

2. VOLUNTAS UT POTENTIA RATIONALIS *Opera Philosophica vol. 4*
(*Quaestiones in Metaphysicam IX*, q. 15)

"Palam quia et potentiarum aliae erunt irrationabiles, aliae cum ratione, quapropter omnes artes et scientiae factivae potentiae sunt" [*Metaphysica IX*, c. 2, 1046b1-4].

- 1 Utrum differentia quam assignat Aristoteles inter potentias rationales et irrationales sit conveniens, scilicet quod istae sint oppositorum, hae unius oppositi.

[*Argumenta Pro et Contra*]

Arguitur quod non:

Primo de rationalibus sic:

- 2 [1] Habens potentiam potest illud cuius est illa potentia; ergo posset aliquis in opposita. (Dicitur, sicut videtur Aristoteles respondere in littera, quod non habet potentiam faciendi opposita simul, licet habeat potentiam simul ad opposita. Contra: in isto nunc in quo est unum oppositum, quaero an possit in eodem nunc aliud inesse aut non? Si sic, habetur propositum, ut videtur quod opposita simul. Si non, ergo potentia ista in hoc nunc non est nisi unius oppositi.)

- 2 [2] Item, secundo sic: non est potentia quae non potest in aliquid; illa autem quae est oppositorum, cum non possit simul in opposita, non videtur posse in aliquid nisi determinetur, sicut arguitur in littera in quarto capitulo [1048a10ss]; determinata autem non videtur esse nisi unius; ergo inquantum potentia, tantum videtur esse unius.

- 4 [3] Item, tertio, si sic, tunc sequeretur quod voluntas posset in malum sub ratione mali, sicut in opposita istorum; consequens falsum, quia in XII huius, capitulo octavo [1075a20] dicit Aristoteles: "Liberis non licet quod contingit facere," etc.

- 5 Contra aliud membrum, scilicet de irrationalibus:

- [4] Primo sic: sol potest in oppositos effectus in istis inferioribus; dissolvit enim glaciem et constringit lutum, tamen potentia eius est irrationalis.

2. THE WILL AS A RATIONAL FACULTY

Text of Aristotle: "It is clear that some potencies will be nonrational but others will be with reason. Hence, all the arts or productive sciences are potencies."

Is the difference Aristotle assigns between the rational and irrational potencies appropriate, namely, that the former are capable of contrary effects but the latter produce but one effect?

[*Arguments Pro and Con*]

Arguments that the distinction is inappropriate: first as to the rational potencies:

- [1] Anything having a potency or power is capable of doing what is in its power; therefore, it could perform opposites [simultaneously, if it were rational].—Some try to escape this conclusion by saying, as Aristotle himself seems to say in the above text, that a rational power does not have the ability to produce contrary effects simultaneously, although it does possess simultaneously the potentiality for opposite effects. But this evasion is no good. At that moment when it has one of the contraries, I ask: Could it have the other present or not? If it could, we have what we propose, for it seems opposites are had simultaneously. If not, then this power at this precise moment is capable only of this contrary.

- [2] Also there is this second argument. What is unable to do anything is certainly not a potency, but that which has to do with opposites, since it is incapable of having contrary effects at the same time, seems unable to do anything unless it is determined [by something else such as desire or election], as the argument goes in the text of ch. 4. Once determined, however, it seems able to do but one thing; therefore insofar as it is a potency it seems to be capable of but one thing.

- [3] Thirdly, if the distinction were appropriate, then it would follow that the will could tend to the opposite of what its end is and could will evil under the aspect of evil just as well as it could will the opposite of such things. But the consequent is false, because, as Aristotle puts it in Bk. VIII, ch. 8: "Freedmen are not at liberty to act at random."

Aristotle's distinction is not appropriate for irrational potencies either:

- [4] To begin with, the sun is capable of producing opposite effects in the terrestrial world, for it dissolves ice and dries clay; nevertheless it is an irrational power.

6 [5] Item, infra capitulo septimo, vult Philosophus quod omnis potentia est contradictionis, et declarat illud etiam in activis.

7 [6] Item, rationalis secundum Aristotelem non opponitur esse oppositorum per se, sed unius per se, ut habitus, alterius per accidens, ut privationis; sed potentia irrationalis sic potest esse oppositorum (frigus enim est causa per accidens caloris, et proiciens pilam ad parietem est causa resiliationis); ergo non est differentia dicta conveniens.

8 In oppositum est Philosophus in littera.

[Corpus Quaestionis]

9 Ad istam quaestionem tenendo differentiam esse bene assignatam, primo videndum est quomodo sit intelligenda, deinde quae sit eius causa.

[Articulus 1: Quomodo Differentia Ista Intelligenda Sit?]

10 De primo sciendum est quod potentia activa cuiuscumque est, sive actionis sive termini producti, sic est illius quod manente natura eadem non potest esse ipsa activa alterius, quam cuius ex se potest (frigiditas enim manens frigiditas non potest esse caloris activa nec elicitiva calefactionis, si non est de se activa, quia quidquid circa ipsam fieret, licet aliud posset aliquid facere ad esse caloris, numquam frigiditas faceret ad hoc). Illa ergo potentia activa dicitur esse oppositorum, sive contrariorum sive contradictoriorum productorum, quae manens natura una habet terminum primum sub quo potest utrumque oppositum aequae cadere. Sed illa est oppositarum actionum, quae manens una est elicitivum sufficiens talium actionum. Et si actio potentiae propriae activae dicatur "actus," sicut expositum est quaestione quarta ad tertium argumentum, tunc omnis quae est oppositarum actionum, 12 est oppositorum actorum, non e converso. Hoc autem debet intelligi, quod potentia sit oppositarum actionum seu actionis et negationis eius, sicut patebit in secundo articulo. Et vocatur haec potentia activa non ipsa relatio, quae numeratur secundum numerum correlativorum, sed natura absoluta, quae est relationum plurium, quae sunt ad oppositos effectus, proprium fundamentum.

[5] Also, the Philosopher admits in ch. 7 that "every potency is at the same time capable of contradictory states" and declares that this holds good also for active potencies.

[6] Also, according to Aristotle, the rational is not related to both contraries *per se*, but only to the one it possesses as a habit, whereas the privation of such a habit it can only have *per accidens*. But an irrational potency is able to have contraries in this fashion, for cold is an accidental cause of heat, and throwing a ball against the wall is the cause of its rebounding. Therefore, the distinction Aristotle makes is not appropriate.

To the contrary is the Philosopher's statement in the text cited above.

[Body of the Question]

As for the question, granting the distinction to be well made, we must first see how it is to be understood and then what its rationale is.

[Article 1: How Is the Distinction to Be Understood?]

As for the first, keep in mind that any active potency whatsoever, be it a power to act in a certain way or an ability to produce something, is such that so long as its nature remains unchanged, it only does what it can do of itself. Frigidity, remaining frigidity, for example, cannot warm or draw heat from itself if it is not this sort of agent. No matter what the circumstances might be, if something associated with it peripherally, for instance, could produce heat in something, it would never be frigidity qua frigidity that would do this. When we speak of an active potency for opposites, then, be these contradictory or contrary states, it means that with no change in its nature, either falls equally under the scope of its power. But when such a potency has to do with opposite actions, it means that, keeping its unitary character, it suffices to elicit the said actions of itself. And if the action of an active potency is labelled "act" in the sense explained in the third article of the fourth question [i.e., act qua form], then all that has to do with opposite actions or action has to do with opposite acts, but not vice versa. However, this concern with opposite actions or action should be understood to include the negation of action [i.e., the ability deliberately not to act when all conditions for acting are present]. This will become clear in the second article. Now, it is not the relationship itself that we call "active potency," which relationship is listed among the number of correlatives, but an absolute nature [i.e., something nonrelative such as substance or quality], which represents the proper foundation for several relationships towards opposite effects.

[~~Articulus 2: Quae Est Causa Distinctionis?~~]

- 13 De secundo videtur Aristoteles causam differentiae ponere talem,
quia forma naturalis solummodo est principium assimilandi uni op-
14 posito similitudine naturali, sicut ipsa est ipsa et non opposita.) Forma
autem intellectus, puta scientia, est principium assimilandi oppositis
similitudine intentionali, sicut et ipsa est virtualiter similitudo plu-
rium oppositorum cognitorum, cum alterum contrariorum includat
privationem alterius. Agens autem illius est activum, quod potest sibi
assimilari secundum formam qua agit; ideo videtur Aristoteles ponere
dictam differentiam.

[~~1. Opinio Aliorum.~~]

- 15 Sed ista ratio multipliciter improbat:

Primo, quia forma naturalis potest esse principium assimilandi vir-
tualiter opposito, patet de sole.

- 16 Secundo, quia solummodo intellectum vel scientiam videtur ponere
17 potentiam rationalem, quod est falsum, ut dicemus post.) Hoc etiam
expressius exponere videtur in capitulo quarto, ubi concludit quod po-
tentia rationalis est oppositorum, et nihil facit nisi determinetur ad
alterum illorum, et illud determinans dicit esse appetitum aut pro-
haeresim; ergo illam videtur excludere a ratione potentiae rationalis,
18 ut ipsa est oppositorum.) Et hoc expressius patet per sequentia, ubi vi-
detur dicere quod rationalis sic determinata necessario faciet, sicut et
irrationalis ex se necessario facit. Videtur ergo simpliciter quod non sit
potentia rationalis illud aggregatum ex intellectu (quem ponit esse op-
positorum) et ex appetitu determinante (quem ponit esse necessarium
ad hoc ut aliquid fiat).

- 19 Tertio, non videtur valere probatio quod intellectus sit contra-
riorum, licet privative oppositorum, quia contrarium, etsi includat pri-
vationem alterius, non tamen praecise, sed est aliqua natura positiva,
et ita habet aliquam cognitionem propriam suae entitatis, et non
praecise per alterum oppositum; immo, per alterum oppositum tantum
secundum quid cognoscitur.

[~~2. Opinio Scoti.~~] [Articulus 2]

- 20 Quantum ergo ad secundum articulum, primo videndum est de dicta
differentia in se; secundo de intentio Aristotelis circa ipsam.

[~~Article 2: What Is the Rationale for the Distinction?~~]

As for the second point, Aristotle seems to have understood the dis-
tinction to stem from the fact that a natural form is a principle for
making only one of a pair of opposites, that which resembles itself
naturally, just as this is this and not its opposite. But a form that is in
the intellect, in the way that knowledge informs the mind, is a prin-
ciple for representing opposites by an intentional likeness, just as
knowledge is a virtual likeness of opposites [e.g., medical science is
knowledge of both health and sickness], since one of the contraries
includes the privation of the other. But the agent is active in regard to
what can be modeled according to the form by which it acts. For this
reason, then, Aristotle appears to have introduced the distinction.

[~~1. The Opinion of Others.~~]

This argument, however, is attacked on multiple grounds:

First, because a natural form can be the originative source of virtual
opposites, as it clear in the case of the sun.

Second, it seems to assume that the intellect or its knowledge is the
only rational potency (which is false, as will be shown later). This as-
sumption appears even more expressly in ch. 4 where [Aristotle] con-
cludes that a rational power has to do with opposites and it does
nothing unless it is determined to one or the other of these opposites.
What determines it goes by the name of appetite [i.e., desire] or delib-
erate choice. This would seem to exclude desire or will from the con-
cept of a rational potency. What follows makes this conclusion even
more obvious. There Aristotle seems to say that once the rational
power is determined in this way, it acts necessarily, just as the irra-
tional power does of itself. Hence, it seems that properly speaking a
rational power is not the combination of both intellect (which he as-
sumes has to do with opposites) and the determining desire (which he
requires as necessary if anything is to occur).

Thirdly, the proof that the intellect has to do with opposites only
privatively appears invalid, for a contrary, though it includes the pri-
vation of the other contrary, does not include such precisely, since the
other has a positive nature, and thus there is some knowledge corre-
sponding properly to its entity that is not gained precisely through
knowledge of its opposite. In fact it is known only in a qualified sense
through the knowledge of its opposite.

[~~2. The Opinion of Scotus.~~] [Article 2]

As for this second article, then, we must first investigate the dis-
tinction itself and then see what Aristotle thought about it.

[a. De Differentia in Se: Natura et Voluntas]

- 21 De primo, sciendum est quod prima distinctio potentiae activae est secundum diversum modum eliciendi operationem. Quod enim circa hoc vel circa illud agat, etsi aliquo modo distinguat aut distinctionem ostendat, non tamen ita immediate. Non enim potentia ad obiectum circa quod operatur, comparatur nisi mediante operatione quam elicit, 22 et hoc sic vel sic. Iste autem modus eliciendi operationem propriam non potest esse in genere nisi duplex: aut enim potentia ex se est determinata ad agendum, ita quod quantum est ex se, non potest non agere quando non impeditur ab extrinseco; aut non est ex se determinata, sed potest agere hunc actum vel oppositum actum, agere etiam vel non agere. Prima potentia communiter dicitur "natura," secunda dicitur "voluntas." Unde prima divisio principiorum activorum est in naturam et voluntatem. Iuxta quod Aristoteles in II *Physicorum* [cc. 4ss] duas ponit causas moventes per accidens: casum, iuxta naturam; et fortunam, iuxta propositum sive voluntatem.

- 24 Si ergo huius differentiae quaeritur causa (quare scilicet natura est unius tantum, hoc est, cuiuscumque vel quorumcumque sit, determinate ex se est illius vel illorum; voluntas autem est oppositorum, id est, ex se indeterminate huius actionis vel oppositae, seu actionis vel non actionis?), dici potest quod huius nulla est causa. Sicut enim effectus immediatus ad causam immediatam comparatur ex se et primo sine causa media, alioquin iretur in infinitum, ita causa activa ad suam actionem inquantum ipsam elicit videtur immediate se habere; nec est dare aliam causam quare sic elicit nisi quia est talis causa. Sed hoc est 25 illud cuius causa quaerebatur. Sicut igitur calidum calefacit quia calidum, nec ista propositio "Calidum calefacit" est mediata, sed prima in quarto modo per se, ita et haec "Calidum ex se determinata calefacit." Similiter illa "Voluntas vult" et "Voluntas non vult" determinate determinatione necessaria ex se.

- 26 [Instantiae]—Contra ista obiicitur primo sic: ista propositio est contingens "Voluntas vult"; si voluntas non est ex se determinata ad volendum, quomodo illa propositio contingens est immediata?

[a. The Distinction Itself: Nature and Will]

As for the first, keep in mind that the primary distinction of active potencies stems from the radically different way in which they elicit their respective operations [rather than from what they are concerned with]. For if we can somehow distinguish them because one acts in regard to this, another in regard to that, such a distinction is not so immediate [i.e., radical or basic]. For a power or potency is related to the object in regard to which it acts only by means of some operation it elicits in one way or another, and there is only a twofold generic way an operation proper to a potency can be elicited. For either [1] the potency of itself is determined to act, so that so far as itself is concerned, it cannot fail to act when not impeded from without; or [2] it is not of itself so determined, but can perform either this act or its opposite, or can either act or not act at all. A potency of the first sort is commonly called "nature," whereas one of the second sort is called "will." Hence, the primary division of active potencies is into nature and will—a distinction Aristotle had in mind in II *Physics* when he assumed there were two incidental or *per accidens* efficient causes: chance, which is reducible to nature; and fortune, which involves purpose or will.

Suppose someone seeks a further reason for this distinction. Just why does nature have to do with only one sort of action? i.e., if it has to do with this or that, why is it determined of itself to cause just this effect or these effects, whatever they may be, whereas will, by contrast, has alternatives, i.e., it is not intrinsically determined to this action or its opposite, or for that matter to acting or not acting at all? One could reply to such a question that there is no further reason for this. Just as any immediate effect is related to its immediate cause primarily and *per se*, without benefit of any mediating cause—otherwise one could go on *ad infinitum* looking for reasons—so an active cause [as opposed to a material or other "cause"] seems to be immediately related to the action it elicits. One can give no other reason why it elicits its action in this way except that it is this sort of cause. Yet this is precisely what one is [foolishly] asking a reason for. Hence, just as "Heat heats" because it is heat, nor is such a proposition mediate [i.e., a conclusion], but rather it is a primary proposition in the fourth mode of *per se* predication, so also is this: "Heat is determined of itself to heat." "The will wills" and "The will does not will in a definite way by reason of some intrinsically necessary specification" would be similar sorts of statements.

[Two objections] Against this it is first objected that the proposition "The will wills" is contingent. Now, if the will were not determined of itself to will, how would any contingent proposition be immediate?

27 Secundo sic, quare ponitur ista indeterminatio in voluntate, si non potest probari per naturam voluntatis?

28 [Solutiones]—Ad primum responsio: ex necessariis non sequitur contingens. Patet: accipiat aliquam contingens; si est immediata, habetur propositum; si non, detur medium; altera praemissa ad ipsam est contingens, alias ex necessariis inferetur contingens; illa praemissa contingens si est mediata, altera praemissa ad ipsam erit contingens, et sic in infinitum, nisi stetur in aliqua contingente immediata.

29 Confirmatur I *Posteriorum* ultimo [c. 19, 82a2–8]: vult Aristoteles quod contingit opinari "propter quid," scilicet per immediata, et "quia," per mediata; ita in proposito "Voluntas vult A." Si non est causa inter extrema, habetur propositum. Si est causa, puta "Voluntas vult B," ulterius procedetur. Stabitur alicubi! Ubi? Quare illud voluntas volet? Nulla est alia causa nisi quia est voluntas. Et tamen, si illa ultima propositio esse necessaria, non antecederet sola ad aliquam contingentem.

30 Ad secundum, a posteriori probatur. Experitur enim qui vult se posse non velle sive nolle, iuxta quod de libertate voluntatis alibi diffusius habetur.

31 [Dubium]—Secundo, dubitatur circa praedicta: quomodo reducetur talis potentia ad actum, si indeterminata est ex se ad agendum et non agendum?

32 [Responsio: est quaedam indeterminatio insufficientiae, sive ex potentialitate et defectu actualitatis, sicut materia non habens formam est indeterminata ad agendum actionem formae. Est alia superabundantis sufficientiae quae est ex illimitatione actualitatis, vel simpliciter vel quodammodo.] Primo modo indeterminatum non reducitur ad actum nisi prius determinetur ad formam ab alio. Secundo modo indeterminatum potest se determinare. Si enim posset hoc si haberet actum

Secondly there is this objection. Why postulate this indeterminacy in the will if it cannot be proved to follow from the nature of the will? [In which case "The will wills" would be a conclusion and not a *per se* proposition of the fourth mode.]

[Solutions] The answer to the first is that the contingent does not follow from the necessary. This is clear if you consider some contingent proposition. If it is immediate, we have what we seek; if not, then there is some proposition that is intermediate; but this other premise from which it follows is also contingent; otherwise a contingent proposition could be inferred from necessary premises [which is logically impossible]. But if this intermediate premise is contingent [according to the objector], there must be some further contingent proposition from which it follows; and so *ad infinitum*, unless one stops with some proposition that is admittedly immediate [or axiomatic].

What Aristotle says near the end of the *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, confirms this. There his meaning is that opining occurs both as a truth that is "propter quid" (that is it is expressed in terms of a first principle or immediate proposition) and as a factual or "quia" proposition that needs further proof. And so it is with the proposition under consideration, "The will wills A." If there is no further cause or mediate reason why this is the case, then our proposal is conceded [viz., that it is a first or *per se* proposition]. If there is some reason or cause, such as "Because the will wills B," then one inquires further. Somewhere, however, you must stop. Where? Why does the will will this last? There is no other cause to be found except that the will is will. Now, if this last proposition were necessary, it could not be the sole premise from which something contingent followed.

As for the second objection [i.e., that indeterminacy must be proved from the nature of the will and hence *a priori*], the proof here is *a posteriori*, for the person who wills experiences that he could have nilled or not willed what he did, according to what has been explained more at length elsewhere about the will's liberty.

[A doubt] A further doubt arises about the aforesaid. What reduces such a potency to act, if it is of itself undetermined towards acting or not acting?

I reply: there is a certain indeterminacy of insufficiency, based on potentiality and a defect of actuality, in the way, for instance, that matter without a form would be indeterminate as regards the actuation given by the form. There is another indeterminacy, however, that of a superabundant sufficiency, based on unlimited actuality, either in an unqualified or in a qualified sense. Now, the first sort of indeterminacy is not reduced to actuality unless it first is determined to some form by

limitatum, quanto magis si illimitatum, cum nullo tunc careat quod fuit simpliciter principium agendi? Alioquin Deus, qui est summe indeterminatus ad quamcumque actionem indeterminatione illimitationis actualitatis, non posset aliquid ex se agere, quod est falsum. Exemplum huius: ignis est calefactivus, nec quaeritur extrinsecum a quo determinetur ad agendum; si tunc nulla diminutione facta in perfectione caloris daretur sibi perfectio frigoris, quare non ita ex se determinari posset ad calefaciendum, ut prius? Exemplum tamen illud non est omnino simile, sicut dicitur respondendo ad argumentum principale. Indeterminatio autem quae ponitur in voluntate non est materialis, nec imperfectionis, inquantum ipsa est activa, sed est excellentis perfectionis et potestatis non alligatae ad determinatum actum.

[b. *Quid de Intentione Aristotelis?*]

35 Sed quomodo faciunt praedicta ad intentum Aristotelis, qui differentiam dictam non ponit inter naturam et voluntatem, sed inter irrationalem potentiam et rationalem, per rationalem intelligens solum intellectum, ut videtur secundum supra allegata?

36 Respondeo: intellectus et voluntas possunt comparari ad actus proprios quos eliciunt vel ad actus aliarum potentiarum inferiorum in quibus quamdam causalitatem habent, intellectus ostendendo et dirigendo, voluntas inclinando et imperando. Comparatio prima est essentialior. Patet! Et sic intellectus continetur sub natura. Est enim ex se determinatus ad intelligendum et non habet in potestate sua intelligere et non intelligere; sive circa complexa, ubi potest habere contrarios actus, et non habet etiam illos in potestate sua assentire et dissentire in tantum quod, si etiam aliqua una notitia sit oppositorum cognitorum, ut videtur Aristoteles dicere, adhuc respectu illius cognitionis non est intellectus ex se indeterminatus. Immo, necessario tunc elicit intellectionem sicut aliam quae esset tantum unius cogniti.—Voluntas autem ad proprium actum eliciendum opposito modo se habet, ut dictum est prius. Unde isto modo loquendo ponuntur tantum duae productiones in divinis, et quod intellectus est idem principium cum natura. Secundum hanc primam comparisonem non videtur loqui Aristoteles.

something else. Something indeterminate in the second sense, however, can determine itself. If this could occur where some limited actuality exists, how much more where the actuality is unlimited! For it would lack nothing simply required for an acting principle. Otherwise God, who, in virtue of his indeterminacy of unlimited actuality, is supremely undetermined in regard to any action whatsoever, would be unable to do anything of himself, which is false. Take this example: fire has the ability to heat, neither do we seek anything extrinsic to fire itself that determines it to burn. Suppose, without losing any of its perfection as heat, it were given the perfection of coldness, why should it not be able to determine itself to heat something, as before? Nevertheless, this example is not quite similar, as will be pointed out later in answering the initial argument. But the indetermination ascribed to the will is not like that of matter, nor, insofar as it is active, is it the indeterminacy of imperfection, but rather it is the indeterminacy of surpassing perfection and power, not restricted to some specific act.

[b. *What about the Mind of Aristotle?*]

But how reconcile the aforesaid interpretation with the mind of Aristotle, who distinguished, not between nature and will, but between irrational and rational potencies, understanding "rational" apparently as referring only to the intellect, as the second objection claims?

I reply: intellect and will can be compared either with the proper act each elicits or with the acts of other subordinate powers over which they exercise a kind of causality—the intellect, by showing and directing; the will, by inclining and commanding. Of the two, the first comparison is clearly the more essential. From this standpoint the intellect falls under the heading of "nature," for it is of itself determined to understanding and does not have it in its power to both understand and not understand; or as regards propositional knowledge where contrary acts are possible, it does not have the power to both assent and dissent. If, as Aristotle seems to say, some one type of knowledge has to do with opposites, still with respect to this knowledge the intellect is not indeterminate of itself. Quite the contrary, in such a case it would elicit of necessity an act of intellection, just as it would in regard to knowledge that involves only one thing. The will, however, has the ability to elicit an act proper to itself in opposite ways, as was stated earlier. It is in this vein that we assume only two productions in the divine [namely, that of the Word and that of the Holy Spirit] and put intellect [whereby the Word is spoken] in the same class of principles as nature. Now, Aristotle apparently says nothing about this first and more essential comparison.

- 37 Secunda comparatio videtur quasi accidentalis:—tum quia ad actus aliarum potentiarum non comparantur istae potentiae, nisi median-
tibus actibus propriis, ut videtur, quia proprii sunt priores illis aliis;—
tum quia specialiter intellectus hoc modo non habet rationem poten-
tiae activae propriae dictae, et tactum est in VII, capitulo [septimo
38 1032b15–16]. Et hoc modo videtur Aristoteles loqui et ponere talem
ordinem quod primo requiritur notitia aliquis oppositorum. Sed ista
in se est insufficiens ad aliquid causandum extra, quia ut arguit in
quarto capitulo, tunc faceret opposita. Hoc non videtur sequi nisi quia
intellectus etiam cognoscens opposita, quantum ad illud causalitatis
quod habet respectu eorum fiendorum extra ex se, determinatus est ad
illud cuius est, et ita non solum non est rationalis respectu actus pro-
prij, sed nec complete rationalis respectu actus extrinseci in quo di-
rigit. Immo, praecise sumptus etiam respectu intrinseci est irrationalis,
solummodo autem secundum quid rationalis, inquantum praeexigitur
39 ad actum potentiae rationalis. Sequitur voluntas determinans, non sic
quod ipsa potentia voluntatis ex se determinata sic habet ad unum et
per hoc aggregatum, et ex intellectu oppositorum et voluntate, sit
unius, ut supra allegatur; sed quod voluntas, quae indeterminata est ad
actum proprium, illum elicit, et per illum determinat intellectum
40 quantum ad illam causalitatem quam habet respectu fiendi extra. Unde
dicit Aristoteles “Hoc autem dico appetitum, aut prohaeresim,” id est,
“electionem”; non dicit autem voluntatem, scilicet potentiam. Itaque
si “potentia rationalis” dicatur ab Aristotele intellectus, differentia
dicta sic intelligenda est secundum supra posita; sibi non convenit re-
spectu actus proprii, nec inquantum per actum suum concurrat ad ac-
tum potentiae inferioris, praecise sumendo actum suum, sed utroque
modo cadit sub “natura.” Cadit autem sub alio membro, inquantum
prius per suum actum subest actibus voluntatis.
- 41 Si autem intelligitur “rationalis” [ut] “cum ratione,” tunc voluntas
est proprie rationalis, et ipsa est oppositorum tam quoad actum pro-
prium quam quoad actus inferiorum, et non oppositorum modo natu-
rae, sicut intellectus non potest se determinare ad alterum, sed modo
libero potens se determinare. Et ideo est potentia, quia ipsa aliquid
potest, nam potest se determinare. Intellectus autem proprie non est
potentia respectu extrinsecorum, quia ipse, si est oppositorum, non
potest se determinare, et nisi determinetur, nihil extra poterit.

The second comparison or relationship seems to be accidental, as it were, for two reasons. One, because these potencies [of intellect and will] are related to the acts of the other potencies they control only by means of acts proper to themselves, since their proper acts are prior to these others. The other reason is that the intellect in particular does not have the character of an active potency properly speaking, according to [Aristotle] in Bk. VII, ch. 7. And it is of this second relationship that Aristotle appears to be speaking, and he assumes some order such that some knowledge of opposites is first required. But this initial knowledge is of itself insufficient to cause any extrinsic effect, for as Aristotle argues in ch. 4, it would then produce opposites. But this does not seem to follow unless the intellect also knows of such opposites. So far as its causality over things outside itself is concerned, the intellect is determined of itself in regard to what it directs. Hence, not only as regards its own acts is it not rational, but it is not fully rational even as regards the external acts it directs. As a matter of fact, speaking precisely, even as regards its intrinsic acts it is irrational. It is rational only in the qualified sense that it is a precondition for the act of a rational potency. A determining will follows, but not in such a way that this potency of the will is determined of itself to one alternative and hence the combination of intellect and will together has to do with one effect, as the objection above claimed. Rather the will, which is undetermined as regards its own act, elicits its act, and through its elicited act it determines the intellect insofar as the latter has a causal bearing on some external happening. Hence Aristotle says: “I call this desire or *prohaeresis*, i.e., choice.” But he does not call it “will,” that is to say, a potency. And so if intellect is called a “rational potency,” the aforesaid distinction [between rational and non-rational] must be understood in the way explained above. For the distinction is not applicable to the intellect’s own acts nor insofar as the intellect concurs with the acts of subordinate powers solely by means of its own act, for in both these ways it falls under the heading of “nature.” Nevertheless it falls under the other heading [i.e., of “will”] insofar as earlier its own act is subject to acts of the will.

But if “rational” is understood to mean “with reason,” then the will is properly rational, and it has to do with opposites, both as regards its own act and as regards the acts it controls. And it has to do with opposites not in the way that a nature, like the intellect, acts, which has no power to determine itself in any other way. But the will acts freely, for it has the power of self-determination. Properly speaking, however, the intellect is not a potency with regard to external things, because if it does have to do with opposites, it cannot determine itself, and unless it is determined, it is unable to do anything extra.

[3. *Responsio Scoti ad Improbationes Opinionis Aliorum supra in 1*]

42 Per dicta potest responderi ad illa, quae superius allegantur contra viam Aristotelis.

43 Ad primum respondeo de sole. Forma naturalis, si est illimitata et principium oppositorum in materiis dispositis illorum, est ita determinate, sicut illa quae est unius tantum est illius determinate; nam non est in potestate sua ad alterutram istarum formarum generare praesente passo receptivo huius formae et illius, sicut nec esset, si esset unius tantum. Voluntas autem actionis suae, sive circa hoc oppositum in quod potest sive circa illud, non est principium ex se determinatum, sed potestative determinativum sui ad alterutrum. Et per hoc patet quomodo deficit similitudo superius posita de calore et frigore in eodem contentis unitive. Nec breviter potest aliquod exemplum conveniens omnino adduci, quia voluntas est principium activum distinctum contra totum genus principiorum activorum quae non sunt voluntas per
44 oppositum modum agendi. Et ideo satis videtur fatuum universales propositiones de principio activo applicare ad voluntatem, propter hoc quod non habeat instantiam in aliquo alio a voluntate. Sola enim est non talis, nec ideo negandum est eam esse talem, quia alia non est talis, quia principium activum creatum capax est sine contradictione illius perfectionis quam attribuimus voluntati, scilicet quod non solum determinetur ad unum effectum vel actum, quia multas habet in virtute, sed nec ad aliquem illorum determinatur, quos in virtute sufficiente habet. Quis enim negat activum esse perfectius quanto minus dependens et determinatum et limitatum respectu actus vel effectus? Et si hoc conceditur de illimitatione ad multos et contrarios effectus, cum determinatione tamen naturali ad quemcumque illorum, quanto magis si cum prima indeterminatione ponatur et secunda? Haec enim nobilior est contingentia necessitate, sicut tactum est in V, in questione mota capitulo "de necessario," scilicet quomodo perfectionis est in Deo nihil necessario causare. Si ergo ista perfectio quam attribuimus voluntati, principio activo creato non repugnat et summum tale est voluntas, ergo rationabiliter est attribuenda, et ista declaratio melior
45 est quam prior posita de calore et frigore unitis. Secundum hoc potest illa ratio, quae videtur poni in littera pertractari sic: si intellectus per eandem notitiam est aliquo modo oppositorum, ut ostendens, ergo potentia activa indeterminationis potest esse excellentiori modo oppositorum, scilicet ut ipsa una existens possit se ad utrumque illorum ostensorum determinare; alioquin frustra videretur data fuisse potentia prima oppositorum, quia ipsa sine secunda in nullum illorum posset, ita quod argumentum sit a minori, non autem a causa propria. Scientia enim non est propria causa differentiae praedictae.

[3. *Scotus' Reply to the Objections to Aristotle Raised in 1*]

With this in mind one could answer the objections raised earlier to the way of Aristotle.

I reply to the first about the sun. A natural form, if it is not limited and is a principle of opposite effects in materials disposed to receive such, is still determined to produce these effects in the same way as a form with but one effect is determined to produce a single effect. For the sun does not have it in its power to generate an alternative to the form it produces—when the recipient of this or that form is present—any more than it would have if it could produce but one form. The will, however, is not the sort of principle that is of itself determined in regard to its action, whether the action has to do with this or that opposite, but it possesses the power to determine itself in regard to either alternative. And this makes clear why the example cited above about heat and cold being found together in the same agent is deficient. In short, there simply is no appropriate example whatsoever that could be given, because the will is an active principle distinct from the whole class of active principles which are not will, by reason of the opposite way in which it acts. It seems stupid, then, to apply general propositions about active principles to the will, since there are no instances of the way it behaves in anything other than will. For the will alone is not this other sort of thing. Hence, one should not deny that it is the sort of thing it is, just because other things are not like it. For there is nothing contradictory about a created active principle having the perfection we attribute to the will, namely, that it is not just determined to one effect or to one act, but has many things within its scope and is not determined towards any of these things that fall sufficiently within its power. For who would deny an agent is more perfect the less it is determined, dependent, and limited in its action or effect? And if one concedes this in regard to a lack of limitation as regards many contrary effects, even in a case [like the sun], where this is associated with a natural determination towards every one of them, how much more perfect would it be if we were to assume the second sort of indeterminacy [i.e., of superabundant sufficiency] to be added to the first! For this sort of contingency is more noble than necessity, as was pointed out in Bk. VII (in the question raised there about the chapter "On the Necessary," namely, how it is a matter of perfection in God that he causes nothing necessarily). Consequently, if this perfection we ascribe to the will is not opposed to the notion of a creative active principle—and the will is the highest such—then such perfection ought reasonably to be attributed to the will. And this is a better assessment of the case with the will than the earlier example about the

- 46 Ad secundum: non exceptit Aristoteles voluntatem a potentia rationalis nisi ut "potentia rationalis" sumitur incomplete, scilicet per notita oppositorum; sed dicit istam incompletam nullius extrinseci esse causam nisi determinatione facta aliunde. Quaero a quo per electionem determinatur? Non nisi a potentia eligente, et haec ut distinguitur contra rationem. Ratio enim non est determinativa, cum sit oppositorum respectu quorum se non potest determinare, nec multo magis aliud a se. Aut si determinaret, hoc esset simul ad opposita, sicut Aristoteles arguit de agente generante [1048a9-10]. Et illud aliud non necessario determinat ad istum oppositum, quia tunc intellectus nec in potentia remota esse oppositorum; ergo illud aliud contingenter se determinat, et cum per actum suum fuerit determinatum, *et*
- 47 consequenter determinat intellectum. Innuit ergo Aristoteles quod illa potentia est ex se oppositorum sic quod est determinativa sui ad alterutrum, per cuius actum iam determinative elicited ponit illam determinari respectu operis exterioris, quae erat ex se sic oppositorum, quod necessario nec potuit se determinare. Et ita ostendendo in quarto capitulo quomodo rationalis potentia incompleta procedit ad actum, manifeste videtur innuere quod est alia rationalis completa, quantum ad istam differentiam hic positam, et quod illae duae cum accidentibus [seu actibus] suis concurrunt respectu effectus exterioris, ad quem non est potentia contradictionis proprie in potentia exsequente, quae est rationalis per participationem, sed tota ratio potentiae ad opposita formaliter est in voluntate.

combination of heat and cold. The reasoning that seems to underlie our opening text from Aristotle, consequently, could be treated as follows. If the selfsame knowledge enables the intellect to deal in some way with opposites, as the text indicates, then an active potency even less limited should be able to do this even better; i.e., while retaining its integrity it could determine itself to either of the alternatives shown to it. Otherwise, the initial potency for opposites would seem to have been given in vain, for without a second principle [like the will] an intelligent agent would be unable to do either. In this way, the argument would rest on the dialectical rule *a minori*, and not be an instance of reasoning from a proper cause, for knowledge is not the proper cause of the aforesaid distinction.

As for the second objection, Aristotle did not exclude the will from the rational potencies, unless you restrict the meaning of "rational potency" to what is incompletely such, namely, the knowledge of opposites. But Aristotle acknowledged that such an incomplete potency could cause something external only if it had some additional determination from another source. Now, I ask: What is the source of this determinate choice? It can only come from a potency distinct from reason that is able to choose. For reason is not a determining factor, since it has to do with opposites with respect to which it cannot determine itself, much less determine something other than itself. Or if it were to determine itself, it would be to produce opposites simultaneously, as Aristotle argued would be the case with a productive agent. Neither does this other factor [distinct from reason] determine itself necessarily to the opposite alternative, for then the intellect would not be in even remote potency to opposites. Hence, this other potency determines itself contingently, and once it has done such through its own act, as a consequence it determines the intellect. Aristotle, then, at least hinted that this other potency of itself has to do with opposites in such a way that it is self-determinative towards either alternative. And in virtue of its act already elicited determinatively, he assumes it is determined as regards the work of something exterior [viz., the intellect] which of itself had to do with opposites in such a way that it was impossible for it to determine itself. And thus by showing in the fourth chapter how this incomplete rational potency proceeds to act, Aristotle clearly seems to imply that there is another complete rational potency (in the sense of the distinction he postulates here), and that these two [potencies of intellect and will] together with their [proper] acts concur to produce the external effect. Properly speaking, the executive power is not in contradictory potency to the effect it carries out, since it is only rational by participation. But the full meaning of a potency for opposites is found formally in the will.

- 48 Quod autem subdit Aristoteles [1048a14-15] quod rationalis sic determinata, necessario est unius quod concupiscit, principaliter hoc faciet; posset dici quod non est verum de necessitate absoluta. Sicut enim antecedens (si est antecedens, scilicet "illud velle") non est necessarium, ita nec consequens. Si est necessarium, consequens (scilicet illud exterius "facere") est necessarium. Si autem sequatur necessario "Vult hoc extrinsecum; ergo non impeditum facit hoc," tunc Aristoteles nullum effectum poneret nisi a causa prius determinat ad ipsum prius natura quam ipsum producat, excepto solo "velle" quod sequitur apprehensionem oppositorum, et determinat secundum ipsum respectu sequentium extra. Sic posset exponi illud quod est in fine capituli quarti [1048a21ss]: "Propter quod nec si opposita vult, necessario faciet," etc. Quare enim non sequitur hoc de voluntate? Et tamen prius arguit in principio capituli de potentia rationali quod ipsa simul faciet, scilicet opposita, videtur bona differentia, quia "sic faciet sicut faciendi habet potentiam; non autem sicut habet potentiam faciendi."
- 50 Potentia autem rationalis incompleta ipsa ex se, ut dictum est, naturalis est respectu oppositorum. Ideo, quantum est ex se, non tantum simul oppositorum sed etiam est oppositorum simul, et ideo, si ipsa ex se faceret illa, simul faceret. Sicut sol est oppositorum simul in diversis receptivis, et simul faceret, illis approximatis, et si esset illorum aequaliter et tantummodo aliquod idem passum aequae receptivum amorum esset sibi approximatum, nihil faceret, vel simul in illo opposita, ita hic.
- 51 Contra: intellectus non est aequaliter oppositorum; ergo ageret secundum virtutem fortiolem.—Respondeo: per unam notitiam quae est habitus et privationis, non est aequaliter istorum, sed huius per se et illius per accidens; sed per duas notitias positivas comparationis potest esse causa oppositorum.—Contra: quomodo valet consequentia Aristotelis de "non aequaliter" [1046b35ss]?

As for what Aristotle adds, however, about a rational potency, once it is determined [by choice or desire], being necessarily restricted to what is desired and that it must do this, one could note that the necessity in such a case is not absolute. For if the antecedent—for instance, "This is willed"—is not necessary, then neither is the consequent. If such a volition exists necessarily, then the consequent (namely, what is done externally) is also necessary. But if the necessary implication is merely "The will wills this external thing; therefore, if not impeded, it will do this," Aristotle would be saying nothing more than that nothing occurs without some prior cause being first determined to do this. The sole exception is the volition itself that follows the intellectual apprehension of the alternatives, and it is this volition that determines what takes place outside. In this way one could gloss or explain his statement at the end of the chapter: "Even if one had the will to do both at the same time, one will not do them . . . for this is not a potency for doing both contraries at the same time." Why should this not apply to the will as well? Yet he had argued earlier, at the outset of the chapter on rational potency, that its simultaneous ability to produce opposites seems to be a good basis for distinguishing it [from the non-rational], because the way it will act will be in accord with its potentiality, but it [will not act all at once] in every way it has a potency to act. Now, the potency characteristic *per se* of an incomplete rational potency, as has been said, is natural so far as opposites are concerned. Therefore, so far as itself is concerned, it will be not only simultaneously capable of opposites, but capable of producing opposites simultaneously, and therefore, if this potency were to produce them on its own [i.e., without benefit of will], it would produce them simultaneously. The situation here would resemble that of the sun, which produces opposite effects at the same time in the diverse receptive subjects that are brought near to it, and if it were related to such different effects in equal measure, and only one object, equally receptive towards such opposite effects, was placed near the sun, the latter either would do nothing to it or would produce such effects in it simultaneously.

Objection: the intellect is not equally disposed towards opposites; therefore it would act in accord with the stronger pull.

I reply: it is true that with only a single item of knowledge, representing something positive together with its privation, the intellect is not equally disposed towards both but relates towards one *per se* and the other *per accidens*. However, with positive knowledge of both alternatives [the intellect] could be the cause of opposites. Otherwise, how would [Aristotle's] inference based on inequality follow?

Non sic autem de voluntate. Si enim est oppositorum, virtualiter simul est eorum. Sed non est eorum simul, quia non est eorum modo naturae, sed potens se determinare ad alterutrum ante alterum, et ideo sic faciet.

Hoc modo forte posset illud quantum capitulum exponi, quod multum esset pro voluntate, licet aliquid videatur ibi quod est contra voluntatem.

53 Sed contra: quare saltem ita frequenter vocat "potentiam rationalem" intellectum et non sic voluntatem?

Potest dici quod actus intellectus primus est communior actu voluntatis et nobis notior. Aristoteles autem de manifestioribus saepius locutus est. Unde de voluntate pauca dixisse invenitur, quamvis ex dictis eius aliqua sequantur in quibus consequenter dixisset, si ita considerasset.

54 Tertium contra Aristotelem inductum verum concludit, scilicet quod notitia simplicis apprehensionis utriusque contrarii est propria sibi et per speciem propriam. Notitia tamen discursiva, quia unum est prius naturaliter alio, potest esse principium cognoscendi aliquid de illo et sic potest exponi illud I *De anima* [c. 5, 411a4-5]: "Rectum est iudex et obliqui." Iudicium enim non pertinet ad simplicem apprehensionem, sed ad collationem complexorum. Quantum enim ad notitiam secundum quid, unum potest simplici apprehensione apprehendi per speciem alterius, quantum scilicet ad privationem quam includit, non quidem intra suam essentiam vel essentialem rationem, sed concomitanter. Primo ergo modo est notitia eadem contrariorum, unius formaliter et alterius virtualiter, sicut principii et conclusionum; et si aliqua volitio, puta forte electio, primo exigit iudicium aliquod de eligendo, potest unum contrariorum per alterum cognosci quoad illam notitiam, licet contra illud iudicium quandoque eligatur. Secundo modo est eadem notitia contrariorum, unius secundum quid, alterius simpliciter. Et illa sufficit ad hoc quod voluntas velit alterutrum contrariorum, inquantum ostenditur per illam notitiam, et sic potest in contraria; ergo et simpliciter, quia non repugnant sibi absolute nisi ratione privationis talis, non autem in ratione volibilis, ut videtur, quia utrumque inquantum positivum videtur volibile.

But it is not this way with the will. For if it has to do with opposites, only virtually does it have to do with them simultaneously. But it does not actually have to do with both at once, because it is not related to them in the manner of nature. Rather it has the potentiality to determine itself to either alternative with the other alternative before it, and therefore it will act in this way.

And in this way, perhaps, one could explain this fourth chapter, where much is said that could refer to the will, though some statements seem to militate against such an interpretation.

But then one might ask, why does he so frequently call the intellect a "rational potency" and not the will, though admittedly, from what has been said, he hints of this?

One could say that the initial act of the intellect is more common and better known to us than the act of the will. But Aristotle oftener than not speaks about the more obvious, and hence we find him saying little about the will, although some things follow from his remarks that he would have talked about later had he considered the matter.

The third objection against Aristotle does make a valid point, namely, that each contrary has a concept proper to itself which is grasped through a proper species; nevertheless discursive or inferential knowledge, where one item is naturally prior to another, can be the source of knowing something about the other. In this way one can expound the statement in I *De anima*: "By means of the straight line we know both itself and the curved." For judgment is not a function of simple apprehension, but involves a comparison of propositions. Qualified knowledge of one thing, however, can be simply apprehended through the species of another, to the extent that its privation is included, not in the essence or essential notion of the other, but concomitantly. As apprehended simply, then, formal knowledge of one contrary is virtual knowledge of the other, just as formal knowledge of principles is virtual knowledge of conclusions. And if some volition, such as choosing perhaps, first requires some judgmental knowledge about what the choices are, one of the contraries could be known through the other in this way, though at times the choice runs counter to that judgment. As for the second type [namely, discursive knowledge], the same knowledge of contraries has to do with one of them simply and with the other in a qualified sense. And this suffices for the will to select either of the contraries shown to it in this fashion, and so it can act in contrary ways. Hence it can also select contraries in a simple or unqualified sense, because they are not opposed to each other except in the sense that one is a privation of another. It is not under this privative aspect, however, that each is able to be willed, but rather inasmuch as both are something positive, it seems.

- 57 Si dicatur quod potentia rationalis valet ad opposita, nisi determinetur ad unum, et tunc non; contra: ex hoc sequitur quod non est differentia inter oppositas potentias rationales et irracionales, quantum ad hoc quod est posse in opposita; consequens est falsum ex isto IX
- 58 *Metaphysicae* [cc. 2 et 5], ergo et antecedens. Probatio consequentiae: potentia irrationalis, tam activa quam passiva, ut est prior naturaliter actu determinante, potest in opposita, ut patet ex Aristotele II *Perihermenias* [21bross] et Boethio, sexto Commentarii super eundem, editione secunda [PL 64, 615], ubi ponit exemplum de aqua quae potest frigefacere et calefacere.
- 59 Item, si non possit in opposita quando est actu determinata, hoc est in illo instanti et pro illo, nullus effectus actuans esset actu contingens; consequens est falsum, ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentis patet per Philosophum, I *Perihermenias* [c. 9, 19a23], ubi vult quod haec propositio est probanda: "Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse," quia aliquid est contingenter. Probatio consequentiae: effectus non dicitur contingens in potentia nisi ratione suae causae potentis in oppositum; ergo nec in actu effectus contingens, nisi causa actu causans actu posset in oppositum pro illo nunc pro quo causat ipsum; sed per te nunc non potest, cum pro tunc sit determinata; ergo.
- 60 Si dicas effectus dicitur contingens quia potest non fieri; contra: prius non fuit ens; ergo nec prius actu effectus contingens; loquimur enim nunc de contingentia prout esse modus entis in actu, quando est in actu, et pro illo nunc pro quo est in actu.
- 61 Item, quod convenit alicui per se et primo, eius oppositum non convenit ei per se nec per accidens ipso manente, alioquin demonstratio "propter quid" concludens passionem de subiecto non esset ex necessariis; sed posse in opposita convenit potentiae rationali secundum se et primo, ut propria passio potentiae rationalis in quantum rationalis, nam per hoc distinguitur ab irrationali IX *Metaphysicae*; ergo, etc.
- 62 Item, Deus praedestinatum potest non praedestinare in illo nunc et pro illo nunc pro quo praedestinavit, non obstante determinatione voluntatis suae per actum praedestinandi, secundum omnes; ergo determinatio non tollit posse in opposita.

If one objects that a rational potency has opposites in its power only when it is not determined to one and that otherwise it does not, I say this is not so. If it were, there would be no difference between the opposed rational and irrational potencies in terms of their power over opposites. But according to what is said in IX *Metaphysics*, the consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent is also false. Proof of the implication: an irrational potency, whether active or passive, insofar as it is naturally prior to the act that determines it, is in potency to opposites. This is clear from Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, Bk. II, and Boethius' commentary on the same (second edition), where he gives the example of water that can either chill or warm.

Also, if it did not have opposites in its power, even when actually determined to one of them (i.e., in the very instant that it had settled upon this particular alternative), then no effect it is actualizing would be actually contingent. Now, the consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent is also. The falsity of the consequent is clear from what the Philosopher says in *De interpretatione*, Bk. I, where he speaks of the need to qualify this proposition: "That which is, must needs be when it is," because something does exist only contingently. Proof of our initial implication: an effect is not said to be potentially contingent unless its cause has the power to do the opposite. Neither, then, is an effect actually contingent, unless the cause actually causing it has the power to do the opposite at that very moment that it is causing the other, whereas your argument is that it has no power at present because it is now determined.

And if you say the effect is said to be contingent because [at a moment prior to such a decision, one could still say] it could have not happened, I object. Prior to that moment it was not a being; neither, then, was it an actually contingent effect before it existed. For we are speaking now of contingency as a mode of actual being, and about a "now" at the time it is actual.

Also, if something pertains primarily and *per se* to a subject, then its opposite does not pertain to that same subject *per se*, or even *per accidens* so long as the other remains. Otherwise, a demonstration of the reasoned fact, inferring an attribute of its subject, would not be based upon necessary premises. But to have opposites in its power is something a rational potency possesses primarily and *per se* as proper to it qua rational. For this is what distinguishes it from an irrational potency according to IX *Metaphysics*. Therefore, [it possesses power over the opposite even when the alternative choice remains].

Also, all [theologians] admit God is able not to predestine some predestined person at the moment such a one is predestined; therefore, his decision does not take away his power to do the opposite.

[Ad Argumenta Principalia]

- 63 [Ad 1] Ad primum argumentum principale patet quod potentia rationalis, prout dicitur esse voluntas, est contrariorum non simul fiendorum, sed potest se determinare ad alterutrum; non sic intellectus.
- 64 Cum arguitur contra, possum me non sedere nunc, supposito quod sedeam, dico quod in sensu compositionis propositio de possibili, componendo opposita, est falsa, quia notat potentiam ad opposita simul. In sensu divisionis autem dicerent aliqui quod quando est sessio, est necessario, iuxta illud I *Perihermenias*: "Omne quod est, quando est," etc., et nihil pro tunc possibile, sed tantum pro instanti priori pro quo potuit non fore nunc. Et isti non videntur quod possint salvare voluntatem nunc esse potentiam ad oppositum eius quod inest. Huius positionis absurditas patet, quod scilicet necessitas et contingentia non sint proprie conditiones entium quando existunt, sed tunc necessitas et contingentia numquam, quia quando non est, nec est necessario nec contingenter. Quomodo etiam illa auctoritas I *Perihermenias* pro illis non facit propter fallaciam consequentis et figurae dictionis et propter secundum quid et simpliciter prolixum esset nunc explicare. Potest dici aliter quod voluntas quando est in aliqua volitione, tunc contingenter est in illa, et illa volitio tunc contingenter est ab ipsa; nisi enim tunc, numquam, quia numquam alias est ab ipsa. Et sicut illa contingenter inest, ita voluntas tunc est potentia potens respectu oppositi, et pro tunc in sensu divisionis; non scilicet quod possit illud oppositum ponere simul cum isto, sed quod possit illud oppositum ponere in hoc instanti, non ponendo illud aliud in hoc instanti, quod tamen illud aliud divisim ponit in hoc instanti, et hoc non necessario sed contingenter.
- 66 [Ad 2] Ad secundum, si arguitur de voluntate, dico quod illa potest in actum nulla determinatione in ipsa praeintellecta actui, ita quod prima determinatio in tempore et natura est in positione actus, et si tunc de ipsa accipiatur, et nihil potest nisi prius determinata, falsum est.
- 67 Si autem arguitur de intellectu cognoscente opposita, tunc verum est quod respectu extrinseci non potest aliquid nisi determinetur aliunde, quia ex se est illorum per modum naturae, non potens se ad alterum determinare; vel ergo ambo aget, vel nihil. Et si de intellectu

[Reply to the Initial Arguments]

[To 1] As for the initial argument at the beginning, it is clear that a rational potency, such as the will is said to be, does not have to perform opposites simultaneously, but can determine itself to either alternative, which is something the intellect cannot do. When it is objected that I am unable to be not seated, on the assumption I am sitting, my answer is this. A proposition about the possible would be false in the composite sense, because it would imply I could do both at once. In the divided sense, however, some would say that when the sitting occurs, this is so necessarily, according to that principle in *De interpretatione*, "That which is, must needs be when it is," and that nothing else is possible then, but only at the moment before, when the present situation could have been otherwise. And these persons see no way of saving the claim that now the will has a potency for the opposite of the state it is actually in. This is absurd, however, for it would mean that necessity and contingency are not properly conditions of being at the time they exist. But if that were true, necessity and contingency would never exist, for when something is nonexistent, it is neither necessary nor contingent. It would take too long, however, to explain now why the *De interpretatione* principle does not support their claims, because their argument is invalid on three counts, being an instance of the fallacy of consequent, of figure of speech, and of the simple and qualified sense. To put the matter in another way, one could say that when the will is in a certain state of volition, it is in that state contingently, and that its present volition stems from it contingently, for if it does not do so then, it will never do so, since at no other time does it proceed from the will. And just as this particular volition is contingently in the will, at that very moment the will is a potency with power over the opposite; and this holds for that moment in the divided sense. Not that it could will the opposite at the same time as it wills this, but in the sense that it has the power to will the contrary at that very instant, by not willing the other at that instant. For at this very instant it could, nevertheless, posit the other, in a divided sense, and do so not necessarily but contingently.

[To 2] As for the second argument, if it is the will one is speaking about, then I say that it is able to do what it does with no conceivable predetermination to act, so that the initial determination, both in the order of nature and in the order of time, occurs in the very placing of its act. And if one claims that at that instant it can do nothing unless first determined [by something other than itself], this is false. But if the argument refers to the intellect knowing opposites, then it is true that the intellect can accomplish nothing externally unless it be deter-

concludatur quod non est sufficiens potentia rationalis, conceditur iuxta praedicta. Immo, si solus esset, per impossibile, intellectus cum virtutibus inferioribus sine voluntate, nihil unquam fieret nisi determinate modo naturae, et nulla esset potentia sufficiens ad faciendum alterutrum oppositorum.

68 [Ad 3] Ad tertium dicitur quod potest habere actum circa opposita quae subsunt suo primo obiecto, quod—quantum ad actum volendi—ponitur bonum verum vel apparens; non est autem circa oppositum sui primi obiecti, quod ponitur malum inquantum malum. Similiter de actibus ponitur quod oppositos potest habere, scilicet velle et nolle circa illud in quo potest aliquid inveniri de ratione primi obiecti utriusque actus, scilicet aliquid boni et aliquid mali. In fine ultimo nihil invenitur de malo, et respectu eius videntur aliqui ponere quod non sit potentia rationalis. Similiter videntur ponere quod per habitum aliquem possit immobilitari respectu aliorum aliquorum a fine ultimo. Discussionem istorum et an circa finem determinetur ad velle, et circa malum inquantum malum ad nolle, hic omitto quaerere.

69 [Ad 4] Ad quartum argumentum de sole, patet supra ad responsionem ad primam objectionem contra Aristotelem.

70 [Ad 6] Ad quintum dici potest iuxta principium primi articuli quod frigus numquam facti ad esse caloris. Facit tamen aliquid, quo facto, aliquid aliud potest magis calefacere, puta constringit ne calor interior diffundatur et ita calor unitus magis calefacit. De projectione pilae, licet sit aliqua contrarietas in motu reflexo ad motum rectum, quanta requiritur inter ubi terminantia motum localem, non tamen est contrarietas formalis, quia violenter movens aliquid ad ubi movet ad omne ubi possibile acquiri per illum motum. Si in directum potest, sic movetur; si non, redit, et hoc donec factus fuerit motus proportionatus violentiae moventis. Haec et alia quaecumque in radiis reflexis et fractis, qualis est in rationalis contingentia et etiam alibi, nullam talem indifferentiam ponunt in aliqua potentia irrationali, qualis est in rationali.

73 [Ad 5] Ad ultimum dico absque exceptione omnes potentiae passivae ex se sunt contradictionis, licet si forma necessario ens, neces-

mined from some other source, because it knows contraries after the manner of nature, and is unable to determine itself towards any one of these opposites. Hence, it will either act towards both or not act at all. And if one concludes from this that the intellect does not suffice to qualify as a rational potency, it follows from what has been said that this is true. Indeed, if—to assume the impossible—the intellect and its subordinate powers alone existed, without a will, everything would occur deterministically after the manner of nature, and there would be no potency sufficient to accomplish anything to the contrary.

[To 3] As for the third, some say that the will has a choice of opposites so long as all fall within the scope of its first object, which—for the will—is assumed to be a real or an apparent good; whereas an act where evil qua evil is willed lies beyond its scope. Another assumption in regard to acts of willing and nilling is that the will can do either so long as its object contains something good or bad; but where the ultimate end is concerned, where nothing evil can be found, some assume that the will is no longer a rational potency. Others appear to hold that the will can be immobilized in regard to some things other than the ultimate end. Here, however, I omit discussing these things as well as the question of whether the will is determined to will the end, or—where evil qua evil is concerned—whether its act must be one of nolition.

[To 4] The answer to the fourth argument about the sun is evident from our response to the first objection to the way of Aristotle.

[To 6] To the fifth, one could say—in accord with the principle set forth in art. 1—that cold cannot be active as regards the essence of heat. Still, it can do something that makes another agent heat more effectively, for instance, constrict or contract a thing so that its interior heat is not dissipated but compressed to produce greater warmth. As for the bouncing ball, though reflex motion is in some sense contrary to rectilinear motion at the locus where the one motion ends and the other begins, still the contrariety is not formal, for whatever moves something violently, moves it to every possible location it can acquire through such motion. If it can move it straight ahead, it will do so; if not, it will cause it to rebound, and this will go on until the movement is proportionate to the violence of the mover. As for these and other things that resemble rational contingency, such as reflected and refracted rays, etc., none of these are assumed to require in any irrational potency the sort of indifference that exists in a rational potency.

[To 5] To the last I say that all passive potencies without exception are of themselves in contradictory potency, although if the form were

sario dependeret ad materiam compositam, esset incorruptibile, et materia necessario esset sub illo actu, sed non ex necessitate ex parte sui, sed ex parte formae. Activae vero sunt contradictionis, sicut exponit Aristoteles per adesse et non. Quod si intelligatur de passivo approximato et non approximato, sic omnis activa cuius actio dependet a passo potest esse contradictionis, non ex se sed aliunde, si intelligitur de impediante. Sic omnis activa naturalis corruptibilis est impedibilis etiam per causam naturalem aliam activam; sed nulla naturalis ex se habet posse oppositas actiones circa idem elicere, seu ex se agere et non agere, quomodo potentia rationalis est contrarietatis vel contradictionis. Idēo illa propositio non facit contra intentionem Aristotelis assignantis differentiam.

"Explicit Metaphysica Scoti!"

Balliol 234 (ff. 132rb-34vb)

3. QUOMODO VOLUNTAS REGIT INTELLECTUM

(Opus oxoniense II, dist. 42, qq. 1-4; nn. 10-11)

Quomodo est cogitatio in potestate voluntatis?

Respondeo ergo praemittendo tres propositiones. Prima, quod una intellectione perfecta et distincta existente in intellectu, multae intellectiones indistinctae et imperfectae possunt inesse. Patet in exemplo in visu, qui in pyramide et infra basim videt unum punctum in cono distincte, et tamen in eadem pyramide, et infra eandem basim videt multa imperfecte et indistincte, et tamen una est tantum visio perfecta istius, scilicet super quod cadit axis pyramidis; si hoc est possibile in sensu, multo magis in intellectu.

Secunda propositio est quod intellectione inexistente, licet non cognita ut obiectum, potest voluntas velle et complacere sibi in obiecto illius intellectionis et in illa intellectione, et non complacere sibi; aliter enim voluntas non posset copulare parentem cum prole, quod est contra Augustinum quasi ubique in libro [IX] *De Trinitate* [praesertim in c. 12, PL 42, 971].

Tertia propositio est quod voluntate complacente intellectioni intellectio firmatur et intenditur, ipsa autem non complacente vel nolente infirmatur et remittitur, et hoc declaratur sic: agens quod est

necessarily a being [as in the case of the heavenly bodies], it would necessarily depend upon the matter of the composite; it would be incorruptible, and the matter would necessarily be in this form actually, but not by reason of the matter itself, but because of the form.—Active potencies, however, are in contradictory potency, as Aristotle explained, by being present or not [to the patient they act upon]. If this means that the patient is either present to the agent or not, then all active potencies whose action depends upon a patient or recipient can be in potency of contradiction, not of themselves, but from another source. If this refers to what impedes an agent, then every perishable natural agent can be impeded even by some other naturally active cause: But no natural active potency has of itself the ability to elicit contrary actions as regards the same thing, or to act or not act, in the way a rational potency has [liberty] of contrariety [i.e., acting this way or that] or of contradiction [i.e., acting or not acting]. Therefore, that proposition [that "every potency is at the same time capable of contradictory states"] does not militate against what Aristotle had in mind when he assigned the aforesaid distinction [between rational and irrational powers].

3. HOW THE WILL CONTROLS THOUGHT

I reply by first setting forth three propositions. The first is that for every single perfect and distinct intellection existing in the intellect, there can be many indistinct and imperfect intellections existing there. This is evident from the example of vision, the field of which extends as a conical pyramid at the lower base of which one point is seen distinctly, and yet within that same base many things are seen imperfectly and indistinctly; but of these several visions, only one is perfect, namely, that upon which the axis of the pyramid falls. If this is possible in one of the senses, all the more so is it possible in the intellect.

The second proposition is that by some intellection existing there, though not known [distinctly] qua object, the will can will and take pleasure or not take pleasure in the object of this intellection or in the intellection itself; otherwise the will could not join the parent [the mind] with its offspring [knowledge], which is against what Augustine says almost everywhere in Bk. IX of *The Trinity*.

The third proposition is that the will, by taking pleasure in the intellection, strengthens and intends it, whereas the intellection that is nilled or in which the intellect takes no pleasure is weakened and dis-

sim.—Per idem etiam ad Commentatorem super VI *Ethicorum* de sororibus. Concedo quod sorores, etsi iuvent se mutuo ad convivendum, una tamen non est altera, nec una essentialiter perficit alteram; ita istae virtutes bene iuvant se mutuo quaelibet ad salvandum alteram, et in hoc potest intelligi illud dictum quorundam, quod una non est tota sine alia, quia non ita bene salyatur sine alia; nam homini exposito multis tentationibus circa diversas materias, imperfectio circa unam materiam est una occasio imperfecte agendi circa aliam, et perfecta dispositio agendi circa unam iuvat ad recte agendum circa aliam materiam; iuvant igitur se sicut sorores, sed nulla est essentialiter requisita ad perfectionem alterius, sicut prius nascitur una soror sine alia; et semper si non possint simul procreari; non autem possunt duo actus perfecti simul semper haberi per quos duae virtutes generentur, quia unus actus perfectus unius potentiae impediret actum alterius potentiae simul [quibus duae virtutes] tunc perfecte possent generari.

[*Articulus 2: De Connexione Virtutum Moralium cum Prudentia*]

Secundus articulus de connexione virtutum moralium cum prudentia duo habet dubia. Primum de connexione cuiuslibet virtutis cum sua prudentia; secundum de connexione omnium cum una prudentia.

[*Pars I: De Connexione Cuiuslibet Virtutis cum Prudentia*]

[*A. Opinio Aliorum*]

[*Opinio Henrici Gandavensis, Quodl. V, q. 17*].—Quantum ad primum, videtur quod illa connexio sit necessaria.

[*Argumenta*].—Quod probatur per Philosophum VII *Ethicorum*, capitulo tertio [passim] ubi sententia sua est si voluntas male eligit, intellectus male dictat. Istud ibidem dicit aliud ad eandem sententiam; quaere ibi [in Henrico, ff. 189D–190F]. Idem dicit capitulo 6, in fine, quod “malitia mentiri facit et erraret intellectum circa practica principia,” et ita destruit prudentiam.

Idem, quia impossibile est prudentem esse non bonum, et econverso.

{[*Additio*]}—Item, suppono duo: unum quod intellectus non possit simul plura intelligere; secundo, quod voluntas nihil possit velle sub

has the moral virtue of temperance does not merit [grace and glory] if humility does not accompany it, or at least if the opposite vice [of pride] is not in that person.—The same for the gloss on the words of Revelation.—And also for what the Commentator says about Bk. VI of the *Ethics* as to the virtues being “sisters.” I grant they are sisters, and although they help one another to live, one is not the other, nor does one essentially perfect the other. And to the extent that these virtues do indeed aid one another, each helping to preserve the other, one can understand that saying that one is not whole without the other, because one cannot well be saved without the other. For if a man is exposed to many temptations regarding different matters, imperfection in one matter can be the occasion of acting imperfectly in regard to some other matter, whereas a perfect disposition in acting about one is a help to acting correctly about another matter; therefore, the two [virtues] assist each other like sisters, but neither is essentially required for the perfection of the other, just as one sister is born before the other; and this is always the case if both cannot be procreated simultaneously. But it is not possible to have simultaneously the two perfect acts needed to produce the two virtues, because one perfect act in one potency would impede at that time the act of the other potency needed for the two virtues to be generated simultaneously.

[*Article 2: The Connection of the Moral Virtues with Prudence*]

As for the second article, about the connection of moral virtues with prudence, there are two doubtful points to be cleared up. One has to do with an individual virtue's relation to some proper aspect of prudence, and the other with the relationship of prudence as a whole with each of the moral virtues.

[*Part I: How Is Each Virtue Connected with Some Aspect of Prudence?*]

[*A. The Opinion of Others*]

[The view of Godfrey of Fontaines and Henry of Ghent] As for the first, it seems this connection is a necessary one.

[*Arguments*] Proof is from the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the *Ethics*, ch. 3. His view there is that if the will chooses badly, it is because the intellect was at fault. Henry cites other texts there to the same effect. Look them up. The Philosopher says at the end of ch. 6 that evil makes the intellect lie and err about practical principles and thus destroys prudence.

Also, it is impossible that a prudent person should not be good and that a good person should not be prudent . . .

{[*Addition*]} Also, I presuppose two points, one that the intellect could not understand several things perfectly at the same time, and

ratione mali; tunc arguo stante iudicio tantum de aliquo malo fugiendo, aut voluntas fugiet illud malum aut non. Si sic, ergo non potest voluntas esse mala, stante malitia cum iudicio recto. Si potest illud velle, ergo potest in malum sub ratione mali, vel aliquid non cogitatum.— Respondeo quod suppositio prima est falsa de duobus omnino disparatis ad se immediate oppositis, patet per parte, quia non potest esse nec intelligere unum relativum sine correlativo; nec actus sine subiecto; nec multo magis privatio sine subiecto apto nato, quae necessario supponit subiectum et aptitudinem ad formam qua caret. Non igitur potest intellectus intelligere privationem tantum, ut supponit argumentum, nisi in subiecto et ultimo apto nato; sicut nec unum relativum sine correlativo, nec actus sine subiecto. Intelligens igitur malum esse fugiendo; hoc praesentans voluntati, potest voluntas elicere actum subtractum malitiae, quae etiam concomitatur malitia necessario quodammodo, et tamen nolendo malitiam. Licet igitur intellectus possit intelligere subiectum sine privatione, non tamen privationem sine subiecto, quia privative opposita sunt immediata circa subiectum aptum natum.}

Item, *De motu animalium*, si maior proponatur ab intellectu practica, et minor assumatur sub a sensu vel phantasia, conclusio erit operatio; ita quod necesse est operari secundum eam si non impediatur. Numquam igitur secundum eum est operatio omnino contraria dictamini rationis. Et hoc etiam confirmatur per Augustinum super illud Psalmum [2], "Loquitur ad eos in ira sua": "Obliquatio vel obumbratio mentis sequitur eos, qui legem Dei transgrediuntur" [PL 36, 70].

Ad hoc etiam est illud dictum Dionysii: 4 *De divinis nominibus*: "Nullus operatur aliquid ad malum aspiciens" et illud de III *Ethicorum*, c. 3 [1110b27–29]: "Omnis malus ignorans," cui concordat illud *Sapientiae* [2:21]: "Excaecatur eos malitia eorum"; modus ponitur iste, quaere eos in V *Quodlibet* Henricus, q. 17 [f. 190F].—Si obiicitur contra istos per articulum condemnatum [Parisiis] quod dicit quod "stante scientia in universali et particulari de aliquo, voluntas non potest velle oppositum: error"; respondet Henricus *Quodlibet* X, q. 10 [f. 432T–X], quod ista propositio: "Manente scientia, etc., voluntas

secondly, that the will could not will something under the aspect of evil. Then I argue as follows: assume the judgment stands that something evil should be avoided; now the will either flees such evil or not. If it does, then the will cannot be evil. But suppose badness is presented correctly; now if the will could choose it, then it could tend to evil under the aspect of evil or as something not thought of. To this I reply that the first supposition, about the two entirely disparate objects that are opposed to one another immediately, is false. This is clear if we consider the individual parts, because one correlative cannot be known without the other. Neither can one know an act without knowing its subject. Still less can one know a privation without knowing the subject apt to have such, since a privation presupposes a subject together with an aptitude to have some form it lacks. Therefore, the intellect cannot know the privation alone, as the argument supposes, but can only know it as in a subject, and one in the last analysis that is suited by nature to have what is lacking. Neither can one know one correlative alone without the other or know an act without a subject. Therefore, if someone understands that evil must be avoided and presents this fact to the will, his will can elicit an act which avoids looking at the evil, though the evil is there as a quasi-necessary concomitant, and in this case the will still does not shun the evil. And even if the intellect could grasp the subject without the privation, it could not grasp the privation without a subject, because privative opposites are immediate so far as their natural subject is concerned.}

Also, *On the Movement of Animals*: "If the major premise is proposed by the practical intellect and the minor is taken from something known to the senses or imagination, the conclusion will be an operation," so that according to [Aristotle] it is necessary to act if one is not impeded. But according to him there is no operation that is completely counter to what reason dictates. Augustine also confirms this in what he says about that verse from Psalm 2: "He shall speak to them in his anger"—that "a twisting or darkening of the mind will follow those who sin against the law of God."

In support of this there is also that dictum of Dionysius in *The Divine Names*: "No one does anything considering it as evil," and that passage from III *Ethics*, ch. 3: "Every wicked man is ignorant of what he ought to do and what he ought to abstain from, and it is by reason of error of this kind that men become unjust and in general bad." And Wisdom 2:21 agrees with this: "Their malice has blinded them." As for the way in which this argument is presented see q. 17 of Henry's *Quodlibet* V.—And if one brings up that article condemned at Paris that says: "So long as general and particular knowledge of anything

non potest velle oppositum," est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem. In sensu divisionis est falsa, quia significat quod voluntas numquam habet potestatem volendi opposita, quod est falsum. In sensu compositionis iterum est distinguenda per hoc quod ablativus absolutus potest exponi per "si," vel "quia," vel "dum."—Si exponatur per "quia" vel per "si" falsum est, et verum est illud esse errorem; significat enim quod rectitudo in scientia vel intellectu, sit causa rectitudinis in voluntate. Si est exponatur per "dum," ita quod notet executionem vel concomitantiam, non causalitatem, tunc secundum eum potest habere veritatem dicta propositio et non est error, nec condemnatur; ita tamen quod intelligatur quod non sit prioritas naturae in errore intellectus, prius quam voluntatis. Simul enim tempore concomitatur se iste et ille; sed prior natura est error voluntatis, ita quod considerando intellectum quantum ad illud quod est prius natura actu voluntatis, rectus est, sed voluntate libere errante excaecatur intellectus, etsi simul tempore, posterius tamen natura.—Pro isto arguo sic, quia si prima electio non excaecaret intellectum, nec aliqua alia, nam prima potest esse aequae mala, sicut aliqua alia, et si non excaecat quando est mala, numquam excaecat et ita quaecumque malitiae actuales in voluntate, numquam excaecaret intellectum, et ita posset esse quantumcumque malus absque omni errore intellectus, quod videntur negare plures auctoritates.

[Impugnatio istius, primo per auctoritates]—Contra istud primo arguitur per auctoritates:

Una est Augustini super illud Psalmi [124:2], "Forte vivos deglutissent nos": "Sicut vivi," inquit, "sorbentur qui sciunt malum esse et consentiunt, aut moriuntur forte" [PL 37, 1642–43].

Istud idem super illud Psalmi [69:23], "Fiat mensa eorum," etc.: "Quid est vitiosus esset i.e. consentientes ubi scientes vitiis consentientur non debemus. Ecce muscipulam noverunt et pedem mittunt" [PL 36, 859].

Item, super illud Psalmi [119:20], "Concupivit anima mea": "Praecedit intellectus, sequitur tardus aut nullus affectus" [PL 37, 1522].

Ad hoc etiam videtur esse ratio et auctoritates Philosophi II *Ethicorum* [c. 4, 1105b7–2]. Primo dicit quod scientia vel ratio aut parum

remains, the will cannot will the opposite: an error," Henry replies in *Quodlibet* X, q. 10, that the proposition "So long as knowledge remains, etc., the will cannot will the opposite" must be distinguished according to composition and division. In the divided sense it is false, because it signifies that the will never has the power of willing the opposite, which is false; in the combined sense one must distinguish further, because the ablative absolute can mean either "if" or "because" or "while." If it is taken as meaning "because" or "if," it is false; and it is true that this is an error, for it means that correct knowledge or understanding is the cause of rectitude in the will. But if one explains it in the sense of "while," so that it signifies not causality but simply the fact that [error in the intellect] follows or accompanies [error in the will], then one can give the aforesaid proposition a true sense and it is neither an error nor condemned. It must be so understood, however, that one does not assert that by priority of nature an intellectual error has to occur before the will can err; for it is only that error is present in both faculties simultaneously. But error in the will is prior by nature to that of the intellect, so that if one considers the intellect only insofar as it is prior by nature to the will, the intellect is correct, but the will, by freely choosing to err, blinds the intellect, and this blindness occurs at the same time as the will errs, even though by nature it is posterior [because it is caused by the will].—For this interpretation I argue in this way. If the first choice of the will did not blind the intellect, then neither did any other, for the first could be just as evil as any other, and if no act blinded it, then no matter what the actual evil in the will might be, it would never blind the intellect, and thus one could become evil to any degree whatsoever without there being any error in the intellect, which seems to contradict several authorities.

[Authorities against this view] Against this view, to begin with, there are these arguments from authority:

One is Augustine's comment on Psalm [124:2]: "Perhaps they would have swallowed us up alive," where he explains: "They are swallowed up alive who know what evil is and consent to it, or perhaps die." And there is his other comment on Psalm [69:23]: "Let their table become a snare," viz., "What is more vicious than knowingly to consent to vices one should not consent to? Behold, they know the mousetrap and put their foot in it." And again, re Psalm [119:20]: "My soul has desired . . .," he says: "The intellect precedes, but the affections follow slowly or not at all."

The argument and authority of the Philosopher in II *Ethics* also supports this. First he says that "as a condition for virtue knowledge or

aut nihil valet ad virtutem; si autem rectitudo intellectus in considerando necessario haberet per concomitantiam rectam volitionem, cum scientia multum faciat ad considerationem, consequenter multum faceret ad rectum velle. Immo, sequitur aliud quod non oportet persuaderi alicui, quod non esset vitiosus, sed quod consideret secundum habitum intellectus, nam per te, considerando recte secundum habitum scientiae, non potest voluntas non simul esse recta, et ideo non oportet persuadere alicui de recte volendo, sed de recte considerando.

[Sex argumenta rationis]—Item, per rationem:

[1] Intellectu recte dictante, voluntas potest nihil eligere, sicut potest non eligere illud quod dictatur ab intellectu, quia non simul movetur ratio ab hoc et ab illo intellectu; nihil autem eligendo non generatur in ea aliqua virtus; sed ex recto dictamine generatur prudentia per te; ergo generabitur prudentia absque alia virtute morali.

[2] Item, quod mala electio non potest excaecare intellectum, ita quod erret circa agibilia. Probatio: termini sunt totalis causa notitiae principii primi in practicis sicut in speculabilibus, ex I *Posteriorum*; et forma syllogistica ~~ex~~ evidens omni intellectui; patet ex definitione syllogismi perfecti, I *Priorum*; ergo terminis apprehensis et compositis et facta deductione syllogistica, necesse est intellectum acquiescere conclusioni, cuius notitia dependet praecise ex notitia terminorum principii et notitia deductionis syllogisticae; igitur impossibile est voluntatem facere intellectum considerantem principia per deductionem syllogisticam, errare circa conclusionem et multo magis nec circa ipsa principia, et ideo nullo modo excaecabitur intellectus ita ut erret.—Si concedas conclusionem et dicas quod ideo voluntas excaecat intellectum, quia avertit intellectum a considerare vel a consideratione recta, contra: sic avertere non est excaecare, nam sic posset avertere stante prudentia; possibile est enim prudentem non semper considerare ea quae sunt prudentiae, sed quandoque voluntarie alia.

[3] Item, velle avertere requirit aliquod intelligere simul tempore et prius natura. Illud dictamen aut est dictamen rectae rationis stans, a quo voluntas vult eum avertere et tunc sequitur quod velle avertere

reason has little weight"; but if correctness of intellect in its considerations is accompanied by right volition, since knowledge contributes much to a correct evaluation of actions, consequently it will also do much for willing rightly. Indeed, if this were not so it would follow that one ought to persuade another not that he should not follow vice but that he should simply consider things according to right reason, for according to you, by considering things rightly according to a habit of knowledge, the will could not help but be right at the same time and, therefore, there is no need to persuade anyone to will rightly but only to consider things rightly.

[Six arguments from reason] There are also these arguments from reason:

[1] Given the fact that the intellect dictates correctly, the will can make no choice, since what the intellect dictates is not a matter of choice, and the intellect is not moved simultaneously from this and from that. If the will makes no choice, however, it generates no virtue in itself. But according to you, prudence is generated by right dictates; therefore, prudence will be produced without any other moral virtue.

[2] Also, a bad choice cannot blind the intellect so that it errs in its judgment about what can be done. Proof: terms of a proposition are the total cause of knowledge of first principles, whether these be practical or theoretical, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*; and the syllogistic form is evident to every intellect, as is clear from the definition of the perfect syllogism in Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics*; therefore, once the meaning of the terms is grasped and put into propositions and a syllogistic deduction is made, it is necessary that the intellect assent to the conclusion, whose knowledge depends precisely on a knowledge of the terms of the principles and knowledge of the syllogistic deduction; therefore it is impossible that the will should make the intellect, considering principles through a syllogistic deduction, err about the conclusion, and much less err about the principles themselves, and therefore there is no way in which the intellect can be blinded so that it errs.—If you grant this conclusion and say that therefore the will blinds the intellect by turning it away from considering something rightly, I say: No. To turn the intellect away is not to blind it; even if it could be turned away in this fashion, prudence would still remain; for a prudent person need not be considering always what is prudent, but may at times be willingly concerned with other things.

[3] Before the will can turn away the mind, it needs some coexistent knowledge as a naturally prior condition for so willing. Now, either [a] this dictate, by which the will wills to turn away the intellect, is a

non est peccatum per te, quia stat cum recto dictamine. Aut ille actus prius ipsi velle avertere est alius a dictamine recto, et si sit rectus, sequitur illud quod prius, scilicet quod velle avertere non sit peccatum, et ita ad ipsum nulla sequitur excaecatio. Si autem ille actus praevious ipsi velle avertere non sit rectus, non erit excaecatio intellectus sequens ipsum velle avertere, quia praecedat illud velle.

[4] Item, aut recto dictamine stante, voluntas male eligit, et ita habet propositum; aut si male eligit et ideo non stante recto dictamine, eligit posito aliquo actu intellectus et non recto, quia tunc per te non peccaret; ergo iste actus alius non rectus, erit praevious ipsi malo velle; ergo non est nisi rectus per aliud malum velle, et ita propositum, quia non est circulus propter processum in infinitum in causis et causatis, et per consequens voluntas non excaecat ad illud malum dictare, quod per te sequitur ad illud malum velle.

[5] Item, nullus in via est omnino incorrigibilis; ergo nullus potest omnino errare circa prima principia. Probatio consequentiae: quia errans circa prima principia practica, nihil habet per quod possit revocari ad bonum; per quaecumque enim fiat ei persuasio, negabit assumpta, quia nihil potest notius assumi quam primum principium practicum.

[6] Item, damnati non acquiescunt huic tamquam vero: "Deum esse odendum," quia tunc non haberet vermem de quo Isaiae ultimo: "Vermis eorum non morietur," nam simpliciter delectabiliter odirent Deum absque remorsu; ergo etc.

[B. *Opinio Scoti Propria*]

Quantum ad istum articulum potest dici quod simpliciter rectum dictamen potest stare in intellectu absque recta electione illius dictati in voluntate, et ita cum unicus actus rectus dictandi generet prudentiam; generabitur ibi prudentia absque omni habitu virtutis moralis in voluntate, et si sic, tunc quaeritur quomodo malitia excaecat intellectum secundum istas auctoritates? Dicitur potest quod excaecatur dupliciter: uno modo privative; alio modo positive; privative, quia aver-

dictate that stands with right reason, and then it follows that it is no sin to will to turn away the mind, according to you, because the will to do so coexists with a correct dictate, or [b] this act of knowledge, prior to the volition to avert, is something other than a right dictate, and then there are two alternatives. If it is right, then it follows as before, namely, that the will to avert is not a sin, and thus no blinding follows as a consequence. But if this act prior to willing to avert is not right, there will still be no blinding of the intellect that follows from the actual willing to avert, because that act precedes this willing.

[4] Also, either the will chooses badly despite the right dictate given it, and then you admit my position, or else it chooses badly without the right dictate present. Now, to choose, the will needs some knowledge or act of the intellect, and this act is not right, because—according to you—if it were right, there would be no sin. Therefore, this other act that is not right will be prior to the bad will itself. And the reason why it is not right can only be some other evil will, and—since there can be no circularity here, since it would imply an infinite sequence of causes and effects—my proposal would follow [namely, that the will chooses badly despite a right dictate], and consequently the will does not blind the intellect so that it dictates badly—a blinding that you claim follows from this bad will.

[5] Also, no one in this life is completely incorrigible; therefore, no one can be entirely in error about first principles. Proof of the implication. One who would err regarding first practical principles would have nothing which could recall him to what is good. For whatever one assumes might persuade him to return will be denied, for no assumption of this sort could be more knowable than a first practical principle.

[6] Also, the damned would not agree that the proposition "God must be hated" is true, for then they would not have the worm referred to in that last verse of Isaiah: "Their worm shall not die nor their fire be extinguished, and they shall be abhorrent to all mankind"; for they take unqualified delight in hating God remorselessly; therefore [they know God should be loved and their reason is not blinded].

[B. *Scotus' Own Opinion*]

As for this article, it could be said that the intellect can have a dictate that is right in an unqualified sense without the will having to choose in conformity to that dictate. And since a single right act of dictating what should be done generates prudence, prudence will exist in the intellect without any moral habit in the will. But if this is so, then one can ask: How does evil blind the intellect, as the authorities claim? To this one can say it blinds in two ways, one privatively, the

tit a recta consideratione; voluntas enim eligens oppositum alterius rectae dictati, non permittit intellectum diu stare in illo recto dictamine, sed avertit ipsum ad considerationes pro opposito, si quae possunt esse rationes sophisticae vel probabiles ad illud; aut saltem avertit ad considerandum aliquid aliud impertinens, ne stet illa actualiter displicentia quae stat in remorsu illo qui habetur in eligendo oppositum dictati.—Positive autem excaecat sic: nam sicut voluntas recte eligens finem praecipit intellectui considerare illa, quae sunt necessaria ad illum finem, et intellectum sic inquirendo media ordinata ad illum finem rectum generat in se habitum prudentiae, ita voluntas eligens sibi malum finem potest quidem sibi praestituere malum finem, sicut dictum est distinctione prima primi, imperat intellectum considerare media necessaria ad consequendum illum finem. De quo bene dicit Augustinus *De civitate Dei* XIV, capitulo ultimo [PL 41, 436] quod voluntas habet suas virtutes sicut ibi pertractat, hoc est voluntas per eam sibi praestituens finem malum praecipit intellectum invenire vel adducere media necessaria ad delectabilia consequenda et tristibilia opposita fugienda. Et sicut habitus generatus ex imperio voluntatis bene eligentis in intellectu dictante circa media ad illum finem bene electum perquirendum, est prudentia, ita in voluntate male eligente, habitus acquisitus ex dictamine circa ea quae ordinantur ad illud male electum est error, et habitus directe oppositus habitui prudentiae, et potest vocari "imprudencia" vel "stulticia," non tamen privative, sed etiam positive et contrarie, quia sicut prudens habet habitum quo recte eligat ordinata ad finem debitum, sic iste habet habitum ad recte et prompte eligendum media ordinata ad finem praestitutum a voluntate mala. Et quia talis habitus generatur ex imperio voluntatis, pro tanto verum est quod voluntas mala excaecat, non quidem faciendo errare circa aliqua complexa, sed faciendo intellectum habere actum vel habitum considerandi aliqua media ad malum finem; et totus ille habitus error est in agibilibus, licet non sit error quantum ad speculationem.

[Dubium eiusque solutio]—Aliud dubium posset hic esse, si simul non necessario generetur habitus rectus intellectivus et habitus bonus appetitivus, quia contingit bene dictare circa hoc, non bene agendo circa illa, an habitus intellectualis generatus sine virtute morali sit pru-

other positively. Privatively, because it turns the intellect away from the consideration of what is right; for the will by choosing the opposite of what right reason dictates does not allow the intellect to remain thinking for long about its right dictate, but turns its consideration to probable or sophistical reasons for the opposite, if such can be found; or at least it turns it to some other irrelevant matter, lest that actual displeasure remain that consists in the remorse for choosing the opposite of what one knows to be right.—Positively, however, it blinds it in this way. Just as the will in rightly choosing the end commands the intellect to consider those things which are necessary to attain that end, and the intellect, by thus considering the means ordered to attaining that right end, generates in itself a habit of prudence, so the will in choosing a bad end for itself (it can indeed prescribe that bad end for itself, as was said in dist. 1 of the first book) commands the intellect to consider the means necessary to attain such. Augustine has a good description of this in the final chapter of Bk. XIV of *The City of God*. For the will has its virtues, as he discusses them in that book, but what he implies here is that the will, by setting before itself an evil end, commands the intellect to find the means and set forth the ways needed to attain its delights and forestall any terrible consequences. And just as prudence is the habit generated in the intellect at the command of the will once it has chosen well—a command, namely, to dictate suitable means for attaining its well-chosen end—so also the habit acquired by the intellect (when it carries out the will's command to dictate means needed to attain the evil end it has chosen) represents an error, and a habit of knowledge directly opposed to prudence. One could call it "imprudence" or [as Augustine implies in the aforesaid chapter] "stupidity"—not however in a privative sense, but rather in a positive and contrary sense. For just as a prudent person has a habit whereby he quickly chooses the right means for a good and fitting purpose, so this person has a habit by which he quickly and correctly chooses those means ordained to achieve the bad end the will has prescribed for itself. And since this habit was generated under a command of the will, to that extent it is the evil will that blinds, not indeed by making the intellect err regarding some proposition, but by forcing it to perform an act and develop a habit of considering some means for attaining a bad end; and this habit as a whole represents an error regarding actions, though it is not an error theoretically speaking.

[A doubt and its solution] Another doubt could arise here. If a correct intellectual habit and a good appetitive habit need not be simultaneously generated, because it could happen that one dictates well regarding this matter but the other does not act well in its regard, two

dentia, et an econverso habitus generatus in appetitu sine illo [in] intellectu sit virtus moralis.

[Ad quaestionem primam]—Quantum ad primum de prudentia potest dici quod stricte loquendo non est sine virtute morali, quia est recta ratio agibilium confesse se habens appetitui recto ex VI *Ethicorum*, c. 2 [1139a30]. Appetitus autem non est rectus sine virtute morali. Si hoc esset verum, tunc prima dictamina circa principia agibilium recta essent, tamen non essent prudentiae, sed quaedam seminaria prudentiae, sed etiam circa media quae sunt necessaria ad finem praestitutum a voluntate, esset aliquis habitus recte dictativus, non tamen esset prudentia.

Posset ergo poni duplex habitus intellectivus circa agibilia et rectus, et neuter esset prudentia. Unus quidem, qui praecederet rectam electionem finis in particulari, et ille non esset prudentia, quia non est circa media ordinata ad finem, quia est habitus consiliativus; consilium non est de fine sed de entibus ad finem. Est etiam discursivus, quia consiliativus, et ita de his ad quae discutitur. Electo autem fine bono, non tantum in communi sed etiam in particulari, ut quod caste vivendum est, posset esse aliquis intellectus dictativus de his quae sunt ad finem, sed non habens secum electionem rectam tamquam concomitantem; et ille quantum est ex parte obiecti, esset prudentia; esset ratio recta circa ea quae sunt ad finem, sed deficeret sibi alia conditio, quia videlicet non esset concors appetitui recto circa eadem obiecta.

Secundam viam istam esset dicendum quod quicumque habitus generatur in intellectu, licet practicus et rectus sive circa finem particularem vel universalem, sive circa media necessaria ad consequendum finem illum particularem electum, si non concomitetur recta electio voluntatis circa eadem, non est prudentia.

[Instantia]—Et si arguitur contra istud sicut arguitur contra praedictum articulum de connexionione virtutum moralium, quia in ista concordia sequeretur prudentiam constituere virtutem moralem, et econverso; et ita per unum actum ultimate generaretur uterque habitus, scilicet prudentia et virtus moralis; ille autem unus actus non posset esse intellectus et voluntatis, sed tantum alterius; ergo non posset esse generativus utriusque.

[Solutio]—Posset dici quod non est necessaria conformitas unius virtutis moralis ad aliam, quia nulla est regula alterius, sed cuiuslibet est necessaria conformitas ad prudentiam, quia in definitione virtutis

questions arise: Is the intellectual habit generated without the moral virtue prudence? and vice versa, Is the habit generated in the appetite without this understanding [or that in the intellect] a moral virtue?

[One answer to the first question] To this first question about prudence one could say that strictly speaking prudence is never without moral virtue, because according to the definition in VI *Ethics*, ch. 2, prudence is a correct judgment "in agreement with right desire"; but the appetite is not right without moral virtue. Now, if this be true, then [not only] could the first dictate about practical principles be right without being the result of prudence (though they are a sort of seedbed of prudence), but also right dictates about the means necessary to attain some end prescribed by the will could be a habit dictating correctly, yet not one called prudence.

Thus there could be two correct intellective habits in regard to actions neither of which would be prudence. One is that which would precede correct choice of a particular end, and this would not be prudence, because it is not concerned about the means to an end, whereas [prudence] is a consultive habit, and counsel is not about the end but about the means to the end. Prudence is also discursive, because it is consultive, and thus has to do with things one treats discursively. But once a good end has been chosen, not only in general but also in particular, such as to live chastely, there can be some directive intellect as to the means for achieving such an end, but it is not actually accompanied by a right choice. Now, this would be prudence, so far as the object is concerned, for it is right judgment about means to an end, but the other condition is lacking, namely, it is not accompanied by a righteous desire regarding the same object.

According to this way it must be said that any habit generated in the intellect, although it is practical and correct as regards a particular or universal end, or in regard to the means necessary to attain the particular end chosen, if it is not accompanied by a right choice of the will in regard to the same, is not prudence.

[Objection] And if one argues against this as was done in the preceding article about the connection of moral virtues, namely, that it would follow that by reason of this accord, prudence constitutes the moral virtue and vice versa; and thus one act in the last analysis suffices to generate both habits, namely, prudence and the moral virtue; but this act cannot be one of both the intellect and the will; therefore, it is an act of one or the other, and hence it could not generate both habits—[Solution] it could be said that what is necessary is not conformity of one moral virtue with another, because no one is the rule for the other, but conformity of each moral virtue to pru-

cadit quod sit habitus electivus secundum rectam rationem, et ideo posset esse constitutio per modum concomitantis etiam habitus in esse morali per prudentiam et econverso; non sic moralium inter se. Et tunc concederetur quod simul generaretur aliquis habitus in ratione prudentiae, et alius habitus in ratione virtutis moralis, et generatur per unum habitum vel actum qui generat ultimatē vel virtutem moralem vel prudentiam. Inconveniens enim est in moralibus quod unus actus ultimatē generet duas virtutes morales; sed hoc non est inconveniens in prudentia et temperantia, quia ille actus qui generat prudentiam in ratione regulativi, generat temperantiam in ratione regulativi; non autem habet rationem virtutis nisi ex ratione regulativi et ideo generat temperantiam in ratione virtutis. Non sic potest dici comparando eam ad fortitudinem, quia fortitudo non est regula eius. Diceretur igitur quod non constituunt se in esse virtutis per aliquam prioritatem, quasi una sit prius virtus quam reddat aliam esse virtutem, sed simul natura est habitus intellectualis prudentiae et virtutis moralis sibi correspondens.

Et si quaeratur per quam generantur isti duo habitus in esse perfecto, concedo quod per unum actum, sive ille actus sit recta electio, quia absque recta electione finis non est habitus appetitus concors rationi recta; ideo nec prudentia sive ille actus sit intellectus, quia absque recto dictamine intellectus, non est electio concors rationi rectae, ideo nec virtuosa nec generativa virtutis moralis, tam igitur actus intellectus quam actus voluntatis generando aliquid per se in esse naturae, potest concomitanter generare illud in esse regulativo et ulterius concomitanter suum correlativum, et ita unus actus generaret simul naturā virtutem moralem et eius prudentiam.

Secundum hoc diceretur quod uterque habitus praecedens electionem rectam esset quidam habitus scientiae moralis vel quaedam scientia moralis. Quemadmodum enim in factibilibus, artifex dirigit ab experto, quia artifex scit propter quid, expertus tantum quia; I *Metaphysicae* [c. 1, 981a24–31]; artifex etiam non est promptus in agendo; expertus autem est promptus in agendo, ut ibidem dicitur: ita in moralibus. Habens habitum rectum principii agibilium vel conclusionis, non autem exercitatus in operando sive in diligendo vel ordinando vel

dence, because a defining characteristic of virtue is that it is an elective habit in accord with right reason; and therefore, a habit could be constituted also in its moral being by the presence of prudence as a concomitant condition, and vice versa, prudence could be constituted by moral virtue as a concomitant condition; but one moral virtue does not constitute another in this way. And then one could grant that one habit that is prudence and another that is moral virtue could be generated simultaneously, and that this effect is produced by one act or one habit which ultimately generates either the moral virtue or the corresponding habit of prudence. For while it is incongruous that one act generate two moral virtues, it is not incongruous that such should occur with prudence and temperance, because this act which generates prudence in its regulative role, also generates temperance in a regulative role. But since temperance does not have its character as a virtue except by reason of this regulative role, this act or habit also generates it in its character as a virtue. But one cannot say this about temperance as regards fortitude, because fortitude does not exercise a regulative function in regard to temperance.—Hence one would not claim that prudence and moral virtue constitute themselves as virtues according to any priority, as though one were a virtue before the other was, but by a simultaneity of nature there is the intellectual habit of prudence and corresponding to it a moral virtue.

And if one asks: By what are these two habits produced in their perfection? I concede it is by one act, whether that act be a right choice (for without a right choice of the end there is no appetitive habit in accord with right reason, and therefore, neither is there prudence) or an act pertaining to the intellect (for without a right dictate of the intellect there is no choice in accord with right reason, and hence nothing virtuous or productive of moral virtue). Therefore, either the act of the intellect or the act of the will, by generating something *per se* in its natural being, can concomitantly give both it and, what is more, its correlative their respective regulative characters, and thus one act can generate by a simultaneity of nature both the moral virtue and the prudence that corresponds to it.

According to this it may be said that both habits preceding a righteous choice would indeed be habits of moral science or of special moral knowledge. For just as in making art products the artist is directed by experience, because the artist knows the reason why, but the one with experience knows how to do it, according to Bk. I of the *Metaphysics*, and also the artist is not prompt in acting, whereas one with experience is (*ibid.*), so too it is in morals. One who has only a right habit of practical principles or conclusions, but is not experi-

dirigendo se circa agibilia, licet habeat remotum habitum directivum, qui habitus potest dici intellectus vel scientia moralis, non tamen habet habitum directivum propinquum, qualis est prudentia, et qualis est in factibilibus habitus experti.

[Alia responsio ipsius Scoti]—Licet istud videatur probabiliter dictum de distinctione scientiae practicae et prudentiae, tamen quia non solum est prudentia circa media ordinata ad consequendum finem ultimum, sed etiam dictando de ipso fine, saltem particulari, puta de castitate (quod probatur primo sic, nam virtus moralis semper sequitur ordine quodam naturae prudentiam aliquam; ex electione autem finis particularis, puta castitatis, generatur virtus moralis; igitur illam electionem praecedat aliqua prudentia); ideo non videtur proprie tantum restringenda prudentia, ut ponatur tantummodo habitus circa media determinata et dictata quae ordinatur ad finem particularem electum, sed etiam circa ipsum finem per se, et proprie.

Hoc etiam secundo probatur, quia tunc non esset una prudentia correspondens uni virtuti morali, nam una virtus moralis est ex unitate finis, ad cuius electionem principaliter inclinatur. Si autem ad dictandum de illo fine nulla esset prudentia, sed tantum de mediis ad illum finem, nullum esset obiectum, a quo esset unitas prudentiae dictativae, sed multae essent prudentiae de multis mediis dictativis ad finem, ubi tamen esset una virtus ex unitate finis. Tum igitur propter prioritatem prudentiae naturalem ad virtutem moralem, tum propter unitatem prudentiae respectu unius virtutis moralis, videtur esse concedendum quod ille actus practicus, qui est recte dictativus de fine particulari sit proprie prudentia.

Nec obstat quod dicitur prudentiam esse habitum consiliativum, et ita ad finem et discursivum, nam de finibus propriis vel proprie virtutum moralium dictatur discurrendo a principio practico sumpto a fine universali particulari posito et iste discursus est prima consiliatio, licet communius dicatur consilium de mediis virtutum.

Ad aliud autem quod additur quod sit concors appetitui recto, non movet. Nam prius naturaliter non videtur habere aliquid de ratione sua dependentis a posteriori, prudentia autem in quantum prudentia videtur esse prior naturaliter virtute morali quia definit ipsam. Quod igitur dicitur ibi concors, sicut tactum fuit in illa quaestione primi de theo-

enced in acting or in loving or in ordering or in directing in such matters, although he may have a habit that is remotely directive (which can be called understanding or moral science)—such a one, I say, does not have a proximate directive habit, such as prudence, which is like the habit of one experienced in making things.

[A more probable answer] Although the above may seem a probable solution to the distinction of practical knowledge and prudence, prudence is concerned not only with means ordered to attaining one's ultimate end, but also with directing one to an end, at least to a particular end, such as chastity. This is proved first in the following way. For, according to a certain order of nature, moral virtue always follows some form of prudence; but by choosing a particular end such as chastity, a moral virtue is generated; therefore some prudence precedes this choice. Therefore, it seems that prudence should not be restricted solely to the habit for dictating the specific means which are ordered to a particular chosen end, but should also be concerned with that end properly and *per se*.

This is proved secondly because otherwise one specific prudence would not correspond to one moral virtue, for such a virtue is unified by reason of the choice of its end, and to this it principally inclines one. But if prudence dictated nothing about that end but only about the means thereto, there would be no object from which this prudential direction would get its unity, but there would be many "prudences" concerned with the many dictates directed to that end, and yet there would be but one moral virtue derived from the unity of its end. Hence, both because of the natural priority of prudence to moral virtue as well as for the sake of giving unity to the prudential knowledge involved with one moral virtue, it seems one ought to concede that this practical act that directs one rightly to a particular end is properly speaking prudence.

It is no objection to say that prudence is called a consultive habit, and so has to do with the means to an end and reasons to these, for concerning proper ends or those proper to moral virtues it dictates by reasoning from a first practical principle taken from some universal end particularly applied, and this discourse represents a first consultation, although more commonly counsel refers to the means for attaining virtues.

The other point that is added, about prudence being conformed to a righteous appetite, does not shake this position, for what is naturally prior does not seem to derive anything of its essential being from what is posterior. But prudence qua prudence seems to be naturally prior to moral virtue because it defines it. What therefore is said about a con-

logia practica et speculativa, debet intelligi concors, id est conformativa praxis rectae sibi ipsi, hoc est quod cognitio debet esse talis quod quantum est ex se praxis recta debet sibi conformari; talis autem est cognitio sive in eodem dictante sequatur electio recta sive non.

Potest igitur aliter dici quod ille habitus generativus ex dictaminibus, sive circa fines saltem in quosdam particulares qui sunt proprie fines virtutum moralium, sive circa media ordinata ad illos fines circa quae forte non sunt alii habitus ab illis qui sunt circa illos fines, est proprie prudentia, licet electio recta non sequitur in eodem dictante, et ita omnino non erit necessaria connexio alicuius virtutis moralis ad prudentiam dictativam de sua materia. Tamen econverso, nulla electio potest esse recta moraliter nisi sit concors suae regulae et suae mensurae, quod est dictamen rectum; dictamen autem rectum natum est generare prudentiam, etiamsi unicam. Ideo econverso potest concedi connexio quod virtus moralis non potest sine prudentia circa materiam suam.

Ad rationes et auctoritates Augustini adductas responderi potest. Quaere de hoc, Henricus *Quodlibet* XIV vel V, q. 3.

[Pars II: De Connexione Omnium Virtutum Moralium in Una Prudentia]

[Opinio aliorum]—De alia parte illius articuli, scilicet de connexione omnium virtutum in una prudentia, videtur Philosophus dicere quod sic VI *Ethicorum*, c. 7 [1145a1–2]: “Prudentia uni existenti omnes inerunt.” Commentator, ibi quaere.

Qualiter autem una prudentia sit circa omnia moralia posset poni sicut de uno habitu scientiae; quaere opinionem [Henrici] et eius probationem super VI *Metaphysicae*, q. 1.

[Opinio propria]—Quantum igitur ad istum articulum potest dici quod sicut ars respicit factibilia, ita prudentia agibilia; nec maior est connexio agibilium ut respiciantur ab uno habitu, quam factibilium; sicut ergo diversa factibilia requirunt diversas artes proprias, ita diversa agibilia diversas prudentias proprias; et sicut potest aliquis moraliter bene esse affectus circa aliqua agibilia et male circa alia, ita etiam in dictando potest esse habituatus ad recte dictandum circa ista et non circa illa; tamen nec ista sunt principia ad dictandum de illis, nec conclusiones sequentes ex eis.

formity there, must be understood in the way explained in our first question, about practical and theoretical theology, namely, it is conformed to right practice itself, i.e., the knowledge must be such that so far as it itself is concerned right practice must be conformed with it. But knowledge is of this sort whether or not it is followed by a right choice on the part of the one who has such.

Hence one could give another answer, that this habit, generated by correct judgments, whether about the means to an end or about the ends themselves (at least certain particular ones which are properly speaking the ends of distinct moral virtues and where perhaps there is no other judgmental habit about such ends), is prudence, even though a correct choice does not follow. And then it would not be always necessary that a corresponding moral virtue be connected to a prudential judgment about some moral matter. But the converse relationship is different, for no choice can be morally right unless it is conformed to some rule or measure, which is a correct dictate. Such a right dictate, however, is suited by nature to generate prudence, even though this prudence refers only to this particular matter. Therefore, one can concede the existence of the converse connection, since a moral virtue cannot exist without there being a prudential habit concerned with its respective matter.

To the reason and authorities cited for the opposite view one can find answers. Look them up in Henry's *Quodlibet* XIV or V, q. 3.

[Part II: The Connection of All the Moral Virtues in One Prudential Habit]

[The views of others] As for the other part of this article, namely, the connection of all moral virtues in one habit of prudence, it seems that the Philosopher says they are connected in Bk. VI of his *Ethics*, ch. [13]: “For with the presence of the one quality, prudence, will be given all the virtues.” Look up the Commentator's remarks on this text.

As to how one can make a case for one virtue of prudence in regard to all moralia, even as one assumes one habit of science, look up the opinion of Henry and my critique of it in the first question on Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*.

[Scotus' own view] As for this article, one can say that just as art regards all makable things, so prudence regards all possible actions, neither is there any greater connection of possible actions with regard to one habit than there is among makables; therefore just as diverse artifacts require their own proper arts, so diverse actions require their proper prudences; and just as one's affects towards some actions may be good and one's affects towards others bad, so also in dictating what should be done, one can be habituated to judge rightly regarding some

creata secundum ordinem suum ad deficere, sic est aliquid eius, sed ut dicit fundamentum huius ordinis, non est aliquid ipsius. Sicut autem ista potestas est aliquod ens positivum, ita est a Deo, quoniam ex ipso et in ipso et per ipsum sunt omnia, ipsi honor et gloria. Amen.

Codex A (ff. 138vb-39ra)

29. DE PECCATO LUCIFER *Editio Vaticana Vol. 8*
(*Ordinatio II*, dist. 6, q. 2)

34 Videndum est primo de ordine actuum voluntatis. Et circa hoc dico quod est in communi duplex actus voluntatis, scilicet velle et nolle: est enim nolle actus positivus voluntatis, quo fugit disconveniens sive quo resilit ab obiecto disconveniente; velle autem est actus quo acceptat obiectum aliquod conveniens. Et est, ulterius, duplex velle,—quod potest nominari “velle-amicitiae” et “velle-concupiscentiae,” ut dicatur velle-amicitiae esse illius obiecti cui volo bonum, et velle-concupiscentiae esse illius obiecti quod volo alicui alii amato.

35 Et istorum actuum patet ordo, quia omne nolle praesupponit aliquod velle: a nullo enim refugio, nisi quia non potest stare cum aliquo, quod accepto tamquam conveniens; et hoc dicit Anselmus, *De casu diaboli*, capitulo tertio [ed. Schmitt, I, 239], ponens exemplum de avaro, nummo et pane. Et istorum duorum velle patet ordo, quia concupiscentia praesupponit illud velle-amicitiae: cum enim amatum sit—respectu concupiti—quasi finis cui volo bonum (nam propter amatum concupisco sibi bonum, quod sibi volo), et cum finis habeat primam rationem voliti,—patet quod velle-amicitiae praecedit velle-concupiscentiae.

36 Et ex isto, probato, sequitur ulterius quod similis est processus in actibus deordinatis: nullum enim nolle est primus actus voluntatis deordinatis, quia non posset habere nolle nisi in virtute alicuius velle,—et si velle esset ordinatum (acceptando obiectum cum circumstantiis debitis, nolle quod haberetur consequenter, similiter esset ordinatum; eodem modo, si velle-amicitiae esset ordinatum, velle-concupiscentiae consequens illud, esset ordinatum,—nam si ordinate amo illud cui amo bonum, ordinate volo quod concupisco sibi, cui volo bonum.

about created liberty and its capacity to choose badly, then this is only a part of what pertains to the perfection of the will, whereas the basis for choice itself [namely, the freedom to act in diverse ways] is a matter of perfection purely and simply, for this power is a positive reality and thus is in God, from whom and in whom and through whom all things exist, to him be honor and glory. Amen.

29. THE SIN OF LUCIFER

First we must examine the order that exists among the acts of the will. And here I say there is a twofold act of the will, namely, to like and to dislike, for dislike is a positive act of the will whereby it turns away from the distasteful and shuns the inconvenient, whereas to like or love is the act whereby it accepts some appropriate or suitable object. Furthermore, there is a twofold like or love, one which can be called the love of friendship [or benevolence], another called the love of desiring or wanting or coveting. Friendship or benevolent love concerns an object of well-wishing, whereas the love of desire concerns some object I want for some other beloved.

The order among these acts is clear, for every dislike presupposes some liking, for I turn away from something only because it is inconsistent with something I regard as suitable; and this is the point of Anselm's example of the miser who gives up his money to buy bread (*The Fall of the Devil*, ch. 3). And the order that exists among the two forms of love is also evident, because the coveting presupposes the other love of friendship. For, with respect to what is desired, the one befriended becomes a quasi-end for the sake of whom I want this good (since it is for the sake of the beloved that I desire the good I wish that person to have). And since the end has the distinction of being the first object willed, it is clear that friendship or benevolent love precedes the love of desire or coveting.

And it follows further, from what has been proved, that there is a similar process in disorderly acts, for the first inordinate act can never be one of dislike, since it is only in virtue of something liked or loved that an act of dislike is possible. And if the love is orderly as to its object and all the circumstances, then the dislike that is a consequence of such a love would also be in order. By the same token, if the friendship-love would not be inordinate, the consequent love of desire would also be ordinate. For if that for which I desire some good is loved ordinately, then the will whereby I desire something for the one I wish well will also be in order.

37 Sequitur igitur quod simpliciter primus actus voluntatis, inordinatus, fuit primum velle-amicitiae respectu eius cui voluit bonum. Hoc autem objectum non fuit Deus, quia non potuit Deum inordinate—ex intensione—amare ex amicitia, nam Deus est tale amabile quod ex sola ratione sui ut objectum est, dat completam rationem bonitatis actui perfecte intenso. Nec est verisimile quod aliquod aliud a se nimis intense dilexerit actu amicitiae: tum quia inclinatio naturalis magis inclinavit ad se quam ad aliquid aliud creatum sic dilexerit sicut se,—tum quia amicitia fundatur super unitatem (VIII *Ethicorum* [c. 4, 1056b33–35]) et amicabilia ad alterum procedunt ex amicabilibus ad se ipsum (ex IX *Ethicorum* [c. 4, 1166b30–31]). Igitur primus actus, inordinatus, fuit actus amicitiae respectu sui ipsius.

38 Et hoc est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV *De civitate Dei*, capitulo ultimo [PL 41, 436]: “Duo amores fecerunt duas civitates: civitatem diaboli, amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei.” Prima ergo radix civitatis diaboli fuit inordinatus amor amicitiae, quae radix germinavit usque ad contemptum Dei,—in quo consummata est ista malitia. Sic patet de inordinatione simpliciter prima, quae fuit simpliciter in primo velle inordinato.

39 Nunc restat videre de prima inordinatione ipsius velle-concupiscentiae. Et videtur ibi esse dicendum, quod primo concupivit sibi immoderate beatitudinem; quod probatur:

Primo sic, nam primum concupiscere inordinatum non processit ex affectione iustitiae, sicut nec aliquod peccatum processit; ergo ex affectione commodi, quia “omnis actus voluntatis, elicited, aut elicited secundum affectionem iustitiae aut commodi,” secundum Anselmum [*De casu diaboli* I, cc. 13–14; I, 255–59]. Maximum commodum maxime appetitur a voluntate non-sequente regulam iustitiae, et ita primo, quia nihil aliud regulat illam voluntatem non-rectam nisi appetitus inordinatus et immoderatus illius maximi boni commodi; maximum autem commodum est beatitudo perfecta; ergo etc.—Et haec ratio habetur ab Anselmo *De casu diaboli*, capitulo quarto, quaere ibi [I, 241–42].

40 Secundo probatur hoc, quia primum peccatum in concupiscendo fuit aliquod velle; nihil enim refugit a se—hoc est—ne sibi aliquid contingat, nisi quia eius oppositum concupiscit sibi. Aut ergo illud concupivit amore honesti, aut amore utilis, aut amore delectabilis (quia non est nisi iste triplex amor quo aliquid amatur): non amore honesti, quia tunc non peccasset; nec amore utilis, quia ille non est primus amor (ex quo enim utile respectu alicuius est utile, nullus primo concupiscit utile, sed illud ad quod est utile). Primo ergo peccavit amando aliquid excessive tamquam summum delectabile; delec-

It follows, then, that [Lucifer's] very first inordinate act of will was the first benevolent love he had towards one to whom he wished well. But this object was not God, for God could not have been loved inordinately, speaking intensively of friendship-love. God is so lovable solely by reason of the object he is, that he renders the most intensive act of love completely good. Neither is it likely that something other than oneself could have been loved too much by an act of friendship-love, first because a natural inclination tends more towards self than towards any other creature, and also because friendship, according to Bk. VIII of the *Ethics*, is based on oneness, and (from Bk. IX) what is amicable for others has its roots in what is amicable for oneself. The first inordinate act, therefore, was one of benevolence towards himself.

And this is what Augustine says in *The City of God*, Bk. XIV: “Two loves created two cities; the love of God to the contempt of self created the city of God and the love of self to the contempt of God created the city of the devil.” The first source from which the city of the devil stems, then, is inordinate friendship-love, which root germinates until it yields contempt of God, in which malice reaches its peak. It is clear, then, that the initial disorder in an unqualified sense consists in that inordinate love that was simply first.

What remains to be seen is what the initial disorder was in regard to the love called desire. And here it seems we have to say that [Lucifer] first coveted happiness immoderately. The proofs are these:

First, the initial inordinate desire did not proceed from an affection for justice, as no sin proceeds from such. Hence, it must have come from an affection for the advantageous, because every act elicited by the will stems from an affection either for justice or for the advantageous, according to Anselm. And a will that fails to follow the rule of justice will seek most of all what is most advantageous, and thus it will seek such first, for nothing else rules that unrighteous will but an inordinate, immoderate appetite for that greatest beneficial good, namely, perfect happiness.—And this reason can be gleaned from what Anselm says in ch. 4 of *The Fall of the Devil*. Look for it there.

The second proof is this. The first sin of covetousness will be one of love or desire (for nothing is shunned to avoid disaster except it be that one desires the opposite of such a calamity). And this first love called “desire” is either just, utilitarian, or hedonistic (for nothing is loved save in one of these three ways). But it was not a just or honorable love, for then the angel would not have sinned; neither is it utilitarian, for this is never first (inasmuch as this regards someone for whom it is useful, and no one covets the useful first, but rather that for which it is useful). Hence he first sinned by loving something exces-

rabile autem summum, est bonum honestum et ipsa beatitudo unde talis; ergo, etc.—Et ista ratio potest accipi a Philosopho VIII *Ethicorum* [cc. 3–4], ex illa communi distinctione boni: utilis, delectabilis et honesti.

42 Tertia persuadetur hoc sic, quia omnis potentia appetitiva consequens in actu suo actum potentiae apprehensivae appetit primo delectabile convenientissimum suae cognitivae,—vel delectationem in appetibili, quia in tali appetibili maxime quietatur; quod patet de appetitu consequente apprehensionem gustus, vel auditus, vel tactus,—quia quilibet talis appetit obiectum perfectissimum potentiae apprehensivae, cuius actum consequitur in appetendo. Ergo voluntas separata ab omni appetitu sensitivo, primo omnino appetit illud quod est convenientissimum intellectui, cuius convenientiam sequitur illud appetere,—vel primo appetit delectationem in tali obiecto, et per consequens beatitudinem, includentem obiectum et actum et delectationem consequentem.

43 Quarto persuadetur hoc sic: illud primo appetitur a voluntate non regulata per iustitiam, quod—si esset solum—solum appeteretur, et nihil aliud sine eo. Tale est delectatio; non enim excellentia (nec quodcumque aliud), si esset triste, appeteretur, sed delectatio vel aliquid tale appeteretur.

44 Quantum igitur ad istum secundum gradum, scilicet quantum ad peccatum angeli, videtur quod primo concupierunt beatitudinem:

Quia sicut primum peccatum appetitus visivi esset in appetendo pulcherrimum visibile suae cognitivae (in quo perfectissime delectaretur et quietaretur), ita voluntatis coniunctae appetitui sensitivo—quando ipsa non sequitur iustitiam nec regulam rationis—videtur primum appetibile esse aliquid summe delectabile illi appetitui sensitivo, cui voluntas maxime conformatur in agendo. Et ideo in hominibus, secundum diversitatem complexionum, est dominium appetituum sensitivorum: si quidem quaelibet cognitiva habet appetitum proprium et secundum diversitatem complexionum est diversitas domini in cognitivis diversis et in earum appetitivis, in quodlibet—inquam—voluntas, secundum praedominium appetitus sensitivi, maxime inclinatur ad actum eius; et ideo quidam sequentes inclinationem primam sine regula iustitiae, primo inclinatur ad luxuriam, quidam primo ad superbiam et quidam aliter.

45 Voluntas igitur separata ab omni appetitu sensitivo, et per consequens ad nihil inclinata propter inclinationem appetitus sensitivi, ipsa—deserta a iustitia—sequitur inclinationem absolutam voluntatis

sively as his supreme delight. What is supremely delightful, however, is the honorable good and as such is beatitude itself [viz., God].—And this argument is based on what the Philosopher says in Bk. VIII of the *Ethics* and the commonly accepted distinction of good into what is useful, delightful, and honorable.

Third, there is this persuasive argument. Every appetite whose act presupposes some antecedent awareness first craves that delectable most in harmony with its associated cognitive power, or the delight that comes from having such, because this most satisfies its hunger. This is clear in the parallel instances of taste, hearing, and touch, where the associated appetite triggered by these senses craves the most perfect object of which they are actually aware. A will unassociated with any sense appetite, then, first seeks what is most agreeable to the intellect or the delight that comes from such an object in harmony with the mind, for desire follows from such knowledge. Hence the will first wants such happiness as comes from knowing and delighting in the knowledge of such an object.

A fourth persuasive argument is this. If justice did not regulate it, what the will would want first is something it would want if such alone existed and in the absence of which nothing else would be wanted. Now, delight is such a thing. For if one were sad, what one would want would be not some excellence or any other such thing, but happiness or something like it.

As for the angel's first sin of desire, then, he would apparently have first coveted happiness.

For just as the first sin of the visual appetite would be coveting a vision of what is most beautiful to the eye (which would most perfectly delight and satisfy it), to a will joined to a sense appetite, but unchecked by right reason or justice, the first appeal would appear to be something most inviting to the sense appetite with which the will was most in harmony at the time it acted. And so in men the dominance of sense appetites is in accord with their varied dispositions. For if each cognitive power has its corresponding appetite, and, according to the different ways they are disposed, various cognitive powers and appetites may predominate, still I say in each case, the will is most inclined towards that action dictated by the predominant sense appetite. Thus anyone who follows his first inclination unchecked by any rule of justice will in one case be first inclined to lust; in another, to pride; in a third, to something else.

A will unassociated with any sense appetite, then, and consequently not attracted to anything by the inclination of such an appetite, if deserted by justice, follows that inclination the will has in itself as will.

unde voluntas;—nam in quo maxime perficitur cognitiva, in illo maxime perficitur appetitiva correspondens illi cognitivae. Fuit igitur immoderata concupiscentia beatitudinis, quia beatitudo est obiectum voluntatis.

46 Et si arguatur contra istud:

Primo, quia secundum Augustinum (XIII *Trinitatis*, c. 5 [PL 42, 1020]), beatitudo ab omnibus appetitur; quod autem est in omnibus uniformiter, videtur esse naturale; igitur beatitudo naturaliter appetitur. Appetitus autem naturalis semper est rectus, quia a Deo; ergo et voluntas ei consona semper est recta, quia quod est consonum recto, est rectum; ergo in appetendo beatitudinem nullus peccat.

47 Praeterea, nullus intellectus errat circa principia (II *Metaphysicae* [c. 5, 933b4–5],—ergo nec voluntas circa ultimum finem. Consequentia probatur per illam similitudinem Philosophi—ex VII *Ethicorum* [c. 8, 1151a16–17] et II *Physicorum* [c. 9, 200a20–23], “sicut principium in speculabilibus, sic finis in operabilibus.”

48 Praeterea, tertio: boni habuerunt affectionem commodi sicut mali; sed secundum Anselmum—*De concordia* [III, 11, ed. Schmitt II, 280–81]—voluntas commoda non-velle nequit; igitur ita volunt boni commodum sicut mali. Ergo, omnes aequaliter peccaverunt, si ex affectione commodi peccaverunt; ergo etc.

Ad primum.

49 Ad videndum autem solutionem istum rationum, distinguo, quid possit intelligi per istas “affectiones iustitiae et commodi,” de quibus loquitur Anselmus *De casu diaboli*, c. 4 [I, 241].

Iustitiae potest intelligi vel infusa (quae dicitur “gratuita”), vel acquisita (quae dicitur “moralis”), vel innata (quae est ipsamet libertas voluntatis). Si enim intelligeretur—secundum illam fictionem Anselmi *De casu diaboli*—quod esset angelus habens affectionem commodi et non iustitiae (hoc est, habens appetitum intellectivum mere ut appetitum talem et non ut liberum), talis angelus non posset non velle commoda, nec etiam non-summe velle talia; nec imputaretur sibi ad peccatum, quia ille appetitus se haberet ad suam cognitivam sicut modo appetitus visivus ad visum, in necessario consequendo ostensionem illius cognitivae et inclinationem ad optimum ostensum a tali potentia, quia non haberet unde se refraenaret. Illa igitur affectio iustitiae, quae est prima moderatrix affectionis commodi et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet voluntatem actu appetere illud ad quod inclinat affectio commodi et quantum ad hoc quod non oportet eam summe appetere (quantum scilicet ad illud ad quod inclinat affectio commodi), illa—inquam—affectio iustitiae est libertas innata voluntati, quia ipsa est prima moderatrix affectionis talis.

For what perfects the intellect most, perfects the appetite corresponding to this cognitive power. Hence, [the angel's first sin of covetousness] was an immoderate desire for happiness, for happiness is the object of the will.

Against this you may raise these objections:

First, happiness is wanted by everyone, according to Augustine in ch. 5 of Bk. XIII of *The Trinity*. But what is found uniformly in all would seem natural. Therefore, happiness is wanted naturally. But a natural appetite is always right, because it comes from God. Hence, a will conformed to this is always right, because it is conformed to what is right. Therefore, in seeking happiness no one sins.

Furthermore, no intellect errs in regard to first principles, according to *Metaphysics*, Bk. II. Therefore, neither does the will err as regards its ultimate end. The validity of the inference is proved from the Philosopher's analogy that as the principle functions in theory, so the end functions in practice (*Ethics*, Bk. VII, and *Physics*, Bk. II).

A third objection, also, is that the good would have an affection for the advantageous just as well as the evil. But according to Anselm in *The Harmony between Foreknowledge and Free Will*, the will is unable not to will the beneficial; hence the good will the beneficial good just as the evil do. Therefore, all would have sinned equally, if they sinned because of the affection for the advantageous.

To the first:

In order to understand the solution to these objections, I first distinguish ways in which these affections for justice and the beneficial that Anselm speaks of in ch. 4 of *The Fall of the Devil* might be understood.

Justice can be understood to be either infused (which is called gratuitous or grace), or acquired (which is called moral), or innate (which is the will's liberty itself). For if one were to think, according to that fictitious situation Anselm postulates in *The Fall of the Devil*, that there was an angel with an affection for the beneficial, but without an affection for justice (i.e., one that had a purely intellectual appetite as such and not one that was free), such an angel would be unable not to will what is beneficial, and unable not to covet such above all. But this would not be imputed to it as sin, because this appetite would be related to intellect as the visual appetite is now related to sight, necessarily following what is shown to it by that cognitive power, and being inclined to seek the very best revealed by such a power, for it would have nothing to restrain it. Therefore, this affection for justice, which is the first checkrein on the affection for the beneficial, inasmuch as we need not actually seek that towards which the latter affection inclines us, nor must we seek it above all else (namely, to the extent to which we are inclined by this affection for the advantageous)—this

50 Et licet Anselmus frequenter loquatur non tantum de actu iustitiae quae est acquisita, sed infusa, (quia illam dicit amitti per peccatum mortale, quod non est verum nisi de iustitia infusa), tamen distinguendo ex natura rei duas rationes primas istarum rationum, in quantum altera inclinat voluntatem summe ad commodum, altera autem quasi moderatur eam ne in eliciendo actum oporteat sequi inclinationem eius—nihil aliud sunt ista quam eadem voluntas, in quantum est appetitus intellectivus et in quantum libera, quia sicut dictum est, in quantum est appetitus mere intellectivus, summe inclinaretur actualiter ad optimum intelligibile (sicut est de optimo visibili, et visu), in quantum liber est, potest se refrænare in eliciendo actum, ne sequatur illam inclinationem—nec quantum ad substantiam actus nec quantum ad intensionem—ad quam potentia naturaliter inclinatur.

51 Potentia autem aliqua, si fuisset appetitiva praecise, sequens in actu suo inclinationem eius sicut appetitus visivus sequitur inclinationem visus et visum, licet—inquam—illa non posset appetere nisi intelligibile (sicut nec appetitus visivus potest appetere nisi visibile), tamen non posset tunc peccare, quia non esset in potestate eius aliud nec aliter appetere quam cognitiva ostenderet et inclinaret. Ipsa eadem, facta iam libera (quid nihil aliud est nisi quod una res includit virtualiter plures rationes perfectionales, quas non includeret si esset sine ratione libertatis), ipsa—inquam—per libertatem suam potest se moderari in volendo, et quantum ad hoc quod est velle ad quod inclinat affectio commodi, et licet inclinet summe ad velle commodum; et ex quo potest moderari, tenetur moderari secundum regulam iustitiae, quae accipitur ex voluntate superiore. Secundum hoc ergo patet quod voluntas libera non tenetur omni modo velle beatitudinem (quae voluntas si esset tantum appetitus intellectivus, sine libertate,—vellet eam), sed tenetur—in eliciendo actum—moderari appetitum unde appetitus intellectivus, quod est moderari affectionem commodi, ne scilicet immoderate velit.

52 Potest autem voluntas—potens se ipsam moderari—immoderate velle beatitudinem quae sibi congruit, tripliciter: vel quantum ad intensionem, puta volendo eam maiore conatu quam sibi congruat; vel quantum ad accelerationem, puta volendo eam citius quam sibi congruat; vel quantum ad causam, puta volendo eam sibi aliter quam sibi congruat (puta sine meritis, vel forte modis aliis, de gradibus omnibus non oportet hic curare).

53 Aliquo igitur istorum modorum, probabile est quod excesserit vo-

affection for what is just, I say, is the liberty innate to the will, since it represents the first checkrein on this affection for the advantageous.

Anselm may often be speaking not just of the actual justice which is acquired, but of infused justice, because he says it is lost through mortal sin, something true only of infused justice. Nevertheless by distinguishing from the nature of the thing the two primary characteristics of this twofold affection (one inclining the will above all to the advantageous, the other moderating it, as it were, lest the will in eliciting an act should have to follow its inclination), he makes these aspects out to be nothing other than the will itself insofar as it is an intellectual appetite and insofar as it is free. For, as has been said, qua pure intellectual appetite, the will would be actually inclined to the optimum intelligible (as sight is to what is best visible), whereas qua free, it could restrain itself in eliciting its act from following this natural inclination, as to either the substance of the act or its intensity.

But if some power were exclusively appetitive, following its inclination in acting as the visual appetite follows the visual inclination of the eye (though I admit it could only want what is intelligible, as the visual appetite can only seek what is visible), that power still could not sin in seeking such, for it would be powerless to seek anything other than what the intellect would show it or in any way other than the cognition would incline it. But this same power, having been made free (because we have nothing more here than one thing which includes virtually several perfectional aspects, which it would not include if it lacked that of liberty)—this power, I say, through its liberty could moderate itself in willing. It could do so as regards that volition towards which it is inclined by the affection for the advantageous, even though it might be most inclined to will the advantageous. And from the fact that it could moderate this, it is bound to do so according to the rule of justice it has received from a higher will. It is clear, then, from this that a free will is not bound in every way to seek happiness (in the way a will that was only an intellectual appetite without liberty would seek it). Rather it is bound, in eliciting its act, to moderate the appetite qua intellectual, which means to moderate the affection for the advantageous, namely, lest it will immoderately.

There are three ways, however, in which a will, able to moderate itself as regards the happiness befitting it, could fail to do so. As to intensity, it might love it more passionately than it deserves. Or through precipitance, it might want it sooner than is becoming. Or with disregard to the proper causal way to obtain it—for instance, it might want it without meriting it—or perhaps for other reasons, all of which one need not bother with here.

Probably in one of these ways, then, the will of the angel went to

luntas eius: vel plus scilicet appetendo sibi beatitudinem in quantum est bonum sibi quam amando illud bonum in se, plus scilicet appetendo illud bonum (ut obiectum beatificum) esse bonum suum tamquam sibi bonum quam appetendo illud inesse alii (ut Deo suo),—et in hoc is summa perversitas voluntatis, quae est uti fruendis et frui utendis secundum Augustinum 83 *Quaestionum*, q. 30 [PL 40, 19]; vel secundo modo,—potuit appetere habere statim eam, cum tamen Deus vellet eum illam habere post morulam viae; vel tertio modo,—appetendo eam ex naturalibus haberei (non habendo eam gratiose), cum tamen Deus vellet eam haberi ex meritis.

54 Debit igitur libera voluntas moderari affectionem quantum ad istas circumstantias, quas recta ratio habuit ostendere,—quia et debuit beatitudo minus appeti sibi quam Deo, et debuit appeti pro tempore pro quo Deus voluit, et ex meritis pro quibus Deus voluit debere appeti.

Igitur si aliquo istorum modorum sequebatur affectionem commodi, non moderando eam per iustitiam (hoc est per infusam, si habuit,—vel acquisitam—vel innatam sive naturalem, quae est ipsamet libertas), peccavit.

55 Per hoc igitur ad argumenta.

Ad primum. Voluntas naturalis non est de se immoderata, sed tantum inclinatur per modum naturae,—et in hoc non est immoderata, quia inclinatur sicut accepit inclinari, nec est in potestate sua aliud; in potestate autem voluntatis ut libera est actu elicitio, est tantum inclinari, vel minus.

56 Quando ergo accepit quod voluntas naturalis est respectu beatitudinis, concedo,—sed non actualiter immoderata actu elicitio; non enim est inclinatio appetitus naturalis aliquis actus elicitus, sed est sicut perfectio prima,—et haec non est immoderata, sicut nec natura cuius est. Tamen ita inclinatur affectione commodi in obiectum suum, quod—si ex se haberet actum elicitum—non posset illum moderari quin eliceretur summe, quantum posset elici; sed voluntas ut habens solum affectionem commodi, naturalem, non est causa alicuius actus eliciti, sed tantum ut libera, et ideo ut eliciens actum habet unde moderatum passionem.

57 Quando ergo accipitur quod voluntas, consona voluntati, naturali, semper est recta (quia et illa semper est recta) respondeo et dico quod consonat sibi in eliciendo actum, sicut illa eliceret si ex se sola ageret,—non est tamen recta, quia habet aliam regulam in agendo, quam illa haberet si ex se sola ageret; tenetur enim sequi voluntatem superiorem, ex quo in moderando illam inclinationem naturalem in potes-

excess: Either by wanting happiness as a good for him rather than loving it as a good in itself—that is, wanting a good, like the beatific object, to belong exclusively to himself, rather than to be in another, such as in his God. And this would be the supreme perversity of the will, which—according to Augustine (*Eighty-three Different Questions*, q. 30)—is to use as means what is to be enjoyed as an end, and treat as an end what is to be used as a means. Or the angel could have failed in the second way, wanting at once what God wished him to have after a period of probation. Or it might have been in the third way, by wanting to possess happiness by natural means rather than by earning it by grace, since God wished him to merit it.

His free will, then, should have moderated his desire in such ways as right reason had revealed to him. For happiness should have been wanted less for his sake than for the sake of God, and he should have wanted it at the time God intended and on the basis of merit, as God planned. If in some such fashion, then, he yielded to this affection for the advantageous, not moderating it through justice, be it infused (if the angel had such), or acquired, or innate (which is liberty itself), then he sinned.

With this in mind, then, consider the objections.

As for the first, the natural will is not of itself immoderate, since it inclines only after the manner of nature—and in this it is not immoderate, for it inclines as it was made to do, nor has it power to do otherwise. But to be so inclined or less inclined is in the power of the will as free, through an elicited act.

When the natural will is taken to be orientated towards happiness, I grant this. But this will is not actually immoderate through an elicited act. For the inclination of a natural appetite is not an elicited act, but resembles the first perfection [i.e., something identical with the substance or being of the will]. And this is no more immoderate than is the nature to which it belongs. However, that nature is so inclined towards its object by this affection for the advantageous that if it had of itself an elicited act, it could not help eliciting it with no moderation in the most forceful way possible. But the natural will, as having only the affection for the beneficial, is not the cause of any elicited act; only the will as free can cause such, and therefore, qua eliciting an act, the will does have what is required to moderate passion.

As for the assumption, then, that a will conformed to a natural will [or appetite] is always right, because what is natural is always right, I reply by saying this. If in eliciting its act, the will behaves as it would if it were acting solely on its own, then it is not right, for it has another rule for acting than it would have if it were to act solely on its own. For it is bound to follow a higher will [viz., that of its Creator], from

tate eius est moderari vel non moderari, quia in potestate eius est non summe agere in quod potest.

58 Ad secundum dico per idem, quod non est in potestate intellectus moderari assensum suum veris, quae apprehendit,—nam quantum ostenditur veritas principiorum ex terminis vel conclusionum ex principiis, tantum oportet assentire, propter carentiam libertatis. Sed voluntas potest—in se et in potentiis inferioribus—moderari ne illa inclinatio omnino dominetur in eliciendo actum, vel saltem ne actus eliciatur: potest enim avertere intellectum ne speculetur talia speculabilia circa quae inclinaretur, et tenetur avertere si speculatio eorum sit peccatum materialiter intellectui vel formaliter voluntati; sic—ex alia parte—voluntas, respectu finis ultimi, tenetur moderari inclinationem sui ad ipsum ne immoderate velit, alio scilicet modo quam velle debeat et ne alio modo velit illud sibi quam illud sit in se.

59 Aliter potest dici, quod sicut actus intellectus considerando principium in se non potest esse falsus, ita nec actus voluntatis amando finem in se potest esse malus,—et iste actus est actus amicitiae, non actus concupiscentiae; tamen sicut actus intellectus posset esse falsus attribuendo veritatem primae causae alicui principio creato, cui non congruit illa veritas,—ita actus voluntatis potest esse malus concupiscendo bonitatem ultimi finis alicui alii ab ultimo fine, eo modo quo non congruit alicui alii.

60 Ad tertium dico quod in bonis erat inclinatio naturalis ad beatitudinem, quanta erat in malis,—et maior, si habebant meliora naturalia, quia ista inclinatio est secundum perfectionem naturalium; tamen boni in eliciendo actum non utebantur voluntate in quantum scilicet est appetitus intellectivus tantum, agendo scilicet tali modo quo appeterent appetitu intellectivo agere,—sed utebantur voluntate secundum eius perfectam rationem (quae est libertas), agendo secundum voluntatem eo modo quo congruit agere libere in quantum liberum agit: hoc autem erat secundum regulam superioris voluntatis determinantis, et hoc iuste.

61 Et cum dicitur “commoda non-velle nequit,” respondeo: boni nec poterunt nec voluerunt, nolle sibi beatitudinem, etiam sibi concupiscendo,—se illam non voluerunt plus sibi quam Deo bene esse in se, sed minus, quia illud velle ita potuerunt moderari per libertatem.

whom it was given the power to moderate or not moderate this natural inclination, for it has the power not to act in the most passionate and forceful way that it could.

My reply to the second objection is the same. It is not in the intellect's power to temper its assent to the truth it apprehends. For when it is shown the truth of principles in the very meaning of their terms, or that of conclusions as contained in their principles or premises, it must assent, for it lacks the freedom to do otherwise. But the will—both in itself and in the powers under its control—can be moderated so that no act is elicited, or if one is, it is not completely dominated by this inclination [for the beneficial]. For the will can turn away the intellect, lest it think about such things as it is inclined to do, and the will is bound to do so, if such thoughts would represent in the intellect matter for sin, or lead to formal sin in the will. On the other hand, the will has an obligation to moderate its own inclination towards its ultimate end, lest it will this immoderately, or want to possess it in an unbecoming way, or want it only for self rather than as something good in itself.

Another answer to this objection would be that just as an act of the intellect considering a principle in itself cannot be false, so an act of the will loving the end in itself cannot be evil. But the act in this case is an act of friendship and not one of covetousness. But just as the act of an intellect could be false in ascribing the truth that some first cause exists to some created principle to which it does not belong, so an act of the will can be bad by wanting the goodness of the ultimate end to pertain to something other than the ultimate end, in a way unfitting to any other.

To the third, I say there was a natural inclination towards happiness in the good [angels] as well as in the bad—in fact, a greater inclination if their natural endowments were greater, for this inclination increases in proportion to the perfection of one's natural gifts. But in eliciting an act the good did not use the will as a mere intellectual appetite, by wanting happiness in the way such an appetite would want it, but made use of the will's more perfect aspect (which is liberty), by acting in a way befitting a free agent as acting freely. But this means they acted in a manner ordained by a higher will, and hence they acted justly.

As for the claim that it is impossible not to will the beneficial, I reply: The good neither were able, nor wished, to dislike having happiness, or to have no desire for it. But they did not want it more than they wanted God to have everything good; rather they wished for happiness less than they wished God well, for they could moderate this desire through their liberty.

62 Et si obicias "ergo nullo modo bene appetebant sibi beatitudinem, sed tantum bene moderabantur illud appetere," respondeo:

Habere actum perfectum appetendi bonum sibi, ut per illum magis ametur obiectum in se,—hoc est ex affectione iustitiae, quia unde amo aliquid in se, inde volo aliquid in se; et ita boni potuerunt appetere beatitudinem, ut habentes illam perfectius amarent summum bonum: et iste actus concupiscendi beatitudinem, esset meritorius, quia non utitur fruendo sed fruitur eo, quia bonum quod concupisco mihi, ad hoc concupisco ut plus amem illud bonum in se.

63 Viso igitur de primo inordinate concupito, potest poni quod inordinate ulterius concupivit sibi aliquod bonum, scilicet excellentiam respectu aliorum. Vel habuit inordinatum nolle, nolendo scilicet opposita eorum quae concupivit: scilicet nolendo sibi beatitudinem minus inesse quam Deo in se (sive quam Deum esse), vel nolendo eam habere ex meritis sed ex se; et ex consequenti, nolendo subesse Deo,—et tandem, nolendo Deum esse, in quo tamquam in summo malo consummata videtur malitia: sicut enim nullus actus formaliter melior est quam Deus diligere, sic nec aliquis actus formaliter peior est quam Deum odire.

30. PECCATUM EX MALITIA

(Opus oxoniense II, dist. 43, q. 2)

Circa distinctionem quadragesimam tertiam quaeritur utrum voluntas creata possit peccare ex malitia volendo aliquid non ostensum sibi sub ratione boni veri, i.e. bonum simpliciter, vel boni apparentis et secundum quid.

[Argumenta Pro et Contra]

Hic dicitur quod secundum auctoritatem Dionysii IV *De divinis nominibus* [PL 122, 1145]: "Nullus operatur ad malum aspiciens."

Sed contra hoc videtur, quia tunc voluntas creata non posset tendere in obiectum sub ea ratione sub qua non posset tendere voluntas divina; voluntas enim divina potest tendere in omne bonum substratum illi deformitati, licet non in illa rationem malitiae concomitantem.

[Corpus Quaestionis: Duae Opiniones]

Et si concedatur quod omne volibile ab una voluntate sit volibile etiam ab alia, quia omnis voluntas habet obiectum aequae commune, non tamen illud quod est ordinate volitum ab una voluntate, est ordi-

And if you object: Then the good really did not pursue happiness very well, but only did well to moderate this desire, I reply:

To want an act to be perfect so that by means of it one may better love some object for its own sake, is something that stems from the affection for justice, for whence I love something good in itself, thence I will something in itself. And thus the good could have wanted happiness so that, by having it, they could love the highest good more perfectly. And this act of wanting happiness would have been meritorious, because they are not using what is to be enjoyed as an end, but are enjoying it, for this good that I covet for myself, I desire in order that I may love that good in itself [i.e., God].

Seeing what the angel initially desired inordinately, we can assume he went on to covet for himself some further good, such as superiority over others. Or he could have had an inordinate dislike, such as hating anything opposed to what he wanted, for instance, he could have been unwilling to have happiness in a lesser degree than God himself, or disliked the very existence of God. Or he might have been unwilling to postpone his happiness to the end of his period of probation, or to earn it through merits. Consequently, he was unwilling to submit to God, and to that extent, did not want God to exist. In this his malice appears to have reached its peak, for just as no act is better formally than to love God, so no act is formally worse than to hate God.

30. THE SIN OF MALICE

In reference to dist. 44 [of Bk. II] the question is raised: Can the created will sin out of malice by willing something that does not have the characteristic of a true (i.e., unqualified) good or apparent (or qualified) good?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

Here it is claimed on the authority of Dionysius in *The Divine Names* that "no one acts with an eye for evil."

But this does not seem to be so, because then the created will could not tend towards an object under any aspect other than what the divine will could, for the divine will can tend towards every good underlying that deformity [that is evil], even though the divine will cannot will the evil aspect that accompanies it.

[Body of the Question: Two Opinions]

If it be conceded that everything capable of being willed by one will is also able to be willed by the other, since the object of either will is equally extensive, it still does not follow that what is willed orderly by

PART II

The Will and Its Inclinations

5. THE WILL AND ITS INCLINATIONS

According to Anselm, two affections may be assigned to the will, namely, the affection for justice and the affection for the advantageous. He treats of these extensively in *The Fall of the Devil*, ch. 14, and *The Harmony of God's Foreknowledge, Grace, and Predestination*, ch. 19. The affection for justice is nobler than the affection for the advantageous, understanding by "justice" not only acquired or infused justice, but also innate justice, which is the will's congenital liberty by reason of which it is able to will some good not oriented to self. According to the affection for what is advantageous, however, nothing can be willed save with reference to self. And this we would possess if only an intellectual appetite with no liberty followed upon intellectual knowledge, as sense appetite follows sense cognition. The only point I wish to make from this is the following. To love something in itself [or for its own sake] is more an act of giving or sharing and is a freer act than is desiring that object for oneself. As such it is an act more appropriate to the will, as the seat of this innate justice at least. The other act [of wanting something for oneself] pertains to the will inasmuch as it has an affection for the advantageous.

From this it follows that just as these affections are distinct in the will, so also the habits inclining one to these acts will be distinct. That is why I say that charity perfects the will insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection for justice, whereas hope perfects the will insofar as it is inclined to, or subject to, the affection for what is advantageous. And so charity and hope will be distinct virtues not

5. VOLUNTAS EIUSQUE INCLINATIONES (*Ordatio* III, suppl. dist. 26)

In voluntate secundum Anselmum assignantur duae affectiones, scilicet affectio iustitiae et affectio commodi, de quibus tractat *De casu diaboli*, capitulo decimo quarto et *De concordia*, undevigesimo, diffuse. Nobilior est affectio iustitiae quam commodi, non solum intelligendo de acquisita et infusa, sed de innata, quae est ingenita libertas secundum quam potest velle aliquod bonum non ordinatum ad se. Secundum autem affectionem commodi nihil potest velle nisi in ordine ad se, et hanc haberet si praecise esset appetitus intellectivus sine libertate sequens cognitionem intellectivam, sicut appetitus sensitivus sequitur cognitionem sensitivam. Ex hoc volo habere tantum quod, cum amare aliquid in se sit actus liberior et magis communicativus quam desiderare, illud sibi et conveniens magis voluntati inquantum habet affectionem iustitiae saltem innatae. Alius autem conveniat voluntati inquantum habet affectionem commodi.

Sequitur quod sicut istae affectiones sunt distinctae in voluntate, ita etiam habitus inclinantes ad actus illos erunt distincti in voluntate. Dico ergo quod caritas perficit voluntatem inquantum est affectiva vel affecta affectione iustitiae, et spes perficit inquantum est affectiva vel affecta affectione commodi, et ita erunt distinctae virtutes non tantum ex actibus, quae sunt amare et desiderare, sed etiam ex susceptivis,

quae sunt voluntas inquantum habet affectionem iustitiae et etiam commodi.

Codex A (f. 170va)

6. VOLUNTAS NATURALIS ET VELLE NATURALE (*Ordatio* III, dist. 17)

Dico quod voluntas potest accipi sub propria ratione vel sub generali ratione et notita, scilicet pro appetitu. Si generaliter accipiatur, sic ad minus in Christo fuerunt tres appetitus, scilicet intellectus increatus et rationalis creatus et irrationalis creatus, scilicet sensitivus. Sed proprie voluntas addit super appetitum, quia est appetitus cum ratione liber, et sic stricte loquendo tantum fuerunt in Christo duae voluntates. Sed communiter loquendo accipiendo voluntatem pro appetitu, sic puto quod in Christo, sicut in nobis, fuerunt tot appetitus quot sunt potentiae apprehensivae distincte in nobis. Et ita sicut alia est apprehensio gustus et visus, alia tactus et odoratus, ita est alia virtus propria appetitus huius et illius, et alia delectatio propria consequens hanc apprehensionem et illam. Communiter tamen loquimur de appetitu sensitivo sicut de uno . . .

Sed quid de voluntate naturali et libera? Suntne duae potentiae? Dico quod appetitus naturalis in qualibet re generali nomine accipitur pro inclinatione naturali rei ad suam propriam perfectionem, sicut lapis inclinatur naturaliter ad centrum, et si in lapide sit inclinatio illa aliud absolutum a gravitate, tunc consequenter credo quod similiter inclinatio naturalis hominis secundum quod homo ad propriam perfectionem est aliud a voluntate libera. Sed primum credo esse falsum, scilicet quod inclinatio lapidis ad centrum sit aliud absolutum a gravitate et alia potentia, quae potentia habeat aliquam operationem in centrum, ut aliqui imaginantur. Mirabilis enim tamen foret illa operatio, cum non esset dare terminum illius, quia esset actio transiens; et cum centrum sit conveniens sibi, non agit actionem corruptivam ipsi nec salvatorem, quia non posset poni qualis esset illa operatio nec quis terminus ipsius nisi forte conservando proprium ubi, quia forte ubi suum in centro est continue in fieri, sicut lumen in medio. Sed tunc actio illa non est in centrum, quia ubi est in locato et non in locante, et centrum est locans corpus in eo. Igitur ultra gravitatem non dicit nisi relationem inclinans eius ad centrum ut ad propriam perfectionem.

only by reason of their acts, which are to love and to desire respectively, but also by reason of what receives these acts, namely, the will insofar as it has an affection both for justice and for what is advantageous.

6. NATURAL WILL AND NATURAL VOLITION

I say that will can be understood either properly or in the general sense of an appetite. Taken in this broader meaning, there were at least three appetites present in Christ, namely, (1) an uncreated intellectual appetite, (2) a created rational appetite, and (3) an irrational or sense appetite. Properly speaking, however, the will is more than an appetite, because it is a free appetite coupled with reason. Strictly speaking, then, there were but two wills in Christ. But according to common usage, which equates will with appetite, in Christ, as in ourselves, there were as many appetites as there are distinct powers of apprehension in us. Just as perception by sight or taste is other than that grasping a thing by touch or smell, so too is the proper appetite associated with each distinct, as is also the pleasure consequent upon each sort of apprehension—even though we commonly lump them together and speak as if there were but one sensitive appetite.

But what about natural and free will? Are these two powers? I say that a natural appetite in anything is just a general name for a thing's natural inclination towards its proper perfection. A stone is naturally inclined to the center of the earth, for example. Now, if such an inclination in the stone were some absolute thing other than its heaviness, I might then believe that man's natural inclination qua man to his proper perfection was something other than his free will. But I believe the first to be false, namely, that the inclination of the stone towards the center is something absolute in addition to its heaviness and represents another power that functions with respect to the center, as some imagine. But it would have to be a transeunt sort of action with no end point. The center is what is sought, yet the operation neither destroys nor preserves it. No one has suggested a solution as to what sort of operation is involved save that it concerns, perhaps, conservation of one's proper place. But it may well be that its presence in the center is in a continual state of becoming, like light in the intervening space. But then the action is not directed into the center, because the whereabouts or ubiety is in the subject that is in place and not in the place where it is located, and it is the center which locates the body in it. Hence, besides the heaviness there is only the relation inclining a weight towards the center as its proper perfection.