

## | [Art. III: responsio ad quaestionem]

Circa tertium articulum principalem sunt quattuor articuli:  
 p r i m u s est de connexionem virtutum moralium inter se; s e -  
 c u n d u s est de connexionem earum cum virtutibus theologicis;  
 t e r t i u s est de connexionem earum cum habitibus partis sen-  
 sitivae; q u a r t u s est de connexionem earum cum prudentia.

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[Opiniones de connexionem virtutum moralium inter se]

[Opinio Thomae Aquinatis]

Quantum ad primum articulum est una opinio T h o m a e,  
 prima secundae, q.65,<sup>1</sup> quod aliquae sunt virtutes quae perfici-  
 unt hominem secundum communem statum, quantum ad ea quae  
 communiter omni homini occurrunt, cuiusmodi sunt virtutes  
 cardinales; quaedam sunt quae perficiunt hominem quantum ad  
 statum specialem et quantum ad illa quae conveniunt homini se-  
 cundum illum statum, sicut magnificentia, magnanimitas, quae  
 conveniunt homini exsistenti in dignitate, potestate et honore,  
 et aliis virtutibus. Loquendo de primis, dicitur quod illae sunt  
 connexae; loquendo de secundis, illae non sunt connexae.

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Quantum autem ad connexionem virtutum cum prudentia,  
 dicit<sup>2</sup> quod prudentia non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus,  
 quia prudentia est recta ratio agibilium, quae procedit ex finibus  
 virtutum. Quaere in T h o m a.

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## | [Art. III: Reply to the Question]

2. The third principle article itself has four articles: the first con-  
 cerns the connection of the moral virtues among themselves; the  
 second concerns their connection with the theological virtues;  
 the third, their connection with the habits of the sensitive part  
 of the soul; the fourth, their connection with prudence.

[Opinions Concerning the Connection of the Moral Virtues]

[Thomas Aquinas's Opinion]

9. Concerning the first article there is Thomas's opinion in the  
*Summa theologiae*, first part of the second part, q.65.<sup>1</sup> According to  
 Thomas there are some virtues that perfect a person according to  
 the common state, having to do with things every person encoun-  
 ters; the cardinal virtues are of this kind. Other virtues perfect a  
 person according to a special state and have to do with matters ap-  
 propriate to a person in that state—such as magnificence, magna-  
 nimity—which are appropriate to a person who holds a position of  
 dignity, power, and honor, and other virtues. Speaking of the first  
 virtues, it is said that those virtues are connected; speaking of the  
 second, that those virtues are not connected.

19. As to the connection of the virtues with prudence, Tho-  
 mas<sup>2</sup> says that prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues  
 because “prudence is right reason regarding possible actions,”  
 which is derived from the ends of the virtues. See Thomas.

1. Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I-II q.65 a.1 ad 1.

2. Cf. Aquinas, *ST* I-II q.58 a.5 resp.

Item Philosophus, VI *Ethicorum*.<sup>3</sup> "Malitia est corruptiva principii", principium autem est prudentia, igitur non stat cum vitio. Item, III *Ethicorum*.<sup>4</sup> "Omnis malus est ignorans . . .," igitur scientia sive prudentia non stat cum malitia. 25

[Contra opinionem Thomae Aquinatis]

Contra istam opinionem: primo, quia concedit propositum, scilicet quod non omnes virtutes necessario sunt connexae, quia illae quae perficiunt hominem in determinato statu, non sunt connexae cum aliis quae perficiunt hominem secundum communem statum. Secundo, quia possibile est quod alicui occurrat materia unius virtutis, quae perficit hominem secundum communem statum, et non alterius, sicut possibile est quod alicui occurrat materia temperantiae et non fortitudinis, et per consequens potest se exercere circa materiam illius virtutis, acquirendo temperantiam et non fortitudinem, per rationem suam. Tercio, quia videtur contradicere sibi ipsi, quia dicit quod prudentia non potest esse sine virtutibus moralibus, quia qua ratione prudentia separatur ab una virtute morali, et ab alia; et per consequens qua ratione non potest esse sine virtutibus de primo genere, nec potest esse sine virtutibus de secundo genere. Confirmatur, quia non omnis prudens<sup>5</sup> est perfecte virtuosus. 30 35 40

[Opinio Henrici Gandavensis]

Ideo est alia opinio Gandavensis, *Quodlibet* V, q.17,<sup>6</sup> quod in acquisitione virtutis sunt quattuor gradus, scilicet perseverantia, continentia, temperantia, virtus heroica; et in acquisitione habitus vitiosi sunt alii quattuor gradus, scilicet incontinentia, imperseverantia, intemperantia, bestialitas, secundum Philosophum, VII *Ethicorum*, in principio.<sup>7</sup> Dicit enim ibi in responsione ad argumentum,<sup>8</sup> quod aliquis potest exerceri circa materiam unius virtutis et non alterius, ut adquirat perseve- 45 50

3. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 6.5.1140b19–20; Henry, *Quodlibet* V q.17, fol. 190r.

4. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 3.2.1110b28–29; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.11, XV: 627–28; Henry, *Quodl.* X q.10, pp. 268–71.

5. Note that the words 'omnis prudens,' translated "every prudent person," were not found in any manuscript, only in the printed edition of 1495 (=Z).

6. Cf. Henry, *Quodl.* V q.16, fol. 186v.

7. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.1.1145a15–1145b7.

8. Cf. Henry, *Quodl.* V q.17, fols. 192v–193r; fols. 190v–191r); Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.2, XV: 599–600.

23. The next argument is from the Philosopher, *Ethics* 6:<sup>3</sup> "Wickedness is destructive of the principle," but the principle is prudence, therefore prudence is not compatible with wickedness. The next argument is from *Ethics* 3:<sup>4</sup> "Every wicked person is ignorant . . .," therefore scientific knowledge or prudence is not compatible with wickedness.

[Against Thomas Aquinas's Opinion]

28. Against this opinion there are three arguments. First, Aquinas concedes what we set out to prove—namely, that not all virtues are necessarily connected, because those that perfect a man in a determinate state are not connected with other virtues that perfect a person according to the common human state. Second: it is possible that someone should encounter subject matter for one virtue that perfects a person according to the common human state, and not the subject matter of another. For example, it is possible that someone should encounter the subject matter for temperance in the absence of the subject matter for courage; consequently such a person can practice temperance but not courage, according to Thomas's argument. Third: Aquinas seems to contradict himself, because he says that prudence cannot exist without the moral virtues. For if prudence can be separated from one moral virtue, it can be separated from another for the same reason. Consequently if prudence cannot exist without virtues in the first genus, it cannot exist without virtue in the second genus for the same reason. This is confirmed, since not every prudent person<sup>5</sup> is perfectly virtuous.

[Henry of Ghent's Opinion]

45. For these reasons, Ghent defends another opinion, in *Quodlibet* V, question 17,<sup>6</sup> according to which there are four degrees in the acquisition of virtue—namely, perseverance, continence, temperance, and heroic virtue; in the acquisition of a vicious habit another four degrees are found—namely, incontinence, lack of perseverance, intemperance, and brutishness, as the Philosopher indicates at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Ethics*.<sup>7</sup> In reply to an objection, Ghent<sup>8</sup> says that someone could be practiced in the subject matter of one virtue and not another, so that he would acquire perseverance [and] continence; he

rantiam et continentiam et temperantiam in duobus gradibus, scilicet quantum ad inchoationem et augmentationem, sed non quantum ad complementum et perfectionem naturae, in quo gradu simpliciter meretur dici virtus absolute, nec quantum ad virtutem heroicam; ita quod in eodem habitu numero ponit praedictos quattuor gradus, et in duobus primis possunt esse non connexae, et aliquo modo in tertio gradu; sed in tertio gradu perfecto et quarto necessario sunt connexae, quia sic requiritur connexio aliarum sicut fulcimentum, quia non posset diu conservari nisi fulciretur, nec diu persistere absque aliis eam fulcientibus.

Pro ista opinione arguitur multipliciter. Tangam rationes aliquas: primo sic: non est vera virtus quae in contrarium fini suo obliquari potest; secundo, quia una sine alia non potest delectabiliter operari; tertio, quia una non perfecte perducit ad finem virtutis sine alia. Confirmatur, quia virtus<sup>9</sup> est quae habentem perficit et opus eius bonum reddit. Praeterea, VI *Ethicorum*, virtutes sunt sorores.<sup>10</sup> Item Augustinus, VI *De Trinitate*.<sup>11</sup> Item Gregorius, X *Moralium*.<sup>12</sup> Quaere haec et alia in Gandavensi et Ioanne.<sup>13</sup>

[Contra opinionem Henrici Gandavensis]

Contra istam opinionem, quia multipliciter peccat: primo, quia male allegat Philosophum, quia non ponit nisi tria membra, sicut patet in principio septimi,<sup>14</sup> ubi ponit continentiam, temperantiam et virtutem heroicam ex una parte, et ex alia parte ponit incontinentiam, malitiam et bestialitatem. Sed capitulo 9 et 10,<sup>15</sup> ponit quattuor, scilicet perseverantiam, continentiam ex una parte, et ex alia parte ponit molliem et incontinentiam. Et distinguit inter ista, quia continentia et incontinentia sunt circa delectationes, perseverantia et mollietates circa tristitias. Unde dicit sic, 9 capitulo:<sup>16</sup> "hic autem circa delectationes incontinens, hic autem continens; hic autem circa tristitias mollis, hic autem perseverans."

9. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.5.1106a 15–17.

10. Cf. Eustratius, *In Eth. Nic. Commentaria*, ed. G. Heylbut, *Comm. in Aristot. Graeca* (Berlin, 1892), XX: 309.

11. Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI c.4 n.6 (PL 42, 927).

12. Cf. Gregorius, *Moralium Libri XXII* c.1 n.2 (PL 76, 211–12).

13. Cf. Henry, *Quodl.* V q.17, fols. 188v–189v; fols. 191v–192v; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.3, XV: 600.

14. Cf. note 7 above.

15. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.1.1145a35–36, 2.1145b8–10.

16. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.8.1150a13–15.

could even acquire two degrees of temperance (namely, beginning and increasing virtue), but not its natural completion and perfection, which is the degree that is worthy of being called virtue, simply and absolutely; nor could he acquire heroic virtue. Thus Ghent posits these four degrees in numerically the same habit. In the first two degrees, the virtues need not be connected, and this is also the case in some sense in the third degree. But in the perfect third degree and in the fourth degree, the virtues are necessarily connected. This is so because in these last two degrees, a connection with other virtues is needed as a support, since such virtue could not be preserved for long unless it were supported, nor could it persist for long without the support of other virtues.

63. Many arguments support this opinion; I should mention some of them. First, what can be bent into the contrary of its end is not true virtue. Second, there is no pleasure in the practice of one virtue without another. Third, no one virtue without another leads perfectly to the end of virtue.<sup>9</sup> This is confirmed because virtue perfects those who possess it and renders their work good. Besides, according to book 6 of the *Ethics*, the virtues are sisters.<sup>10</sup> Then there is a citation from Augustine, in book 6 of *De Trinitate*.<sup>11</sup> Next there is a quotation from Gregory, book 10 of the *Moralia*.<sup>12</sup> These and other references may be found in Ghent's work and in that of Scotus.<sup>13</sup>

[Against Henry of Ghent's Opinion]

73. Since this opinion is mistaken in many ways, I will argue against it. First, the reference to the Philosopher is bad; the Philosopher posits only a three-part distinction, as is evident at the beginning of book 7,<sup>14</sup> where he posits continence, temperance, and heroic virtue on the one hand, and incontinence, malice, and brutishness on the other hand. In chapters 9 and 10,<sup>15</sup> he posits a four-part distinction—namely, perseverance and continence on the one hand, and softness and incontinence on the other hand. He distinguishes between them as follows: continence and incontinence pertain to pleasures; perseverance and softness, to pains. That is why he says in the ninth chapter:<sup>16</sup> "those regarding pleasures are continence and incontinence; those regarding pains are softness and perseverance."

Quod sic intelligo,<sup>17</sup> quod continens est ille qui habet pravās concupiscentias et delectationes in appetitu sensitivo, et non sequitur eas sed sequitur rectam rationem; incontinens, qui dimittit rectam rationem et sequitur illas delectationes. Ideo continentia et incontinentia habent proprie fieri circa delectabiles concupiscentias. Perseverans est ille qui habet virtutem, sed in illa aliquando perseverat cum tristitia propter aliquid extrinsecum annexum materiae illius virtutis. Mollis est, qui propter illud extrinsecum, ex quo sequitur tristitia, dimittit actum virtutis, quia non vult illum actum exercere cum tristitia.

Exemplum: si aliquis esset virtuosus in surgendo ad matutinum ad laudandum Deum, si esset frigidus vel piger vel aliquid tale sibi accideret, et exerceret tunc actum illius virtutis, hoc esset cum quadam tristitia, et diceretur talis perseverans, continuando actum virtutis. Si autem dimitteret actum virtutis et non exerceret illum quia non vult talem actum exercere cum tristitia, tunc diceretur mollis.

Quod autem bestialitas distinguatur per obiecta a virtute, patet per eum, capitulo 7:<sup>18</sup> "Dico autem bestiales...". Quomodo autem isti gradus quos ponit Philosophus distinguuntur, patebit postea.<sup>19</sup>

Secundo, ponendo quod essent gradus tales in virtute sicut non sunt, adhuc non valet quod dicit de connexione.<sup>20</sup> Primo, quia possibile est materiam unius virtutis occurrere et numquam alterius, et per consequens circa materiam illius virtutis potest generari virtus in gradu heroico sine aliqua alia virtute, maxime cum secundum eum<sup>21</sup> isti sint gradus unius quantitatis, et una potest augmentari usque ad gradum supremum possibilem sibi sine alia, quando non occurrit materia alterius.

Praeterea virtus sufficit ad fulciendum seipsam sine quacunque alia; igitur etc. Antecedens patet, quia stante vitio opposito alteri virtuti, quamvis non in complemento, sufficit; igitur sine illa virtute sufficit. Patet enim per experientiam quod aliquis intemperatus citra complementum intemperantiae potest velle exercere opera iustitiae et facere, igitur multo magis potest talia opera exercere sine temperantia. Ideo dixi 'in complemento,' quia tunc aliquis est in complemento vitii quando propter actum vitiosum vult omnino deserere actum virtuosum, et ideo intemperantia in tali gradu non stat cum iustitia.

17. Cf. OTh VIII, 272-73, 275, 281.

18. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 7.6.1148b 19-21.

19. Cf. OTh VIII, 272-86.

20. Lines 57-62; cf. OTh VIII, 284-85.

21. Cf. Henry, *Quodl.* V q.17, fol. 192r; q.16, fol. 187r; q.17, fol. 191v.

85. I understand<sup>17</sup> this to mean that a continent person is someone who experiences depraved desires and pleasures in the sensitive appetite and does not follow them, but follows right reason instead; an incontinent person follows those pleasures and abandons right reason. Therefore, the proper operation of continence and incontinence pertains to pleasurable desires. A persevering person is someone who possesses a virtue, but because of something extrinsically connected with the subject matter of that virtue, sometimes experiences pain and perseveres. A soft person abandons a virtuous act on account of something extrinsic that has pain as a sequel, because he does not will the practice of the act when associated with pain.

95. Consider an example. Suppose someone virtuously got up at matins to praise God. If that person felt cold or sluggish (or something similar occurred) and still performed that virtuous act, it would be with some pain; and a person continuing that virtuous act would be said to persevere. However, if a person abandoned that virtuous act and did not practice it because she did not will its practice with pain, she would be called soft.

102. Brutishness is distinguished from virtue by its objects, according to the Philosopher, as is evident from chapter 7:<sup>18</sup> "I mean the brutish states . . ." But how the degrees posited by the Philosopher are distinguished will be evident later.<sup>19</sup>

106. Second, this opinion errs, because, even positing non-existent degrees of virtue, what he says about their connection is not valid.<sup>20</sup> This is clear, first, because the subject matter of one virtue can occur where that of another never does. Consequently, regarding the subject matter of that virtue, a heroic degree of that virtue can be generated without any other virtue. This is particularly so, since according to Ghent,<sup>21</sup> these are degrees of a single quantity, and one virtue can be augmented without another, attaining the supreme degree of which it is capable in the absence of the subject matter for another virtue.

114. Besides, one virtue suffices to support itself without any other virtue. The antecedent is evident, for one of two virtues suffices in the presence of a vice opposed to the second virtue, as long as that vice is not complete; therefore it suffices in the absence of that virtue. For it is evident from experience that an intemperate person can will the practice of works of justice and can perform them, provided her intemperance is not complete; so much the more, therefore, in the absence of temperance. I have spoken of "complete" vices because someone is in a state of complete vice when she wills to desert virtuous action entirely on account of a vicious act; consequently intemperance in such a degree is not compatible with justice.

Praeterea quando<sup>22</sup> aliqua causa nata est generare aliquem effectum augmentabilem, illa approximata generabit et perducet ad perfectionem tantam quantum potest; sed sic est de causis generativis unius virtutis sine alia. 125

Praeterea secundum<sup>23</sup> istam viam multi Sancti et Confessores non habuissent aliquam virtutem moralem perfecte, quia multi fuerunt quibus numquam materia fortitudinis occurrit nec materia regiminis. 130

Si dicas quod occurrebat eis in cognitione et fuerunt parati mortem sustinere, si materia eis occurrisset, et eodem modo ad bene regendum: contra, forte numquam cogitabant de materia fortitudinis nec de regimine, nisi tantum forte in generali, saltem hoc est possibile. Sed sic cogitare non sufficit ad virtutem moralem in speciali, quia ad illam requiritur prudentia in speciali, sicut prius dictum est.<sup>24</sup> 135

[Conclusiones auctoris de connexionione virtutum inter se]

[Conclusio prima] 140

Ideo respondeo ad istum articulum, et sit haec prima conclusio, quod virtutes morales omnes connectuntur in quibusdam principiis universalibus, puta 'omne honestum est faciendum,' 'omne bonum est diligendum,' 'omne dictatum a recta ratione est faciendum,' quae possunt esse maiores et minores in syllogismo practico concludente conclusionem particularem, cuius notitia est prudentia immediate directiva in actu virtuoso. Et potest idem principium numero esse maior cum diversis minoribus acceptis sub, ad concludendum diversas conclusiones particulares, quarum notitiae sunt prudentiae directivae in diversis actibus virtuosis, sicut de ista conclusione dictum est diffuse in *Reportatione* Ockham in materia morali.<sup>25</sup> Quaere ibi. 150

22. Lines 66–67 above; cf. OTh VI, 420–21, 424; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.9, XV: 617.

23. Cf. Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.4, XV: 600–601.

24. See a.2 30–50.

a. Here the reporter responsible for the written text has recorded Ockham's reference to his own works in the third person. It is not a sign that we should question the authenticity of *De connexionione* but that we have a *reportatio*, not a written version approved by Ockham. See the preface.

25. Cf. OTh VI, 425–26.

124. Besides, when<sup>22</sup> some cause is designed to generate an augmentable effect, and that [cause] is proximate, it will generate and attain such perfection as it can. But this is the case for causes that generate one virtue without another.

128. Furthermore, according to this opinion,<sup>23</sup> many saints and confessors would not have possessed any moral virtue perfectly, since there were many who encountered neither the subject matter for courage nor the subject matter for [virtuous] governance.

132. Someone might object that courage occurred to them in thought, and they were prepared to sustain death if the subject matter had occurred; and similarly they were prepared to govern well. On the contrary, I reply: perhaps they never thought about the subject of courage or government, except perhaps merely in general; at least this is possible. But such [general] thinking does not suffice for a particular moral virtue, since particular moral virtue requires particular prudence, as was indicated above.<sup>24</sup>

[Author's Conclusions about the Connection of the Virtues]

[First Conclusion]

141. Therefore in reply to the first article of the third principle article, let this be the first conclusion: All moral virtues are connected in certain universal principles, which can serve as major premises and as minor premises in a practical syllogism proving a particular conclusion; the knowledge of these conclusions is the prudence that is immediately directive of a virtuous act. I have in mind such principles as, 'everything worthy should be done,' 'everything good should be loved,' 'everything dictated by right reason should be performed.' Numerically the same principle as the major premise, together with different subordinate minor premises, can serve to prove different particular conclusions; the knowledges of these conclusions are the prudences that are directive of different virtuous acts, as was discussed at length in Ockham's *Reportatio*<sup>a</sup> in the section on morals.<sup>25</sup> See that passage.

## [Conclusio secunda]

Secunda conclusio<sup>26</sup> est ista, quod una virtus perfecta sufficienter cum voluntate et recta ratione sive prudentia inclinatur ad primum actum alterius virtutis qui est generativus illius virtutis; et intelligo per virtutem perfectam virtutem in tertio et quarto gradu, de quibus supra dictum est.<sup>27</sup> Quia si aliquis vult aliquid solum quia dictatum est a recta ratione quantum ad tertium gradum, vel quia solum dictatum est a recta ratione et propter honorem divinum, tunc vult omne dictatum a recta ratione; et ita dicente recta ratione quod actus virtuosus sit eliciendus circa materiam alterius virtutis, statim ista virtus, licet sit alterius speciei in uno gradu vel in alio, inclinatur voluntatem sufficienter ad eliciendum actum primum alterius virtutis. Patet exemplum de iustitia et temperantia.

Et si quaeras utrum virtus in secundo gradu<sup>28</sup> inclinet sufficienter modo praedicto ad primum actum alterius virtutis: respondere quod aliquando inclinatur, aliquando non. Universaliter enim, quando occurrit materia alterius virtutis cum aliqua circumstantia repugnante conservationi istius virtutis in secundo gradu, tunc inclinatur ad primum actum alterius virtutis, in secundo gradu sicut in tertio vel quarto. Quando autem occurrit cum circumstantiis impertinentibus, tunc non inclinatur.

Exemplum: si enim aliquis sit iustus et imminet sibi mors nisi faciat actum iniustitiae, talis iustitia in secundo gradu inclinatur statim modo praedicto ad actum primum fortitudinis, quia actus illius virtutis est nolle deserere iustitiam pro aliquo quod est contra rectam rationem; et ideo si recta ratio dictet quod citius sustinenda est mors quam fiat actus iniustitiae, statim illa iustitia in tali gradu inclinatur ad actum primum fortitudinis. Sed si aliquis habeat iustitiam in praedicto gradu et imminet sibi mors nisi faciat actum intemperantiae, puta nisi fornicetur, ibi non inclinatur iustitia in gradu praedicto ad primum actum temperantiae, quia potest istam iustitiam conservare secundum rectam rationem et tamen facere actum intemperantiae, quia hic nulla est repugnantia inter actus nec inter circumstantias actuum.

Sed utrum iustitia in primo gradu<sup>29</sup> inclinatur ad primum actum alterius virtutis? Respondere quod non, quia potest

## [Second Conclusion]

154. This is the second conclusion:<sup>26</sup> One of two perfect virtues, together with the will and right reason or prudence, sufficiently inclines to the first act of another virtue, an act capable of generating that other virtue. Here I understand by "perfect virtue" third- or fourth-degree virtue, as was indicated above.<sup>27</sup> For if someone wishes something precisely because it is dictated by right reason in the third degree, or precisely because it is dictated by right reason and for the sake of divine honor, then he wishes everything dictated by right reason. Hence, one of two virtues sufficiently inclines the will to elicit a first act of another virtue, as soon as right reason dictates that an act of virtue should be elicited concerning the subject of the second virtue. This is evident in the example of justice and temperance.

167. Someone might ask whether second-degree<sup>28</sup> virtue would sufficiently incline us to the first act of another virtue in the manner described. My answer is that a second-degree virtue sometimes does and sometimes does not function in this manner. For it is universally the case that when the subject matter for one virtue occurs, together with some circumstance that is incompatible with the preservation of that second-degree virtue, second-degree virtue inclines us to elicit the first act of another virtue, and it would do so whether it is in the second degree or the third or the fourth degree. However, when it occurs with circumstances that are not pertinent, then it does not so incline us.

175. For example, suppose death is imminent for someone just unless she performs an unjust act. Such second-degree justice immediately inclines her to the first act of courage in the manner described, because to reject the abandonment of justice for the sake of something that is contrary to right reason is an act of that virtue. Therefore if right reason were to dictate that she should sustain death rather than perform an act of injustice, that degree of justice inclines her to the first act of courage at once. But if death is imminent for someone who is just in the aforesaid degree unless he performs an act of intemperance—unless he fornicates, for example—justice in the aforesaid degree does not incline him to the first act of temperance because he can preserve this justice according to right reason and yet perform the intemperate act, since neither the acts nor the circumstances are incompatible here.

188. But does first-degree<sup>29</sup> justice incline us to perform the first act of another virtue? My answer is that it does not. For

26. Cf. OTh VI, 426; *Dial.* 1.VI.77, fol. 90r-v.

27. See a.2 132-42.

28. See a.2 124-31.

29. See a.2 116-23.

aliquis velle facere opera iusta conformiter rectae rationi absque hoc quod plus inclinetur ad volendum actum temperantiae conformiter rectae rationi, quia tam isti actus quam circumstantiae actuum sunt impertinentes ad invicem; et ideo habitus a quo elicitur unus actus, non inclinatur ad alium actum impertinentem.

De hac conclusione, quomodo scilicet una virtus inclinatur ad actum primum alterius, quaere in Ockham ubi prius.<sup>30</sup>

Si quaeratur utrum iustitia, secundum quod est virtus heroica,<sup>31</sup> inclinet sufficienter ad actum alterius virtutis: respondeo quod aliquando inclinatur, aliquando non. Nam occurrente materia alterius virtutis cum aliqua circumstantia necessario sequente iustitiam vel repugnante, puta si oporteret aliquem deserre actum iustitiae vel facere inhonestum, vel sustinere carcerem, ibi inclinetur sufficienter ad actum fortitudinis. Si autem occurrat materia alterius virtutis cum circumstantiis omnino impertinentibus, puta si oporteret aliquem bona sua perdere nisi faceret actum intemperantiae, in tali casu non inclinatur sufficienter.

Si quaeratur utrum iustitia in uno gradu inclinetur ad actum iustitiae in alio gradu: respondeo, primus gradus non videtur inclinare ad secundum, quia secundus habet circumstantiam omnino impertinentem ad primum, nec sequentem nec repugnantem sibi; nec eadem ratione secundus inclinatur ad tertium nec ad quartum. Sed tam secundus quam tertius quam quartus inclinantur ad quintum, puta ad heroicam.

#### [Conclusio tertia]

Tertia conclusio<sup>32</sup> est quod nulla virtus moralis in quocumque gradu necessario coexigit aliam virtutem in quocumque gradu. Hoc probatur, quia aliquis potest se exercere circa materiam unius virtutis in quocumque gradu supradicto absque hoc quod exerceat se circa materiam alterius virtutis, quia possibile est quod non occurrat materia cuiuscumque alterius virtutis, et non videtur maior ratio quare potest se exercere magis in uno gradu quam in

30. Cf. OTh VI, 426.

31. See a.2 152-67.

32. Cf. OTh VI, 420-21, 424.

someone can will the performance of just works, in conformity with right reason, without being more inclined to will an act of temperance in conformity with right reason, since neither the acts nor the circumstances of the acts are pertinent to each other. Therefore a habit from which one act is elicited does not incline us to perform another, impertinent act.

195. Concerning this conclusion—namely, the discussion of how one virtue inclines us to perform the first act of another virtue—see Ockham, in the passage just cited.<sup>30</sup>

197. Someone might ask whether justice as a heroic virtue<sup>31</sup> sufficiently inclines us to an act of another virtue. My answer is that sometimes it does, and sometimes it does not. When the subject matter of the second virtue occurs together with some circumstance necessarily consequent on justice or necessarily incompatible with justice, it would sufficiently incline someone to an act of courage. Suppose, for example, a just person would have had to sustain imprisonment if he had not abandoned an act of justice or performed an unworthy act. If, however, the subject matter of the other virtue occurred together with entirely impertinent circumstances, heroic justice would not sufficiently incline a person to an act of another virtue. If, for example, a just person would have to act unjustly or lose his possessions unless he performed an intemperate act, that would be a case of an impertinent circumstance.

207. Someone might ask whether justice in one degree inclines to an act of justice in another degree. I would say in reply that the first degree does not appear to incline to the second because second-degree justice includes a circumstance that is entirely impertinent to first-degree justice, a circumstance that neither follows from, nor is incompatible with, first-degree justice. For the same reason second-degree justice does not incline to third- or fourth-degree justice. But second-, third-, and fourth-degree justice do incline us to heroic, or fifth-degree, justice.

#### [Third Conclusion]

215. The third conclusion<sup>32</sup> is that no moral virtue in any degree whatever necessarily requires another virtue in any degree whatever. A proof of this is that someone can practice the subject of one of two virtues in any of the aforesaid degrees whatever, without practicing the subject of the second virtue, since the subject matter of the second virtue need not occur. There seems to be no more reason why a person should be more capable of the practice of a virtue in one degree than another; consequently a person should

alio, et ita in quolibet vel in nullo; et si quandoque occurrat materia alterius virtutis, hoc accidit.

[Conclusio quarta]

Quarta conclusio<sup>33</sup> est quod duo primi gradus virtutis stant cum vitio contrario alteri virtuti et<sup>34</sup> recto iudicio rationis, non tantum respectu istius virtutis quae stat cum vitio, sed respectu alterius virtutis cum cuius opposito stat ista virtus; et similiter stat cum vitio opposito et errore respectu alterius virtutis, et hoc quantumcumque virtus in illis gradibus intendatur. 225 230

Prima pars probatur per experientiam, quia aliquis potest temperate agere secundum duos primos gradus temperantiae et tamen velle iniuste agere, etiam dictante ratione recta quod talia opera iniusta non sunt facienda sed opposita sunt facienda. Etiam stante ratione recta tam respectu temperantiae quam respectu iustitiae, potest aliquis propter libertatem voluntatis velle oppositum unius, sicut post patebit,<sup>35</sup> et ita potest velle facere opera iniusta et post esse iniustus. 235

Praeterea quando<sup>36</sup> aliquis actus sine circumstantiis stat cum alio actu, idem actus saltem genere, — non dico numero, quia non potest esse idem actus numero primo sine circumstantiis et postea cum circumstantiis —, stat cum eodem actu cum circumstantiis impertinentibus. Hoc patet, quia si stat cum eo sine circumstantiis, non posset sibi repugnare nisi propter aliquam circumstantiam repugnantem alicui circumstantiae illius virtutis. Puta, si aliquis vellet facere opera iniusta quia inhonesta vel quia contra rectam rationem, hic videtur repugnantia inter actum temperantiae in primo gradu et secundo, et inter actum iniustitiae, quia actus temperantiae tam in primo quam in secundo elicitur propter honestatem et quia conformis rectae rationi; et ideo ille qui elicitur quia inhonestus vel quia contra rectam rationem, videtur repugnare actui temperantiae propter istas duas circumstantias; 240 245 250

33. Cf. Ockham, OTh VIII, 284–85, 421.

34. Namely, et cum recto iudicio rationis.

35. Lines 521–22, 691–93 below.

36. Cf. lines 170–74 above.

be capable either of any degree or of none. Moreover, if at one time or another the subject matter of another virtue occurs, that is coincidental.

[Fourth Conclusion]

225. The fourth conclusion<sup>33</sup> is that the first two degrees of one virtue are compatible with reason judging correctly and<sup>34</sup> with a vice contrary to some other virtue—that is, these degrees of virtue are compatible with vice even when right reason judges correctly not only with respect to original virtue, but also with respect to the other virtue, whose opposite is compatible with the original virtue. Similarly, the first two degrees of one virtue are compatible with error in respect to the other virtue and with a vice opposite to the other virtue. This is the case, however much the [original] virtue is intensified in those degrees.

231. The first part of the fourth conclusion is proved on the basis of experience, since in the first two degrees of temperance someone can act temperately and yet will injustice, even when right reason dictates that such unjust works should not be performed but rather the opposite works. Even when reason dictates correctly, both in respect to temperance and in respect to justice, someone can will the opposite of temperance or justice because the will is free, as will be evident later;<sup>35</sup> thus a person can will the performance of unjust works and thereafter be unjust.

239. Besides, when<sup>36</sup> one act without circumstances is compatible with a second act, generically the same act is compatible with the same second act in the presence of impertinent circumstances. (I say generically the same act, since it is not numerically the same act if it occurs first without circumstances and afterward with circumstances.) This is evident because if it is compatible with the second act in the absence of circumstances, it could not be incompatible unless on account of some circumstance that is not compatible with some circumstance of the second virtue. Suppose, for example, someone were to will the performance of unjust works because they were unworthy or because they were contrary to right reason. In this case, there appears to be incompatibility between an act of temperance, both in the first and the second degree, and an act of injustice. For both in the first and in the second degree, an act of temperance is elicited because of its worthiness and because it conforms to right reason; consequently that act elicited because it is unworthy or because it is contrary to right reason appears to be incompatible with an act of temperance on account of these two circumstances.



igitur sublata omni repugnantia inter circumstantias et stante impertinentia inter eas, videtur quod isti actus possunt aequaliter simul stare sicut quando unus fuit sine circumstantiis. Patet igitur maior.<sup>37</sup>

Sed pro minori, patet quod velle facere actum temperantiae, prout est actus indifferens et sine circumstantiis, stat cum actu vitioso volendi facere opera iniusta, sicut patet per experientiam. Et potest primo elici actus in primo gradu et secundo cum circumstantiis omnino impertinentibus, ut si aliquis vellet facere opera iniusta quia nociva proximo vel destructiva vel huiusmodi, ubi ponuntur circumstantiae omnino impertinentes circumstantiis temperantiae in praedictis gradibus. Igitur virtus temperantiae in praedictis gradibus potest stare cum iniustitia.

Secunda pars<sup>38</sup> patet, quia si iniustitia potest stare cum temperantia et recta ratione respectu iustitiae, multo magis potest stare cum errore in ratione respectu iustitiae, puta si ratio erronea dictaret quod talia opera iniusta non sunt mala sed bona vel honesta.

#### [Conclusio quinta]

Quinta conclusio est quod tertius gradus virtutis<sup>39</sup> non stat cum vitio opposito alteri virtuti et recto dictamine respectu illius virtutis; sed si sit ignorantia in ratione vel error respectu alterius virtutis, tunc potest stare cum vitio opposito.

Prima pars probatur, quia quando aliquid est volitum quia aliquale praecise, nihil scitum esse tale potest esse nolitum. Exemplum: si diligo Sortem quia est homo, impossibile est, stante prima dilectione, quod ego odiam aliquem quem scio esse hominem, et per consequens diligo omnem quem scio esse hominem, quia aliter sequeretur quod diligam omnem quem scio esse hominem per primam propositionem, et tamen odirem aliquem quem

Therefore, leaving aside any incompatibility between the circumstances, as long as the circumstances are impertinent, it appears that these acts can be just as compatible as they were when one of them was without circumstances. Consequently the major premise<sup>37</sup> is evident.

257. But as for the minor, it is evident that willing the performance of an act of temperance, insofar as it is an indifferent act without circumstances, is compatible with a vicious act of willing to perform unjust works, as is evident on the basis of experience. The act can also be first elicited in the first and second degree, together with circumstances that are entirely impertinent, as when someone wills the performance of unjust works because they are harmful to his neighbor or destructive or something similar, where the circumstances posited are entirely impertinent to the circumstances of temperance in the degree we have discussed. Therefore the virtue of temperance is compatible with injustice in the aforesaid degrees.

266. The second part<sup>38</sup> of the fourth conclusion is evident. For if injustice is compatible with temperance and right reason in respect to justice, it is much more compatible with error in human reason regarding justice. Consider the case where an erring reason dictates that such unjust works are not wicked, but good or worthy.

#### [Fifth Conclusion]

272. The fifth conclusion is that third-degree virtue<sup>39</sup> is not compatible with a vice that is opposed to another virtue when reason dictates correctly in respect to the second virtue. But if there is ignorance in reason or error in respect to the second virtue, then third-degree virtue is compatible with a vice opposed to the second virtue.

276. The first part of this fifth conclusion can be proven as follows. When something is willed because it is something of a certain kind, nothing scientifically known to be of this kind can be rejected. For example, if I love Socrates because he is a man, it is impossible that I should hate someone whom I know to be a man, as long as my first love remains. Consequently, I love everyone whom I know scientifically to be a man. Otherwise it would follow that I love everyone whom I know to be a man in virtue of the first proposition, and yet I would hate someone whom I know

37. Lines 225–28.

38. Lines 228–30.

39. A.2 132–36; cf. OTh VIII, 285–86; *Dial.* 1.VI.77, fol. 90r–v.

scio esse hominem, quod includit contradictionem. Sed in tertio gradu diligo vel volo facere opera iusta praecise quia conformia rectae rationi. Igitur impossibile est quod sciam aliquid esse conforme rectae rationi, et tamen quod nolim illud. 285

Si dicas quod licet non possim nolle illud dictatum a recta ratione, tamen possum velle oppositum illius dictati; puta, possum velle actum incontinentiae quantumcumque ratio dictet continentiam esse volendam. Nunc autem vitium non tantum generatur ex actu nolendi continentiam, sed ex actu volendi incontinentiam. Igitur etc. 290

Respond eo quod stante prima volitione et recta ratione praedicta, impossibile est aliquem velle actum incontinentiae propter repugnantiam formalem, quia si vult facere actum iustitiae propter honestatem et praecise quia est sic dictatus a recta ratione, tunc consequenter vult necessario omne dictatum a ratione recta, stante prima volitione. Et per consequens si dictatur a ratione quod sit continendum propter honestatem, necessario vult illum actum. Igitur non potest simul velle oppositum, quia volitiones talium oppositorum sunt oppositae. 300

Si dicas quod tunc ista secunda volitio respectu continentiae non est actus virtuosus, quia non est in potestate voluntatis: respondeo quod sic, quatenus potest suspendere primum actum.<sup>40</sup> 305

Secunda pars<sup>41</sup> conclusionis patet, quia si aliquis ignoret actum incontinentiae esse malum vel erret credendo illum actum esse bonum, tunc cum primo actu voluntatis et tali errore potest stare vitium oppositum alteri virtuti, quia hic non videtur aliqua repugnantia. 310

#### [Conclusio sexta]

Sexta conclusio est quod iustitia in quarto gradu<sup>42</sup> cum nullo vitio stat nec errore culpabili. Hoc probatur, quia si aliquod vitium staret, aut illud esset peccatum ex ignorantia, vel ex malitia, vel ex passione. Non primum, quia illa ignorantia aut esset vincibilis aut invincibilis; si secundo modo, non est tunc ignorantia culpabilis; si vincibilis, tunc necessario vincit et amovet impedimentum, 315

scientifically to be a man, which is a contradiction. But in third-degree justice, I love—or will the performance of—just works precisely because they conform to right reason. Therefore it is impossible that I should scientifically know that something conforms with right reason and yet reject it.

287. Someone might object that although I could not reject what is dictated by right reason, yet I can still will the opposite of that dictate. For example, I can will an incontinent act, however much reason dictates that continence should be willed. But vice is generated not only when continence is rejected, but also when incontinence is willed. Therefore, etc.

293. My response is that as long as right reason remains, together with the first act of will mentioned above, it is impossible for someone to will any incontinent act on account of formal incompatibility. For if she wills an act of justice in order to be worthy precisely because it is so dictated by right reason, and if the first act of will remains, she necessarily wills everything dictated by right reason. Consequently, if reason dictates that she should be continent in order to be worthy, she necessarily wills that act. Therefore, she cannot will the opposite act at the same time, since acts in which opposites are willed are themselves opposite.

302. Someone might say that then this second volition in respect to continence is not a virtuous act, since it is not in the power of the will. I reply that it is virtuous to the extent that she can suspend the first act.<sup>40</sup>

306. The second part<sup>41</sup> of the fifth conclusion is evident, since if someone does not know that an act of incontinence is wicked, or if he mistakenly believes that that act was good, then a vice opposite to another virtue can be compatible with the first act of will and with such an error; there does not appear to be any incompatibility here.

#### [Sixth Conclusion]

312. The sixth conclusion is that justice in the fourth degree<sup>42</sup> is compatible neither with any vice nor with culpable error. This is proven because if some vice were compatible with fourth-degree justice, it would be a sin committed either from ignorance, malice, or passion. Ignorance is not a possibility, since the ignorance would be either vincible or invincible. If it is invincible, then it is not culpable; if it can be overcome, then, if a person loves God or

40. Lines 295–96.

41. Lines 274–75.

42. A.2 137–42; cf. *Dial.* 1.VI.77, fol. 90r–v.

si diligat Deum vel honorem Dei ordinate. Non secundo modo nec tertio, quia si sic, sequitur quod aliquid plus diligeretur quam Deus, et ita corrumpetur illa virtus qua diligo aliquid propter amorem Dei ordinate. 320

[Conclusio septima]

Septima conclusio est quod iustitia in quinto gradu,<sup>43</sup> prout est virtus heroica perfecta in uno christiano, qui talem actum imparet propter honorem Dei, non compatitur secum aliquod vitium nec defectum culpabilem propter eandem causam. Tamen virtus heroica alicuius philosophi bene compatitur aliquod vitium, quia illae sunt alterius speciei, quia una habet Deum pro obiecto, alia non. 325

[Conclusiones de connexion virtutum moralium cum virtutibus theologicis: Conclusio prima] 330

Quantum ad secundum articulum istius tertii articuli sit ista prima conclusio, quod virtutes morales in tribus primis gradibus non necessario coexigunt virtutes theologicas stricte vel large acceptas.<sup>44</sup> Hoc patet, quia theologicae virtutes non possunt haberi sine cognitione finis in particulari, eo modo quo cognoscitur pro statu isto, in conceptu sibi proprio.<sup>45</sup> Sed virtutes morales in praedictis gradibus possunt adquiri sine tali cognitione finis,<sup>46</sup> sicut patet in simplici pagano, qui posset talia facere secundum rectam rationem sine investigatione ad habendum conceptum proprium de illo fine. Igitur etc. 335 340

[Conclusio secunda]

Secunda conclusio: quod duo primi gradus stant cum contrariis virtutum theologiarum. Hoc patet, quia stant cum dubitatione

43. A.2 152–67. The text of the first part of this conclusion is uncertain. As can be seen in the apparatus of variants, most of it is found only in the printed edition, Z, and in codices E and L, which are not credible witnesses. Wey has followed E and L, but notes that the authenticity of Z's text seems to be confirmed from what Ockham says elsewhere. See OTh VI, 427–28, and a.4 353–66.

b. The three theological virtues are faith, hope, and charity. On the origins of the phrase 'theological virtues,' see O. Lottin, *PM* III: 100–102, citing Peter of Poitiers, *Sent.* III c.20 (PL 211, 1087).

44. A.2 194–98.

45. Cf. OTh II, 402–3.

46. Cf. OTh VII, 58.

God's honor ordinately, he necessarily overcomes his ignorance and removes the impediment. Neither malice nor passion need be considered, since these would imply that a person loved something more than God, consequently the virtue of loving something ordinately for the sake of love of God would be destroyed.

[Seventh Conclusion]

323. The seventh conclusion is that for the same reason, fifth-degree<sup>43</sup> justice, insofar as it is a perfect, heroic virtue in a Christian who would command such an act for God's honor, is not compatible with any vice or culpable defect. Nonetheless, heroic virtue in a philosopher is indeed compatible with some vice. This is so because those virtues belong to different species, since one has God as its object, and the other does not.

[Conclusions Regarding the Connection of Moral and Theological Virtues]

[First Conclusion]

332. This brings us to the second article of the third [principal] article. Here the first conclusion is that the first three degrees of moral virtues do not necessarily require the theological virtues,<sup>b</sup> considered either strictly or loosely.<sup>44</sup> This is evident because we cannot have theological virtues without particular knowledge and a proper concept<sup>45</sup> of the end, in the manner in which it is known in this state. But moral virtues in the aforesaid degrees can be acquired without such knowledge of the end.<sup>46</sup> This is evident in the case of a simple pagan, who does these things according to right reason, without seeking to acquire the concept proper to that end. Therefore, etc.

[Second Conclusion]

343. Second conclusion: the first two degrees of moral virtue are compatible with the [vices] contrary to theological virtues. This is evident because they are compatible with doubt and dissent in

et dissensu respectu credendorum, patet in philosopho;<sup>47</sup>  
et cum desperatione, quia nullus sperat quod non credit;  
et cum odio Dei, quia potest virtuosus in praedictis gradibus odire  
sectam christianorum.

Praeterea non est maior connexio virtutum moralium et theologicarum quam unius virtutis ad aliam, nec maior repugnantia inter virtutes morales in praedictis gradibus et opposita theologicarum quam inter unam virtutem moralem et vitium oppositum alteri virtuti. Sed una virtus moralis in praedictis gradibus stat cum vitio opposito alteri virtuti.<sup>48</sup> Igitur eodem modo in proposito.

#### [Conclusio tertia]

Tertia conclusio est quod virtus moralis in tertio gradu non compatitur secum contrarium virtutis theologiae nisi propter defectum rationis. Probatur per omnia sicut quinta conclusio alterius articuli,<sup>49</sup> ideo nunc transeo.

#### [Conclusio quarta]

Quarta conclusio est quod virtus moralis in quarto gradu necessario coexigit virtutes theologicas, et hoc de potentia Dei ordinata. Hoc patet, quia non potest esse amor creaturae vel alicuius creati propter Deum nisi talis amet Deum super omnia, quia propter<sup>50</sup> quod unumquodque etc.; talis<sup>51</sup> autem amor de potentia Dei ordinata non potest esse sine fide, spe et caritate infusus, nec sine eis aliquo modo adquisitis.

#### [Conclusio quinta]

Quinta conclusio est quod virtus in quinto gradu, quae est heroica perfecti christiani, coexigit necessario de potentia Dei ordinata virtutes theologicas, non autem virtus heroica philosophi. Probatur quantum ad primam partem sicut praecedens conclusio. Probatur etiam quantum ad secundam partem, quia ipse non im-

47. Cf. OTh VI, 280; OTh V, 291. Or see perhaps Vincentius Bellovacensis, *Speculum Hist.* (ed. Douai, 1624), cc. 70–71.

Here the text of the critical edition has been changed, the word “second” found in three of the fifteen manuscripts has been omitted, and the note has been changed accordingly.

c. The Latin word “secta” refers to schools of thinking; unlike the modern English ‘sect,’ it does not connote error.

48. Lines 225–26 above.

49. Lines 271–305 above.

50. Cf. Aristotle, *Anal. Poster.* 1.2.72a 29–30.

51. Cf. OTh VI, 281–82, 312.

regard to what we ought to believe, as is evident in the case of the Philosopher<sup>47</sup> in the second book. They are also compatible with despair (since no one hopes for what he does not believe) and with hatred of God (since a person virtuous in the aforesaid degrees can hate the Christian school).<sup>c</sup>

349. Besides, there is no greater connection between the moral virtues and the theological virtues than between one virtue and another. Nor is there greater repugnance between moral virtues in the aforesaid degrees and the vices opposite to theological virtues than between one moral virtue and a vice opposed to another moral virtue. But in the aforesaid degrees, one moral virtue is compatible with the vice opposed to another moral virtue.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, similarly in the case under consideration [the first two degrees of moral virtue and theological virtues are not connected].

#### [Third Conclusion]

357. The third conclusion is that third-degree moral virtue is not compatible with the contrary of theological virtue, except on account of defective reason. This is proved in entirely the same way as the fifth conclusion of the other article,<sup>49</sup> therefore I will pass over it now.

#### [Fourth Conclusion]

362. The fourth conclusion is that fourth-degree moral virtue necessarily requires the theological virtues; this is true according to God’s ordained power. It is evident because no one can love a creature or anything created for the sake of God unless she loves God above all, since “that on account of which we love is better loved.”<sup>50</sup> But by God’s ordained power, such love<sup>51</sup> cannot exist without infused faith, hope, and charity, or without faith, hope, and charity acquired in some manner.

#### [Fifth Conclusion]

370. The fifth conclusion is that fifth-degree virtue, which is perfect, heroic Christian virtue, necessarily requires the theological virtues by God’s ordained power; while heroic philosophical virtue does not. The first part is proved in the same manner as the preceding conclusion. The proof of the second part is that a

peraret talem actum propter honorem Dei nec diligeret Deum  
super omnia, igitur etc. 375

[Conclusio sexta]

Sexta conclusio est quod virtutes theologicae non necessario  
coexigunt omnes alias virtutes morales; sunt tamen causae suffi-  
cientes mediantibus actibus suis, — ubi concurrunt tam virtutes  
theologicae acquisitae quam infusae, quia infusae<sup>52</sup> sine acquisitis  
non inclinant ad aliquem actum —, cum recta ratione, si occurrat  
materia virtutis moralis, ad causandum actum virtuosum. 380

Haec conclusio probatur quantum ad primam partem, quia  
rectitudo circa finem potest esse sine rectitudine circa ea quae sunt  
ad finem; potest enim aliquis credere articulos fidei, sperare spe-  
randa et ordinate diligere Deum, etsi nullam creaturam velit vel  
diligat. Sed virtutes morales in tribus gradibus maxime inclinant  
ad actus rectos circa creaturam praecise. Igitur etc. Sed virtutes<sup>53</sup>  
theologicae stricte sumptae non infunduntur de potentia Dei ordi-  
nata alicui adulto habenti usum rationis sine virtute morali in  
quarto gradu, quia in eo requiritur bonus motus praecedens. 385 390

Secunda pars<sup>54</sup> patet, quia qui habet virtutes theologicas infu-  
sas et acquisitas, occurrente materia virtutis et dictante ratione quod  
actus virtuosus sit eliciendus, statim illae virtutes cum recta  
ratione inclinant sufficienter ad talem actum virtuosum. Et hoc  
est quod dicit G r e g o r i u s,<sup>55</sup> quod “probatio dilectionis  
exhibitio est operis”. 395

Et ex hoc sequitur quod virtutes theologicae maxime infusae  
non possunt diu conservari sine illis virtutibus, quia ratione dic-  
tante quod actus virtuosus sit eliciendus, occurrente materia et  
aliis inclinantibus modo praedicto et ipso non eliciente, statim<sup>56</sup>  
demeretur conservationem virtutum theologicarum. 400

[Conclusio septima]

Septima conclusio est quod virtutes theologicae nullum vitium  
morale compatiuntur. Hoc patet, quia rectitudo circa finem ulti- 405

52. Cf. OTh VI, 281–82, 291–92; OTh VII, 57.

53. Cf. OTh VII, 218–21.

54. Lines 379–83; cf. OTh VII, 51, 57–58; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.29, XV: 726.

55. Cf. Gregorius, *XL Homiliarum in Evang.* II h.30 (PL 76, 1220 C).

56. Cf. Scotus, *Sent.* II d.37 q.1 n.10, XIII: 359–60.

philosopher’s [will] would not dictate such an act for the sake of  
God’s honor; nor would he love God above all; therefore, etc.

[Sixth Conclusion]

378. The sixth conclusion is that theological virtues do not neces-  
sarily require all other moral virtues. Nonetheless, it is by means  
of moral acts that theological virtues sufficiently cause a morally  
virtuous act, when accompanied by right reason, if the subject  
matter of moral virtue occurs. Here, both acquired and infused  
theological virtues concur because in the absence of acquired vir-  
tues,<sup>52</sup> infused virtues do not incline us to perform any act.

384. The first part of the conclusion is proved as follows.  
Rectitude concerning the end can exist without rectitude con-  
cerning those things that pertain to the end. For someone can  
believe the articles of the faith, hope for what we should hope for,  
and love God ordinately, even if he neither loves nor wills any  
creature. But the [first] three degrees of moral virtue maximally  
incline us to correct acts regarding creatures precisely. There-  
fore, etc. But the theological virtues,<sup>53</sup> taken strictly, are not in-  
fused in any adult having the use of reason without moral virtue  
in the fourth degree. This is by God’s ordained power, because  
baptism requires a preceding good motion in adults.

393. The second part<sup>54</sup> is evident because in a person who  
has the infused and acquired theological virtues, when the sub-  
ject matter of virtue occurs and right reason dictates that a virtu-  
ous act should be elicited, those virtues together with right  
reason immediately and sufficiently incline that person to per-  
form such a virtuous act. This is what Gregory<sup>55</sup> means when he  
says that “the proof of love is a display of work.”

399. From this it follows that the theological virtues—most  
of all, the infused theological virtues—cannot long be preserved  
without those [moral] virtues. For when reason dictates that a  
virtuous act should be elicited, and the subject matter of virtue is  
present together with other factors inclining us to virtue in the  
aforesaid manner, and a person does not elicit a virtuous act, he  
immediately<sup>56</sup> ceases to merit the preservation of the theological  
virtues.

[Seventh Conclusion]

405. The seventh conclusion is that the theological virtues are  
not compatible with any moral vices. This is evident because rec-

mum repugnat omni deformitati circa ea quae sunt ad finem; quia si non, aut<sup>57</sup> illa deformitas procedit ex ignorantia vincibili, et tunc vincit si potest, aliter non est rectitudo circa finem; aut invincibili, et tunc non est culpabilis; aut procedit ex malitia aut ex passione, et sive sic sive sic, destruitur rectitudo circa finem ultimum. 410

Patet etiam, quia qui recte diligit Deum, diligit Deum super omnia; qui autem habet aliquod vitium, diligit obiectum illius plus quam Deum; ista non stant simul. 415

Patet tertio, quia qui recte diligit Deum, diligit<sup>58</sup> omne quod Deus vult diligi, et odit omne quod Deus vult odiri; sed si sit vitiosus, tunc non diligit omne quod Deus vult diligi, quia non virtutem, quam Deus vult diligi; similiter diligit aliquid quod Deus non vult diligi, quia vitium; haec repugnant. Patet igitur maior.<sup>59</sup> 420

Sed si sit deformitas circa ea quae sunt ad finem, illa procederet ex ignorantia vel malitia etc. Igitur non stant simul.

#### [Conclusio octava]

Octava conclusio<sup>60</sup> est quod virtutes theologicae stricte sumptae compatiuntur secum vitia moralia habitualia, sed non actualia; sed theologicae adquisitae non compatiuntur habitualia nec actualia. 425

Prima pars probatur<sup>61</sup> de adulto vitioso nunc baptizato, cui infunduntur virtutes theologicae, et tamen vitia habitualia non corrumpuntur, quia ita pronum sentit se adhuc post baptismum ad actus vitiosos sicut ante; igitur remanet habitus aequaliter nunc inclinans sicut prius. 430

Secunda pars patet, quia quilibet actus vitiosus moraliter corrumpit illas virtutes demeritorie, quia non stant simul rectitudo circa finem et deformitas circa ea quae sunt ad finem, patet ex conclusione praecedenti.<sup>62</sup> 435

57. Lines 314–21 above.

58. Cf. OTh VI, 284, 298; Anselm, *De libero arbitrio* c.8, ed. F. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946), I: 220.

59. Lines 406–7.

60. Cf. a.4 344–99.

61. Cf. OTh VII, 52, 59–60; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.27, XV: 684–85.

62. Lines 405–23; cf. OTh VII, 60.

titute concerning the final end is not compatible with any deformity of character concerning those things that pertain to the end. For otherwise, either that deformity of character proceeds from vincible ignorance,<sup>57</sup> and it will be overcome if it can, otherwise there is no rectitude concerning the end; or it proceeds from invincible ignorance, and then it is not culpable; or it proceeds from malice or passion, either of which destroys rectitude concerning the final end.

413. This conclusion is also evident because a person who loves God correctly loves God above all; but a person who has some vice loves the object of that vice more than God; these [loves] are not compatible.

417. A third argument for the conclusion is that a person who loves God rightly loves everything that God wills us to love,<sup>58</sup> and hates everything that God wills us to hate. But if that person were vicious, he would not love everything that God wills us to love, since he would not love a virtue that God wills us to love; similarly he would love something that God does not will him to love, since he would love a vice; the two are not compatible. Therefore the major premise is evident.<sup>59</sup>

422. But if there were deformity of character concerning those things that pertain to the end, that would proceed from ignorance or malice, etc. Therefore, [theological virtue] is not compatible [with moral vice].

#### [Eighth Conclusion]

425. The eighth conclusion<sup>60</sup> is that, taken strictly, the theological virtues are compatible with habitual moral vices, but not with actual vices. On the other hand, acquired theological virtue is compatible with neither habitual nor actual [moral vice].

429. The first part of this conclusion is proved<sup>61</sup> in the case of a [formerly] vicious and now baptized adult in whom the theological virtues are infused, and yet habitual vices are not destroyed. For such a person feels himself as much prone to vicious acts after baptism as before; therefore the habit, which equally inclines him before and after, remains.

434. A proof of the second part of this conclusion follows: Any morally vicious act corrupts those virtues demeritoriously. For rectitude concerning the end is not compatible with deformity of character concerning those things that pertain to the end, as is evident from the preceding conclusion.<sup>62</sup>

Tertia pars patet, quia<sup>63</sup> universaliter ubi actus aliquorum habituum repugnant, illi habitus repugnant; sed actus vitiorum moralium et virtutum theologiarum adquisitionum repugnant, quia actus caritatis adquisitionis est diligere Deum super omnia, actus autem vitiosus est plus diligere aliud quam Deum, vel diligere aliquid quod Deus non vult diligere, vel odire aliquid quod Deus vult diligere; igitur etc.

[Conclusiones de connexione virtutum moralium cum habitibus] 445

[Conclusio prima]

Circa tertium articulum huius tertii articuli principalis sit haec prima conclusio,<sup>64</sup> quod nulla virtus moralis necessario exigit habitum consimilem in parte sensitiva. Hoc patet, quia<sup>65</sup> quantumcumque actus eliciantur in appetitu sensitivo generativi habituum, tamen potest esse tanta rebellio carnis ad spiritum quod causatio talis habitus potest omnino impediri. Exemplum de Paulo,<sup>66</sup> qui habuit stimulum carnis qui non potuit ab eo naturaliter per actus naturales auferri, sicut satis patet, et tamen ipse fuit castus et temperatus.

Praeterea quando duo contraria generantur, augmentantur vel conservantur ex distinctis causis, quantumcumque una causa sit approximata, fortior poterit impedire eam. Igitur quantumcumque causa generativa habitus virtuosus denominative approxime-  
tur in appetitu sensitivo, — quae aliquando potest esse voluntas et volitio, quia non est mihi inconueniens quod voluntas causet et conservet aliquem habitum in parte sensitiva, sicut in quarto Ockham dictum est,<sup>67</sup> aliquando actus imperati a voluntate generant talem habitum, sicut patet de actibus temperantiae et aliis virtutibus quae requirunt actus in parte sensitiva —, tamen causa contraria impediens potest esse ita fortis, quod totam illam activitatem destruet et generationem habituum impedit. Et hoc<sup>68</sup> aliquando potest esse cibus bonus, aliquando bona complexio naturalis vel calor vel sanitas vel aliquid tale.

63. Cf. OTh VII, 60; OTh VIII, 317–18.

64. Cf. OTh VI, 373–74; OTh VIII, 279–80.

65. Cf. OTh VI, 368, 417–19.

66. Cf. 2 Cor. 12:7.

67. Cf. OTh VII, 282–83; OTh VI, 411–12; OTh VIII, 279–80. Perhaps, however, the reference is to article four of this question. See a.4 410–26.

68. Cf. OTh VI, 395–97, 399; OTh VI, 204.

438. The third part of the conclusion is evident because it is universally true that when the acts proceeding from certain habits are irreconcilable,<sup>63</sup> those habits are irreconcilable. But the acts proceeding from moral vices and from acquired theological virtues are irreconcilable, since the act proceeding from acquired charity is to love God above all; but the vicious act [proceeding from habitual moral vice] is to love something other than God, or to love something that God does not will us to love, or to hate something that God wills us to love. Therefore, etc.

[Conclusions Concerning the Connection of Moral Virtues with Habits of the Sensitive Soul]

[First Conclusion]

447. Concerning the third article of this third principal article, let this be the first conclusion:<sup>64</sup> No moral virtue necessarily requires a similar habit in the sensitive faculty. This is evident because,<sup>65</sup> however much acts generative of habits are elicited in the sensitive appetite, the flesh can still rebel against the spirit, so much so as entirely to impede the generation of such a habit. Consider the example of Paul,<sup>66</sup> who was possessed of a fleshly urge, which he could not naturally remove by means of natural acts, as is sufficiently evident, and yet he was chaste and temperate.

456. Moreover, when two contraries are generated, augmented, or preserved on the basis of different causes, however near one cause draws, a stronger cause will be able to impede it. Therefore, however near a cause generative of a habit draws in the sensitive appetite, a contrary impeding cause could be so strong as to destroy the whole of that activity and prevent the generation of habits denominated vicious; here I have in mind [causes like] good food, a good natural constitution, heat, health, or something similar. And sometimes the [faculty of] will and an act of will can be such a cause, for I see no objection to holding that the will might cause and preserve some habit in the sensitive faculty, as was mentioned in Ockham's commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*.<sup>67</sup> As is evident in the case of acts of temperance and other virtues that require an act in the sensitive faculty,<sup>68</sup> sometimes imperative acts of will generate such a habit.

## [Conclusio secunda]

Secunda conclusio est quod quicumque habitus partis sensitivae inclinans ad opera bona ex genere, sicut habitus partis sensitivae inclinans ad temperate comedendum, compatitur secum quodcumque vitium in voluntate, etiam contrarium virtuti voluntatis respectu illius obiecti. Quod autem compatiatur vitium disparatum quod respicit aliud obiectum omnino, patet, quia nulla est repugnantia.

Quod autem compatiatur vitium oppositum virtutis quod respicit obiectum istius habitus, probatur, quia<sup>69</sup> talis actus in parte sensitiva potest indifferenter fieri bona intentione et mala: propter bonum finem conformiter rectae rationi, vel deformiter. Et si primo fiat bona intentione, tunc stat cum virtute in voluntate inclinante ad illum actum; si post fiat mala intentione, tunc corrumpitur virtus et generatur vitium, et semper stat idem habitus in parte sensitiva. Et ideo ille habitus et actus in appetitu sensitivo, qui est virtuosus et vitiosus denominatione extrinseca et non intrinsece, potest primo denominari virtuosus et post vitiosus, stante semper eodem actu uniformiter non variato in appetitu sensitivo, propter solam variationem actus voluntatis.

## [Conclusiones de connexion virtutum moralium cum prudentia]

## [Conclusio prima]

Quantum ad quartum articulum huius tertii articuli sit haec prima conclusio,<sup>70</sup> quod nulla virtus moralis nec actus virtuosus potest esse sine omni prudentia, quia nullus actus est virtuosus nisi sit conformis rectae rationi, quia recta ratio ponitur in definitione virtutis, II *Ethicorum*;<sup>71</sup> igitur quilibet actus et habitus virtuosus necessario requirit aliquam prudentiam.

Et si quaeras utrum post generationem virtutis possit elici actus virtuosus sine actu prudentiae: respondeo quod non, quia nullus virtuose agit nisi scienter agat et ex libertate. Et ideo si aliquando talis actus voluntatis elicatur a tali habitu sine actu prudentiae, non dicetur virtuosus nec est, sed<sup>72</sup> magis elicatur sicut actus appetitus sensitivi habituati, sicut in fatuis patet

69. Cf. OTh VI, 359–62.

70. Cf. OTh VI, 421–22; OTh VIII, 409–10, 412–13, 414; Scotus, *Sent.* III d.36 n.20, XV: 654–55.

71. Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 2.6.1106b36–1107a2.72. Cf. OTh VI, 356–57, 360–62.

72. Cf. OTh VI, 356–57, 360–62.

## [Second Conclusion]

471. The second conclusion is that any habit of the sensitive faculty whatever that inclines us to generically good works—such as a habit in the sensitive faculty inclining toward temperate eating—is compatible with any vice in the will whatever; it is even compatible with the [vice] contrary to that virtue in the will with respect to that [same] object. That it is compatible with a disparate vice in respect to an entirely different object is evident because there is no repugnance.

478. That it is compatible with the vice contrary to that virtue in respect to the object of that habit is proved as follows.<sup>69</sup> Such an act in the sensitive faculty can equally be produced by a good and by a wicked intention, on account of a good end and in conformity with right reason or contrary to right reason. If it is first produced by a good intention, then it is compatible with the virtue in the will inclining us to that act; if it is afterward produced by a wicked intention, then it corrupts the virtue and generates vice; the habit in the sensitive faculty always remains the same. Therefore that habit and the act in the sensitive appetite that is virtuous and vicious by extrinsic, not intrinsic, denomination can be first virtuous and afterwards vicious on account of a variation only in the act of will, while the sensitive act always remains uniformly the same, with no variation in the sensitive appetite.

## [Conclusions Concerning the Connection of Moral Virtues with Prudence]

## [First Conclusion]

492. Let this be the first conclusion<sup>70</sup> of the fourth article of the third [principal] article: There can be no moral virtue and no virtuous act without any prudence. For no act is virtuous unless it is in conformity with right reason, since right reason is posited in the definition of virtue (see the *Ethics*, book 2).<sup>71</sup> Therefore any virtuous act or habit necessarily requires some prudence.

498. Someone might ask whether after the generation of virtue, a virtuous act could be elicited without an act of prudence. My answer is no, since no one acts virtuously unless he acts knowingly and freely. And therefore, if on some occasion such an act of will is elicited on the basis of such a habit without an act of prudence, it will neither be, nor be called, virtuous. Rather it is elicited in the manner of an act of habituated, sensitive appetite.<sup>72</sup> This is evident in the case of the insane, who will some-