

Article

"*Causa Causarum* (I)"

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Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 4, n° 1, 1948, p. 77-109.

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URI: <http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1019802ar>

DOI: 10.7202/1019802ar

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Causa Causarum

Referring to the poet quoted by Aristotle in the *Physics*, Book II, St. Thomas says: "Vult enim poeta quod non omne ultimum sit finis, sed illud quod est ultimum et optimum, hoc est cuius causa fit."¹ The final cause, therefore, implies not only the notion of ultimate but also that of what is a greatest good. Not every end can be a final cause, but only that end which is a good. "Ultimum et optimum" — such therefore is the definition of final cause.

A true understanding of final cause thus depends upon a correct notion of the good. Indeed, the modern elimination of final causality from the operations of nature has gone hand in hand with an ever-deepening misconception of the good. In the present study we shall try to retrace the gradual deterioration of this notion among the Scholastics themselves. Our main purpose, however, remains purely doctrinal. Only to the extent it may contribute to a better understanding of the truth could a scrutiny of past errors ward off the charge of plucking dead lions by the beard.

First we shall state briefly the doctrine of St. Thomas on the good and its role in final causality. We will then attempt to point out the theoretical misunderstandings and the textual misreadings which led gradually to an utter loss of this notion of good amongst influential Schoolmen of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Lastly, we will state the doctrine of John of St. Thomas concerning the good, a doctrine reaffirming and defending the basic notions of St. Thomas. From this restatement of the true notion of the good, we shall see in contrast how far those Scholastic teachers had strayed from the basic concepts.²

I. DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

The principal doctrine of St. Thomas concerning the good is to be found in the *Summa theologiae*, First Part, Question V; in the *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, Question I, article 1, and Question XXI, article 1; and in the exposition of Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*.

¹ ST. THOMAS, *In II Physicorum*, lect. 4, n. 8.

² We hope that in the future we shall be able to examine those modern philosophers who had great influence in leading the thinking world away from final causality. We shall then try to point out what connections may exist between the early Scholastic errors regarding the good, and the ultimate rejection of final causality by the moderns. In our opinion, such a comparison will show that, although the Scholastic errors passed unnoticed by many, whereas the errors of the modern thinkers are obvious, the former were far more profound in their deviation from the truth.

In these places the Angelic Doctor speaks of the good as a transcendental convertible with being. It will be well to note that throughout this discussion we confine ourselves to the transcendental good. The moral good is specific to the responsible actions of creatures having an intellect and free will. The transcendental good is more extensive, is indeed coextensive with being. It is with this good that our problem of final causality is principally concerned. Many will admit final causality in human actions but at the same time deny it to the universe as a whole. Indeed, the first objection of those who admit a moral good and a purposeful action of human beings is that in asserting final causality for the universe of being we commit the error of anthropomorphism, by unwarrantedly projecting our own purposeful action into the universe.

In the First Part of the *Summa theologiae*, we read:

Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, quod sit aliquid appetibile. Unde Philosophus dicit, quod 'bonum est quod omnia appetunt.'¹

... Cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt; hoc autem habeat rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat.²

... Bonum dicitur diffusivum sui eo modo quo finis dicitur movere.³

... Unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum; sic enim est appetibile, ut supra dictum est (aa.1, 3). Perfectum autem dicitur, cui nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque sit id quod est per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod et formam habeat, et ea quae praeexistunt, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. Praeexistit autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam. Et hoc significatur per modum; unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam unumquodque in specie constituitur; et propter hoc dicitur quod numerus speciem praebet; quia definitiones significantes speciem sunt sicut numeri, secundum Philosophum. Sicut enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in definitionibus differentia appositae vel subtractae variat speciem. Ad formam autem consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem aut ad aliquid huiusmodi; quia unumquodque inquantum est actu, agit et tendit in id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in perfecto esse, consistit etiam in modo, specie, et ordine.⁴

From these passages we may conclude that the proper nature of the transcendental good includes the notions of perfection, appetibility, and final causality. In reality, good and being are identical; and yet the terms are not synonymous. Good is being in so far as it is perfect and therefore appetible, and hence a final cause.

In the *De Veritate*, St. Thomas approaches the notion of the good through the general notion of property of being. Thus, in Question I, we read:

... Secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere supra ens, in quantum expriment ipsius modum, qui nomine ipsius entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis; sunt enim diversi gradus

¹ Ia, q.5, a.1, c.

² Ibid., a.4, c.

³ Ibid., ad 2.

⁴ Ibid., a.5, c.

entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi; et juxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera; ... Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generaliter consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in ordine ad aliud... Si autem modus entis accipiat secundum modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum; hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen *aliquid*; ... Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiat aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia... In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. *Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum*; ut in principio Ethic. dicitur: *Bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum*.¹

Here we see that good is a general mode of being, consequent upon every being, not in so far as it is considered in itself, but in so far as it has order to another. We see further that this order is an order of *convenientia*, of proper proportion, not between any two beings whatever, but between any being and the intellectual appetite. Good, therefore, is a name expressive of the general mode of being which is the *convenientia* of being as such to the appetite. In this passage, then, St. Thomas brings out once again that appetibility, order to appetite, is of the very nature of good.

In Question XXI of the *De Veritate*, too, St. Thomas approaches the notion of good from the viewpoint of property of being. This time, however, he stresses the notion of its causality rather than that of its simple relation to appetite. He says:

... Et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum... Verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphys. (text.20), dicitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur... sicut patet in scientia et scibili; ... relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum: ... et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile.

Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid aliud subsistit in specie illa: et sic aliquid ens potest esse perfectum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum; et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis; nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens... Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura: et *per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum*; bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. (com.8). In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod *omnes recte definiunt bonum ponunt in ratione ejus aliquid quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis*; unde Philosophus dicit in I Ethic. (in princip.), quod *bonum optime definiunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt*.²

From this we see that to define good rightly, we must consider it as perfective, not in any way whatsoever, but as perfective according to all the being which it has in the nature of things. This is the perfectivity of reality, the perfectivity which has the nature of final cause, the perfectivity which all seek — which is, therefore, referred to the appetite.

¹ A.1, c.

² A.1, c.

In the opusculum commenting on Boethius's *De Hebdomadibus*, St. Thomas delves profoundly into the notion of good as it pertains to creatures. The concept of good in this work is the same as the one given in the *Summa* and the *De Veritate*. He says: "...Unumquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem, quae est bonum uniuscujusque, et est semper proportionatum suo perfectibili, et secundum hoc habet similitudinem ad ipsum."¹

From the doctrine of St. Thomas, therefore, it manifestly follows that the notion of transcendental good must include not only being as such, but being as perfect, and hence as perfective, not of the intellect, but of the appetite. Good, most essentially, is being as appetible, as final cause.

II. ERRONEOUS NOTIONS OF THE GOOD

We will now turn to investigate how this notion of the transcendental good gradually suffered basic, though subtle changes at the hands of certain Scholastics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It will not be possible to deal with each of the writers of this epoch, but from those examined the trend of the error will be surely indicated.

(a) DURANDUS

1. *The good as a property of being*

In 1508 a member of the Order of Preachers, Durandus de Sancto Portiano published a commentary on the Books of *Sentences*. In commenting on the Second Book he set forth the proper nature of the good as follows:

Dicendum ergo quod formalis ratio boni est ratio convenientis ita quod bonitas est formaliter ipsa convenientia et contrahit entitatem ad partem subjectivam quae est relatio: et ad talem relationem quae est convenientia: et sic omnis bonitas est quaedam entitas quae est respectiva: sed non omnis entitas est quidditative bonitas: ita quod non convertuntur essentialiter: bonum vero ratione concretionis importat id quod habet talem convenientiam ut ejus subjectum: vel fundamentum et quia illud potest inveniri in quolibet genere: saltem in generibus absolutis: ideo bonum dicitur converti cum ente *non essentialiter sed denominative*: formalis tamen ratio boni est respectiva scilicet ratio convenientiae.²

This short paragraph contains one of the most radical errors possible regarding the nature of the good, an error concerning the good as a property of being. Indeed, he depicts it as a property of being by affixing it to being as an accident to its subject. In doing this, he distinguishes between the *ratio formalis* of the good and the good considered in the order of concretion. This distinction is fundamental to Durandus's doctrine of the good. His denial of the reality of universals and his tendency towards terminism seem to imply that the good taken formally or *in abstracto* has no extra-

¹ *Opuscula Omnia* (MANDONNET ed.), T.I, p.177.

² DURANDUS, *In II Sententiarum*, Paris 1508, d.34, q.1, fol.212, L.

mental reality but is produced by the intellect from the observation of things; the good, taken concretely, seems to include the relation of *convenientia* and the subject in which it inheres, and only because of this subject do we call it concrete.

In so far as good is said concretely of this subject of the relation of *convenientia*, Durandus admits its convertibility with being, *non essentialiter sed denominative*. We shall best understand what he means by this if we read the distinction as he himself makes it in the form of a premise for his reply:

...Aliquid potest converti cum ente dupliciter uno modo essentialiter: alio modo denominative. Primo modo res convertitur cum ente: quia omnis entitas extra animam est essentialiter realitas et e converso. Secundo modo quando unum non est alterum essentialiter et formaliter tamen unum non invenitur sine altero sicut ens creatum et relatio: quia dato quod non omnis essentia creata sit relatio: nulla tamen essentia creata invenitur sine relatione et ideo convertuntur denominative.¹

Thus, when Durandus says that good is convertible with being *denominative*, he means simply that wherever being is found there also is found the relation of *convenientia*, which is the good. Whether this relation is real or of reason is difficult to determine, because of the terministic nature of Durandus's doctrine. As we will see below, Suarez, who studied Durandus's system, says that he denied all real relations proper.

The question immediately arises as to how Durandus would hold God to be good, what kind of relation he would posit of the Divine Essence. The answer is found in his response to an objection against his position:

Ad quartam dicendum quod antecedens est falsum: quia bonum in Deo dicit relationem vel respectum formaliter non quidem respectum ad intra: sed ad extra videlicet ad creaturas et cum dicitur quod Deus non refertur realiter ad creaturas. Dicendum est quod sicut dictum fuit primo libro dist. xxx. Si relatio accipiat pro respectu per se consequente ad naturam rei. Sic Deus non refertur ad creaturas. Si autem accipiat pro reali denominatione sumpta ex pluribus: sic Deus refertur realiter ad creaturas cum dicitur creator vel bonus: et quod subditur quod sequeretur quod Deus esset bonus ex habitudine ad creaturas: et sic bonitas ejus dependeret a creaturis dicendum quod falsum est. Aliud enim est Deum dici bonum in habitudine ad creaturas et bonitatem ejus dependere ad creaturas. Primum enim est verum: sed secundum est falsum: imo potius bonitas creaturae dependet a Deo: et propter hoc Deus dicitur bonus in habitudine ad creaturam: quia tota creatura: et quicquid bonitatis et perfectionis est in ea dependet a Deo.²

According to this doctrine, therefore, God is good only by a relation of reason — at any rate, His goodness is at most a real denomination flowing from His presence in the creatures; were there no creatures, it would follow that God could not be called good, since goodness requires plurality of being for its very existence.

This doctrine is so obviously erroneous as almost to discourage a refutation. But it serves well to show to what extremes an error on the nature of the good can lead. We may do this most aptly by turning to

¹ *Op. cit.*, fol.211, M.

² *Ibid.*, fol.213, C.

St. Thomas's doctrine on divine goodness, Q.VI of the *Prima Pars*. There, in the first article, St. Thomas demonstrates that it belongs to God to be good. To understand this proof one must have grasped well what St. Thomas taught on the nature of the good itself in the preceding Question. Since, as we shall see, Durandus failed to do that, it is small wonder that he erred in this matter.

To prove "quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit,"¹ St. Thomas shows that God is the object of every appetite in so far as He is "prima causa effectiva omnium." Thus he proves by referring to creatures that God is good, but does not in any way state that God is good only in so far as He has respect to creatures. Nor does he mean in any way to say that the causality of God's goodness is efficient causality, as some seem later to have interpreted him.² In the present article he intends merely to prove that God is good; this he does by showing that God is appetible to creatures. All things, he says, seek their own perfection. This perfection, proper to a certain thing, is a similitude of the efficient agent from which the thing came into being. Thus, when a thing seeks its proper perfection, it seeks really a participation of the similitude of the agent. In this way we can say that every efficient cause as such is sought and so is good. God, being the first agent, the first efficient cause, is therefore good.

Even in this first article, St. Thomas, through the very depth of his wording, gives indication of how God is good in Himself: a doctrine which he asserts explicitly only in article 3. Let us read the body of this first article.

...Bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est secundum quod est appetibile; unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem; perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile; unde ipsum agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni; hoc enim est quod de ipso appetitur, ut ejus similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod ei competit ratio boni et appetibilis.³

In the second article of this Question, St. Thomas is still speaking of the divine goodness in comparison to the created. There he proves that God is the highest good, *summum bonum*; the use of the superlative here indicates that a comparison is made. St. Thomas says that this adjective *summum* "addit supra bonum non rem aliquam absolutam, sed relationem tantum."⁴ This relation is a relation of reason in respect to God, whereas in the creatures it is a real relation.

As we have said, it is in the third article that St. Thomas speaks of the proper goodness of God. There he shows that God is good by His very essence and that it is proper to God alone to be good in this way. Since it contains the proper answer to Durandus's grave error, we will quote the body of this article in full:

¹ *Ia*, q.6, a.1, c.

² Cf. SUAREZ, below, p.105.

³ *Ia*, q.6, a.1, c.

⁴ *Ibid.*, a.2, ad 1.

...Solut Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem alicujus rei triplex est. 1^a Quidem, secundum quod in suo esse constituitur. 2^a Vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia superadduntur ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. 3^a Vero perfectio alicujus est per hoc quod aliquid aliud attingit sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse quod habet per suam formam substantialem. Secunda ejus perfectio consistit in caliditate, levitate, et siccitate, et hujusmodi. Tertia vero perfectio ejus est secundum quod in suo loco quiescit. Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam essentiam, sed soli Deo, cujus solius essentia est suum esse, et cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter; ut esse potentem, sapientem, et alia hujusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet (quaest. III, art. 6). Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus per suam essentiam.¹

Thus we see how very properly God is said to be good in Himself, by His very essence, since His essence is His very being; since, moreover, whatever is attributed as accidental to creatures is attributed to God as being of His essence; and since, lastly, God is ordained to no other as an end but all others are so ordained to Him. Durandus's position, following as it does from a mistaken notion of the good itself, presents a thorough misconception of the very nature of God.

In the fourth and last article of this question, St. Thomas shows that all creatures are good by a certain participation of the divine goodness. He says: "A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, in quantum participat ipsum per modum cujusdam assimilationis; licet remote et deficienter..."² Far, therefore, from God's being good in so far only as creatures exist, the truth is that creatures are good only because God is good by His very essence.

Just as it is difficult to believe how Durandus could have made this error regarding the goodness of God, it is hard to conceive how he could have fallen into such errors on the very nature of the good, for he must have read the doctrine of St. Thomas in the *De Veritate*, Question XXI. In article 1, St. Thomas begins by showing that something can be added to another in three ways. The first is when the thing added is outside the essence of that to which it is added, as when an accidental quality is added to a substance. In this way something can be added to a particular thing only, for, as St. Thomas says, "nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam hujus entis."³ Thus it is quite obvious that in this way nothing can be added to being as such. Nevertheless, this seems to be the way in which Durandus conceived the good taken formally, to add to the good taken concretely, or to the thing which the good taken concretely includes as subject. It is according to this mode of addition that he posited his denominative convertibility.

¹ Ia, q. 6, a. 3, c.

² A. 4, c.

³ *De Veritate*, q. 21, a. 1, c.

The second way in which something is said to be added to another is by way of contracting or determining. An example of this is the way the notion of "man" adds something to that of "animal." Animal is not a part to which man is added, but animal is something which in itself is determined by man.

This is undoubtedly the way in which Durandus held that the good adds to being when both are considered abstractly or formally. As we have seen, he apparently denied extra-mental reality to a thing when it is considered in abstraction. According to his doctrine, therefore, good, abstractly considered, contracts being to the genus relation. It follows that there is no essential convertibility between the two; his denominative convertibility is present, as we have seen, only according to the first mode of addition, when the good, abstractly considered, is added to being *in rerum natura* as included in the notion of the good concretely considered.—Actually the good does not contract being. Being contracted or determined in this way gives rise to the division of the ten predicaments. But, as St. Thomas says, "*bonum dividitur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens.*"¹

The third and final way in which, according to St. Thomas, something is added to another, is "*secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius; quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum; sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive non.*"² It is in this way that good is said to be added to being. It does not contract being, however, for as St. Thomas noted in the first Question of the *De Veritate*, it is a general mode following all being.

Durandus's further contention that the proper nature of the good is a relation of *convenientia* (this term being taken as a proportion between the natures of two beings as such), springs from his misconception of good as a property of being. Good, as we have seen in the doctrine of St. Thomas, is not a relation of *convenientia*, but the name good expresses a particular kind of *convenientia*, a *convenientia* of the being with the intellectual appetite.

As we have seen above, St. Thomas, in the *De Veritate*,³ describes the transcendental properties of being as general modes consequent on every being. Among these general modes he makes a division between those which follow every being *in se* and those which follow each being *in ordine ad aliud*. It is among the latter that the good is to be found.

The group of general modes consequent on every being *in ordine ad aliud* is subdivided into those consequent upon every being according to its division from another being, and those following every being "*secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud.*" In the first of these subdivisions,

¹ *Op. cit.*, q.21, a.1, c.

² *Ibid.*

³ Q.1, a.1.

the *aliud* to which every being is ordered is *any other being*; but in the second group, expressive of *convenientia*, the *aliud* denominates two very determinate kinds of being: intellect and will.

It is precisely this that Durandus failed to note. For him the *aliud* of *convenientia ad aliud* signifies any being whatsoever. St. Thomas says this is impossible. Indeed, immediately upon giving the division of those general modes which follow every being *secundum convenientiam entis ad aliud*, he adds: "...Hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiat aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente. Hoc autem est anima quae quodammodo est omnia..."¹ Thus the *aliud* here is the soul, and it is divided according to the two spiritual powers of the soul, intellect and will. The *convenientia* of every being with intellect is truth; the *convenientia* with will is goodness. Because Durandus neglected to consider the intellectual soul, he erred on the nature of the good. The Thomistic doctrine holds firmly that if there were neither intellect nor will, being would be neither true nor good.

Durandus, however, tried to explain what good adds to being without considering the possibility of the addition of a being of reason; and to conceive the relation of *convenientia*, which the good implies, without making the other extreme of this relation the intellectual appetite. In studying transcendentals one must remember that they can exist only for the intellectual soul and only through the Prime Intellect.

2. Final causality and the good

In the exposition of his doctrine, Durandus divides *convenientia* into intrinsic and extrinsic, the former implying sometimes the relation of formal or material cause, and the latter that of efficient cause. Hence the good would seem at various times to imply the notion of either formal, material or efficient cause.²

In regard to final causality, Durandus makes the following distinction: "...Quod ratio boni dicit finem vel id quod est ad finem ut sic: aut intelligitur de ratione importata per hoc nomen finis et ad finem aut de ratione rei cui competit esse denominative finem: vel ad finem."³

Thus, concerning final cause he makes a distinction similar to the one he made regarding the good.⁴ Accordingly final cause may be considered either formally and abstractly or it may be considered concretely. He goes on to say that the final cause, considered concretely, can in no way be the good formally taken. "...Nullo igitur modo formalis ratio boni est esse finem, vel ad finem: si sic accipiantur."⁵

¹ *De Veritate*, q.1, a.1, c.

² *In II Sent.*, d.34, q.1, fol.213, A.

³ *Ibid.*, fol.212, I.

⁴ Cf. page 80 above.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, fol.212, I.

To understand this doctrine we will do well to consider Question III of this Distinction 34. There Durandus considers more thoroughly the causality of the good. Distinguishing both the good and cause according as each may be taken abstractly or concretely he concludes: (a) The good abstractly or formally taken can be a cause formally taken, and, especially in accord with the doctrine of Aristotle, a final cause formally taken. The reason is that both are respective. In this way Durandus could permit the statement that the good formally taken is final causality. (b) Taken concretely, the good may be called a cause, either, final, efficient, or material. However, it is such a cause only *per accidens*, whereas that which is denominatively good in this way is the *per se* cause. According to Durandus, to be a cause belongs only to what is an absolute thing. In other words, he seems to hold, first, that while the good formally taken cannot be a final cause, it can be said to have the notion of final causality, and, second, that the good concretely taken is *per accidens* a final cause.

Durandus does attribute a motion to the good, though it is difficult to see in what way it is properly a motion of the good. He says the motion of the good consists in its apprehension by the practical intellect. It will be best if we read his own words in this matter:

Ad quintam dicendum quod solus respectus non movet sed absolutum cum respectu movet tam intellectum practicum quam voluntatem. Simplex enim quidditas licet possit movere intellectum ad actum simplicem qui est indivisibilem intelligentia: tamen non potest movere ad actum componentem nisi accepta in habitudine ad alterum quia actus intelligendi componens fertur in duo propter convenientiam unius ad alterum: et sic intellectus practicus movetur a bono inquantum apprehendit aliquam naturam absolutam sub ratione convenientis ad alterum.¹

Although in the first sentence Durandus speaks of a motion of the will, his words would seem to imply that the prime motion of the good is a motion of the practical intellect, the motion of the will being consequent upon this. In reality the motion of the good is a metaphorical motion, a movement of attracting the will; naturally a necessary condition for such a movement, is the presentation of the good to the will by the intellect. This apprehension of the good is not due to a motion of the good, but rather to the motion of the intellect.

Durandus's idea of the motion of the good is fundamentally a rationalization from his concept of the essence of the good. It will be interesting to note how a variation of this idea recurs in the doctrine of Vasquez when he says that final cause has the *ratio formalis* of finalizing when it bespeaks an objective concept; in other words, that final cause moves *by* being known and not merely *through* being known. This Vasquezian doctrine is only one evidence of how much Vasquez's thought was influenced by the teaching of Durandus; there are many more as we shall soon see.

To summarize the errors of Durandus's doctrine of the good, then, we may say that he has erred in considering good as a contraction of being; in making it an accidental relation in so far as it refers to creatures, and an

¹ *Op. cit.*, d.34, q.1, fol.213, D.

extrinsic denomination as it refers to God; in speaking of it as a *convenientia* of a being not to the appetite but to another being; and in allowing it to be, in the nature of things, a final cause only *per accidens*.

We will consider now the doctrine of some of the later Schoolmen. We shall confine ourselves to the authors whose names rank among the foremost in scholarship, Vasquez and Suarez. We will endeavour to point out not only the errors of their doctrine of the good and of the final cause, but also in what way these errors seem to be rooted in the teaching of Durandus.

(b) SUAREZ

1. *The good as a property of being*

In his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, published in 1614, Francis Suarez, S.J. discusses at great length the notion of the transcendental good. His discussion is found in *Disputatio X*. This tract begins with a list of various opinions as to the proper nature of the transcendental good. Second among these opinions Suarez lists that claiming good to be a real relation of *convenientia*. This opinion, he says, is attributed to Durandus, but is not really the view of that Schoolman. Suarez claims rather: "Sed cum Durandus in aliis etiam rebus neget proprias relationes reales, alia est in praesenti mens ejus, ut infra videbimus."¹

Although Durandus's doctrine, and, more particularly, his notion of denominative convertibility render this claim of Suarez capable of further investigation, still we will not argue the point here, since in the confused state of mind in which Durandus seems to have conceived things anything is possible. That Suarez should make a claim such as this and should, moreover, regard his own doctrine of the transcendental good as being what Durandus really meant — all this is a sure indication of how much influence Durandus had on Suarez's thinking.

The fourth opinion regarding the transcendental good quoted by Suarez is that attributed to a certain Hervaeus in his *Quodlibetales*. Two Hervaei lived in the fourteenth century, both of whom wrote about Thomistic doctrine. In the absence of the proper Hervaeian text we will give the opinion as set forth by Suarez:

...Bonitatem nihil aliud dicere quam intrinsecam rei perfectionem, quae absoluta est in absolutis, et relativa in relativis. Unde fieri videtur consequens, bonum nihil aliud esse quam ipsum ens, quatenus in se aliquid perfectionis habet. Haec opinio tribuitur Hervaeo quodlib.3, qu.2; ibi tamen magis sentit bonitatem dicere entitatem, quatenus est perfectiva alterius, seu quatenus ad alterius perfectionem ordinatur, quam ut in se habet perfectionem aliquam, de quo sensu infra dicam.²

Suarez accepts this opinion as true, but says it is necessary to add something to it. With this addition he forms his own conclusion which, he adds, is the one Durandus too had intended. Let us read it:

¹ SUAREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Paris, Vivès, 1856, disp.10, sec.1, n.5.

² *Ibid*, n.9.

Dicendum ergo est, bonum supra ens solum posse addere rationem convenientiae, quae non est proprium relatio, sed solum connotat in alio talem naturam habentem naturalem inclinationem, capacitatem, vel conjunctionem cum tali perfectione; unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfectionem rei, connotando praedictam convenientiam, seu denotationem consurgentem ex coexistentia plurium.¹

One will certainly see Durandus mirrored here. Suarez, however, did not make the basic error regarding the nature of a property of being which we found in Durandus. Indeed, Suarez never speaks of good as a contraction of being, but he speaks of the two as distinct only by reason. He strongly maintains their coextension, moreover, adding there can never be good where there is not being. It will not be amiss to read some of his texts on this point:

Ut sit [i.e. according to his opinion] nonnulla distinctio rationis fundata in rebus inter bonum et ens, ut sic possit bonum attribui enti tamquam proprietas, et non esse synonymum cum illo, quia formaliter aliud est esse seu habere entitatem, aliud vero ratione entitatis habere semper aliquam convenientiam, quam ratio boni declarat.²

Dicendum tamen censeo, bonum proprie dictum semper supponere vel includere ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum, latius patere quam ens.³

Sequitur deinde, bonum sub eadem ratione sumptum, esse aliquo modo passionem seu proprietatem entis, quia et cum illo convertitur, et secundum rationem illud supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi esse aliquo modo passionem, quia non est passio in eo rigore, in quo passio requirit distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum, ut dicitur de quolibet attributo, secundum rationem distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tractando de passionibus.⁴

Cum bonum nomen sit connotativum seu denominativum, hic non inquirimus quid illud sit, quod bonum denominatur; nam certum est illud, in communi loquendo, esse ens quod natura seu ratione bonum antecedit, ut in superioribus dictum est, et ex sequentibus magis constabit; sed inquirimus quaenam sit illa forma seu ratio, a qua res bona denominatur.⁵

This last text (one with which Suarez opens his tract), when taken alone, is reminiscent of Durandus: convertibility *non essentialiter sed denominative* between good and being. Viewing it, however, in the light of Suarez's whole doctrine, we shall see that while he maintained the correct conception of a property of being, he was forced to a vague acceptance of denominative convertibility.

Although Suarez did not follow Durandus's basic error regarding the properties of being, he did follow him in holding the *ratio formalis* of the good to be *convenientia* not to the appetite but to *being*. For him the *aliud* of St. Thomas is another being, not always really distinct as Durandus seems to require, but distinct at least by reason. This is indeed the basic error of Suarez's doctrine, and once again it springs from an omission of the notion of intellectual soul in the system, though Suarez's omission was not so complete as was Durandus's.

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.10, sec.1, n.12.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, sec.3, n.3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n.5.

⁵ *Ibid.*, sec.1, n.1.

In his discussion, Suarez seems often to teeter dangerously on the precipice of Durandus's error of denominative convertibility. In so far as he saves himself he does so only by holding firmly to his correct notion of property of being and by a consistent vagueness. We encounter his most revealing flaw in the answer to an objection concerning the proper nature of the good. This objection may be stated briefly as follows: good is divided into *bonum alteri* and *bonum in se*. The former is only good *secundum quid*. The *ratio formalis* of the good, as Suarez understands it, applies, however, only to the *bonum alteri*.

Suarez gives two answers to this difficulty. In the first he falls into Durandus's error, yet he seems to redeem himself in the second. In the first he maintains his definition:

... Describere bonitatem, quae est passio entis; bonum autem solum esse passionem entis prout dicit convenientiam ad alterum, seu prout est bonum alteri; hoc enim modo distinguitur bonum aliquo modo ab ente, et convenit omni enti, etiam perfectissimo;...

Bonum autem absolute sumptum, scilicet, prout est bonum in se, non videtur pertinere ad passionem entis, sed potius ad essentiam seu entitatem ejus, ut supra argumentabar, quia bonum hoc modo idem est quod perfectum, ut D. Thomas saepe dicit 1 part. quaest. 5; perfectum autem includitur in essentiali conceptu entis realis, quia non potest concipi ens cum entitate, quin concipiatur cum perfectione essentiali.¹

Suarez here seems to echo Durandus's very words, distinguishing between *bonum* in its *ratio formalis* and *bonum ratione concretionis*. He follows Durandus too in denying the *formalis ratio* of the good to include the perfect.² In this matter it will be interesting to note Suarez's distinctions of the "perfect." They contrast significantly with the distinction we shall find in John of St. Thomas. Suarez divides the perfect as follows:

... Dicit enim Arist., 5 Metaph., c. 16, 'perfectum dici, extra quod non esse ullam partem accipere, seu cui nihil deest'... Hoc ergo sensu perfectum dicitur, non quodcunque bonum, sed illud quod omni ex parte consummatum est, quod est simpliciter bonum. Alio tamen modo potest perfectum dici, quidquid sub aliqua ratione entis, habet perfectionem simpliciter necessariam et essentialem... Atque hoc modo bonum et perfectum convertuntur, imo sunt omnino idem, prout bonum dicit id quod in se bonum est, seu quod habet bonitatem, id est, perfectionem sibi debitam; hoc autem nihil aliud est quam habere essentiam vel entitatem sibi debitam; igitur *bonum sub hac ratione nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter dicit quam ens*;... Imo etiam esse perfectum priori modo, seu bonum simpliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum ejus requiritur.³

This doctrine might be interpreted in keeping with the teaching of St. Thomas, but unless the proper distinctions are made it is *prima facie* far from that doctrine. One cannot divorce the notion of perfect from the formal notion of the good, nor can one say that under this *ratio* of perfect the good essentially and formally signifies only being, that it is synonymous with being. We shall find the proper distinction to solve this difficulty in the treatise on the transcendental good given by John of St. Thomas. We will defer its solution till we come to this doctrine.

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp. 10, sec. 1, n. 14.

² DURANDUS, *In II Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, fol. 212.

³ *Op. cit.*, disp. 10, sec. 1, n. 15.

One can scarcely fail to see the hand of Durandus in the Suarezian doctrine set forth in this text. True, Suarez does not expressly say here that good and being are convertible *non essentialiter sed denominative*. He does say that good, when considered as perfect, is being, essentially and formally. This notion of perfect, however, he does not hold to be the *ratio formalis* of good. Hence, in so far as perfect and good are convertible here (unless the passage is interpreted in the true sense of St. Thomas and John of St. Thomas), the only implication possible is that the convertibility is merely denominative.

In the second response Suarez seems to extract himself from this difficulty. A careful analysis, however, will reveal that even here he does not quite evade the notion of denominative convertibility between good and being. He says:

Verumtamen *propter usum vocum* potest adhiberi alia responsio. Nam, licet prior in hoc habeat verum, quod bonum sub ea ratione in re non differt ab ente, nihilominus possunt ratione distingui, quod satis est ut bonum assignetur ut proprietas entis, ad modum aliorum transcendentium. Est itaque quoad impositionem vel significationem nominis advertendum, ens solum dici ab esse aut entitate, ut supra exposuimus; perfectum autem clarius exprimere entis perfectionem, in quo negationem quandam includit, vel saltem sine illa non potest a nobis ejus significatum explicari, scilicet, quod nihil ei desit secundum eam rationem, secundum quam perfectum dicitur. Bonum vero dicere convenientiam aliquam, ratione cujus habet res, quod appetibilis sit; nam bonum per ordinem aliquem aut appetitum, dictum est, ut D. Thomas docuit. . . ex illo Arist., 1 Ethic.: *Bonum est, quod omnia appetunt*, et statim magis explicabitur. Unde necesse est, res etiam illas, quae absolute et secundum se dicuntur bonae, sic denominari, quia habent perfectionem sibi convenientem et appetibilem, et ita etiam fit ut bonum hoc modo de formali significet perfectionem existentem in tali re, connotando in eadem re capacitatem, inclinationem, seu naturalem connexionem cum tali perfectione.¹

Thus, for Suarez, the intrinsic or *in se* goodness of a being consists in the perfection it has according as that perfection bespeaks a *convenientia* with the being itself. Suarez goes on to say that sometimes this perfection is distinguished from the being as accidentally inhering in it. In this case it is easily discerned how the being is good through the goodness of this perfection. Suarez finds the case more difficult, however, where the perfections are not really distinct from the being as accident from substance. Let us read his words on this subject, again:

Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est distincta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominatur; nam quando homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali significatur virtus non utcumque, sed ut bonitas quaedam, in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia quam habet cum humana natura, connotando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem, vel propensionem ad talem perfectionem. In his vero rebus, in quibus non est distinctio inter perfectionem et rem, quae perfecta dicitur, difficilius videtur explicari haec convenientia vel connotatio; dicendum est tamen, quamvis in re non sit distinctio, a nobis tamen concipi ac significari ad modum distinctorum, id est, *per modum formae denominantis et rei denominatae*, et ideo significari illam formam ut perfectionem accommodatam ei in quo existit, in quo computatur naturalis connexio ejus cum tali forma, et ita distingui tale bonum ab ente, saltem ratione.²

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp. 10, sec. 1, n. 18.

² *Ibid.*

In this latter instance, therefore, the distinction between good and being is a distinction of reason only. One may well ask whether Suarez intended only a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* or a distinction implying a *fundamentum in re*. The answer is that he intended it as a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*, as it clearly appears from his commentary on the *Prima Pars* of St. Thomas's *Summa theologiae*. There, in discussing the goodness of God, he says that a thing can be called good in three ways:

Primo igitur dicitur res bona, quia in suo esse perfecta est, i.e. quia habet omnia, quae ad complementum sui esse requiruntur.¹

Secundo modo dicitur aliquid ens bonum, quia conveniens est alicui ac proinde ei est appetibile. Hoc autem ipsum intelligi potest duobus modis. Primo, quatenus unumquodque habet perfectionem sibi convenientem et amabilem, quae convenientia, si per modum relationis consideretur, solum est per considerationem nostram, *tamen ut in re habet virtuale fundamentum, solet vocari bonitas transcendentalis*, juxta probabilem opinionem, de qua disput. 10 *Metaphysicae*. . . Alio vero modo dicitur una res bona respectu alterius, quia est illi conveniens.²

Tertio modo denominantur peculiariter res intellectuales bonae bonitate morali vel actuali, quia opera bona moralia exercent, vel habitu, et aptitudine retinent, quatenus sunt dispositae et propensae ad illud bonum exercendum. . . hanc tertiam bonitatem non esse illam quae transcendentalis est.³

From the first division of the second mode in which Suarez says things are called good, we may well conclude that Suarez was thinking of a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* in the passage from the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* quoted on page ninety. Indeed, this mode of good and that last mode of the passage in the *Disputationes* both refer to a simple being and are undoubtedly to be understood in the same way. That the distinction is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* is evident, since Suarez posits a virtual fundament *in re*. It is a virtual fundament *in re* which underlies a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae*.

Further and conclusive evidence that he could only have meant a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* is afforded by the fact that he did not admit of such a thing as a *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*. We can find this doctrine in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. John of St. Thomas has summarized it as follows:

Sed quidam explodunt distinctionem rationis ratiocinantis et solum admittunt illam quae habet fundamentum aliquod in re; distinctionem vero rationis ratiocinantis utpote fictam solum esse repetitionem ejusdem conceptus sine resultantia alicujus distinctionis in conceptu objectivo. Videatur Suarez in *Metaph. disp. 7, sect. 1.*, Vasquez, 1. p. dist. 117, cap. 3.⁴

In the above commentary, where he makes the three divisions of the good, Suarez discusses in what ways God is said good. He applies especially to God the mode in which a being is said good in so far as it has the perfection convenient to itself, a *convenientia* which we discern by our reason, basing it on a virtual *fundamentum in re*. Right after describing it, he says:

¹ SUAREZ, *In Iam*, Lib. I, cap. 8, n. 2.

² *Ibid.*, n. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, nn. 16, 18.

⁴ JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus philosophicus*, T. I (REISER ed.), pp. 294b41-295a7.

"Hoc ergo modo, per se notum, et evidentissimum est, Deum esse summe bonum: habet enim perfectionem sibi maxime convenientem et amabilem a se; unde se necessario amat, ut postea videbimus."¹

Thus Suarez did not fall into the error of Durandus: that God is good only in relation to His creatures, because goodness requires a plurality of being. Suarez held that God is good in Himself, though he too required a plurality for the formal notion of goodness. We may have noted this in the last part of his definition given above. "Unde bonitas dicit ipsam perfectionem rei, connotando praedictam convenientiam seu denominationem consurgentem ex coexistentia plurium."²

Here again he seems to have echoed Durandus's words, though he has certainly changed their import. Durandus's plurality was of real beings only; Suarez makes his plurality either real, or one of reason. Thus he is able to save the goodness of God in Himself.

Suarez also held God to be good in so far as He is *conveniens* to creatures. He does not hold this to be quite so evident as his first conclusion concerning God's goodness *in se*, but he does hold it. In discussing this point, he again reflects the errors of Durandus, saying that good in its formal notion of *convenientia* may be considered as the form or some part of another, or as its efficient cause. He concludes that God is *conveniens* to creatures in so far as He is their end, their object, their friend, and through His great power as efficient cause. Thus he does not place the causality of the good in final causality alone but makes it loom through several genera of cause. Indeed, what he has to say of God's causality as end in a later tract will manifest that his conception of final causality tended confusedly to identify it with efficient causality.³

We will do well to read Suarez's conclusion as to the transcendental goodness of God. He says:

Bonitas ergo transcendentalis in Deo est vel prima, vel secunda quae a nobis explicatae sunt, vel utramque simul juxta varios modos explicandi bonitatem transcendentalem, de quibus in disp. 10 Metaphysicae diximus. Praecipue vero solet denominari Deus bonus ex plenitudine omnis perfectionis, et quatenus ex plenitudine ejus propensus est ad se diffundendum et communicandum aliis, quibus bonus esse potest. Quomodo videtur de bonitate Dei praecipue agere Dionys. cap. 4 de Divi. nom. Sic autem clarum est, bonitatem nihil addere essentiae Dei secundum rem, sed solum secundum quandam connotationem et habitudinem rationis nostro modo concipiendi, non quod relatio rationis sit bonitas, sed fundamentum ejus, ut dicto loco declaravi.⁴

We may wonder exactly to which division Suarez refers by *prima* and *secunda*, whether it is to his first two modes in which a thing is called good as given in the quotation on page 91, or to his two divisions of the second mode. According to the phrase which follows "juxta varios modos explicandi bonitatem transcendentalem," and in the light of his last sen-

¹ Cf. SUAREZ, *In Iam*, Lib.I, c.8, n.12.

² Cf. page 88.

³ Cf. below, p.105.

⁴ *In Iam*, Lib.I, c.8, n.18.

tence of this quotation, we conclude that he would interpret the first mode in the light of the first division of the second, and that thus the first mode in the quotation on page 91 is not formally transcendental good, but is presupposed by it.

This position is supported by three conclusions with which Suarez resolves his treatment of the transcendental good in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. These three we shall find to be quite parallel with the first mode and with the two divisions of the second mode named in the *Commentary* above. The conclusions in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* are:

Dicendum tamen censeo, bonum proprie dictum semper *supponere vel includere* ens, seu fundari in ente, ideoque non posse bonum, sub quacunque praedictarum rationum, latius patere quam ens.¹

... Omne verum ens in se bonum est, seu bonitatem aliquam habet sibi convenientem; atque *ita fit* ut bonum absolute dictum cum ente convertatur.²

... Omne ens etiam est bonum respectu alicujus, id est alicui conveniens; quocirca etiam bonum, sub ratione convenientis sumptum, cum ente convertitur, et est attributum seu passio ejus.³

We will note that only the last of these is said to be an attribute or property of being. Suarez means, however, that the second also — if understood correctly — denotes a property of being. To make this plausible, he maintains a division of the perfection of a thing according as that perfection is an accident to the thing or is its very essence. We saw this same division earlier⁴ when Suarez gave the second answer to his difficulty as to how a thing may be said good *in se*. Here he makes it clear that he considers only the *convenientia* of the essential or intrinsic perfection of a thing *in se* as transcendental *bonum in se*, a property of being. He says:

Potest autem haec perfectio in creaturis esse vel essentialis seu intrinseca (sub qua ipsum esse comprehendo),⁵ vel accidentalis. Prior est inseparabilis ab unoquoque ente, si in suo actuali esse conservetur. Posterior vero saepe potest separari. Denominatio igitur boni, quae omni enti necessario convenit, illa est quae a perfectione intrinseca et essentiali desumitur; prout vero sumi potest a perfectione accidentali (sub hac ratione includendo quicquid ex natura rei distinguitur ab essentia rei, et entitate actuali), sic non est necesse, omne ens creatum esse bonum, id est affectum omni perfectione sibi possibili aut debita. Atque ita fit, *bonum priori ratione sumptum converti cum ente*; ostendimus enim omne ens esse bonum, nihilque esse vere bonum, nisi quod vere est. Sequitur deinde, bonum sub eadem ratione sumptum, esse aliquo modo *passionem, seu proprietatem entis*, quia et cum illo convertitur, et secundum rationem illud supponit, et ab eo aliquo modo distinguitur secundum formalem rationem a nobis conceptam et significatam. Et ideo dixi esse aliquo modo *passionem*, quia non est passio in eo rigore, in quo passio requirit distinctionem aliquam ex natura rei a suo subjecto, sed solum, ut dicitur de quolibet attributo, secundum rationem distincto ab eo cui attribuitur, ut superius declaratum est, tractando de passionibus.⁶

¹ Disp. 10, sec. 3, n. 3.

² *Ibid.*, n. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, n. 6.

⁴ Cf. p. 90 above.

⁵ We may wonder whether by the word "esse" Suarez here means existence or being. If he meant "being," he would have to distinguish being against itself, and then his relation could only have been identity and not *convenientia*. We must understand the term, therefore, as existence, because he meant to consider perfection of a thing as convenient to itself. Moreover, as we saw above, Suarez admitted of no *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis* and hence we should not logically expect one here.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, disp. 10, sec. 3, n. 5.

By these words Suarez does not rule out accidental perfection as a transcendental good; he does, however, remove it from the nature of *bonum in se*, considered as a transcendental good. For him accidental perfection is to be considered as something distinct from the thing in itself, and, therefore, as *bonum alteri*. This is clearly indicated in the passage from his second reply to the objection against his doctrine, quoted above page ninety. As we saw, he says there:

Quod clarius patet, quando talis perfectio est *distincta ab ipsa re*, quae ab illa bona denominatur; nam, quando homo dicitur bonus ratione virtutis, de formali significatur virtus non utcumque, sed ut bonitas quaedam, in quo importatur, non tantum perfectio virtutis, sed etiam convenientia quam habet cum humana natura, connotando ex parte ipsius naturae capacitatem, vel propensionem ad talem perfectionem.¹

Undoubtedly, therefore, Suarez considers accidental perfection as a *passio entis*, a transcendental good in so far as it is *conveniens alteri*. Hence, in so far as it is a good, it is so according to the second division of his second mode in the *Commentary* or to the third conclusion in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*.

This Suaresian doctrine will appear rather startling in its ramifications. It manifests first of all, as its basis, a complete misconception of the notion of individuality and, when carried through, denies the fundamental distinction between *bonum simpliciter* and *bonum secundum quid*.

Indeed, this doctrine of *simpliciter* and *secundum quid* as applied to being and to good is incomprehensible without a correct notion of what is an individual. As we shall see, St. Thomas's whole treatment of this important question presupposes a correct notion of individuation. It will not be amiss, therefore, to consider briefly the Thomistic idea of individuation and to point out how Suarez departs from it.

In the *Summa theologiae* St. Thomas defines "individuum": "quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum."² The principle of individuation is none other than *materia signata quantitate*, as he states clearly in the opusculum *In Boethium de Trinitate*:

Illa quae differunt numero in genere substantiae, non solum differunt accidentibus, sed etiam forma et materia. Sed si quaeratur, quare haec forma differt ab illa, non est alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata. Nec invenitur alia ratio, quare haec materia sit divisa ab illa, nisi propter quantitatem. Et ideo materia subjecta dimensionibus intelligitur esse principium hujus diversitatis.³

We note in this text that accidents do have their share in the difference of individuals. John of St. Thomas makes this more explicit when he says:

Unde obiter intelligitur, quam vera sit sententia D. Thomae, quod principium individuationis est *materia signata quantitate et accidentibus*, non quia accidentia formaliter constituent individuationem, sed quia a materia ut a principio per se dependet individuatō, ab accidentibus autem ut a conditionibus designationis, alias frustra individuum definiretur per collectionem proprietatum, etc.⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.10, sec.1, n.18.

² *Ia*, q.29, a.4, c.

³ *Q.4*, a.2, ad 4.

⁴ *Curs. phil.*, T.I, p.429b7-18.

The definition to which John of St. Thomas refers in this last line is the one given by Porphyrius: "Individua ex eo dicuntur, quod ex proprietatibus consistit unumquodque eorum, quarum collectio numquam in alio eadem erit."¹ Such accidents are indeed comprised by the individual and we designate the individual by such distinctive traits.

Suarez's opinion is completely at variance with all this. He holds that everything is individuated by itself, by its very being. Thus he seems to separate the accidents as if they were added on to an already individuated *compositum*. He not only destroys thereby the principle of individuation but also renders impossible the designation of any individual.

Suarez's doctrine of the principle of individuation is found in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, Dispute V. The scope of our paper does not permit a thorough investigation of this tract. To illustrate our point we shall confine ourselves to the following two passages from this work. The first concerns the notion of individuation.

... Dicendum est, res omnes, quae sunt actualia entia, seu quae existunt, vel existere possunt immediate, esse singulares ac individuas. Dico *immediate*, ut excludam communes rationes entium, quae ut sic non possunt immediate existere, neque habere actualem entitatem, nisi in entitatibus singularibus et individuis, quibus sublati, impossibile est aliquid reale manere, sicut de primis substantiis dixit Aristoteles in *Praedicamentis*, cap. de Substantia... Omnis ergo entitas, hoc ipso quod est una entitas in rerum natura, necessario est una praedicto modo, atque adeo singularis et individua.²

From the second we may gather his opinion on the individuation of accidents:

Diximus enim dupliciter posse nos loqui de principio individuationis: primo, in ordine ad esse, et ad propriam rei constitutionem secundum se. Secundo, in ordine ad productionem, quatenus determinatur agens ad distinctum individuum producendum, vel ad efficiendum unum potius quam aliud, et consequenter in ordine ad nostram cognitionem, quatenus sensibilibus (ut sic dicam) distinguere possumus unum ab alio. Priori igitur consideratione (quae maxime a priori est, et maxime propria huius scientiae), vera est posterior sententia, docens accidentia non ex subjecto, sed *ex propriis entitatibus habere suam individuationem et numericam distinctionem*,... Posteriori autem consideratione (quae magis est physica, et a posteriori) dici possunt accidentia accipere individuationem ex subjecto tamquam ex radice, seu occasione potius multiplicationis et distinctionis eorum. Hoc tamen non de subjecto nudo sumpto, sed adhibitis aliis circumstantiis, vel conditionibus ad actionem necessariis intelligendum est, ut in solutionibus argumentorum commodius explicabitur.³

Thus, for Suarez, accidents do not serve as conditions for designating the individual being, but rather the substance. In fact, the substance itself would have to be that by which we designate distinctive traits.

John of St. Thomas summarizes Suarez's doctrine of individuation in the following terms: "Prima [sententia] affirmat unumquodque individuari seipso et ex propria entitate, et sicut seipsa habet unitatem formalem, et omnis unitas est passio entis, ideo ipsam entitatem ponit pro principio individuationis."⁴

¹ *Op. cit.*, p.425b33.

² *Sec.1*, n.4.

³ *Ibid.*, sec.7, n.4.

⁴ *Curs. phil.*, T.II, a.3, p.771a11.

A consequence of this opinion is, as we have said, the utter negation of St. Thomas's distinction between *bonum simpliciter* and *secundum quid*. This distinction establishes a definite contrast between being and its transcendental property — the good, the one being said *simpliciter* or *secundum quid* inversely to the other. St. Thomas's doctrine is clearly stated in his reply to the first objection of article 1, Question V, in the *Prima Pars*:

... Licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem; quia tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscujusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter; per actus autem superadditos dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid; sicut esse album significat esse secundum quid; non enim esse album aufert esse in potentia simpliciter; cum adveniat rei jam praeexistenti in actu. Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile; et per consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem, in quantum est actu; non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et bonum secundum quid; id est, in quantum est ens. Secundum vero ultimum actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid et bonum simpliciter. Sic ergo quod dicit Boetius quod in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, et aliud quod sunt; referendum est ad esse bonum simpliciter, et ad esse simpliciter: quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter; et tamen secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum: et secundum ultimum actum est quodammodo ens.

This doctrine is quite incompatible with Suarez's teaching on individuation and on the good. Hence, it is small wonder that we find him utterly destroying the very meaning of the distinction with the one word "equivocal," when he does come to speak of it. We find his treatment of this subject immediately following the division of the perfect which he made, as we saw above,¹ in the course of his first answer to the difficulty raised against his notion of the good. There, we may remember, he divided the perfect into that which is perfect *simpliciter*, i.e. lacks nothing as to its complement, and that which is perfect only essentially, i.e. has only necessary and essential perfection. He says explicitly in this passage that the good in so far as it signifies the perfect in this second sense "nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter dicit quam ens." He concludes also that only *bonum simpliciter* is to be said perfect in the first sense. In this sense as well he seems to have conceived the good as formally identical with being, for, in the last sentence he adds: "Imo etiam esse perfectum priori modo, seu bonum simpliciter, nihil aliud est quam esse ens habens totam entitatem, quae ad complementum requiritur." From this he proceeds to the distinction of *bonum simpliciter* and *bonum secundum quid*. Let us read what he has to say on this point:

Et hoc modo intelligendus est D. Thomas cum dicere solet (ut videre licet 1 p., q. 5, art. 1, ad 1) aliter inter se comparari in creaturis ens simpliciter et secundum quid, quam bonum simpliciter et secundum quid; nam res habet quod sit ens simpliciter per esse substantiale, secundum quid vero per esse accidentale; habet autem quod sit bona secundum quid per esse substantiale, simpliciter autem per esse accidentale.

¹ P. 89.

Hoc tamen ultimum intelligendum est non praecise de esse accidentali, sed ut conjuncto esse substantiali; non esset enim bonus homo per accidentales virtutes, nisi supponeretur homo, et consequenter substantialiter et naturaliter bonus. Unde in illis vocibus, *secundum quid*, et *simpliciter*, videtur esse aequivocatio; nam cum dicuntur de ente, videntur dici de substantia et accidente praecise comparatis; cum autem dicuntur de bono, dicuntur de substantia creata aut solitarie sumpta, aut ut affecta dispositionibus et facultatibus sibi connaturalibus. *Quo fit ut, licet in modo loquendi sit diversitas, in re tamen nulla videatur esse differentia, quia etiam bonitas vel perfectio, quam confert accidens, si praecise comparetur ad eam bonitatem quam confert substantia, est secundum quid.* Sic enim in universum verum est, quod ex D. Thoma supra retulimus, unumquodque quantum habet de esse, tantum habet de bonitate, et quod etiam retulimus ex Augustino, quod in quantum sumus, boni sumus.¹

Thus understood, St. Thomas's doctrine as given above would have no meaning in reality. Indeed, it could not have any meaning if *bonum* and *ens* were formally one as they are according to this consideration. Nor could it mean anything if accidents were related as separate individuals to the substances in which they inhere.

Having thus identified being and good, when good is taken, not formally, but *sub ratione perfecti*, Suarez can only resort to equivocation when explaining St. Thomas's doctrine. Moreover, taking being itself as the principle of individuation, he could only think of precision *secundum rem* when he considered the division of being into substance and accident.

Yet, St. Thomas's whole purpose in pointing out the difference between being and the good in terms of the distinction "*simpliciter*" and "*secundum quid*," is to show that the two do not differ *secundum rem* but *secundum rationem* only, so that the terms *simpliciter* and *secundum quid* must necessarily be taken univocally in both cases. These terms serve as the very fulcrum for the understanding of the formal difference between being and good.

The reason which Suarez gives for considering the terms *simpliciter* and *secundum quid* as equivocal in the two cases is that, in speaking of being, these terms are applied to substance and accident as *praecise comparatis*, i.e. as individuated one from the other. In speaking of goodness, on the other hand, he says these terms are applied to substance and accident differently: *secundum quid* applies to substance as existing without any accident, while *simpliciter* applies to accident, but only when it is actually inhering in a substance.

In this Suarez is entirely mistaken. St. Thomas never speaks of substance and accident as individuated one from the other. In the present context he refers to the individual both when he speaks of being and when he speaks of good. Indeed, in the natural order accident cannot be conceived as having a separate existence from substance. The distinction which St. Thomas makes between the two, both as regards being and good, is intentional, though none the less real. Indeed, when he speaks of accident in the line of being he makes definite mention of its actual inherence in substance by adding: "*cum adveniat rei jam praexistenti in actu.*"²

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.10, sec.1, n.16.

² Cf. quotation, p.96.

Substance and accident divide both being and its transcendental property, good. St. Thomas uses this division here because it serves to distinguish the actuality of an individual proportionally as being prime or secondary. Since being "dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu," and since it is by substance that something is first distinguished from potency, and has its first actuality, substance is said to be being *simpliciter*. Accident, being a secondary actuality, is said of being *secundum quid*.

The nature of good, however, bespeaks the perfect which is appetible, and St. Thomas adds, "per consequens dicit rationem ultimi." This word "ultimate" has profound significance: for it may be understood to signify the causal nature of the good, as well as the nature of that perfection which is said of a thing to which nothing is lacking, and which is present only when the ultimate actuality is present to the individual. Thus while being most properly refers to the first actuality of an individual, good by its proper nature concerns the ultimate actuality. Hence, because of the ultimate actuality, the ultimate accidental perfection inhering in it, an individual is called good *simpliciter*; because of its prime actuality, its substance, it is, in this precise respect, good only *secundum quid*.

The fact that the good *simpliciter* regards the whole being, the individual, substance and accidents down to the last perfection, is due to the very nature of the good which appeals to the appetite as it were, by reason of the ultimate perfection. Being, on the other hand, by its nature is not ultimate but prime. Hence, this difference must not be attributed to an equivocation in the terms *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*, but is rather to be explained by their univocity.

In making this error, Suarez, as we have seen, has taken the word good to mean "nihil aliud essentialiter ac formaliter . . . quam ens." But, as we know, this is not the transcendental good for him. In his opinion, the transcendental good adds to being the *ratio convenientiae*, and is divided into *bonum in se* and *bonum alteri* according as the beings between which this *convenientia* is found are distinct by a *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* or by a real distinction.

Suarez never makes the assertion openly that, as Durandus claimed, good and being are convertible *non essentialiter sed denominative*. His whole doctrine, however carries this implication. When he speaks of the good as being nothing other than "being formally and essentially," good can be no more than another name for being and hence their convertibility is merely denominative. We pointed this out when first we spoke of his doctrine on this subject — a doctrine he presents in answer to the objection concerning his definition of the good.¹

We also pointed out that when he spoke of the good as a property of being according to his own notion, even then he seemed unable to evade denominative convertibility, referring more than once to the good as de-

¹ Cf. page 90.

nominative. We saw this to be more particularly evident when he spoke of *bonum in se*, wherein he distinguished the perfection and the thing by a mere distinction of reason. There he said that we distinguish them by reason "per modum formae denominantis et rei denominatae."¹ He used a similar expression, moreover, when he spoke of *bonum alteri*, for when treating of accidental perfection as a good (we saw just above that he considered this to be *bonum alteri*) he stated "talīs perfectio est distincta ab ipsa re, quae ab illa bona denominatur."²

We might point out many other passages where he more or less explicitly conveys the idea of denominative convertibility. As we saw at the beginning of our discussion, he seems to have had a correct notion of a property of being. This is incompatible with denominative convertibility, and that is what may have restrained him from openly asserting the latter.

It was through his false concept of the *ratio formalis* of good that Suarez was forced into this logical impasse which may account for the vagueness of his doctrine. Thus we can see how very necessary it is to understand correctly the meaning of *convenientia ad aliud*. St. Thomas's words contain profound truth when they say that in the case of those properties of being which bespeak *convenientia ad aliud*, the *aliud* is to be understood as the soul, the soul being *quodammodo omnia*.

The *convenientia* which Suarez assigned as the *ratio formalis* of the good is no general mode of being at all. It is a special mode, as particularized as each individual being itself. Thus it is that although Suarez tries to retain the correct notion of a property of being with which he started, he is finally compelled to deny it in explaining his own doctrine of the good. But, being averse to make this denial explicit, he lapses into vagueness.

2. On goodness and final causality

This identification of the *ratio formalis* of the good with the *convenientia* between beings has particularly contributed to a false notion of final causality. We found this identity in Durandus and now in Suarez. We shall find it again in Vasquez, though in a new and more modern form. We hope in the future to show its presence in the philosophies of such moderns as Bacon and Spinoza, and to point out its connection with their doctrines of final cause. The other errors which Suarez makes concerning the good are patently at variance with the doctrine given by St. Thomas. Their categorical assertion makes it needless to discuss at length what Suarez might have intended.

The first of these errors lies in the belief that the *ratio* of appetibility is posterior to that of the good. Suarez says: "... Bonum autem formaliter in ratione et denominatione sua non includit conformitatem ad appetitum, quamvis haec ad rationem boni consequatur."³

¹ Cf. page 90.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.*, disp.10, sec.1, n.20.

This doctrine follows as a necessary corollary from Suarez's definition of the good. As we have seen, his *aliud* is not the appetite. He looks upon good as the formal *ratio* of attaining the appetible:

... Bonitas autem supponitur in objecto appetitus, et est ratio formalis attingendi illud; appetibilitas autem dicit denominationem sumptam ex proportionem talis objecti cum tali potentia, unde non dicit formalem rationem objecti, sed conditionem concomitantem.¹

Thus, he would compare the good to the appetible in the way light is compared to colour as the object of sight. The two are for him formally distinct. A conclusion such as this is almost unthinkable in the light of that most famous of all definitions of the good, the one given by Aristotle himself in the *Ethics* — "bonum est quod omnia appetunt."

However, the main subject of our present concern is Suarez's denial of the *ratio finis* to the good. Let us consider the following statement: "Bonum habere rationem finis, eo, scilicet, modo quo habet rationem appetibilis."² Accordingly, *bonum* and *finis* are formally distinct. In explanation of this statement, Suarez presents a rather strange division of *finis*.

Etenim si formaliter sumatur habitudo ac denominatio finis, illa non est de ratione boni, sed ad illam consequi potest; nam finis ut sic dicit rationem causae in ordine ad media, vel ad aliquam actionem, quae propter finem fiat, quam habitudinem non dicit bonum, sed solam rationem convenientis. Si autem sumatur finis fundamentaliter, sic attribuitur bono, qua ratione bonitatis habet finis vim causandi finaliter.³

In this division we may again observe the shadow of Durandus. As we saw above,⁴ he had similarly divided end, — a division which was markedly parallel to his division of the good itself into *bonum formaliter* and *bonum ratione concretionis*. Durandus, however, did not come out bluntly and deny the *ratio finis* to the proper nature of the good, although it seems that this division would have forced him to do so had he understood the nature of the good correctly. Suarez, therefore, is more forthright in his error when he denies that the good and the end are formally the same. He looks upon the good as that from which the end has its power to move, a formality separate from the end, yet basic to it. Indeed, neither he nor Durandus deny a motion to the good.

In connection with this subject it will be interesting to take note of Suarez's theory of the *ratio causandi* of final cause. He divides final causation into *actus primus*, which he also calls the *proxima ratio finaliter causandi*, and *actus secundus*. He then adds that the *actus secundus* of final causation is the very act of the will. It will be best to use his own words:

Est ergo tertia sententia, quae constituit etiam hanc finis causalitatem in motione metaphorica. Addit vero, hujusmodi motionem non poni in actu secundo, nisi quando voluntas in actu secundo movetur, et quando sic ponitur in re non esse aliquid distinctum ab ipsomet actu voluntatis.⁵

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.10, sec.1, n.20.

² *Ibid.*, n.21.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Cf. page 85.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.4, n.8.

...Ita aiunt unam et eandem actionem voluntatis causari a fine et a voluntate ipsa, et prout est a voluntate, esse causalitatem effectivam, prout vero est a fine esse causalitatem finalem, et priori ratione esse motionem realem ac propriam, quia talis actio manat a potentia ut a proprio principio physico, posteriori autem ratione esse motionem metaphoricam, quia manat ab objecto alliciente, et trahente ad se voluntatem.¹

This opinion Suarez attributes to St. Thomas and most expressly to Ockham. He himself accepts it as the only possible solution. In support of it he makes the following distinction:

Neque contra illam quicquam obstat objectio supra facta, quod actus voluntatis potius est effectus quam causalitas finis. Nam imprimis in ipsomet actu voluntatis possumus distinguere actionem ab actu, et actum dicemus esse effectum, actionem vero quatenus in suo genere est a fine, esse causalitatem ejus, sicut proportionaliter dicendum est de causalitate effectiva. Deinde, etiamsi in illo actu non distinguantur ex natura rei illae duae rationes, sed fingatur esse pura actio, nihilominus non repugnat ut eadem res, quae est effectus causae, in eo genere, in quo est effectus, sit etiam causalitas, quando ille effectus est ipsamet actio, sufficitque distinctio rationis, ut distinguantur per modum causalitatis, vel per modum effectus, sicut in causalitate activa manifeste constat.²

The *actus primus* or *proxima ratio finaliter causandi* Suarez holds to be the good. He describes what he means by *actus primus* and then asserts it to be the good in the following words:

...Ergo illa ratio, sub qua [aliquid] exercet munus causae finalis, erit, quae proxime constituit finalem causam quasi in actu primo.³

De hac igitur re communis consensus Doctorum omnium esse videtur, bonitatem esse proximam rationem, sub qua finis movet; atque ita illam esse, quae constituit finalem causam, dans illi (ut ita dicam) virtutem ad causandum.⁴

Suarez's proof for this will be helpful for a better understanding of his whole doctrine:

Ratio autem est, quia causalitas finis consistit in motione metaphorica voluntatis, quae illam ad se allicit; nihil autem ad se allicit voluntatem, nisi quatenus bonum est; ergo bonitas est ratio movendi voluntatem; ergo etiam est ratio, seu principium causandi finaliter.⁵

This distinction of final causality into *actus primus* and *actus secundus* is a novel one. Indeed, the distinction between *actus primus* and *actus secundus*, as usually understood, is made with respect to a proportion to potentiality and cannot be understood except as referred to potentiality. The actuation of potentiality according to the proportion "in" is called *actus primus*; further actuation according to the proportion "to" is called *actus secundus*. Such is the distinction St. Thomas makes in the *Prima Pars*, when he says: "Actus autem est duplex: primus et secundus. Actus quidem primus est forma et integritas rei; actus autem secundus est operatio."⁶ The basis for this division may be found in the *Metaphysics*, where St. Thomas comments on Aristotle's division of the modes in which *actus* may be predicated:

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.4, n.8.

² *Ibid.*, n.12

³ *Ibid.*, sec.5, n.1.

⁴ *Ibid.*, n.2.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Q.48, a.5, c.

Ostendit quod diversimode dicatur actus. Et ponit duas diversitates: quarum prima est, quod actus dicitur vel actus, vel operatio. Ad hanc diversitatem actus insinuandam dicit primo, quod non omnia dicimus similiter esse actu, sed hoc diversimode. Et haec diversitas considerari potest per diversas proportionones. Potest enim sic accipi proportio, ut dicamus, quod sicut hoc est in hoc, ita hoc in hoc. Utpote visus sicut est in oculo, ita auditus in aure. Et per hunc modum proportionis accipitur comparatio substantiae, idest formae, ad materiam; nam forma in materia dicitur esse.

Alius modus proportionis est, ut dicamus quod sicut habet se hoc ad hoc, ita hoc ad hoc; puta sicut se habet visus ad videndum, ita auditus ad audiendum. Et per hunc modum proportionis accipitur comparatio motus ad potentiam motivam, vel cujuscumque operationis ad potentiam operativam.¹

Thus, the division *actus primus* and *actus secundus* is not a division of *actus* considered *simpliciter*, but of *actus* according as it is proportioned to potentiality. The division made by Suarez, however, does not fit in well with the Thomistic doctrine. He is saved from outright error only by the vagueness of his terminology, for it will be noted that he does not say good is final cause *in actu primo* but *quasi in actu primo*. Had he not inserted this *quasi* he would be guilty of making good the form of final cause, whereas just above we saw that he explicitly held them to be formally distinct.

The very vagueness of his doctrine in this matter leads one to believe that he conceived this division of final causation as a kind of quantitative division, a division of actuality in itself, prescinding from any proportion to potentiality. Granting the doctrine as he gives it, we are faced with the impossible situation of a *quasi actus primus* having for its *actus secundus* the operation of a thing other than itself — even though Suarez tries to avert this objection by a distinction of reason. The reason underlying this rather strange division of final causality may well be found in his doctrine concerning the role of final causality in respect to God and in respect to irrational creatures. The doctrine which we have given above is limited by Suarez to final causality, as it applies to created intellectual beings only.

Before going on to consider what Suarez has to say on final causality considered with respect to God and to the irrational creatures, it will not be amiss to add a note concerning his idea of the metaphorical motion of the end. Indeed, he does not seem to understand what is meant by metaphorical motion since he interprets it as a mere means of distinguishing the causality of the end from that of the efficient agent. Here again we had better read his own words:

Quare cavenda est aequivocatio in vocabulo *metaphoricae motionis*; nam respectu nostri illa particula, *metaphoricae*, additur ad distinguendam illam motionem a motione efficientis causae, non vero ad excludendam illam a tota latitudine motionis et causalitatis realis proprie dictae; cum vero Deus dicitur moveri aut allici a bonitate sua, tota locutio est metaphorica, ad explicandam solam rationem divinae voluntatis.²

¹ In IX *Metaphysicorum* (CATHALA ed.), lect.5, nn.1828, 1829.

² *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.9, n.12.

For Suarez, therefore, the motion of the good in final causality as regards the created intellect is a real motion, a motion *proprie dicta*, and is not merely metaphorical.

Turning to final causality as it refers to God, Suarez distinguishes the action of God into immanent and transient. Of the former he says: "Unde dicendum est finem non posse exercere causalitatem suam in divinam voluntatem quantum ad actus immanentes, seu determinationes liberas ejusdem voluntatis."¹

We can agree on the whole with this conclusion, disregarding for the moment what he says about the immanent acts. Indeed, this is the true Thomistic doctrine, as Dr. De Koninck has so clearly asserted in his *Defence of St. Thomas*: "Obviously, when we consider the divine good with respect to the divine will, the term *finis* cannot be taken in the strict sense of final cause, since causality involves dependence."² In support of this Dr. De Koninck quotes from the *De Veritate*, where St. Thomas says:

... Voluntas est alicujus dupliciter; uno modo principaliter, et alio modo secundario. Principaliter quidem voluntas est finis, qui est ratio volendi omnia alia; secundario autem est eorum quae sunt ad finem quae propter finem volumus. Voluntas autem non habet habitudinem ad volitum quod est secundarium, sicut ad causam; sed tantummodo ad volitum principale, quod est finis. Sciendum est autem, quod voluntas et volitum aliquando distinguuntur secundum rem; et tunc volitum comparatur ad voluntatem sicut realiter causa finalis. Si autem voluntas et volitum distinguuntur tantum ratione, tunc volitum non erit causa finalis voluntatis nisi secundum modum significandi. Voluntas ergo divina comparatur, sicut ad finem, ad bonitatem suam, quae secundum rem idem est quod sua voluntas; distinguitur autem solum secundum modum significandi. Unde relinquitur quod voluntatis divinae nihil sit causa realiter, sed solum secundum modum significandi. Nec est inconveniens, in Deo significari aliquid per modum causae; sic enim Divinitas significatur in Deo ut habens se ad Deum per modum causae formalis. *Res vero creatae, quas Deus vult, non se habent ad divinam voluntatem ut fines, sed ut ordinata ad finem*: propter hoc enim Deus creaturas vult esse, ut in eis sua bonitas, quae per essentiam multiplicari non potest, saltem similitudinis participatione in plures effundatur.³

We italicized the sentence "Res vero..." in view of the error Suarez makes in considering finality in the transient acts of God. Let us read his own statement:

... Actio Dei transiens non est Deus, nec in Deo, sed in creatura; et ideo habere potest causam finalem, et ordinari in finem. Atque ita, licet Deus non habeat finem sui esse, habet tamen finem suae actionis transeuntis, qui si sit finis proximus, esse potest aliquid extra Deum; agit enim Deus ad extra, ut sese communicet, quae communicatio aliquid est extra Deum, et in universum actio dici potest ordinari in terminum, ut in suum finem; si vero sit sermo de fine ultimo, est ipsemet Deus, non quia intendat aliquid commodum vel bonum sibi acquirere, sed quia agit propter suam bonitatem communicandam et manifestandam.⁴

To understand the basic errors in this passage, we must recall St. Thomas's division of action into immanent and transient, and see how he applies it to divine action. Two pertinent references from the *Summa theologiae* will do for the first point.

¹ *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.9, n.3.

² CHARLES DE KONINCK, *In Defence of St. Thomas*, in *Laval théologique et philosophique*, 1945, Vol.I, n.2, p.55.

³ Q.23, a.1, ad 3.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.9, n.12.

...Duplex est actio. Una quae transit in exteriorem materiam; ut calefacere et secare. Alia quae manet in agente; ut intelligere, sentire, et velle.¹

Duplex enim est actionis genus, ut dicitur. Una scilicet quae transit in aliquid exterius inferens ei passionem; sicut urere et secare: alia vero actio est quae non transit in rem exteriorem, sed magis manet in ipso agente; sicut sentire, intelligere et velle: per huiusmodi enim actionem non immutatur aliquid extrinsecum, sed totum in ipso agente agitur. De prima ergo actione manifestum est quod non potest esse ipsum esse agentis.²

A transient action, therefore, is one which passes outside the agent to some other thing; an immanent action is one which remains within the agent. Now when we speak of action with respect to God we must remember that we use the term analogously. Since He is entirely immutable, there is no such thing as a motion proper in God. We add "proper" because motion may be understood in a broad and improper sense.³ We do, however, speak of an action or operation of God which is identified in reality with His essence. Although many by a distinction of reason, it is in reality a single operation. "...In Deo secundum rem non est nisi una operatio, quae est sua essentia."⁴ This divine operation is formally an immanent action, in which we distinguish the formalities of knowing and willing. We further divide God's action into action *ad intra* and action *ad extra*. The action *ad extra* consists in the production and conservation of creatures. Although action *ad extra*, taken formally it is nevertheless an immanent action, for God produces and conserves things by His knowledge and volition. Since this immanent action may be said to pass into something exterior in so far as the effect of the immanent action is exterior to God, it is said to be virtually transient.

John of St. Thomas draws our attention to the Angelic Doctor's conclusion of the question on the existence of God in things: "Deus est in rebus non sicut accidens, nec sicut pars essentiae, sed sicut agens; et quia agit ipsum esse, profundissime et intime est in rebus."⁵ In other words, as John of St. Thomas points out in his treatise on the immensity of God and His presence in creatures:

...Sententia Divi Thomae est, quod ipsa operatio Dei immanens, secundum quod virtualiter est transiens et ponens effectum in esse, est formalis ratio a priori contactus divini ad creaturas, et existentiae Dei in rebus quantum ad contactum.⁶

And so we see that the division of action into immanent and transient cannot be applied to the divine action as denoting two formalities. The divine action is formally immanent; it is virtually transient only in so far as its effects are exterior.

On the other hand, if the position stated by Suarez in the second conclusion on the action of God *ad extra*—viz., that the transient action of God is *in the creature*—were logically carried through, we fail to see how it could escape pantheism.

¹ *Ia*, q.18, a.3, ad 1.

² *Ia*, q.54, a.2, c.

³ Cf. ST. THOMAS, *De Divinis Nominibus*, c.9, lect.4.

⁴ *Ia*, q.30, a.2, ad 3.

⁵ JOHN OF ST. THOMAS, *Cursus theologicus* (SOLESMEs ed.), T.II, p.16.

⁶ *Ibid.*

Again, the division of *finis* into ultimate and proximate does not apply to divine action. This division is based on the possibility of a multiplicity of intentions of the will. In the case of these multiple acts, that which, objectively, has merely the nature of *means* may have, subjectively, the nature of *end*—not an ultimate end, but a proximate one. Where there is no possibility of a multiplicity of intentions the means can never take on the *ratio finis*, and hence the division cannot apply. Such, however, is the case of the divine will, Whose end is eminently one: the divine goodness. In support of this we have the words of St. Thomas quoted above from the *De Veritate*: "Res vero creatae, quas Deus vult, non se habent ad divinam voluntatem ut fines, sed ut ordinata ad finem."¹

It is therefore somewhat surprising to hear Suarez say that God can have a proximate end and that this end is something outside Himself. We may well surmise that this doctrine is closely connected with his strange distinction of the causality of final cause into *actus primus* and *actus secundus*. Thus, with respect to the so-called transient action of God, the *actus primus* of His final causality would be His ultimate end, His own goodness, while the *actus secundus* would be His action in creatures, and while it is His action, it would have to be at the same time the action of the creatures. This contention is supported by the following words of Suarez, where, indeed, he even confuses the final causality of God with His efficient causality:

Consistit autem causalitas finalis Dei respectu effectuum ad extra in hoc, quod Deus intuitu et amore suae bonitatis effectus extra se producit; unde ipsamet operatio quam ad extra habet, essentialiter pendet a Deo tum in ratione efficientis, tum etiam in ratione finis, quia respicit Deum et ut omnipotentem, et ut summe bonum, qui ratione suae bonitatis, et dignus est ut omnia ad ipsum ut ad finem ordinentur, et seipsum dicto eminenti modo inclinatur ad communicandam aliis suam bonitatem propter ipsam. Atque ita facilis est responsio ad rationem dubitandi; negamus enim esse semper necessariam causalitatem finis intra ipsum agens, ut habere possit locum extra ipsum in alios effectus ejus, . . .²

This same doctrine will explain Suarez's peculiar conception of final causality as concerning natural things. He says:

Nihilominus proprius modus loquendi in hac materia est, actiones horum agentium naturalium esse propter finem, et esse effecta causae finalis. Non tamen ut praecise egrediuntur ab ipsis naturalibus agentibus, sed ut simul sunt a primo agente, quod in omnibus et per omnia operatur. Vel e converso (et fere in idem redit) prout ipsa proxima agentia substant directioni et intentione superioris agentis. Et ideo ipsa agentia naturalia non tam dicuntur operari propter finem, quam dirigi in finem a superiori agente.³

In the scope of the natural agents here considered, Suarez would include all irrational creatures. In a special article on the final causality of brute animals, he says that they participate in the causality of the end, as a material motion of the end, but "quantum ad formalem relationem in finem ita existimandum est de actionibus brutorum, sicut aliorum agentium naturalium."

¹ Q.23, a.1, ad 3.

² *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.9, n.9.

³ *Ibid.*, sec.10, n.5.

Immediately after stating this conclusion, Suarez goes on to say that this is the opinion of St. Thomas and of many others, including Aristotle. To show that it is the doctrine of St. Thomas, he resorts to a comparison used by the Angelic Doctor—the example of the arrow directed to the target, not by itself but by the archer. One of Suarez's references is to the *Prima Pars*, Question CIII, on the government of things in general. The first article is entitled: "Utrum mundus gubernetur ab aliquo." The example in question is found in the reply to the first objection.

Videtur quod mundus non gubernetur ab aliquo. Illorum enim est gubernari, quae moventur vel operantur propter finem. Sed res naturales, quae sunt magna pars mundi, non moventur aut operantur propter finem, quia non cognoscunt finem. Ergo mundus non gubernatur.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod aliquid movetur vel operatur propter finem dupliciter: uno modo sicut agens seipsum in finem, ut homo et aliae creaturae rationales; et talium est cognoscere rationem finis, et eorum quae sunt ad finem: alio modo aliquid dicitur operari, vel moveri propter finem, quasi ab aliquo actum, vel directum in finem; sicut sagitta movetur directa ad signum a sagittante, qui cognoscit finem, non autem sagitta. Unde sicut motus sagittae ad determinatum finem demonstrat aperte quod sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscente; ita certus cursus naturalium rerum cognitione carentium manifeste declarat mundum ratione aliqua gubernari.¹

St. Thomas's intention in this reply is to prove that the world is governed by an intellect. To do this he draws a parallel between the directed motion of an arrow and that of natural things. From the former we conclude to the presence of an archer; from the latter we conclude to the presence of a governor of the universe. The argument is a posteriori, from effect to cause. Directed motion is an effect of final causality. But final causality necessarily implies an intellectual agent. Therefore, directed motion in beings lacking an intellect must be caused by an intellectual agent, a being other than themselves. If we followed Suarez's interpretation, however, this argument would utterly confuse efficient and final causality; it would lead toward pantheism, and render univocal our direction of an arrow and God's direction of natural things.

For St. Thomas, directed motion is always the effect of final causality. It may be either action or passion with respect to its subject. If it is action it is efficient causality; if it is passion it is the result of efficient causality. Whichever it is, however, it is always the effect of final causality. That it could not be final causality itself is evident from the fact that final causality is motion in a metaphorical sense only. Suarez, however, as we have seen, does not remove final causality from the scope of motion properly so called. Hence he considers this directed motion both as final causality as well as the effect of final causality itself, "non tamen ut praecise egrediuntur ab ipsis naturalibus agentibus, sed ut simul sunt a primo agente."² Having identified final causality with action,³ he identifies it with efficient causality, so that it is the action of a thing moving to its determined end, in so far as this action is the transient action of God.

¹ A.1, 1 – ad 1.

² Cf. quotation, p.105.

³ Cf. p.105.

The whole impact of St. Thomas's argumentation consists in showing that directed motion in a being lacking intellectual knowledge demands the existence of a directing intellect. This is utterly lost in Suarez's interpretation. Suarez would express in the premise what St. Thomas states in the conclusion. Directed motion for him would not only be the effect of final causality; it would be the final causality itself, and as we have just seen, this is identical here with efficient causality. Hence Suarez looks upon directed motion as being at the same time directing motion. Thus while St. Thomas's argument proceeds from effect to cause *in actu secundo*, from directed motion to directing motion, and thence to a real difference between directed and director, Suarez would interpret the argument as proceeding from cause *in actu secundo* to cause *in actu primo*. This verges on pantheism.

Suarez might have tried to evade this difficulty by saying that he too argues from effect to cause *in actu secundo*, since he distinguishes final causality, by reason, from the effect of final causality. This distinction would be similar to the one he made with regard to the created intellectual appetite.¹ Even though he should in some way succeed in thus avoiding the problem, he still would have to explain how such an act, numerically one and the same, can proceed from two principles, the one uncreated, the other created. If it issues formally from both the one and the other, as he appears to hold, it certainly seems impossible to escape pantheism.

However, the most obvious error which Suarez seems to have made in this matter was to consider the directed motion of the arrow and that of natural things as univocal. St. Thomas used the example of the arrow as an analogue from which he manifested the idea of a need for a director in the case of natural things, but he did not intend to identify the two modes of direction.

In the case of the arrow two motions may be considered. In so far as the arrow is a natural thing it has a natural motion, a natural action following its form; in so far as it is an arrow directed to a target it has an artificial motion, a motion imparted to it, which is a passion in so far as it is a natural body. It is this passion of the arrow which we call its directed motion. This passion, however, is at the same time the virtual efficient action of the archer, an effect of final causality. Now, the directed motion of natural things is quite different. In this case the directed motion of the natural bodies, considered as agents, is not a passion in them, but their very own action. St. Thomas rejects the opinion that all operation is the immediate operation of God, v.g. in article 5 of Question CV, *Prima Pars*. In the *corpus articuli* he says: "...Quod Deum operari in quolibet operante aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus Deus immediate omnia operaretur; puta quod ignis non calefaceret, sed Deus in igne; et similiter de omnibus aliis. Hoc autem est impossibile."

¹ Cf. page 101.

Further in this same article St. Thomas shows in what way God does operate in creatures as regards each of the three principles of action: final, efficient and formal cause. Since Suarez has confused final and efficient causality here, we will quote St. Thomas on these two causes.

Sic igitur secundum haec tria Deus in quolibet operante operatur. Primo quidem secundum rationem finis; cum enim omnis operatio sit propter aliquod bonum verum vel apparens (nihil autem est vel apparet bonum, nisi secundum quod participat aliquam similitudinem summi boni, quod est Deus), sequitur quod ipse Deus sit cujuslibet operationis causa ut finis. Secundo considerandum est, quod si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in virtute primi agentis. Nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum; et secundum hoc omnia agunt in virtute ipsius Dei; et ita ipse est causa omnium actionum agentium.¹

Thus, in so far as the created good moves by way of final cause, it does so because of the similarity it bears to the divine goodness. While the created good is a final cause in virtue of the divine goodness, formally its causality is its own. The same is true of efficient cause: the created agent moves in virtue of the divine, but its formal efficiency is its own. This is another way of stating that God is present in all things by His immanent operation in so far as it is virtually transient.²

Indeed, St. Thomas is insistent that nature itself acts for an end. We find this question treated at length in his commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle, where he concurs with the Philosopher who defines nature in terms of its action for an end.

...Natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum: sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere, quod ex se ipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.³

From this it should be plain how specious is Suarez's argument when on the basis of *De Caelo*, Book I, he attributes to Aristotle the view that natural things do not operate under the causality of an end, "dum conjungit Deum et naturam, dicens nihil facere frustra, satis indicat naturam in agendo propter finem subordinari Deo."⁴ To be sure, Aristotle held that nature is subordinated to God in acting for an end; but he did not deny that at the same time nature does act for an end by its own action. Indeed, he defined nature in terms of finality. Thus, not only did he attribute action for an end to natural things, but he made nature itself a principle of action for an end.

The positive sciences have been all too willing to accept the Suarezian doctrine that nature does not act because of an end, rejecting its counterpart of direction by God as something not within the scope of experimental investigation. However unintentionally, Suarez, by the logical implications of his position, prepared the way to that modern thought which definitely expels finality from nature and, next, God from the universe. This doctrine, so widely accepted and so popular in latter times, had at least

¹ Q.105, a.5, c.; *Contra Gentes*, III, c.67.

² Cf. p.104.

³ In *II Physic.*, lect.14, n.8.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, disp.23, sec.10, n.5.

a logical foundation in the metaphysical speculations of Schoolmen who, even to this day, are acclaimed as faithful exponents of Thomistic teaching.

While his general notion of a property of being may have been right, Suarez went quite astray when he identified being *qua* good with *convenientia unius entis ad aliud*, overlooking the pertinent point that the *aliud ens* in question must be *natum convenire cum omni ente*: "Hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia." This alone would account for his inconsistent attitude when faced with Durandus's denominative, non-essential convertibility of "good" with "being." Omitting appetite from the formal nature of the good, he considers "good" and "appetible" as formally distinct, and "appetible" as posterior to the good. His next step is to make a similar distinction between good and final cause. Vasquez, however, will provide a further link between this Scholastic deviation and the hostile attitude of modern thought towards the Aristotelian and Thomistic doctrine of the good, by identifying what Suarez had, inconsequentially, left distinct, viz. *convenientia ad aliud* and final cause.

We will now proceed to show Vasquez's share in this emancipation of being from the good.

(To be continued)

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