point was quite natural. As we saw, they view the problem of the unity of bodies from the hylomorphic standpoint, according to which the substantial form is the uniting principle, causing a body to be *unum per se*. The fact that this ontological approach cuts too often across their logical approach to the problem, may be deplored, but it serves precisely to confirm their holistic attitude. As for the non-Scholastics, to whom we referred, they too take their stand right from the beginning firmly on a holistic standpoint.

Summing up our discussion about the criteria of corporeal individuality, we conclude that the analytical method might yield only negative results and that the criterion of continuity either in the sense of *unum per se* or in that of non-interruption is of no help as far as compound bodies are concerned. The only valid criterion is the one founded on the active properties or behaviour of bodies. The interpretation of this criterion, however, is far from unanimous, even among the Scholastics. The discrepancy of opinions about this factual point creates the controversy concerning subtsantial changes and, consequently, concerning the constitution of matter.

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PERSON AND INDIVIDUAL

In a recent number of *Blackfriars*, devoted chiefly to problems concerning the human person, the editor writes:[1]—"One of the principal duties of 'social thinking' is to distinguish person from individual." Stressing the need for a proper understanding of this "all-important distinction," the writer insists on its value in the application to present-day State problems. This distinction will, he believes, if properly understood and applied, provide a principle of solution for many of the vexed questions that hinge on the relations of man and society.

Of this distinction, much has been written in recent years. Catholic social reformers, preoccupied with the problem of determining man's relations to society, frequently have recourse to the distinction and see in it a valuable foundation for a 'personalist' sociology. The writings of M. Jacques Maritain have helped to make the doctrine familiar to a growing body of social thinkers, who seek in the traditional philosophy of the School for the principles whereby to solve present-day problems. But Maritain is by no means the sole protagonist of the theory. The distinction had already been propounded and publicised by writers of the French school of Personalism,[2] which prior to the fall of France exercised an increasing influence on social thought in that country. It is, in fact, as we shall see presently, one of the distinctive doctrines of the growing philosophical movement known as Personalism.

Many partisans of the distinction, while claiming for it a rank of first importance, seem to take for granted rather than demonstrate the philosophical foundation for the doctrine. As they profess to find in it a complete vindication of the rights

[1] *Blackfriars*, Vol 23, 1942 (Sept.), p. 337.

[2] E. Mounier, *A Personalist Manifesto*, pp. 67 ff. This work is the most complete statement to date of the doctrinal aims of French Personalism.

of the human person, it is imperative to examine the full implications of their position, and to determine what justification, if any, philosophy can offer for their assertions. By discussing first the theories of Personalists, we shall be in a better position to examine the exposition of Maritain, and to evaluate his claim to propound a Thomistic doctrine.

I

The most prominent writers in the French school of Personalism are Emmanuel Mounier and Denis de Rougemont. For them the foundation of the doctrine of personality is the distinction between person and individual. In the correct formulation of this antithesis, they see the solution of the whole social problem and the salvation of society from its present chaos.

In his "Révolution Personnaliste et Communitaire," which reproduces a series of articles published in "Esprit," Mounier tells us that person and individual are in no way to be identified. To make clear the distinction, he defines both concepts, chiefly from the psychological view-point. The individual, he tells us, is the diffusion of the person on the surface of his life, the dispersion and distraction of the self among other selves. The individual is, further, the selfish enjoyment of this dispersion and the inordinate love of its own singularity. It is, as it were, a fortress of egoism and security, erected around the ego, to ensure it against the surprise attacks of friendship and love.[3]

The person, on the other hand, " is opposed to the individual by being its master: it is choice, formation, the conquest of the self." [4] Person, however, is not to be identified with consciousness of the self. It is, so to speak, an invisible centre to which the whole being is attached, but it can never fall directly within the regard of consciousness. It reveals itself as the secret subject ('hôte') of the least actions of my life. Person is above consciousness and above time. It is a unity given, not constructed, vaster than the views I glimpse of it, more interior than any attempted reconstructions of it. It is, in fact, a tension in each man between his " three spiritual dimensions "; vocation, incarnation, communion! [5]

[3] E. Mounier, *Révolution personnaliste*, p. 67.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

In his " Personalist Manifesto," [6] Mounier, the better to distinguish his personalism from the decadent individualism, proposes to define more precisely the antithesis between person and individual. To this end, he enumerates five 'fundamental' aspects of the person. This description of personal characteristics proceeds from the exterior to the interior.

(1) The individual is characterized by dispersion and avarice. The marks of the person, on the contrary, are self-possession, self-determination, generosity.

(2) The person is endowed with a vocation, singular and incommunicable, characterizing and singularizing a man, while at the same time assimilating him to the humanity of all men. The mark of individuality is dispersion.

(3) The realization of personality is not the shrivelling down of the individual to any material possessions, as individualists would have it. Rather, it is achieved by the constant effort at renunciation, self-sacrifice, spiritualization.

(4) The person enjoys autonomy and spiritual liberty, the characteristic of which is adhesion. But this adhesion is not properly personal, unless it is freely embraced, and inspired by a liberating spiritual life. It cannot be a simple adherence to a public pattern, obtained by force or enthusiasm, which is the ideal of liberalism and individualism.

(5) Finally, " communion " is implanted in the very heart

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 67-50.
[6] An English translation of his *Manifeste au Service du Personnalisme.*

of the person as an integral part of its existence. The true, authentic person "finds himself in giving himself"; while the individual is motivated chiefly by the claims of ownership and the desire for security and isolation; he distrusts the stranger and refuses intercourse with him.[7]

II

To this psychological description of Mounier, de Rougemont adds further considerations, drawn chiefly from the political sphere. The individual is, for him, primarily the individual of the liberals and of the Declaration of the Rights of man: a being that is indeterminate, abstract, undifferentiated. Such a man is without destiny, without vocation, without raison d'être. As an individual, he is a part of the whole; the whole comes first. From this on one could logically deduce that priority of rights belongs to the State and that the individual should be absorbed by it. Hence the logical fate of the individual is Statism, Fascism, or some form of dictatorship.

In the conception of the abstract individual envisaged by the Rights of Man, all differences ought to be suppressed, and absolute equality should be established. But, de facto, such equality does not exist, and "to build institutions on that conception (scil. the individual of the Rights of Man) is to ignore the concrete nature of man."[8] Equality appertains to the specific nature, not to the concrete man of flesh and blood, and in wishing to extend it to the latter, revolutionaries have curtailed liberties, and destroyed fraternity.

To complete his doctrine, de Rougemont has recourse to the antithesis, represented as irreducible, between person and individual. The individual is enclosed in itself: it is an undifferentiated unit—a shapeless cell ("une cellule amorphe") lost in the mass. The person, on the contrary, affirms its responsibility: it is conscious of its rôle, of its mission among others, and knows how to bear the burden which that entails, even to the point of heroism. As a consequence, "la véritable cellule sociale, c'est la personne et non point la famille qui lui est subordonnée." The person, not the family, is subordinated to society. Here the doctrine of Mounier and de Rougemont runs the risk of degenerating into individualism, even of the anarchistic type.

[7] Mounier, *A Personalist Manifesto*, pp. 77-78, 85-87.
[8] De Rougemont, *Politique de la Personne*, p. 175.

These conceptions of de Rougemont lead us ultimately to assert that the individual is a man without personality, completely absorbed in himself; "un homme que l'on ne connait pas au qu'on ne veut pas nommer," to borrow a definition of Littré. The person, on the contrary, is a man, or more exactly, according to the exposition of the same author, an individual who is, in the popular sense of the term, a "personality," of a masterful character. Conscious of a mission to fulfill among others, he unselfishly devotes himself to the love and service of humanity.[9]

III

Examined from the philosophic view-point, this personalist formulation of the distinction hardly justifies the importance attached to it by its authors. Lacking a sound metaphysical foundation, the theory is based chiefly on certain social and psychological aspects of the person.

To begin with, Mounier's terminology suffers from some confusion. The words "person," "character," "personality," in their common usage, have a well-defined meaning which it is arbitrary to ignore. Man is a person; he exhibits character. His personality is that whereby he is a person. These notions

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 56 ff.

are clear and prescind from any distinction between person and individual. Now, for Mounier, the individual and what he terms "personality" are identified with absolute liberty and pure egoism. He is evidently employing the term "personality" in a sense to which journalism and "popular" works on psychology have given currency: that of the forceful, domineering type of individual, the so-called "successful" man. But as this is not the strict metaphysical sense of the term, Mounier's identification is not a philosophic doctrine. Finally, the "individual" and "personality" are accused of "individualism," understanding the term in its worst sense. Again, this doctrine seems arbitrary and unjustified.

The person, on the other hand, as opposed to the individual and to "personality," is characterized by certain attributes, certainly not of a metaphysical character, which emphasize the rôle it can be called upon to play in "spiritualizing" itself, and in voluntarily communicating its gifts to others. In all these characterizations, Mounier's thought is not of the strict philosophical order, and is, consequently, difficult to comprehend. At times, however, his doctrine is more intelligible and appears to approximate to a sane Personalism. When, for instance, he writes that the person alone finds his vocation and realizes his destiny, his words have a very intelligible sense and are capable of a perfectly orthodox interpretation: but only if the person is assigned a transcendent end, and if all his activity and his being is conceived in the light of this end. In such a conception, Mounier could have found an excellent Christian basis for his Personalism and for his distinction between person and individual. If we attach to the rational, free human being the destiny of a transcendent end, we are immediately able to offer this intelligible alternative to Mounier's distinction: The individual is wholly wrapped up in himself, wholly preoccupied with his own end, understood in a narrow individualist sense. The person, on the contrary, leaves himself open to other attractions, human and Divine: he transcends himself and freely offers himself in love, in order the better to realize the glory of his Creator, which is his proper end, as it is the end of all creation.

Mounier's failure to arrive at such a doctrine is due precisely to his failure to attach to the person a clear idea of its supreme end. As a consequence his Personalism lacks a sound metaphysical basis, and all his efforts to establish clearly the antithesis between person and individual are unavailing. His doctrine, in fact, leaves the way open to a regression, to a radical individualism, for nowhere has he approached a doctrine of a final end, and he has failed to mark the limits or the metaphysical safeguards of personality.

IV. The Personalist Argument

The distinction which personalists place between person and individual is supported by an argument which might be stated briefly: The individual is "closed," while the person is "open." This, in summary form, is the position of Mounier, de Rougemont, Lalande,"[10] Stern,[11] and some American personalists.

According to this argument, the individual embodies tendencies to selfishness, egoism, narrow-mindedness. The essential characteristic of personality, on the contrary, is the "open" or public character of man, as a subject capable of moral judgments. There is, obviously, a measure of truth in this assertion that the individual is "closed" while the person is "open." The individual is, in effect, closed, as being "divisum ab omni alio." The person, on the contrary, is an intellectual being, and is, consequently, open to all communications, human and divine: he is accessible to all the gifts of the spirit. Neverthe-

[10] In *Vocabulaire pratique et technique de Philosophie.*
[11] *General Psychology*, p. 70.

less, this conception of the distinction suffers from grave defects. It has recourse to a criterion that is merely extrinsic and accidental. So true is this that it seems possible, even reasonable, to defend [12] the inverse proposition: the individual is essentially "open," the person is "closed." Let us examine both view-points philosophically.

To comprehend properly the doctrine of individuality it is necessary to take account of the different grades in the hierarchy of being. When in the scale of being we ascend from the wholly material and sensible individual to the realm of spirit, we notice a change in the nature of individuality. The more perfect the specific type, the more independent it is of its genus. To the spiritual, free human being, the whole world is open as possible material for its development. Man, unlike the animal, is not wholly bound to matter. At the upper limit of the hierarchy, the species disappears completely and the individual suffices for itself. Each angel constitutes a distinct species, says St. Thomas. But to return to the human person, with whom we are concerned. In the case of man, social relations have not disappeared, and the principal error of individualism lies in reducing to a minimum, if not altogether suppressing, the dependence of man on the species.

Of course, it is only when we reach the human level that the individual ceases, for the first time, to be entirely for the species, and begins to attain independence. With man, we encounter the meeting of the notions of person and individual. In the scale of being, the individual undergoes a progressive perfection, until we reach the perfect individuality of God. With man, however, there appears for the first time a conscious individuality, a self-constructed unity, an autonomy. Yet the notion of individuality is realized more perfectly in beings

[12] As P. Descoqs has done in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. XIV (1938), cahier II, pp. 29 ff.

superior to man: he is not, so to speak, the terminal point of individuality and the starting-point of personality. The whole man is the human individual, as the whole man is the human person. As an individual of the human species, then, man is never completely isolated: he holds vital communications with his fellow-man. He is "open" to the influence of the human community. Being free with respect to his equals, man is open to exterior expansions of every sort: love, social service, etc. And this is true of man in so far as he is a member of the species, and hence an *individual*, in the sense of the Personalists.

On the other hand, his personality is that which renders man sacred; it is that whereby he defends himself, by which he is "for himself," by which he resists external influences. The forum internum is an inviolable sanctuary, impenetrable to external force. Man, in the precise measure in which he is free, regulates at will his moral activity. In the moral realm man is, with respect to other men, self-determined. He is then self-determined, autonomous, "closed," in so far as he is a person. He is "open," ad alteros, in so far as he is an individual. This logical conclusion is seen to be the inverse of the proposition defended by the personalists. Yet in our reasoning we have adopted precisely their perspective: a fact which shows the value of the opposition which they place between "person" and "individual," and of the distinction they seek to found on this antithesis.

It seems, then, that Personalists have not justified the importance they attach to this distinction. The defence of the person in the political sphere, which de Rougemont seeks to found on this doctrine, is, as a consequence, an inadequate vindication of man's liberties. We turn next to evaluate an exposition of the distinction by one of the greatest living Thomists.

V

Previously, we have discussed the views of certain Personalists, who have attempted to place a mysterious antithesis between person and individual, and who have seen in this antithesis a solution for the whole social problem. This distinction likewise finds acceptance among many contemporary Thomists. Indeed, it has been said with truth that "M. Jacques Maritain, more than anyone else, is responsible for the wide recognition to-day of the all-important distinction between person and individual."[13] In recent years, Maritain's insistence on this distinction and on its importance for the solution of social problems has been the leitmotif of his political writings. The Scholastics who profess adherence to his view-point frequently exhibit a tendency to make of the distinction a separation, even an opposition. As they invoke the authority of St. Thomas for their doctrine, we must determine what place, if any, it holds in the Thomist philosophy, and then evaluate the distinction on its merits.

To do full justice to the doctrine of St. Thomas on this point, it will be necessary to distinguish carefully two problems: the problem of individuation, and the problem of individuality. "Hypostasis et persona" writes St. Thomas, "addunt supra rationem essentiae principia individualia."

The problem of individuation deals exclusively with the multiplication of individuals within the same species. It seeks the radical principle of numerical plurality of individuals within a species. The solution of St. Thomas seems at first sight very similar to that of Aristotle. Both speak of a formal distinction and of a material distinction. The formal distinction is that whereby one species is distinguished from another.

[13] *Blackfriars*, Editorial, Sept. 1942, p. 334. Cf. Maritain, *Three Reformers*, pp. 19-26, 195-196; *Du régime temporel et de la liberté*, p. 63.

The material distinction accounts for the existence, within a species, of a plurality of individuals, numerically distinct. But since matter exists in view of the form, the material distinction necessarily exists in view of the formal distinction: that is to say, individuals are intended for the conservation of the species. In the case of incorruptible beings, the species is realized in a single individual, which suffices for its conservation. Every angel constitutes a distinct species. With such beings, there is no need to distribute the species into a plurality of numerically distinct individuals. But in the case of corruptible beings, the species embraces a plurality of individuals. The specific form, which cannot endure in its fullness by itself, is perpetuated by the generation and corruption of a series of distinct individuals, individuated by matter.[14] Take the case of the human species. Each man is by definition a being unique in itself, original and irreducible to all others. The matter which is a substantial part of the composite is incommunicable because of its extension. This, however, does not mean that my selfhood is constituted by the accidental fact that the portion of matter constituting my body is not that which constitutes my neighbour's. This Thomistic doctrine, as Gilson points out, has for its object to explain the problem of individuation and nothing else. From the fact that there would be no individuals if there were no bodies, it does not at all follow that it is the body which confers on the individual his dignity and defines his originality. We must recall that there is no concrete substance without matter, but that the substantiality of the composite is communicated by the form to the matter. Here St. Thomas, while using Aristotelian principles, is able to transcend the doctrine of the "Philosopher," because of his clearer insight into the doctrine of substance.[15]

[14] St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 47, 2.

[15] R. Jolivet, *La Notion de Substance*, pp. 40 ff.

The principle of the Thomistic solution is this: The form of man cannot subsist as an individual subject. But, nevertheless, it is in virtue of its form that the quality of substance belongs to the individual human subject; for the form gives to matter its actual being, and thus permits the individual to subsist. The form gives being to the whole composite. Hence, we must maintain the non-individuality of the soul as such, since two forms of this kind, numerically distinct, would be an absurdity.

This leads us to a second problem no less important: the problem of individuality. What is an individual, according to St. Thomas? "An individual," he tells us, "is that which is an undivided unit, and differentiated from others." [16] Here is a universal definition, applicable both to individual substances and to individual accidents: it is also taken by St. Thomas to imply incommunicability.[17] Though matter is the principle of individuation, and thereby renders individuality possible, it does not constitute individuality. Man is an individual (i. e. a being undivided in itself and divided from all others), because he is a concrete substance taken as a whole.

St. Thomas, then, distinguishes the 'principia individualia' from the 'principium individuationis.' While the latter is the radical principle of numerical plurality of individuals in a species, the former denote the formal principles of uniqueness in each individual as such.

In this context two terms occur, which are intimately connected, yet different: 'individual,' and 'individualism.' The latter is the wider term. It embraces substance, complete and incomplete, as well as accident. The term 'individuum,' which is now a naturalized word, is applicable only in the category of substance. Thus, e. g., concrete accidents, such as the height and colour of Peter, are singular and individual, but

[16] *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 29, 4.

[17] *Ibid.*, I, 29, 3 ad 4.

they are not individuums. Every individuum is individual, but not every individual is an individuum. The term 'individual' is, of course, both a noun and an adjective. Its use without qualification may give rise to an ambiguity which we shall notice presently.

Porphyry in his Isagoge describes the individuum as a congeries of accidents. St. Albert the Great enumerates these as

> Forma, figura, locus, tempus, stirps, partia, nomen;
> Haec ea sunt septem, quae non habet unus et alter.

These are the individuating notes ('notae individuantes'). Their aggregate is never the same in another individuum. Different 'individua,' says Porphyry, are denominated by this, that each of them consists of properties, the aggregate of which is never the same in another.

This, then is individuation, but it is quite different from the principle of individuation. The latter is the basis of the principle of individuation. Individuation is the effect of the principle of individuation. That which is individuated is the 'hoc aliquid.' Formally, it constitutes the individuum intrinsically complete and extrinsically distinct from other individuums. His notae individuantes stamp this particular man, X, with his individuality; they render him singular and unique.

Let us apply these considerations to the human person.

Since the concrete substance envisaged as a whole constitutes the individual man, the individuating matter is such only in virtue of its integration into the being as a whole. Now, since form gives being to the substance, it follows that individuality must necessarily be a property of the form as much as of the matter. Indeed, it must pertain much more to the form, since it is the substance which is individual, and the form is the source of substantiality. In other words, it is the matter which individualizes the form, but, once individualized, it is the form that is individual. St. Thomas frequently remarks that sev-

eral human souls are distinct by their union with the body. But it is also true that the total man forms the individual. Moreover, each human individual is a substantially different participation of the same specific nature. In other words, the soul of John and his body, and hence the individual nature of John, is of a substantial perfection different from that of Peter. Between two human individuals there is, then, not a mere accidental difference; there exists physically and numerically a substantial distinction within the framework of the same specific nature. In so far as he is a substantially different participation of the same nature each man possesses dispositions and aptitudes, physical, psychical, intellectual and moral, which are proper to him and to him alone.

Every man is, then, a concrete substance, an individual totality. What is the principle of this individuality? St. Thomas gives first the general reply which holds for all individuality. The individual subject, he says, subsists as a concrete substance in virtue of the form, which does not itself subsist as an individual subject, but which gives actual being to the matter, and thus permits the individual to subsist.[18] Man, however, constitutes a special case because of his subsistent soul. This soul communicates to matter the being in which it subsists: from the union of soul and matter results a single whole, so that the being of the composite is the being of the soul.[19] Subsistent and endowed with individuality, the soul is the form of the concrete substance, which would not exist without matter: it communicates to the composite its being and its individuality. In the last analysis, therefore, the concrete human substance is endowed with individuality because of its form.

Let us link up this notion of individual with the Thomistic concept of person. When St. Thomas wishes to define person, he accepts the definition of Boethius: "persona est rationalis

[18] *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 29, 2 ad 5. [19] *Ibid.*, 1, 29, 1 ad 5.

naturae individua substantia." [20] In questions 29 and 30 of the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, he carefully specifies the rôle of the adjective 'individua' in this definition. This adjective is placed there, he tells us, to show that here we are dealing with first substance, and not with second substance. But this concrete first substance is the individuum: the being undivided in itself and divided from all others. The term 'individual' is wider than the term 'person' which implies a spiritual element. The notion 'individual' is applicable to every concrete substance, and to indicate that by it we designate a man it is necessary to add a specification: the *human* individual. Moreover, this term is synonymous with person: the individual with a rational nature is a person.[21] At most, then, one could say that for St. Thomas the person is a determinate individual: an individual that is very high in the scale of individuality, but still an individual. Applied to man, individual and person denote the same concrete totality, the same substance. "St. Thomas," says P. Descoqs, "was quite ignorant of the distinction, much less of the opposition, which certain of his disciples place between person and individual, and which they invest with his authority." [22]

VI

The antithesis between person and individual does not then pertain to the Thomistic patrimony. What value should be attached to the distinction in itself, independently of its claim to represent a Thomistic doctrine? To answer this question, we must examine its applications.

In opposing individual and person, Maritain and the Personalists imply that the development of individuality is the

[20] *Ibid.*, 1, 29. [21] *Ibid.*, 1, 29, 3 ad 2.

[22] P. Descoqs, *Personne et Individu* (*Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. XIV (1938), cahier 11, p. 26).

development of the inferior parts of man's being: his passions, egoism, etc. To develop his personality, on the other hand, is to develop all the superior elements of his being, and to open it to spiritual communications of the intellect, of love, of social service, etc. By thus confining the individual to the inferior and material elements of man, Maritain seems to attribute to it all our human frailties. But the inferior and material elements which are thus attached to the notion of individual, are in reality an integral part of the totality which is the person. For the Scholastics, the person is an individual substance: an individual high up in the scale of individuality, but still an individual only. From this it follows that everything in the human composite: passions, sensibility, etc., flows from the personality, just as well as intellectual attainments and the higher qualities. Affectivity and sensibility, which presuppose a material organism, enhance the person as well as will and thought. Man is a besouled organism, an Ego that is partially corporeal. In the personal totality, there are appetites and faculties of unequal status, implying varying degrees of perfection. But this distinction does not coincide with that between person and individual, a distinction which, psychologically speaking, disrupts the unity of the Ego.

Again, Maritain asserts that, for St. Thomas, the principle of individuation shows that the individual is a part, a fragment of the species.[23] Furthermore, he claims that the whole doctrine of individuality and personality lies at the very root Thomistic metaphysics. It is true that St. Thomas has frequently examined the doctrine of personality with his customary thoroughness, and a reader of his exposition in question 29 of the first part of the *Summa Theologica* will find that it leaves little to be desired from the point of view of metaphysical precision. But it is no less true that it is difficult to find in

[23] J. Maritain, *Three Reformers*, p. 195.

these expositions any foundation for a distinction between person and individual. Here and elsewhere Maritain appears to confuse two questions which we have already distinguished: the problem of individuation and that of individuality. For St. Thomas, the angel is an individual and yet it is not a fragment of a species; since each angel constitutes a distinct species.

In the writings of St. Thomas, we can find a clear and adequate answer to Maritain's difficulties. The intention of nature, he tells us, seems to be the conservation of the incorruptible rather than of the species. In the case of corruptible beings, however, nature provides in the first place for the species, since it alone survives. But when it is a question of spiritual substances, the individuals themselves fall within the principal intention of nature. Now, the human soul is spiritual and immortal, and so we must admit that the multitude of human individuals seems the primary intention of nature.[24]

VII

Why have philosophers devoted so much attention in recent years to the distinction between person and individual? In this matter, they are motivated chiefly by the desire to provide a philosophical answer to the claims of totalitarianism. Totalitarian ideologies arrogantly claim to subordinate human rights in every phase of personal life to the interests of the State or the Nation. They claim absolute authority over the human person. In opposition to such theories and in an effort to effect a synthesis of solidarism and individualism, Personalists have attempted to set up a distinction between person and individual. Designating by the term 'individual' that part of man that is immersed in the material world, and reserving the term 'person' for the nobler element in man that transcends the

[24] *Sum. Theol.*, 1, 98, 1.

conditions of the temporal life, they say that the individual is for the State, while the State is for the person.

This distinction is forced. Is not everything that pertains to man's temporal life an integral part of the personal totality? On what basis can we exclude from man's personality those elements of his being that are submitted to conditions of the spatio-temporal world? It is precisely in this world of space and time, and as forming part of a natural society, the State, that man is divinely called to attain his personal salvation, and to achieve the full perfection of his personality. It does not suffice, therefore, to subordinate man to society merely in so far as he is an individual, a material unit; for it is in his activity, and chiefly in his spiritual activity, that his social nature is proved. Man is called to communion with his fellow-men precisely in so far as he is a spiritual person. Hence, the distinction of the Personalists is inadequate as a refutation of the claims of Statism. To the partisans of the distinction a Totalitarian apologist may well retort: If the individual is for the State, if his temporal life ought even to be sacrificed for the common good, it is reasonable that the State, in the interests of that common good, should have absolute authority over the individual body! By this little piece of dialectics, the tables are neatly turned on the Personalist, and his favourite distinction serves as the basis of a possible theoretical justification of such a Totalitarian practice as sterilization! Nor can the partisans of the distinction oppose to such intervention the rights of personality, since logically for them the individual only, and not the person, is subordinated to the State. We do not wish to press the criticism too far, but it is difficult to see how the practical application of the distinction can serve to safeguard the rights of the human person.

Occasionally, social writers avail of the distinction to distinguish two types in relation to social behaviour. The

'individualist,' they say, is concerned with that aspect of his life which divids him from others. He is egoistic, self-centered, inordinately attached to his own singularity. The 'personalist,' on the contrary, is not isolated or self-centered; he can find the full development of his personality only in God, and in spiritual communications with other beings. While such a dichotomy is possible, it is well to remember that with this doctrine we leave the realm of strict metaphysics and enter that department of applied psychology known as typology. While such distinctions may hold in this sphere, they are of little service in the strictly philosophical work of founding man's personal rights in relation to the State. In the last analysis, the ultimate end of man is the decisive criterion for all social problems. Because of his transcendent end, the person can never be a mere means or instrument, and can never use other persons as such. Yet he is called to realize his destiny with other men in a social life. He is so constituted that he can achieve the full perfection of his nature only by submitting himself to social relations. This necessity of social ties arises from the fact that man is not a purely instinctive being. His activities are not instinctive responses to stimuli, rigidly established from birth. Endowed with free-will, and called to a definite destiny, man can realize his perfection only by conscious organization of his activities. To affirm, therefore, a certain juridical subordination of man to society, is not to degrade his dignity as a person, since social ties cannot be in fundamental opposition to the exigencies of his nature. Social life and individual life are complementary. There is a personal end of social life and a social end of personal life. That is the very essence of Christian solidarism.

Finally, the attempt to place a mysterious antithesis between the concepts of person and individual is due to a subtle ambiguity in the terms. This ambiguity is possible only when we use

the term 'individual' in its most general form and without qualification. When we recall that our discussion deals exclusively with man, we necessarily add the qualification 'human.' It is then clear that the two terms: 'human individual' and 'human person' designate precisely the same concrete being. The person, it must be emphasized, is the human totality, and the so-called material individual is but an integral part of the personality.

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KANT'S *OPUS POSTUMUM*

A CHARACTERISTIC feature of Kant as a philosopher is his inability to rest content with any of his philosophical achievements. For the critical mentality nothing is definitively settled, no goal finally attained, no position established beyond all doubt or possibility of revision. In spite of his comfortable assurance that he had encompassed the basic features of thought and reality within the limits of his three Critiques, Kant was forced by the very nature of his method to resubmit his conclusions to critical scrutiny toward the end of his life. This move was also a penalty which is imposed upon every founder of a philosophical school. Those teachers who have the fortune or misfortune to survive into the first generation of their disciples are frequently led by the exaggerations in which their professed followers indulge to offer some sort of balancing restraint and recall to the true orthodoxy of the master himself. Such were the motives which prompted Kant to occupy his last years with a serious and thorough-going reconsideration of the main themes he had propounded.

1. *The Opus Postumum and Nineteenth Century Historians of Phiposophy*

From a letter addressed to Kant by Kiesewetter, June 8, 1795, we obtain the first recorded mention of a projected work which Kant had been considering for several years. This letter was written five years after the third *Kritik* had appeared (1790), one year after *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1793-4), and two years before *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre* (1797). During the same year appeared the acute opusculum *Zum ewigen Frieden.* This chronological orientation is necessary because of the charges of senility which have been levelled by some critics at the