-be* belongs.⁵

To-be, itself, takes its determination, its whole character, from that which it brings to actuality, which it posits in the world of reality. It is as act to which all else is as potency: remote or proximate. We say "remote" because matter in natural substances is not in proximate potency

¹ "...Hoc quod dico *esse* est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod *esse* ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet *esse*, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico *esse* est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum."—*De Pot.*, q.7, a.2, ad 9.

² "Dicendum, quod ipsum *esse* est perfectissimum omnium; comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est; unde ipsum *esse* est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum."—*Ia*, q.4, a.1, ad 3. For the English translation of the *Summa theologiae*, we have used the one prepared by the Dominican Fathers, but have adapted it to harmonize with our translation of the *De Hebdomadibus* and other texts in which we have rendered *esse* by *to-be*, and *secundum quid* by "as to something" in order to avoid confusions that might arise in the present problem.

³ "Extremum vero illud, quod in secunda compositione se habet ut actus, est ultima actualitas illius generis; post existentiam enim *Sortis* nihil sibi substantiale amplius advenit."—CAJETAN, *In de Ente et Essentia*, cap.5, q.10, n.90 (quarto).

⁴ "...Ipsum enim *esse* nondum est."—*De Hebdom.*, *ibid.*

⁵ "Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico *esse* hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum *esse* consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit *esse*."—*Ia*, *loc. cit.*

for the act of *to-be*; if, *per impossibile*, it existed as mere matter, then all form would be purely accidental, superadded to an already existing matter. Saint Thomas says:

The very *to-be* is not the proper act of matter, but is of the whole substance. For *to-be* is the act of that of which we can say that it *is*. Now, *to-be* is said not of matter, but of the whole. Hence, matter can not be called what *is*, but the substance itself is that which *is*.¹

Thus, neither is the form *that which is* in those things composed of matter and form; nor is the form the *to-be*. It is compared to the latter as whiteness is to "to be white." Form is, to be sure, the determining principle of a being; it is that *by which* ("quo") a material substance is *what* it is. But it is not *that which is* ("id quod est"), nor does it confer existence on it. The *to-be* is that *by which* ("quo") the substance comes actually to be and is called a being.

Hence, in things composed of matter and form, neither matter nor form can be called either *that which is* or the very *to-be*. Yet, form can be called that *by which* something is, according as it is a principle of *to-be*; but the whole substance is *that which is*. And the *to-be*, itself, is that by which the substance is denominated being.²

There is, therefore, a double composition in existing material substance: (a) that of matter and form which are the essential components of the substance; and (b) that of the ensuing composite and its *to-be*. In other words, the substance, thus considered, involves a twofold actualizing *quo*: the form which determines the matter, thus giving rise to a specific nature; and the *to-be*, by which the composite exists outside its causes.³ And if we consider the supposit, we may speak of a threefold *quo* in those things composed of matter and form: (a) the form which actualizes the matter; (b) the nature that results from the union of form and matter, as for instance, humanity; (c) the act of existing.

In created separated substances, however, in which there is no matter (unless we understand every potency to be "matter" in an improper sense⁴), there is only one composition required for a substance to exist: the form is itself *that which is*; that *by which* it exists is its *to-be*. To continue with the passage in the *Contra Gentes*: "In intellectual substances, however, which are not composed of matter and form, as has been shown, but in which the form itself is the subsisting substance, the form is *what is*, but the *to-be* is the act and *that by which it is*."⁵

¹ "Secundo autem quia ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius. Eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dicere quod *est*. Esse autem non dicitur de materia, sed de toto. Unde materia non potest dici quod *est*, sed ipsa substantia est id quod est."—*Contra Gentes*, II, cap.54.

² "Unde in compositis ex materia et forma, nec materia nec forma potest dici ipsum quod est, nec etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest dici *quo est*, secundum quod est essendi principium; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens."—*Ibid*.

³ CAJETAN points out two ways in which these two compositions agree and ten ways in which they differ. Cf. *In de Ente et Essentia*, loc. cit. Cf. also, SAINT THOMAS, *In I Sent.*, dist.8, q.5, a.2, c.

⁴ Cf. *infra*, p.189, n.1.

⁵ "In substantiis autem intellectualibus, quae non sunt ex materia et forma compositae, ut ostensum est (capp.50, 51), sed in eis ipsa forma est substantia subsistens, forma est quod est, ipsum autem esse est actus et quo est."—*Contra Gentes*, loc. cit.; cf. also, *infra*, p.188, n.1.

In creatures, therefore, we find that the *to-be* is a terminal perfection both to whatever else is *by which* ("quo") and to *what is* ("quod est"), whether this be material or spiritual. Hence, it is ultimate act to all foregoing potencies and perfections.

In his exposition of the *De Hebdomadibus*, Saint Thomas next explains the three differences that Boethius gives between *what is* and *to-be*, taken according to their intentions; he afterwards shows how these differences apply to things in the concrete when he develops the principles concerning the *one*.

The first difference is stated thus: "*To-be* is not as yet anything. But *that which is*, having received the form of *to-be*, is and has consistence."¹ Since *to-be* is not by itself anything, it cannot be the subject of *to-be*, just as *to run* cannot be the subject of the race; both, taken in themselves, are abstract. Something other than *to-be* will have to be, as something other than *to run* will have to run. *To-be* awaits, as it were, a subject in order to exercise its own actuality; it, itself, never stands in the relation of subject to some ulterior act. This point is brought out in the same passage of the *De Potentia* to which we referred above:

Hence, *to-be* is not determined by another as potency is by act, but rather as act is by potency. For even in the definition of forms, the proper matter is put in place of a *differentia*, as, for instance, it is said that the soul is the act of a natural body endowed with instruments. And in this manner, one *to-be* is distinguished from another *to-be* in that it is of such or such a nature.²

But on the other hand, *that which is* can be the subject of *to-be*, and subsists in itself in virtue of having received the act of *to-be*. Of this substance that *is*, the text says: "Being is not predicated properly and *per se* except of substance, to which it belongs to subsist. For accidents are not called beings as if they themselves were, but only in as much as they are in some subject."³

The second difference between the two notions is this: "*That which is* can participate in something else, but *to-be* participates in no way in anything."⁴ Saint Thomas here mentions various ways in which one thing may participate, or take a part, in another; we give them in summary:

- (a) as when one thing receives in a particular way that which, considered in itself, is more universal, as man participates in animal, or Socrates in man. We might say in other words: as a species participates in a genus; or as an individual, in a species or in a genus.

¹ "...Ipsum enim esse nondum est. At vero id quod est, accepta essendi forma, est, atque consistit."—*De Hebdom.*, loc. cit.

² "Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum hoc esse ab illo esse distinguitur, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae."—*De Pot.*, loc. cit.

³ "Non enim ens dicitur proprie et per se, nisi de substantia, cujus est subsistere. Accidentia enim non dicuntur entia quasi ipsa sint, sed in quantum eis subest aliquid..."—SAINT THOMAS, *In de Hebdom.*, cap. 2.

⁴ "Quod est, participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo esse participat."—BOETHIUS, *De Hebdom.*, loc. cit.

- (b) as a subject participates in accident; and matter, in form. The substantial form, universal when considered as to its nature, is limited by this or that matter; and in a similar way, the accidental form is determined in this or that subject.
- (c) as an effect participates in its cause. This is especially true when the effect is of lesser power, as is the light in the air from the sun.

The third mode will be considered later. For the present we shall follow Saint Thomas's exposition which returns to the first two only.¹ Viewed in the first mode, *to-be* is, itself, the most abstract, and hence cannot participate in anything else as a particular in a universal, or as a less universal in a more universal, as when *this* man is referred to *man*, or man to animal. It is true that some things spoken of in the abstract can still participate in something more universal, as "whiteness" in "color"; but there is nothing more universal than *to-be*, since in each thing it is that by which whatever is, is. Hence, unlike whiteness, *to-be* cannot participate in anything more universal. Thus it follows that neither can it, according to the second mode, participate as subject, in any substantial or accidental form.

Now, *that which is*, is also most universal, yet it must participate in *to-be*. The solution is, as Saint Thomas points out, that the one universal is related to the other, not as one abstract to another, as the less universal to the more universal, but as the most universal by way of concretion: *that which is* ("quod") to the most universal by way of abstraction: *that by which* ("quo") that which is, is. Now since *that which is*, is because of *to-be*, *that which is*, while commensurate with *to-be* in universality, will be only in so far as it participates in *to-be*.

And this leads us immediately to the third difference: "*That which is* can have something besides what it itself is; but the very *to-be* has no admixture of ought besides itself."² Anything that is signified in the abstract, that is, as something "*by which*" something is such or such, cannot, thus considered, have anything extraneous added to what it is; it is indivisibly confined to itself as that by which a thing is such. Humanity is that by which a thing is a man; whiteness, that by which the white is white. Whiteness is not that by which something white is also other than white, such as warm; nor does humanity admit of anything else but that by which a man is a man; for even what is accidental, such as whiteness, is, thus considered, indivisible and unmixed.

But when a thing is signified in the concrete, such as man, it may have something which is not of the nature of that by which it is such, as a man may have something else than that by which he is a man; for instance, whiteness. Likewise, whereas whiteness cannot be warm, the white can also be warm—just as the warm can be white. Saint Thomas says of this:

¹ *In de Hebdom.*, cap. 2.

² "Id quod est, habere aliquid, praeterquam quod ipsum esse, potest; ipsum vero esse nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum."—BOETHIUS, *ibid.*

"Thus, what is warm can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, but heat itself can have nothing besides heat."¹ Hence, while the concrete subject, man, remains the same, the formalities by which he is man, white, tall, learned, warm, are many, as parts of one whole. That they are as parts is seen from the fact that man is not humanity, nor is he whiteness, nor learning, and so on. But, as the exposition adds:

... The fact that a man has humanity or whiteness does not prevent him from having something else which does not belong to the nature of these—with the exception of that which is opposed to these; and hence, a man and white can have something other than humanity and whiteness. This is why whiteness and humanity are signified in the manner of a part and are not predicated of concrete things, just as no part is predicated of its whole.²

Now, *that which is*, is signified as concrete, and can therefore "have something more than what it itself is, namely something beyond its essence." But *to-be* is signified as abstract, so that "*to-be* has no admixture of ought besides its essence."³

This third difference brings us to a new point of view. Because concrete substance can have something besides its own essence, we must consider two kinds of *to-be*. And so Boethius immediately goes on to state that: "To be something absolutely is not the same as to be something. ... Every thing that is participates in *to-be* so that it may be; in order to be something, it participates in something else."⁴ And this difference in ways of being, follows from a difference in the formal principle:

... Since form is the principle of *to-be*, it is necessary that according to whatever form is had, the thing having it be said to be in some such way. If, therefore, that form is not in addition to the essence of the thing having it, but constitutes its essence, then from the fact that it has such a form, the thing having it is said to be absolutely, for instance, a man from the fact that he has a rational soul. But if it be a form extraneous to the essence of the thing having it, according to that form a thing will not be said to be absolutely, but to be something; as for instance, according to whiteness a man is said to be white.⁵

1 "... Sicut quod est calidum, potest habere aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem, sed ipse calor nihil habet praeter calorem."—SAINT THOMAS, *Ia*, q.3, a.6, c.

2 "Ex hoc autem quod homo habet humanitatem vel albedinem, non prohibetur habere aliquid aliud, quod non pertinet ad rationem horum, nisi solum quod est oppositum his: et ideo homo et album possunt aliquid aliud habere quam humanitatem vel albedinem. Et haec est ratio quare albedo vel humanitas significantur per modum partis, et non praedicantur de concretis, sicut nec aliqua pars de suo toto."—SAINT THOMAS, *In de Hebdom.*, cap.2.

3 "Quia igitur, sicut dictum est, ipsum esse significatur ut abstractum, id quod est ut concretum; consequens est verum esse quod hic dicitur, quod 'id quod est, potest aliquid habere, praeterquam quod ipsum est,' scilicet praeter suam essentiam, sed 'ipsum esse nihil habet admixtum praeter suam essentiam.'"—*Ibid.*

4 "Diversum est tamen esse aliquid in eo quod est, et esse aliquid... Omne quod est, participat eo quod est esse, ut sit; alio vero participat ut aliquid sit..."—BOETHIUS, *ibid.*

5 "Quia enim forma est principium essendi, necesse est quod secundum quamlibet formam habitam, habens aliquam habere dicatur. Si ergo forma illa non sit praeter essentiam habentis, sed constituat ejus essentiam; ex eo quod habet talem formam, dicitur habens esse simpliciter, sicut homo ex hoc quod habet animam rationalem. Si vero sit talis forma quae sit extranea ab essentia habentis eam, secundum illam formam non dicitur esse simpliciter, sed esse aliquid: sicut secundum albedinem homo dicitur esse albus..."—SAINT THOMAS, *ibid.*

In a number of passages, Saint Thomas marks clearly the distinction between "absolute being" and "being as to something"—sometimes from the point of view of form, as in the text just quoted, sometimes from the point of view of the mode of existence, as in the following text from the fifth Question of the *Summa theologiae*:

Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality, a thing is, in consequence, said absolutely to be, according as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality, and this is precisely each thing's substantial *to-be*. Hence, it is by its substantial *to-be* that each thing is called being absolutely. But by any further actuality it is said to be "as to something." Thus, to be white signifies to be "as to something," for to be white does not take a thing out of absolutely potential being, since it is added to a thing that already is actually existing.¹

Thus, that which is a being *as to something* ("secundum quid") does not have a *to-be* of its own apart from the being to which it is added. It is of its nature not so much to *be*, as to *be in another* ("inesse") as in a subject.² Saint Thomas writes thus in the *Metaphysics*:

... Quantity and quality and the like, are not absolutely [*simpliciter*] beings... For being is predicated as "having *to-be*," but this is true only of substance, which subsists. Accidents are called beings, not because they are, but rather because by them something is; as white is said to be, because its subject is white. Therefore [Aristotle] says that they are not called beings absolutely, but that they are beings of being, such as quality and motion.³

We must note that this division of being into "that which is absolutely" and "that which is as to something else," or into substance and accident, is made according to an absolute consideration of the nature of a thing. Hence, the accident which is here opposed to substance is the predicamental accident.⁴ That this division is not the same as the one between

¹ "Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praexistenti in actu."—*Ia*, q.5, a.1, ad 1. Cf. also: *Ia*, q.76, a.4, c, where we read: The substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be absolutely, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to be absolutely, but only to be hot... But the substantial form gives being absolutely, and hence by its coming a thing is said to be generated absolutely. Also, *De Ver.*, q.21, a.5, c.

² Cf. *supra*, p.180, n.3.

³ "...Quantitas et qualitas et huiusmodi non sunt simpliciter entia, ut infra dicitur. Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia, quae subsistit. Accidentia autem dicuntur entia, non quia sunt, sed quia magis ipsis aliquid est; sicut albedo dicitur esse, quia ejus subjectum est album. Ideo dicit, quod non dicuntur simpliciter entia, sed entis entia, sicut qualitas et motus."—*In XII Metaph.*, lect.1, n.2419.

⁴ "Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparisonem accidentis ad substantiam... Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens."—*In V Metaph.*, lect.9, n.885.

ens per se and *ens per accidens* is plain from the fact that *ens per se* is itself divided into the ten predicaments, of which nine are in the genus accident. The latter division is made according as something is predicated of another essentially or accidentally. In other words, accidental, here, has reference to the fifth predicable.

A number of differences between absolute being and being "as to something" are pointed out by Cajetan. Since the form is a cause of *to-be*, he shows how a difference in its function involves a difference in the *to-be* of substance and of accident. We shall give briefly the five ways in which they are distinguished:¹

- (a) That which receives substantial form does not have a *to-be* apart from that caused by the substantial form; it is being in pure potency. Whereas the subject of accidental form is already actually existing.
- (b) From the union of substantial form with its subject, there comes a *to-be* by which a thing absolutely is; from the union of accidental form with its subject, there comes a *to-be* by which a thing is "as to something." This difference arises from the first. For, from the fact that the subject of substantial form lacks *to-be*, it first *is* by the *to-be* which comes from form. But the subject of accidental form already has *to-be*, and hence it comes to be in some way, but not absolutely.
- (c) From the union of substantial form with its subject, there arises an *unum per se*. From the composition of accidental form with its subject, there does not arise an *unum* except *per accidens*. *Unum* follows *ens*.
- (d) From the union of substantial form with matter, a third reality, an essence, results; but not from the union of accidental form with its subject. This follows from the third difference: Essence is that which is signified by definition. The defined must be an *unum per se*. From the fact that the union of accidental form with its subject does not result in an *unum per se*, neither does an essence result.
- (e) Although substantial form is not a complete essence, it is part of a complete essence. Accident is neither. This difference follows from the fourth.

In his exposition of Boethius's work,² Saint Thomas himself gives three differences between absolute being and being "as to something." They may be stated succinctly, in the light of the passage just presented from Cajetan:

- (a) It belongs to substance to be absolutely, since the substantial form determines the essence of the thing.

¹ Cf. *In de Ente et Essentia*, cap.7, n.135.

² Cf. *In de Hebdom.*, cap.2.

It belongs to accident to be "as to something," since the accidental form is extraneous to the essence of a thing.

- (b) In order to be absolutely, a subject participates in the very *to-be*. In order to be "as to something," a thing participates in something else.
- (c) First, a thing is absolutely. Afterwards, it is "as to something."

This "first" and "afterwards" do not, as such, involve a passage of time in one and the same concrete thing; a thing has some of its accidental determinations when it first comes to be. "First" may also mean in the order of nature; thus, if there were not substance first of all, accidents would have no subject for their being. Taken absolutely, however, substance is prior in both the chronological order and the logical.¹

As a summary to the foregoing and a prelude to the following principles which concern the *one*, we should like to quote one more relevant passage from Saint Thomas's *Contra Gentes*:

The very *to-be* cannot participate in anything which is not of its essence: although *that which is* can participate in something else. For nothing is more formal or more simple than *to-be*. And thus, the very *to-be* can participate in nothing. But the divine substance is *to-be* itself. Therefore, it has nothing which is not of its substance. Therefore, no accident can be in it.²

Cajetan, too, referring to a passage from the *Contra Gentes*, which deals with the real distinction between essence and existence, makes a profound observation drawn from the third difference noted by Boethius, between *to-be* and *that which is*: every created essence has something conjoined with it, besides its *to-be*; but a *to-be* that would not be received into a subject, would have nothing added. He then comments:

The precise reason why a *to-be* may have something besides itself added, is that *to-be* is received in another, in which other, something else can be received. This is clear from the fact that the substantial *to-be* of Sortes and his *to-be-white* are united by no other reason except that each is received into Sortes, for they are one only by their subject. In the case, therefore, that *to-be* will not be received, there will not remain any way in which it can have anything added to it.³

In the following paragraph, he makes clear that although this addition follows upon *to-be*, it is not identified with it; nor can the substantial *to-be* stand as potency to an accidental *to-be*, because: "No *to-be* of actual

¹ Cf. SAINT THOMAS, *In VII Metaph.*, lect.1, nn.1257-1259.

² "Ipsium enim esse non potest participare aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo accidens ei inesse potest."—*Contra Gentes*, I, cap.23.

³ "...Sed praecisa causa, quare esse habeat aliquid praeter se annexum, est, quia esse est receptum in alio, in quo potest recipi aliud: quod patet ex hoc quod esse substantiale Sortis et esse album ejusdem nulla alia ratione adunatur, nisi quia utrumque recipitur in Sorte, sunt enim tantum unum subjecto. Cum ergo esse non erit receptum, non remanebit aliquis modus quo potest habere aliquid sibi annexum."—CAJETAN, *op. cit.*, cap.5, q.12, n.100.

existence can be posited as the subject of something else, since it is the ultimate actuality."¹ Therefore, Cajetan concludes:

It remains that they are united because together they are received into a third; and so if the latter is taken away from the very *to-be* of actual existence... the possibility of *to-be's* having anything more added is likewise removed. And this is what Boethius says in the *De Hebdomadibus*: that *that which is* has something besides itself added to it; but the very *to-be*, nothing.²

* * *

We have found that the notions of *to-be* and *what is* differ in nature; we may now ask whether or not they differ in the actually existing thing. It is around this point that most of the controversy anent the distinction between essence and existence has been and is still carried on. We need not, for our present purpose, enter upon the history of that controversy. We are interested only in giving the answer of the *De Hebdomadibus*, together with several other texts that corroborate the same doctrine, so that we may be the better prepared to grasp the relations between *to be* and *to be good*.

John of Saint Thomas examines the case of the actually existing essence and presents as excellent a statement of the problem as we know. It merits quoting at length:

The difficulty is, whether two entities concur; one, that of essence which receives existence; the other, that of existence which renders essence actual; just as a white body, not only when the whiteness is removed but also while the body is subject to it, is distinguished from the whiteness by which it is rendered white. But there is this difference between white and existing: that the existing thing, when existence is removed, ceases altogether, and remains nothing; whereas the body, when the whiteness is removed, remains existing, and so it is easily seen how it is really distinguished from whiteness. But with regard to existence, it does not so easily appear that there is some entity distinguished from it, which is called essence: since this latter is in act only as long as it is the subject of existence; but when existence is removed, essence remains nothing, but is objectively only and in a state of possibility. And from this fact, some maintain that essence and existence cannot be distinguished unless as one would distinguish nothing and being, or, a thing in a state of possibility and the same thing outside its causes. But that even while essence exists, it is distinguished from existence in such a way that one reality would be existence, and the other, essence, although one would be nothing without the other: this is the whole difficulty.³

¹ "...Quia nullum esse actualis existentiae potest poni subjectum alterius, cum sit ultima actualitas."—*Op. cit.*, cap.5, q.12, n.100.

² "Remanet igitur quod ea ratione adunentur quia ambo recipiuntur in tertio: et ideo sublato hoc ab ipso esse actualis existentiae, quod sit, scilicet receptum, auferitur etiam quod possit habere aliquid sibi annexum; et hoc est quod Boetius dicit in *Hebdomadibus* quod ipsum quod est aliquid habet sibi praeter se conjunctum: ipsum vero esse nihil."—*Ibid.*

³ "...Difficultas est, an duplex entitas concurrat, altera essentiae quae recipit existentiam, altera existentiae quae reddit illam actualem; sicut corpus album non solum remota albedine, sed etiam dum est sub illa, distinguitur ab albedine per quam redditur album; sed haec est differentia inter album et existens, quod res existens remota existentia desinit omnino, et manet nihil: corpus autem remota albedine manet existens, et ita ibi facile dignoscitur quomodo ab albedine distinguatur realiter; respectu vero existentiae, non ita facile apparet quod ab illa distinguatur aliqua entitas quae vocatur essentia: quia solum invenitur actu quamdiu est sub existentia; illa vero remota, essentia manet nihil, et solum objective et in statu possibilitatis. Et ex hoc aliqui intulerunt non posse distingui essentiam et existentiam nisi sicut nihil et ens, et sicut res in statu possibilitatis et ipsamet in statu extra causas; quod autem etiam dum essentia existit, distinguatur ab existentia, ita quod alia realitas sit existentia, alia essentia, licet una sine alia nihil sit: haec est tota difficultas."—JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS, *Cursus theologicus* (SOLESMES ed), T.I, p. 450.

The question, then, is whether the substance that exists is really distinguished from its existence, so that there is a real composition of these two in the concrete; or whether they are distinguished only by a distinction of reason, so that the substance and its existence would be one and the same reality.

Saint Thomas unmistakably stands for a real distinction in creatures. The principle, as stated in the text of Boethius, is: "In every composite, *to-be* is one thing and *that which is*, is another."¹ The commentary on this furnishes a proof that we have not found elsewhere in just the same form, drawn from what was previously said concerning the *to-be*. This is the argument:² The very *to-be* does not participate in anything else; hence its nature cannot be constituted by anything other than *to-be*. *To-be* does not have anything extraneous added, so there is no composition of accident in it. Hence, there is no composition whatever in it, either essential or accidental. Therefore, the *composite* cannot possibly be the same reality as its uncomposite *to-be*.

The next principle further develops this doctrine, and affirms that: "Every thing simple has its *to-be* and *that which is*, as one."³ Saint Thomas begins dialectically by speaking of "every thing simple" in general, as if there were a number of cases to be considered. As he progresses, he rules out from what is "absolutely simple" those things that might seem to be and yet are not truly so. First, simple bodies such as "fire" and "water"; then, separated, subsisting forms of sensible things such as Plato understood them; and finally, separated forms as we usually understand them. Of all these it may be said: "Nothing prevents a thing from being relatively simple in so far as it lacks a certain composition, and yet not be entirely simple."⁴

Briefly, this is the way the *De Hebdomadibus* disposes of each case.⁵ Fire and water are composed of matter and form as well as of the parts of quantity. Platonic subsisting natures are each determined to a species; hence, no one is the universal *to-be*, but each participates in it. Hence, each has some composition. The immaterial forms of a higher order than sensible things, as Aristotle taught, are distinguished from one another: each is a form of its kind participating in *to-be*. And therefore, these too have some composition. Truly simple, however, will be that which does not participate in *to-be*, but is the very *to-be* itself.

¹ "Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est."—*In de Hebdom.*, cap.2.

² Cf. SAINT THOMAS, *In de Hebdom.*, cap.2: "...Sicut esse et quod est differunt in simplicibus secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter: quod quidem manifestum est ex praemissis: dictum est enim supra, quod ipsum esse neque participat aliquid, ut ejus ratio constituatur ex multis; neque habet aliquid extraneum admixtum, ut sit in eo compositio accidentis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum. Res ergo composita non est suum esse..."

³ "Omne simplex, esse suum, et id quod est, unum habet."—BOETHIUS, *ibid.*

⁴ "...Nihil prohibet aliquid esse secundum quid simplex, inquantum caret aliqua compositione, quod tamen non est omnino simplex..."—*Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

There is no need to dwell further on the case of fire and water, nor on that of the Platonic forms. But Aristotle seems to have envisaged in his immaterial forms, the intellectual substances that we know as angels. What of these spiritual creatures, the angels, in their actual state of existence? Will it be true of them, whose nature is pure form, that each one, since it is simple in nature, has its *to-be* and *what is* as one? Saint Thomas's answer is certainly in the negative. In the following passage he first makes a supposition with regard to simple quiddities:

Now if we should find some quiddity not composed of matter and form: that quiddity is either its own *to-be*, or it is not. If that quiddity should be its own *to-be*, then, it will be the essence of God Himself, which is its own *to-be*, and it will be entirely simple. But if it is not its own *to-be*, it must have its *to-be* acquired from another, as does every created quiddity. And since this quiddity is supposed as not subsisting in matter, *to-be* will not come to it in another, as in composite quiddities, but will come to it itself; and so the quiddity itself will be *what is* and its *to-be* will be that *by which* it is.¹

He then shows that in such a quiddity there will be potency and act, since its quiddity, not being its own existence, must have it from another; and he asserts that such is the case of the angel and of the soul.

And in this way I understand the composition of potency and act in angels, and of *quo est* and *quod est*; and likewise, in the soul. Hence, an angel or a soul can be called a simple quiddity or nature or form, insofar as their quiddity is not composed of diverse things; but nevertheless, there is found in them a composition of these two, namely, quiddity and *to-be*.²

Again, in his *Quaestio disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis* — after speaking of the twofold act and twofold potency in material composites,³ — he treats the question of the separated substances: "If there remains some form, of a determinate nature, subsisting in itself and not in matter, it will still be compared to its *to-be* as potency to act. However, I do not say as potency separable from act, but rather which is always concomitant with its act."⁴ Now it could hardly be made more definite than it is in the last sentence, that we have to do with an actually existing spiritual creature: a subsisting form not separated from its existence; and of this, Saint Thomas says:

In this way the nature of the spiritual substance which is not composed of matter and form, is as potency with respect to its *to-be*. And thus, in the spiritual substance

¹ "Si autem inveniamus aliquam quidditatem quae non sit composita ex materia et forma, illa quidditas aut est esse suum, aut non. Si illa quidditas sit esse suum, sic erit essentia ipsius Dei, quae esse suum esse, et erit omnino simplex. Si vero non sit ipsum esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquisitum ab alio, sicut est omnis quidditas creata. Et quia haec quidditas posita est non subsistere in materia, non acquireretur sibi esse in altero, sicut quidditatibus compositis, immo acquireretur sibi esse in se; et ita ipsa quidditas erit hoc 'quod est,' et ipsum esse suum erit 'quo est.'" — *In I Sent.*, dist. 8, q. 5, a. 2, c. Cf. *supra*, p. 179, n. 5.

² "Et hoc modo intelligo in angelis compositionem potentiae et actus, et de 'quo est' et 'quod est,' et similiter in anima. Unde angelus vel anima potest dici quidditas vel natura vel forma simplex, inquantum eorum quidditas non componitur ex diversis; sed tamen advenit ibi compositio horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse." — *Ibid.*

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 179.

⁴ "...Si remaneat aliqua forma determinatae naturae per se subsistens, non in materia, adhuc comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum. Non dico autem ut potentiam separabilem ab actu, sed quam semper suus actus comitetur." — *De Spirit. Creat.*, q. un., a. 1, c.

there is composition of potency and act, and consequently of form and matter, if every potency be called matter and every act be called form. But yet, this is not properly said according to the common use of the terms.¹

These texts plainly assert that in all created things there is a real composition of *to-be* and *what is*, whether the creature be composite in nature or simple. For further assurance, if need there be, we add another passage which offers an additional reason for this composition and distinction, and specifically calls it "real":

Every thing that is in the genus substance, is composed by a real composition, from the fact that that which is in the category of substance subsists in its own *to-be*, and so its *to-be* must be other than itself, otherwise it could not differ in its *to-be* from those things with which it agrees in the nature of *what it is* ["quidditas"]. . . And thus every thing that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of *to-be* and *what is*.²

There is no creature, then, that is truly simple, since all can be shown to have some composition. That which is truly simple must be the *to-be* itself, uncomposed in essence, uncomposed in existence, and receptive of no addition. Apart from this, every thing is, of necessity, more or less composite. Now, no matter what nature we consider, as a nature it can be only one and undivided in itself—one nature of animal, one nature of white, one nature of man, and so on; all the more is it obvious that there can be only one self-subsisting *to-be*. The dialectical consideration of simple things in general has thus cleared the way to a single Being that is perfectly simple. Saint Thomas says:

But *to-be*, in that it is *to-be*, cannot be diverse: it can, however, be diversified by something that is outside the *to-be*; as, for instance, the *to-be* of a stone is other than the *to-be* of a man. Therefore, that which is subsisting *to-be* can be only one. Now, it has been shown (I, chap. 22) that God is His own subsisting *to-be*. Hence, none other than He can be its own *to-be*. Therefore, it must be that in every substance except God, the substance is different from its *to-be*.³

¹ "Et hoc modo natura spiritualis substantiae, quae non est composita ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu sui esse; et sic in substantia spirituali est compositio potentiae et actus, et per consequens formae et materiae; si tamen omnis potentia nominetur materia et omnis actus nominetur forma. Sed tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nominum."—*Ibid.* Cf. also, *Contra Gentes*, II, cap. 53.

² "Omne quod est in genere substantiae, est compositum reali compositione; eo quod id quod est in praedicamento substantiae est in suo esse subsistens, et oportet quod esse suum sit aliud quam ipsum; alias non posset differre secundum esse ab illis cum quibus convenit in ratione suae quidditatis. . . et ideo omne quod est directe in praedicamento substantiae, compositum est saltem ex esse et quod est."—SAINT THOMAS, *De Ver.*, q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.—The same is not true of those things that are in the category of substance by reduction, as for instance, the principles of substance. Nor is this true of accidents, since they do not have their own *to-be*; these have a composition of genus and difference.

Cf. also, *De Spirit. Creat.*, loc. cit.: "God is His own *to-be*. But this can not be said of any other; for just as it is impossible to understand that there might be a plurality of separated whitenesses, since if white were separated from every subject and receiver, it would be only one; so it is impossible that the self-subsisting *to-be* should be other than one only. Therefore, every thing that is, after the first being, since it is not its own *to-be*, has its *to-be* received in another by which the *to-be* is contracted. And thus, in any created thing whatever, the nature of the thing that participates *to-be* is one thing, and the participated *to-be*, itself, is another."—That God is not in the genus substance, is shown in *Ia*, q. 3, a. 5, c.; *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 14, a. 2.

³ "Esse autem, in quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud ergo quod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum tantum. Osten-

In the *De Hebdomadibus*, too, Saint Thomas reaffirms a doctrine that is central in all his teaching: that in every created thing there is a real distinction between essence and existence, and that to God alone belongs absolute simplicity:

Now that alone will be truly simple which does not participate in *to-be*; not something inhering, but rather, subsisting. This, however, can be only one; because if the very *to-be* has no admixture of ought besides that which is *to-be*, as was said, it is impossible for that which is *to-be*, itself, to be multiplied by something which diversifies. Moreover, since it has nothing added besides itself, it follows that it can receive no accident. Now this simple being, unique and sublime, is God Himself.¹

To return now to the three modes of participation mentioned above,² it is most important to understand correctly the nature of the first mode, lest we be logically led to the error of those who, confusing community of predication with causal community, identified the *esse communissimum* of the first mode with an existing reality, and understood that God is the formal *to-be* of all things.³ Saint Thomas warns us against this more than once, and makes it definitely clear that the self-subsisting *to-be* is not to be confused with the *to-be* that is universally common to all things. Thus, in the *De Potentia*, we read the following objection:

Being to which no addition is made is being that is common to all. But if God is His own *to-be*, He will be a being to which no addition is made. Therefore, He will be common to all; and thus will be predicated of each and every thing; and God will be mixed with all things. Now this is heretical. . . .⁴

The answer is:

Being, in its community, is that to which no addition is made; yet, it is not of its nature that it is impossible for any addition to be made to it. The divine *to-Be* is a being to which no addition is made, and it is of its nature that no addition can possibly be made to it. Hence, the divine *to-Be* is not *to-be*, taken in its community.⁵

We must point out that the common *to-be*, considered in this very community, does not, itself, have a being apart from those things of which it may be predicated, but it is only in the mind. It is thus opposed to

sum est (lib.I, cap.22) autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni substantia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam et esse eius."—*Contra Gentes*, II, cap.52.

¹ "Id autem erit solum vere simplex, quod non participat esse, non quidem inhaerens, sed subsistens. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi unum; quia si ipsum esse nihil aliud habet admixtum praeter id quod est esse, ut dictum est; impossibile est id quod est ipsum esse, multiplicari per aliquid diversificans: et quia nihil aliud praeter se habet admixtum, consequens est quod nullius accidentis sit susceptivum. Hoc autem simplex unum et sublime est ipse Deus."—*In de Hebdom.*, cap.2.

² Cf. *supra*, p.180.

³ SAINT THOMAS devotes *Contra Gentes*, I, cap.26, to this problem; cf. also, *ibid.*, II, cap.75 (*secunda ratio*).

⁴ "... Ens cui non fit additio, est ens omnibus commune. Sed si Deus sit ipsum suum esse, erit ens cui non fit additio. Ergo erit commune; et ita praedicabitur de unoquoque, et erit Deus mixtus rebus omnibus; quod est haereticum. . . ."—*De Pot.*, q.7, a.2, obj.6.

⁵ "... Ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut ei additio fieri non possit; sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio, et de ejus ratione est ut ei fieri non possit; unde divinum esse non est esse commune."—*Ibid.*, ad 6. Cf. also, CAJETAN, *op. cit.*, cap.6, n.108: although the abstract universal *to-be* exists in the mind without addition, it cannot exist outside the mind without addition and determination.

those things as the abstract to the concrete which participates in it, as Socrates in man. This community or universality differs from the universality of causality. For the universal cause is a being apart from those things of which it is a universal cause. The being that is the most universal cause, God, would be participated in according to the third mode of participation, the one Saint Thomas merely states without taking it up further—and we can now see the reason why.

* * *

After the principles which have to do with being, we turn to others which concern the *good*; then, we shall be prepared to solve the problem of how substances are good. Since the good is defined in terms of appetite: *that is good which all things desire*, we are led to examine two principles in the domain of appetite. The first: "Every unlikeness is discordant; likeness, however, is desirable,"¹ is drawn from the fact that each and every thing desires its own perfection. In desiring this, it will naturally desire in some way, such things as bear a likeness to its own being; that is, which are proportionate and suitable to it, and contribute to its development and attainment of its end. For since like is increased and perfected by like, and every thing desires to be perfected, every thing must desire its like. It follows, too, that it will repel the unlike, since this is discordant with its perfection. The primary and fundamental assertion of this principle is found in each thing's desire to *be*, and to shun whatever is counter to its continuance.

Saint Thomas adds in his exposition that it is *per accidens* that the reverse is true, viz. that an appetite desires the unlike and shuns the like.² It seems that this may happen even while a thing is pursuing its proper perfection which "consists in a certain commensuration"; or, it may happen because a thing has turned aside from its proper perfection—as man may, through vicious habit. To illustrate the first possibility, Saint Thomas gives the example of the warmth of the body. There is a certain warmth that is proportionate to it. This, the body desires. When it does not have the proper temperature, it may *per accidens* desire that which is unlike, namely a higher, or a lower temperature, in order to bring the body back to its commensurate warmth. Of the second possibility, we may take an example from the potter who desires to hold commerce with others of his trade in as much as one may contribute to another's skill *qua* potter, by sharing his competence in the art. Yet, when one potter harms another by taking away his clientele, the latter may disdain the former. This, however, is *per accidens*.

It is the like that is *per se* desirable,³ and this calls our attention to a second principle: "That which desires another shows itself to be naturally

¹ "Omnis diversitas discors; similitudo vero appetenda est."—BOETHIUS, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. *In de Hebdom.*, *loc. cit.*

³ On whether, and how, likeness is the cause of love, cf. *Ia IIae*, q.27, a.3, with CAJETAN's commentary.

like to that which it desires."¹ For, as Saint Thomas adds: "If likeness is *per se* to be desired, consequently that which desires another shows that it is naturally like to that which it desires, namely, it has a natural inclination for that which it desires."²

In the order of appetite, this is an application, or a corollary of two other more general principles, viz.: Every agent acts in its likeness—or: Such as a thing is, such is what it produces. The second general principle is: Every agent acts for an end. Hence, there is a twofold determination in every created agent: one, on the part of form, to produce its like; the other, on the part of appetite, to desire some thing other than itself as an end. If the act is like to the agent, then so must its object be, for the act is specified by the object; it will not, then, be a like act unless the object is also like. Therefore, in acting for an end, every agent acts in some way for a likeness, since to appetite, the end is as the object. That it does so by "natural inclination" is attributable to its form:

From the diversity of forms whence things derive their specific differences, there follows also the difference of operations. For, since things act in so far as they are actual . . . and since a thing is actual by its form, a thing's operation must needs follow its form. Accordingly, if there be diverse forms, they must have diverse operations.³

And, with regard to the end: "Since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be diverse proper ends in things, even while there is one ultimate end common to all."⁴

This diversity of forms, which is the root and source of diverse inclinations, may be either in the order of substance or in the order of accident: This natural inclination sometimes follows from the very essence of the thing, as the heavy tends downwards according to its essential nature; but sometimes it follows from the nature of some supervening form, as when a person has an acquired *habitus*, he desires whatever is agreeable to him according to that *habitus*.⁵

In virtue of this accidental determination, a man's desires are set upon ends that are like to the *habitus* he has cultivated, even while such *habitus* may not be in line with his true perfection. For, as Aristotle wrote: "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him."⁶ And this shows

¹ "Et quod appetit aliud, tale ipsum naturaliter esse ostenditur quale est illud ipsum quod appetit."—BOETHIUS, *ibid.*

² "Si enim similitudo per se est appetenda, consequenter id quod appetit aliud, ostenditur tale naturaliter esse quale est hoc quod appetit, quia scilicet naturalem inclinationem habet ad id quod appetit. . ."—*Ibid.*

³ "Ex diversitate autem formarum, secundum quas rerum species diversificantur, sequitur et operationum differentia. Cum enim unumquodque agat secundum quod est actu . . . est autem unumquodque ens actu per formam: oportet quod operatio rei sequatur formam ipsius. Oportet ergo, si sint diversae formae, quod habeant diversas operationes."—SAINT THOMAS, *Contra Gentes*, III, cap.97.

⁴ "Quia vero per propriam actionem res quaelibet ad proprium finem pertingit, necesse est et proprios fines diversificari in rebus: quamvis sit finis ultimus omnibus communis."—*Ibid.*

⁵ "...Quae quidem naturalis inclinatio quandoque sequitur ipsam essentiam rei, sicut grave appetit esse deorsum secundum rationem suae essentialis naturae; quandoque vero consequitur naturam alicujus formae supervenientis, sicut cum aliquis habet habitum acquisitum, desiderat id quod convenit ei secundum habitum illum."—SAINT THOMAS, *In de Hebdom.*, cap.2 (*fin.*).

⁶ "...Qualis est unusquisque, talis finis videtur ei: idest tale aliquid videtur ei appetendum quasi bonum et finis." Cf. SAINT THOMAS, *In III Ethic.*, lect.13, n.516.

why he may, *per accidens*, stray from objects properly suitable to human desire, thus seeking the unlike and the unsuitable. Even in this, however, he desires a *likeness* to some improper disposition. Speaking of the appetitive powers, Saint Thomas gives the general reason for this: "Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Hence, each power desires by natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself."¹ And, depending on the way and the order in which a man habitually satisfies these powers, so will he be: like objects, like acts; like acts, like *habitus*; like *habitus*, like desires.

In the same Question 80 of the *Prima Pars* as well as in the following one, there is a division of appetite based upon the fundamental principle that some inclination toward a suitable end follows every form. First, take those things that lack knowledge: "For in those that lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to the being which is natural to each. Now this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite."² But those things which have knowledge, may by that fact possess other forms besides the form which determines their natural being, namely the intentional forms or species of other things—of sensible things in the sense powers, and of intelligible objects in the intellect. And:

Therefore, just as in those beings that have knowledge, forms exist in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms, so there must be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive part of the soul.³

Saint Thomas then makes a distinction between the sense appetite and the intellectual appetite, based on the difference in their respective objects; for the appetible is to the appetite as an active and motive principle to the passive and movable. Hence, there must be a proportion between the appetible and the appetite. It follows that: "Since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different, consequently, the intellectual appetite is a power distinct from the sensitive."⁴

In the *Prima Secundae* Saint Thomas epitomizes this teaching, viz. that appetite is of something good; that it is an inclination toward what is like and suitable to the thing inclined; that this inclination follows upon a form, and is accordingly diversified.

¹ "Dicendum quod unaquaeque potentia animae est quaedam forma seu natura, et habet naturalem inclinationem in aliquid. Unde unaquaeque appetit objectum sibi conveniens naturali appetitu."—*Ia*, q.80, a.1, ad 3.

² "In his enim quae cognitione carent, invenitur tantummodo forma ad unum esse proprium determinans unumquodque, quod etiam naturale uniuscuiusque est. Hanc igitur formam naturalem sequitur naturalis inclinatio, quae appetitus naturalis vocatur."—*Ia*, q.80, a.1, c.

³ "Sicut igitur formae altiori modo existunt in habentibus cognitionem supra modum formarum naturalium, ita oportet quod in eis sit inclinatio supra modum inclinationis naturalis, quae dicitur appetitus naturalis. Et haec superior inclinatio pertinet ad vim animae appetitivam..."—*Ibid*.

⁴ "Quia igitur est alterius generis apprehensum per intellectum et apprehensum per sensum, consequens est quod appetitus intellectivus sit alia potentia a sensitivo."—*Ibid.*, a.2, c.

Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason for this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a being desirous of a thing, toward that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says that *the good is that which all desire*.

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things, while the sensitive, as also the intellectual or rational appetite, called the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing, so the animal as well as the voluntary appetite tends to the apprehended good.¹

With these principles in mind, as well as the others which concern being and the one, we shall now take up the question submitted by John, the deacon: How are created substances, considered in themselves, good?

(To be continued)

SISTER M. VERDA CLARE, C.S.C.

¹ "Omnis autem appetitus non est nisi boni. Cuius ratio est quia appetitus nihil aliud est quam quaedam inclinatio appetentis in aliquid. Nihil autem inclinatur nisi in aliquid simile et conveniens. Cum igitur omnis res, inquantum est ens et substantia, sit quoddam bonum, necesse est ut omnis inclinatio sit in bonum. Et inde est quod Philosophus dicit in I *Ethic.* quod *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Sed considerandum est quod cum omnis inclinatio consequatur aliquam formam, appetitus naturalis consequitur formam in natura existentem; appetitus autem sensitivus, vel etiam intellectivus seu rationalis, qui dicitur voluntas sequitur formam apprehensam. Sicut igitur id in quod tendit appetitus naturalis, est bonum existens in re; ita id in quod tendit appetitus animalis vel voluntarius, est bonum apprehensum."

—*Ia IIae*, q.8, a.1, c.