

QUESTIONS
ON THE METAPHYSICS
OF ARISTOTLE
BY JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

II

BOOKS SIX-NINE

Translated by

Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.

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QUESTION FOURTEEN

Could something be moved by itself?

Since the Philosopher says in the first chapter of Bk. IX:¹ "Insofar as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted upon by itself, for it is one and not two different things," therefore the question can be raised whether anything can be moved by itself.

[Arguments pro and con]

1 [1] From the text of Aristotle just cited it is argued that nothing can move itself.

2 His proof from the definition of potency there² seems to imply this, because potency is a principle of changing another.

3 Also, it is argued from a reason suggested in Bk. II, *On the Soul*,³ [that, if something could move itself], then—if it were natural [and not a voluntary agent]—it would be always acting. For this action would not depend upon anything outside, since what is acting and being affected is identical. But the consequent is clearly false.

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 1, 1046a 28-30.

²Ibid., ch. 1, 1046a 12-16: "For one kind is a potency of being acted on, that is a principle in the very thing acted on of its being passively changed by another thing qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of a principle of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula of potency in the primary sense."

³Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417a 2-8: "Here arises a problem: why do we not perceive the senses themselves as well as the external objects of sense, or why without the stimulation of external objects do they not produce sensation, seeing that they contain in themselves, fire, earth and all the other elements, which are the direct or indirect objects of sense? It is clear that what is sensitive is so only potentially, not actually. The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition." Ibid., 417b 16-21: "In the case of what it is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect to sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge. But between the two cases compared there is a difference; the objects that excite the sensory powers to activity, the seen, the heard, etc., are outside. The ground of this difference is that what actual sensation apprehends is individuals, while what knowledge apprehends is universals."

4 To the contrary:

"Natural things contain within themselves a principle of motion and rest," according to Bk. II of the *Physics*.⁴ But this is not merely a passive principle, both [a] because the form is more truly nature than is matter; therefore it participates more truly in the definition of nature, namely, that it is a principle of movement—form does not seem to be a passive principle; and [b] because in *Physics* II⁵ it is said that "natural are those which have in themselves a principle of motion," etc. But this principle from which motion proceeds is an efficient cause.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION
A. THE COMMON VIEW]

5 [2] Here it is generally claimed⁶ that nothing moves itself except perhaps by parts—namely one part moves another part, and this is never an essential part, but only some quantitative part that moves another, distinct from it in place.

6 Three reasons are given in support of this view. The first is from Aristotle's *Physics* VII.⁷ "Nothing is moved by itself primarily, for then it would not come to rest at the rest of another." But every mobile rests with the rest of another, because of the rest of a part. For every mobile thing has a part, which part being at rest, it is evident that the whole is not moved primarily.

⁴Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 1, 192b 13-16: "All things constituted by nature seem to have within themselves a principle of motion and of rest (in respect of place, or of growth and decrease, or by way of alteration)."

⁵Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 1, 193b 3-4.

⁶Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* V, lect. 14, ed. Parma XX, 412a: "Omne enim quod movetur ab alio movetur. Neque aliquid movet se ipsum nisi per partes, in quantum, una pars eius movet aliam, ut probatur in VIII *Physicorum*. Potentia igitur, secundum quod est principium motus in eo in quo est, non comprehenditur sub potentia activa, sed magis sub passiva"; Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI, q. 5 (PhB III 155); Siger de Brabant, *Quaest. super lib. Metaphys.* q. 6 (PM XXIV 324); Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 5 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 99-139).

⁷Aristotle, *Physics* VII, ch. 1, 241b 34-242a 15: "That which is in motion of itself does not cease because something else is at rest, but a thing must be moved by something if the fact of something else having ceased from its motion causes it to be at rest."

7 The second argument is from *Physics* III,⁸ where Aristotle says that "the mover is always thought to be some species [or form], thus the full-formed man begets man from what is potentially man." Hence it is admitted that the mover moves insofar as it is in act and the mobile is moved insofar as it is in potency, as is evident from the definition of motion given there.⁹ But it is impossible that the same thing should be both in potency and in act as regards the selfsame thing; therefore etc.

8 This reasoning is confirmed because acting and being affected are contraries according to *On Generation*, Bk. I¹⁰ and *On the Soul* Bk. II.¹¹

9 The third reason stems from Aristotle's remarks in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter 'On Relations,' that the active is really related to the passive or the mover to the mobile, according to the second class of relations.¹² Now it does not seem possible that real opposed relations could be rooted in one limited foundation. This is something attributed only to the divine essence, which, because of its lack of limitation, could be the basis for opposite relationships;¹³ wherefore [one and the same thing cannot be mover and moved, active and passive].

10 In line with these general arguments specific claims are made—according to the order that obtains among beings.

[Coeval and Other Accidents]

First, it is universally true that nothing is an efficient [cause] of its own accidents, even if these are coeval [properties]. Thus for example, with respect to its proper attributes, a subject does not have the mark of an efficient cause, but only that of a recipient or material cause.

⁸Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 2 202a 9-12: "The mover or agent will always be the vehicle of a form, either a 'this' or a 'such,' which, when it acts, will be the source and cause of the change, e.g. the full-formed man begets man from what is potentially man."

⁹Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 1, 201a 10-11; *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse, p. 148: "Motus est actus entis in potentia secundum quod in potentia."

¹⁰Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, ch. 7, 324a 1-3 and 11-13.

¹¹Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417a 17-20.

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 15-18.

¹³That is, among the divine persons who are constituted by opposite relationships.

11 The same is said, secondly, of any accident that can be present at one time and absent at another, and this is true whether it be induced by motion, as is the case with place, quantity or quality, or by change [*mutatio*], as is the case with the cognitive or appetitive acts.

12 [3] About these and similar accidents [that may be present or absent], first about place. It does not seem that anything can move itself about locally except light and heavy bodies or moving animals. They deny any of these moves itself.

[Light and Heavy Bodies]

13 Of the first, then, it is said that light and heavy bodies do not move themselves, as Aristotle seems to have settled the matter in *Physics* VIII,¹⁴ where he says: "None of these things have a principle of doing anything, but only one of being affected." And he seems to prove this by means of four arguments which are presented there.

[Animal Movement]

14 Secondly, the same is asserted of animals. They only move themselves ahead because one part moves another, as seems to be settled for self-movers in *Physics* VIII,¹⁵ and the manner of this motion is spelled out further in *On the Movement of Animals*.¹⁶

[Quantitative Change]

15 Thirdly, it is said as regards motion to quantity, that things animated by a vegetative soul do not move themselves in regard to nutrition and growth rather they move food converting it into themselves.

[Qualitative Change]

16 Fourth, it is said of qualitative change that water does not effectively cool itself, nor does the seed of what is animate alter itself, but the seed of the male which is distinct in place and subject from that provided by the mother. And one acts upon the

¹⁴Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 4, 255b 29-31: "So it is clear that in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself a principle of motion, not of moving, nor of causing motion, but of suffering it."

¹⁵Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 4, 255a 3-19; ch. 6, 259b 1-6 and b 29-31.

¹⁶Aristotle, *De motu animalium* ch. 2, 698b 12-20 and chs. 6-11, 700b 4-704b 3.

other, as an artisan upon the wood from which he fashions a chair. This seems to be Aristotle's mind in *On Animal Generation* Bk. XVI.¹⁷ But where there are not two seeds, male and female, as in plants, they assign two parts within the same seed distinct in place, one of which acts upon the other.

[Cognitive Change]

17 Fifth, they claim no cognitive power is an active principle of knowledge, but it is only passive and the object active.

18 And this is confirmed through Aristotle in Bk. II *On the Soul*,¹⁸ where he wants to say the sense is passive and not active. And in Bk. III *On the Soul*¹⁹ he holds the same for the intellect.

19 Also this is confirmed of both, because cognition occurs through the assimilation of the knower to the known. Therefore the agent is that to which the knower is assimilated, for it is the agent that makes the patient like unto itself, according to Bk. I *On Generation*.²⁰

20 Thirdly, it is confirmed of the cognitive and appetitive together, because to know and to seek appear to be common accidents of their respective potencies, which come and go, etc.²¹ To such accidents, however, the subject does not seem to be determined of itself, and thus does not seem to be a sufficient cause of them.

[Appetitive Movement]

21 Sixthly, the same is said of the appetite. This is confirmed by Aristotle in Bk. III *On the Soul*:²² "Here that which moves without being moved is the realizable good, that which at once moves and is moved is the appetitive faculty."

¹⁷Aristotle, *De generatione animalium* ch. 19, 727a 26-30 and ch. 20, 728b 32-34.

¹⁸Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417a 7-9.

¹⁹Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 1, 429a 13-15.

²⁰Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, ch. 7, 323b 30-324a 12.

²¹Porphyry, *Liber praedicabilium* c. 4 (AL I⁶ 20, ed. Busse 13, 2-3): "Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem."

²²Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 10, 433b 16-18.

22 Likewise, this is confirmed through the Commentator, in *Metaphysics* XII comment 36,²³ about the bath; look for it there.

²³And for each of these cases, further [proofs] are adduced, but the principal conclusion is held universally for whatever other cases there may be.

[II.—SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

23 Here we should proceed as follows. Just as this opinion gives a universal negative answer, from which certain [specific] conclusions seem to follow, so we must first show in general that something can act upon itself (which is the contradictory of this universal denial), and then take up the special cases where this particular proposition holds true.

[A.—THE GENERAL ARGUMENT: SOMETHING CAN ACT UPON ITSELF. PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION]

24 The first is proved: Anything active looks to a kind of passive thing, not to this [particular] passive thing, as its primary object. For example, what in general is able to heat, as well as any particular source of heat, regards as its first object whatever in general can be heated, not this or that particular. Contrariwise, what is passive, or can be heated, be it in general or any given thing, has as its primary object what is able in general to heat, not this particular [source of heat].

From this it follows that whatever is contained under the primary object is a *per se* object for the same. And anything able to heat regards whatever is able to be heated as a *per se* object; and conversely, whatever can be heated looks to whatever can heat it. But it is possible for something to be active regarding A in the same way as something else is active in its regard, and also for something to be passive as regards A, as anything else is passive in its regard.

²³Averroes, *Metaphysics* VIII, com. 15 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 149vb): "Verbi gratia, quoniam balneum duplicem habet formam, in anima et extra animam, et propter illam formam quae est in anima, desideramus aliam formam quae est extra animam. Forma igitur animae balnei in quantum est in anima, est agens desiderium et motum; secundum autem quod est extra animam, est finis motus, non agens."

Therefore, such a thing qua active has as object qua passive, itself as much as any other thing; therefore, it can act upon itself just as upon something else.

[1.—A CERTAIN OBJECTION]

25 The major is clear enough from the primary relationship between the general terms,²⁴ but the minor might be denied. Or if it also is conceded, the final implication might be denied on the grounds that the agent must be in proximity to the patient and thereby distinct positionally,²⁵ so that the identical thing could not be related to itself in this way.

[2.—REPLY TO THIS OBJECTION]

26 Against the first contingency, we prove the minor. Many are the effects apt to be produced by an agent that is not univocal but equivocal, as is evident of lightness produced in fire. This equivocal form must be postulated either as a substantial form or as some other quality. Hence, whatever possesses this active form *per se* is able to lighten, if I may speak this way. But this form can be in something able to be lightened, as is evident in the aforesaid example [of fire]. For whatever form one held to be active with respect to lightness in the agent, the same is present in the fire it produces, and is prior naturally to the lightness itself, because it is its active principle. Therefore, there is no contradiction that it be in what is produced when what lightened it no longer exists. And it is evident it can exist [in what is produced]; why then cannot the same thing be able to lighten and be lightened without contradiction?

27 Against the second contingency, we prove the final implication, for proximity, coupled with positional distinctness, does not seem to be necessary for acting, except where a greater presence of the agent to the patient is not possible. For if that [lesser] presence suffices, all the more so does the greater

28 This is proved in two ways:

²⁴Namely, that something can act upon itself as upon another.

²⁵Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl. VIII* q. 2 (PhB IV, 19 and 29).

First by a reduction to the absurd: otherwise, if one assumed fire to be in water the way an angel is assumed to be together with a celestial body, fire could not heat the water nor the angel move the celestial sphere.

29 The second is a causal proof: for why must the agent be present to the patient if it is not because the agent's power cannot reach the disproportionately distant so as to effect something there? Would not the agent's power reach it more perfectly, if it were together with the patient? And on the assumption that it would, it is argued further. Whenever the same thing—if both active and passive with respect to the same—is more truly present to itself than anything else could be, then all the more truly is that condition fulfilled that requires proximity when a greater presence is impossible. Most truly therefore is there action.

30 [6] The entire argument is confirmed with respect to both the proof of the minor²⁶ and the final implication.²⁷ If A *per se* is an active form as regards B, and A is present in C, no one denies that A is active in bringing about the existence of B in D. Conversely, if A were in D, it would be an active principle in [causing] B in C. If A, then, is in both C and D, and both C and D are in potency to [receiving] B, then C and D will act on each other by reason of A to mutually produce B in themselves. But this situation where each produces the same thing in the other seems to be just as incongruous as the case where each is both agent and patient with respect to itself. For it is like other situations, where, just as nothing is the cause of itself, so neither is a circle in causes possible as the same thing would be both cause and caused in the same respect. Hence, if the first is possible [where each causes the same effect in the other], the second is also [where each causes such an effect in itself].

31 It is clear—to draw a generalization from these remarks—that the aforesaid argument proves the same thing can act on itself only if the action is equivocal and when the agent is capable of receiving the form that results from the equivocal action of an active form it already possesses.

²⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 26.

²⁷Cf. *supra*, nn. 27-29.

And so we must normally hold that only and generally can something act upon itself when these two conditions concur, namely, [1] it has a form that is the principle of an equivocal action, and together with this [2] it can be the terminus of such an action.

[B.—SPECIAL APPLICATIONS: AGENTS THAT
CAN ACT ON THEMSELVES]

32 Descending to particulars, then, we see that it follows from this that nothing acts upon itself to cause a substantial form, for nothing new can arise to make the composite one *per se* unless it be more perfect than the entity preceding it. But the less perfect is not an active principle with respect to the more perfect.

33 Secondly, it is evident that nothing acts on itself by any univocal action, for then the precise font²⁸ of the action and the term of the action would be specifically the same and differ only numerically. This is clear, because nothing is the principle of [thus] acting on itself, for it would follow that two individual [accidents] of the same species would coexist in the same subject—a point denied earlier in Bk. V in the question raised about this.²⁹ And especially as regards absolute accidents,³⁰ it is clear that the precise font of the action would be something absolute, and the term of the action as well.

34 Thirdly, it is clear that all growth is the result of an equivocal agent, because quantity is not an active form, from question six *supra*.³¹ Also all local motion is from an equivocal mover for the same reason, namely, 'place' is not an active form. Also many alterations [or qualitative changes] stem from an equivocal [cause], and in general those involving inactive qualities, where 'active' is understood in the strict sense that Aristotle speaks of it in Bk. II *On Generation*³²—as was said above in reply to the first argument in

²⁸The Latin reads "ratio agendi."

²⁹Cf. *supra*, Bk. V, q. 7, nn. 41-54 and 71-82. The question reads: Is it possible that some accidents only numerically different are in the same subject?

³⁰That is, in the category of quantity or quality.

³¹Cf. *supra*, q. 6, nn. 11-13.

³²Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, ch. 2, 329b 21.

question six.³³ Also any quality could be from an equivocal cause, although some could be caused by a univocal cause.

It follows in general there is nothing repugnant about some substance causing in itself a quality, quantity or its whereabouts. Given the two concurrent conditions mentioned above, however, it will cause this either as coeval with itself (and thus without change) or not coeval with itself and hence through movement or change.

35 [8] [About coeval or proper attributes] Concerning what is coeval is evident in a subject and its proper attribute. Two arguments are given for this.

First, a receptive potency, differing from the act, never is necessitated of itself to that act, for any such potency is one of contradiction. [Yet] the subject of itself must necessarily have this attribute; otherwise the inherence of a proper attribute could not be demonstrated through the quiddity or principles of its subject, since demonstration is of what is necessary.

36 Secondly, because the general argument given above³⁴ obviously applies to this case. For if the generating [subject] is depicted as agent with respect to the attribute generated, it is clear that this attribute is not univocally in its generator, especially if this attribute is not an active form. Also even if it were an active form, the same would be appear [to be the case]. For although that quality was the principle of altering the subject earlier, nevertheless the principle of this alteration does not remain at the last instant but becomes the other. How will it act instantaneously upon this other with no movement of alteration in itself?—Whatever be said of this, it is argued that when the attribute is not an active form, as is the case with quantity that is a consequence of the bodily substance produced, I ask: Through what? By A? But A in the product is [specifically] the same as A in the producer and prior naturally to the product's quantity itself, for it is prior by nature to the producer's quantity. The active form is naturally prior to the form it can induce in something able to receive it. For priority in time is not required—as is evident of light and what it makes luminous—nor

is local distance needed, as was proved above.³⁵ In this way, then, the product will cause such an attribute in itself even more than its producer. From this it is clear what we said above,³⁶ that what is coeval is caused without a change, since change requires opposite terms, and thus privation precedes the form. Privation occurs only when a suitable subject precedes the form, which is not so here. We spoke of this earlier in reply to the second argument in question eleven.³⁷

37 Against this is it objected: change can coexist with its end-term and hence privation need not precede it temporally.

38 Also, in that prior instant of nature when the principle of acting precedes its term, the subject is considered to be deprived of its term, otherwise its term would be thought to be already produced.

39 Also, in that first instant [the form] has another relation to the agent than it seems to have afterwards, because at first it is said to be induced at that time. Hence, there is no change in that instant which is not going on at present, for that reason the form is said to first exist then or to begin to be.

40 To these I reply: in the first³⁸ there is a fallacy of the consequent. For this follows 'There is a change, therefore it has a term,' speaking of what is inseparable which is what we are talking about here. But the converse does not follow unless one takes 'term' not only for what is suited to terminate change, but also for what actually does so. And why doesn't the converse follow? Because the form, suited to be a term, is only a term if the opposite term precedes it. For although change is more essentially related to the terminus ad quem than to the terminus a quo, taken strictly, it cannot be understood without both.

41 If you were to say a change is not really something other than the terminus ad quem, this touches another [issue].³⁹ But grant this for the present as regards the absolute reality involved in change,

³³Cf. *supra*, nn. 27-29.

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

³⁷Cf. *supra*, Bk. IX, q. 11, n. 6.

³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 37.

³⁹Perhaps how change should be defined; cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 5, p. 2, q. un., n. 91 (XVI, 444-445); *Ordinatio* I, d. 5, p. 2, q. un., n. 95 (IV, 60-61).

³³Cf. *supra*, Bk. IX, q. 6, n. 14.

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

nevertheless in addition to this, change includes a relation to the terminus a quo after which it immediately follows. Such a relation does not exist at a time when no privation immediately preceded the form. And therefore change does not exist after the first instant it ceases to be a change, though the absolute reality remains. But this respect does not exist in the subject of a coeval attribute.

42 To the second,⁴⁰ a priority of nature does not imply privation of the posterior, but only—without thinking of ‘posterior’—that ‘prior’ be thought of as an essence more perfect in itself. But this does not preserve the privation, nor in this way is there [any notion of] change.⁴¹

43 To the third:⁴² the form does have another relationship to the agent at the first instant than it does at a subsequent time, but that respect does not complete the notion of change, but rather that of a ‘passive production.’ Hence it is then said to be ‘becoming’ and afterwards it is not; and thus ‘first existing’ and ‘beginning to be’ are compared precisely to preceding denial of existence, not

⁴⁰Cf. supra, n. 38.

⁴¹This interpolated text follows in five manuscripts and in the commentary of Maurice O’Fihely: “To the contrary: either [1] one understands ‘prior’ qua prior without any thought of the posterior, which seems to be impossible, since it is related to it, or [2] that which is prior is thought of without thinking of what is posterior. And then in such ‘separated thinking’ the priority of nature would consist, and nevertheless that which is posterior, if it is something absolute, can be thought of likewise without thinking of what is prior. It follows that naturally posterior will be naturally prior, and vice versa. Hence it is not in this ‘this can be understood without that’ that the priority of nature between this and that consists. For in this way an ass is prior by nature to a man. Neither in this ‘this is or can be without that’ [does priority consist], because then the premises of the strongest demonstration would not be prior by nature to its conclusion. Then even God could not cause these premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. In what does this priority then consist? In the *Categories* [ch. 12, 14a 34-35] and in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* [ch. 11, 1019a 1-4]. it is said that this is prior by nature another when the ‘sequence subsisting cannot be reversed.’ But if this definition is convertible with the defined, how then can the premises of a demonstration be prior by nature to the conclusion? For there the subsisting sequence is reversed, but not the causal sequence.—If it be said of the fifth mode of the Philosopher in the *Categories* [ch. 12, 14b 10-19] that ‘of two things each of whose existence implies the other, that which is the cause of the other is said to be prior by nature to the other,’ as man’s existence is said to be with respect to what he says, how therefore will the intellect be prior in nature to the will? For with respect to this, it is neither a partial nor a total cause, as some claim who make it a sine qua non [condition].”

⁴²Cf. supra, n. 39.

however to the privation except as a subject apt to precede the form in time. And then the two respects concur in the form at the first instant; one to the agent, the other to the privation, in which is included that which previously was said to be there as a negation, but both respects do not remain at the time that follows, but the other alone⁴³ completes the notion of change. Of this elsewhere.⁴⁴

44 [Ordinary Accidents] Now we must look at the accidents caused in the subject by itself that are not coeval.⁴⁵

First in general one could say that a merely natural cause, although determined of itself to produce an effect, can be impeded however. But once the impediment is removed, it immediately acts to produce its effect, just as it would have acted at the outset had it not been impeded. And thus wherever the two aforesaid conditions⁴⁶ needed to act upon itself obtain, if the initial impediment be removed, it will immediately act upon itself.

[C.—THE OTHER MODES OF SPONTANEOUS MOTION: SOLUTION OF SCOTUS]

45 From this general statement descending to particulars, as did the first opinion, we can say first that any *per se* natural being has an active principle with respect to the place suited to it.⁴⁷ If it is not located there at the outset, it will move itself there afterwards.

46 But how ought one to reply to Aristotle’s four arguments in *Physics* VIII about light and heavy bodies, and how he thought they moved themselves locally because they are in accidental potency to place in the way a knower is in potency to knowing theoretically? Look for the explanation in the chapter on ‘Of Moving Things,’ etc.⁴⁸ And earlier a distinction was made in Bk. VII, in the question

⁴³That is to the privation.

⁴⁴Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, nn. 269-271 (XVIII 90-93); *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 290 (VII 142-144); IV, d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, n. [7] (ed. Vivès XVII 322a-324b).

⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 34.

⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 31.

⁴⁷An interpolated note in four manuscripts: “This is touched upon in Bk. VII in the question on the implications of Aristotle against Plato [Bk. VII, q. 12, n. 45-50].”

⁴⁸Maurice O’Fihely (a Portu) thought this might be a reference to a lost book of Scotus.

on seminal reasons⁴⁹ about the active and passive principle in a heavy body. It is by the former that the body is in accidental potency to move, whereas according to Aristotle⁵⁰ it has only a passive principle of motion.

47 In eschewing this interpretation, bizarre theories are fabricated as to how a heavy body moves, for it is evident that it is moved when not unimpeded.

48 If one claims it is moved by the continuing influence of the medium as a whole, why does the same influence in an identical part of the medium depress a heavy body and elevate one that is light?

49 If it be by reason of the plenum, lest a vacuum be created, because it pushes the air from itself and because space is filled⁵¹ it must be followed by a rush of air, how does this push it unless it is first moved locally? By what? it is asked. For it is clear that a body at rest in place does not push the air next to it. Likewise, the plenum would be preserved if the adjacent air entered the place of the pushed air, why will the stone enter it?⁵²

50 If, thirdly, it is said that the center draws the heavy body, what is this attraction? Does it stem from an alteration of what is heavy? Or will it be carried along by some univocal action?—Likewise, to assume the impossible, if the entire earth were removed, the same center of the earth would remain as before and the clod of earth would move towards it. What draws it? Is it the mathematical place?

⁴⁹Cf. supra, Bk. VII, q. 12, nn. 45–50.

⁵⁰Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 4, 255b 29–31: “So it is clear in all these cases the thing does not move itself, but it contains within itself a principle of motion—not of moving something or causing motion, but of suffering it.”

⁵¹Latin “propter plenum oportet quod sequatur aerem pulsum.”

⁵²An interpolated text follows in one manuscript: “Note that in assuming that the motion of a heavy body is only effectively by what produced the heavy body, not by the body itself, one can say consequently that the motion of the heavy body does not require an efficient cause in act, although the effect is new; and the cause exists only new in a qualified sense, because it is not simply new. For this effect in the heavy body was continuous, and once the body is produced, this effect was produced. And if it is argued that according to this way, one first moving actually need not be postulated, because it could be said that the center and every other mobile is moved without something moving it actually corresponding to them; but study about particular and general moving things, etc.”

51 If it be said, fourthly, that what produced it also moves it, how will this effect be actual without its cause being in act? You may say, [its producer] gave it the power. It is true: this has produced, and when it did produce, it existed. But now it does not; how does it move now? If having been produced and continuing to exist, it now moves, this is what we are asking about.

52 Therefore, putting aside these views which seem to be fictions, [we hold] what concords with sense experience that the heavy body is moved by itself. And according to Aristotle, *Physics* VIII:⁵³ “It is foolish to disregard sense-perception in an attempt to show a theory reasonable.” And it accords with reason, for no one denies that a heavy body moves downward another tied to it, whose lightness does not exceed the other’s heaviness. Consequently, how will that [heavy body] not first move itself to that location? For we naturally think of it to be moving downward before it moves down what is attached to it. And it moves by an equivocal action and is able to receive the result of the action; therefore it will move itself in this way. Also what effectively breaks a board whose strength in resisting is less than the force of the heavy body?

53 Secondly, an animal is said to move itself forward,⁵⁴ not merely because one part moves another. For the first part moving locally is moved locally, and it does not seem to be by another. Look up this matter in Bk. III *On the Soul*.⁵⁵

54 It is also objected [to the common view] that in jumping it is the whole animal that moves itself, not just a part.—Those who lend little weight to this objection reply that such motion is composed of a pulling and pushing in such a way that the hind part pushes the fore part which then draws the hind part after it, and this being drawn up, pushes again, and so the process continues both in jumping and in going forward. This is apparent to the senses in a crawling worm. It does not seem to suffice in jumping. Because as Aristotle determines *On the Movement of Animals*⁵⁶ motion is supported by something immobile, whose immobility is greater than the mobility of what is moved. This is manifest in the

⁵³Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 3, 253a 32–34.

⁵⁴Cf. supra, n. 14.

⁵⁵Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 9, 433b 14–29.

⁵⁶Aristotle, *De animalium motu*, ch. 2, 699a 6–11.

case of someone in boat using an oar to push a boat resting on the shore, as happens when a sailor first wishes to move a boat from a place where it rested for a long time on dry land. By pushing against the mast he will not move the boat, as Aristotle suggests here regarding the immobility of the earth with respect to the mobility of the heavens, which is quite marvelous! Therefore, in the first push, the hind part of the animal, from the fact that it is resting on the earth, is more stationary than the fore part of the animal and can thus push this fore part; and the fore part, pushed to the greatest possible distance the animal's parts can be stretched, draws the hind part up, and raises it a little from the earth. If there will be further motion, it is necessary that the hind part dragged along push the fore part. But this is impossible, because it is separated from the earth and in the air and has nothing immobile to support it. For the air is not more immobile than the fore part of such an ambulatory animal, as it is with respect to something able to fly, for whom the air is [for them] like the ground is for us. After the initial push and pull by the animal, therefore, no further push or pull can follow. And the animal will fall, if left to itself, after these two actions are finished, so that it will never be possible to jump by pushing and pulling, nor is any upward motion possible beyond the first place that the animal can reach fully extended while standing on the ground.

55 Therefore, whatever is to be said of the argument about the motion of an animal—whether there is *per se* movement internally as existing, or accidental movement like the sailor moving the boat when he pushes it offshore or rows through the water—this much at least seems so, the aforesaid explanation of jumping does not seem suitable. And one could expand Aristotle's remarks about the two parts into which a self-moving animal can be divided to mean that it is not so much that one part has to move some other part precisely, but that the other part is better suited to be moved, and therefore to receive the motion, perhaps from the cognitive or appetitive power, or else the part effecting local motion does so because of some alteration [or qualitative change], because the 'forms or species [in the soul] are quasi-things' according to Aristotle. And

thus in *Physics* VIII,⁵⁷ he seeks to salvage the [theory] that the motion of animals is not simply one, since the movement by the object or what is contained [within the animal] precedes, as he seems to say there. Hence there is no need to cite him, as if one part of the body locally at rest were to move the other locally, which they⁵⁸ [the proponents of the first view] have a mind to do, it seems.

56 [6] Thirdly, what might nutrition be?⁵⁹ For according to Bk. I *On Generation*⁶⁰ nutrition is a certain generation. Earlier we said nothing generates a substantial form in itself, but this will not help us here, it seems, for it is not food that is increased—on the contrary, this perishes—and it is the preexisting animated [body] that is increased. But what preexists that causes this definite quantity that is the end result of this motion? There is no active principle other than the composite endowed with a vegetative soul. [For two reasons, first because] the view that fire could be an active principle is rejected in Bk. II *On the Soul*⁶¹ where it is intimated that the active principle is the soul, and because growth is operation of the vegetative [soul] according to the same book. What is more, it is apparent to the senses that an [organism's] growth is not an increase in quantity that results from an extrinsic agent, for this can produce change only by rarefaction or some juxtaposed addition. Neither in [organic] growth does one part augment another, distinct from it as to place and subject, because every portion of what grows is augmented.

57 If you protest⁶² that, according to Aristotle in ch. 4 of Bk. II *On the Soul*,⁶³ food nourishes in virtue of its substantive power, whereas

⁵⁷Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 2, 253a 9-18.

⁵⁸Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Physica* VIII, lect. 4 (II 378ab): "Videtur enim quod animal quod prius quiescebat, postmodum moveatur processivo motu, nullo motu facto ab exteriori: et sic videtur quod illum motum animalis non praecedebat aliquis motus... Sed hoc est falsum, scilicet quod motus animalis non fiat ab aliquo exteriori... Et huius quod movetur naturaliter, causa non est ipsum animal per suum appetitum, sed forsitan causa huius naturalis mutationis est continens, id est aer, et ulterius corpus caeleste."

⁵⁹Cf. supra, n. 15.

⁶⁰Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* I, ch. 5, 321b 35-322a 4.

⁶¹Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 4, 416a 9-18.

⁶²Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl. VIII* q. 3, a. un., ed. Parma IX, 576b-577a.

⁶³Aristotle, *On the Soul* II, ch. 4, 416b 11-17.

it increases the size of what is fed by its quantitative power, and that what grows is increased by the quantity of the food.

58 Your objection seems worthless. For actual quantity is not a principle of any action, even less so is potential quantity.⁶⁴ But the food perishes before a growth-change occurs, either by a priority of time or of nature. For the nourishment into which the food is transformed, precedes such and such a growth-increase. How will a non-existent thing move?

59 Hence, we must understand the Philosopher's dictum literally. For how does food nourish by its substantive power? It can do so only materially, because flesh is generated from it insofar as it is in potency to the form of flesh. It is this 'generation' we call nutrition, such that food nourished materially. Insofar as it is quantity in potency, food augments [the organism] materially, because as there is so much flesh potentially in [the food], that much flesh is generated, and through the production of flesh, growth takes place.—Here much could be said at this point about the manner in which growth comes about, but it would be more in place in an exposition *On Generation* Bk. I, or *On the Soul* Bk. II. For the present it suffices to say that in the food itself there is no efficient cause for growth; rather this is to be found in the living [organism] converting the food. Not that the growth occurs through this conversion, whether it be into flesh or into so much [flesh], both of which must occur simultaneously in the thing. Rather it is because it occurs in so much flesh—that is, having a discernible quantity, greater than that which has been lost, which it replaces. Not as if at the instant of generation [of flesh from food] there is a greater [growth], but rather [what is there] is suited to produce an increase in size at the time the process of growth takes place. But I omit [a full account of all] this here.

60 Fourthly, as for both the examples of such alteration [or qualitative change] cited,⁶⁵ this view claims that each alters itself, for instance, the water cools itself, and seed alters itself. As for the first, the general observation cited in the article on non-coeval

⁶⁴The Latin reads "How much more is it not by potential quantity."

⁶⁵Cf. supra, n. 16.

accidents⁶⁶ applies, because once the impediment is removed, [water] behaves as it would at the outset had it not been impeded. As for the second, God willing, more detail will be given elsewhere,⁶⁷ and something has already been said in Bk. VII in the question on seminal reasons.⁶⁸

61 Fifth, cognition⁶⁹ is said to be active in regard to cognition as well as the object. How two active [causes] can concur to produce the same effect is considered at length elsewhere.⁷⁰ And in this way the inconvenient consequences are avoided that stem from assuming the intellect is completely passive; or those which follow, likewise, from assuming the intellect to be purely active, so that the object does nothing there. Augustine attributes action to both in Bk. IX *On the Trinity*:⁷¹ "From the knower and the known," he says, "knowledge is born." For how is the understanding of heat from heat alone as from an equivocal agent, from which real heat is generated by a univocal agent, when the intellect is simply more perfect than all heat generated?—And it is impossible for some equivocal effect of the same agent to be more noble than a univocal effect, because then it would be more noble than the agent.—Also would not the nature of the soul be denigrated, if the sensibles—yea, the phantasms of the sensibles,—would effectively cause so noble a perfection of the soul, with respect to which it [the soul] could only be receptive? Other incongruities mentioned elsewhere I omit here.⁷²

62 Sixthly, this view maintains the intellective appetite⁷³ is active

⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 44.

⁶⁷Duns Scotus, *Reportatio* II, d. 18, q. 1, nn. [12-13] (ed. Vivès XXI, 89); *Lectura* II, d. 18, qq. 1-2, nn. 22-39 (XIX, 159-164).

⁶⁸Cf. supra, Bk. VII, q. 12, nn. 23-38.

⁶⁹Cf. supra, nn. 17-20.

⁷⁰Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 3, qq. 2-3, nn. 379-411 (XVI, 372-388); *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, nn. 486-503 and 559-569 (III, 289-298 and 333-338); II, d. 3, p. 2, 1. 1, nn. 269-301 (VII, 525-544); *Quodl.* q. 15, nn. [13-20] (ed. Vivès, XXVI, 144-153).

⁷¹Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, ch. 12, n. 18 (PL 42, 970; CCL 50, 309).

⁷²Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 3, qq. 2-3, nn. 379-411 (XVI, 372-388); *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, nn. 486-503 and 559-569 (III, 289-298 and 333-338); II, d. 3, p. 2, 1. 1, nn. 269-301 (VII, 525-544); *Quodl.* q. 15, nn. [13-20] (ed. Vivès, XXVI, 144-153).

⁷³Cf. supra, nn. 21-22.

in an unqualified sense. Neither do those⁷⁴ who assume it to be purely passive with respect to its object seem able to preserve true or total liberty in man, but only necessity of acting as if it were a process like heat in heating, or merely chance deviation, since they say⁷⁵ we have no power over how the objects to be known first present themselves. These views about the will have been disproved by many⁷⁶ in many ways, which we need not detail here, but explain elsewhere.⁷⁷

63 [14] Finally it is stated in general that one ought not to deny any nature something, which if posited, would contribute to its perfection—unless such can be shown to be lacking on other grounds. For nature “always does what is best,” when this shall be possible, and “is never wanting what is necessary.”⁷⁸ Now creatures are commonly produced in existence minus some perfection they are suited by nature to attain. Organisms, for instance, are imperfect in size and lack accomplishments of the soul; certain other things lack proper qualities, while still others are not in their proper place. Such things would be simply more perfect, if endowed with an active principle for attaining what they are suited to have, for they would be less dependent upon outside help. Hence, when it is not obvious that a given nature lacks an active principle regarding a given perfection, it must simply be conceded that it has it [the active principle], for this dignifies nature.

64 [Some objections] Why should not things be said to possess all the perfection possible, then, for this would dignify nature even more?

⁷⁴Cf. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 80, a. 2, resp. (V 284a); Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI, q. 5 (PhB III, 161 and 164); Thomas Sutton, *Quodl.* II, q. 12 (BAW II, 261-262).

⁷⁵A similar argument in the *Additiones magnae* II, d. 25, q. 1, ed. C. Balic, p. 268.

⁷⁶Peter John Olivi, *Summa* II, q. 58 (BFS V 409-414); James of Viterbo, *Quodl.* I, q. 7 (ed. E. Ypma, pp. 88-102); Gonsalvus of Spain, *Quodl.* q. 8 (BFS IX, 114-123).

⁷⁷Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 49, q. 4 (ed. Vivès XXI, 98-100); *Additiones magnae* II, d. 25, q. 1 (ed. Balic, pp. 264-301); *Lectura* II, d. 25, q. un. nn. 69-80 (XIX, 253-257).

⁷⁸Aristotle, *De caelo* II, ch. 5, 288a 2-3: “...natura semper facit eorum, quae fieri possunt, quod optimum est”; *De anima* III, ch. 10, 432b 21-23: “...nature never makes anything without a purpose and never leaves out what is necessary”; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 188: “Nature nihil facit frustra, unde non deficit in necessariis, nec abundat in superfluis.”

65 Also, nature has so balanced active and passive potencies throughout the universe that they are never coupled in one and the same thing, but relate one thing to another, which makes for an even greater connection between things, it seems. As regards possible perfection, then, it is so ordained universally that wherever an agent exists, it is able to act only upon something else.

66 And in confirmation of this: why should not nature endow anything with an active principle for all the perfections it can have, and thus deprive it of any connection based upon mutual interaction and being acted upon?

67 [Reply to these objections] To the first⁷⁹ I reply: things would not possess all the perfection of which they are capable if they lacked [such] causality. But if everything became as perfect as it could possibly be immediately, nothing except its producer would appear to cause anything in another.

68 To the contrary: if the thing itself were to be the cause of its own perfection, why does it not perfect itself to the utmost from the beginning?—I reply: every nature requires a process for some of its operations, because of the imperfection in the power of the agent as regards the effect to be produced. Such would be the case, for example, if man were begotten full-size, he would be deprived of the ability to cause his own maturation, as least as to size, since this can only be effected through growth—indeed many stages of growth.

69 [15] To the second:⁸⁰ univocal action never makes for an [essential] connection between the active and passive components of the universe; neither does the Philosopher appear to postulate that such a univocal agent and its effect are essentially ordered to a third entity of this sort. The more essential connection is rather achieved through equivocal agents and their effects.

70 To the contrary: you postulate this equivocal rather than univocal causality in one and the same subject. All the more then do you destroy any interconnectedness.

⁷⁹Cf. supra, n. 64.

⁸⁰Cf. supra, nn. 65-66.

71 I reply: causes essentially ordered to some third effect have another sort of order in causing [than does either a univocal or equivocal *per se* cause of an effect], according to what we said in Bk. II, q. 4 about a final status in causes.⁸¹ And perhaps this represents the essential interconnectedness in the universe, whether the ultimate cause be univocal or equivocal with its effect. This sort of connection is preserved by postulating in the same agent the character of an ultimate cause with respect to its effect, as is postulated in another [agent].

72 To the contrary: Just as the notion of an immediate cause and its effect can concur in one and the same thing, why cannot the aspects of a prior and a posterior cause? And thus no order of causes would seem necessary besides the first cause whose causality [ratio] cannot concur with the formal nature [ratio] of any posterior cause.

73 I reply: the aspect of prior and posterior cause may well concur in the same supposit, or perhaps even in the same nature, if the latter possesses unitively several causal grades of perfection with respect to the same effect, although it may not contain [the formal perfection] of all the ordered causes, because the notion of some of these implies such absolute perfection as their basis as would be incompatible with the same subject that grounds the lesser perfection of a secondary posterior cause. This is clear enough from some special extreme examples. For how could the perfection of the sun,⁸² by which it cooperates with a mating bull, be present in the latter?

[III.—TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE FIRST OPINION]

74 [16] To those arguments adduced for the first opinion.

To the first⁸³ based on *Physics* VII: for what he is asking is: How would it be contradictory for some homogeneous attribute like local

⁸¹Cf. supra Bk. II, qq. 4-6, nn. 94-101.

⁸²Cf. Duns Scotus, *Theoremata* theor. 14, n. [1] (ed. Vivès 39a): "Tum quia ordo hoc non concludit: sol non vivit, bos vivit; tum quia haec non est differentia aliqua entis nec communis omnibus entibus...Tum quia primum habet perfectionem nobiliorem vita sicut et sol habet, non tamen vivit."

⁸³Cf. supra, n. 6; see Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 5-6, nn. 323-343 (XVIII 196-204); *Ordinatio* II, d. 2, p. 2, q. 6, nn. 477-478 (VII, 370-371).

motion to reside primarily in some integral or quantitative whole, where 'primarily' falls under the definition of the universal in *Posterior Analytics*⁸⁴ and with this notion according to the way 'primarily' is taken in *Physics* V,⁸⁵ as opposed to that which is 'according to an integral part?' And it is only of such a quantitative whole that Aristotle proves it cannot move itself primarily, where 'primarily' is taken in the sense that a proper attribute is said to exist in its proper subject primarily. For such a predicate is never disassociated from that of which it is affirmed primarily, because its opposite characterizes something that does not receive the predication of that primary subject. Now a quantitative whole is not predicable of a quantitative part, although in the case of homogeneous things, the same whole universal can be predicated of both [whole and part]. Therefore, where the whole is moved primarily, understanding 'primarily' in the aforesaid sense, it will not come to rest at the rest of its part. That is to say, the whole will not lack a predicate that inheres in it primarily, because a part (which is not that whole) lacks it. But "every whole rests"⁸⁶ [when another, viz. a part of it, rests, does so] because it is divisible. And therefore Aristotle understands 'another' as that of which motion is not predicated primarily. And 'at' [in the phrase 'comes to rest at the rest of another,' i.e. its part] holds only if understood in a consecutive, and not a causal sense. For if we are talking about the ablative absolute, [in the statement] 'which part, being at rest,'

⁸⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, 73b 32-74a 3: "An attribute belongs to a subject universally when it can be shown to belong to anything whatsoever belonging to that subject and to belong to that subject primarily... The universal is that which can be shown in anything whatsoever and primarily..."; cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 2, p. 2, qq. 5-6, n. 336 (XVIII, 202); *Ordinatio* II, d. 2, p. 2, q. 6, n. 476 (VII, 370).

⁸⁵Aristotle, *Physics* V, ch. 1, 224a 21-30: "It may change [1] *accidentally*, as for instance when we say that something musical walks, that which walks being something in which aptitude for music is an *accident*. Again [2] a thing is said without qualification to change because *something belonging to it* changes, i.e. in statements which refer to a part of the thing in question: thus the body is restored to health because the eye or the chest, that is to say a *part* of the whole body, is restored to health. And above all there is [3] the case of a thing which is in motion neither accidentally nor in respect of something else belonging to it, but in virtue of being *itself* directly in motion. Here we have a thing which is *essentially* movable."

⁸⁶Aristotle, *Physics* VII, ch. 1, 242a 13-15: "Manifestum igitur quod omne quod movetur ab aliquo movetur; divisibileque enim est omne quod movetur et parte quiescente quiescet totum"; Averroes, *Physica* VII com. 3 (ed. Iuntina IV f. 140ra): "Cum pars quiescit, necesse est ut totum quiescat."

etc., it must be expounded in the sense of 'if' and not 'because' [another, i.e. a part, is at rest]. For though the major may be true when 'because' is used, the minor is false. Hence it is futile to cite this statement of Aristotle to prove the general conclusion that nothing moves itself, for it simply does not apply where simple things like the powers of the soul, are moved, and in ever so many cases of quantified things, there may be nothing against someone asserting [the contrary]. For, if fire is the effective cause of heat proper, even though this 'whole' makes itself hot, and so the same thing primarily mutates, moves or acts upon itself, taking 'primarily' in the sense used in the *Physics* V, whereas this particular instance of fire does not primarily heat itself, understanding 'primarily' in the other sense [of the *Posterior Analytics*], is this so surprising? For no matter how it may come to be, this particular fire, howsoever big it be, is not primarily hot [in this latter or second way]. For this contradiction would follow, namely, that it would not be [non-]hot, if a part of it were not hot, and yet it would be hot, if a part of it were not hot. The first follows if 'primarily' is understood in the second way; the second follows if 'primarily' is understood in the first way [viz. of *Physics* V].

75 [17] What then is primarily hot, or heats primarily, in the [second] way, where 'primarily' indicates the inherence of a proper attribute in its subject?

Reply: a proper attribute is not customarily assigned to something singular, but rather to a universal which abstracts from all quantity [including number] and is found equally in the homogeneous quantitative whole and in any part [or individual instance] thereof. And it is true that this universal attribute never loses its proper attribute just because some particular thing, to which this universal no longer applies because of altered circumstances, is not hot. For this solution and for several observations about the equivocal meanings of 'primarily,' look up the place referred to above.⁸⁷

⁸⁷Cf. supra, n. 74; see Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, d. 2, p. 2, q. 6, nn. 475-485 (VII, 369-374).

76 To the second⁸⁸ about act and potency, it is suggested⁸⁹ that in a self-moving agent there are several intentionally distinct elements of which one is moving and another is moved. Thus, it is not the same entity that primarily moves itself according to the preceding argument.⁹⁰ Neither is the subject in act and potency under the same intentional aspect, according to the second argument.⁹¹ Nor is the same component the foundation for opposite relations, according to the third argument.⁹² This is exemplified in the case of the will moving itself,⁹³ because it is an appetite, and it is [also] free and as free it moves itself.

77 Against this solution it is argued: the intentional distinction, according to those who hold it,⁹⁴ is only in the thing potentially; only in the intellect is it actual and complete. If some difference is required, however, in a thing, if it is to move itself, since the effect produced is real, this difference in the thing must be real, because a real effect does not depend upon a mental or conceptual act.

⁸⁸Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁸⁹Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 5 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 138): "Grave enim movet se secundum formam et movetur secundum materiam, non quod forma moveat et materia moveatur, sed quod forma est quo totum moveat, et materia quo totum moveatur. Similiter in animali anima est quo movet ut forma, et quiddam corpus quod movet et moveatur sicut organum... hic autem movens et motum differunt sola ratione et ad plus intentione, et hoc non sicut diversae potentiae, sed sicut vires unius potentiae"; idem, *Quodl.* X q. 9 (AMPh s. 2, XIV, 225): "Et est tota voluntas movens et mota tota, sed movens ratione qua est libera, quae libertas est formale in ipsa, mota autem ratione qua est natura, quae est materiale in ipsa. Et hoc cessante impedimento, quemadmodum dictum est de gravi et levi respectu translationes sursum et deorsum."

⁹⁰Cf. supra, n. 6.

⁹¹Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁹²Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁹³Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 5 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 131-132): "Quod necessarium est ponere a quocumque movente voluntas ponatur moveri quando de non-volente fit volens: est enim velle in ea accidens et operatio in qua consistit sua perfectio in bene esse. Quam propter libertatem voluntatis, qua debet esse domina suorum actuum, impossibile est poni quod ab aliquo naturali activo, ut est natura ut est receptibilis volitionis, alio a se procedat de potentia in actum; hoc enim omnino repugnat libertati, sicut dictum est."

⁹⁴Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* I q. 9 (AMPh s. 2, V 55-56); *Quodl.* X q. 7 (AMPh s. 2, XIV 164-167); cf. supra, Bk. VII, q. 19, n. 22.

78 Also, thus any species, since it contains as distinct intentions a genus and difference, according to those who hold this view,⁹⁵ could move as the form of the difference, and be moved as the form of the genus.

79 Also, an essential whole [composed of matter and form] has less unity than something in which there is only an intentional distinction, because essential parts are really diverse and make for a real composition. And nevertheless in such an essential whole, the form never moves the matter. A fortiori, one intentional part does not move another.

80 Also, it is by its proper specific difference that a subject, insofar as it is actualized, receives its proper attribute. Two proofs of this: [a] Otherwise, the attribute would not inhere in that subject primarily, if it were present there [only because of some more general characteristic that enters] into its conception, and not according to that other [which is properly specific], just as man is not primarily what lives, although he does live *per se*, according to the ch. 'On *per se*' in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*.⁹⁶ Also [b], if the attribute were present in a subject only because of the form of its genus, then anything falling under that genus would have this attribute and thus it would not be proper to this [specific subject], or if, because of some impediment, it did not exist in another [species of that genus], then at least it would exist prior by nature in this genus before this form could be understood to be determined by the form of the difference.

81 And from this [major] having been proved, it is argued further that since many [of the states] to which some [subjects] move themselves represent their proper attributes, they are so moved in virtue of having the difference proper to themselves rather than by means of some generic characteristic. For they will be moved to

⁹⁵Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 27, q. 1, ad 5 (I, f. 161M-162P): "Quaedam vero differunt intentione, ut diversae differentiae unius speciei quae in eodem separari non possunt quia cadunt in idipsum re, ut vegetativum et sensitivum in bruto, sed in diversis possunt separari, secundum quod in plantis est vegetativum sine sensitivo et in brutis sensitivum sine rationali"; cf. supra, lib. VII, q. 19, nn. 35-43.

⁹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 18, 1022a 30-32: "Whatever attribute a thing receives in virtue of itself directly or in one of its parts, e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life directly resides, is part of the man."

[possess these attributes] in the way that they receive them. And it is agreed that they [i.e., the subjects] act insofar as they are in act through their [specific] forms. Therefore, they act and are acted upon immediately by reason of some absolute characteristic that is undifferentiated both conceptually and in reality.

82 [The Reply of Scotus] For this reason in particular, which could be formulated even more effectively, one can answer this [second] argument [for the common view]⁹⁷ in another way. If 'potency' be understood as opposed to act, in the way stated in the first two questions on this Bk. IX,⁹⁸ never is the same thing in both potency and in act as regards the same referent, for when water is actually hot, it is not actually frigid, but only potentially cold. And when it is argued that 'if it cools itself, it must be in actuality the sort of thing it is in potency to become,' this is a fallacy of the consequent, if 'in actuality' refers to a formal [and not merely virtual] act. For this does not follow: 'The sun can change matter through putrefaction into the form of a maggot, therefore, the sun is in actuality a maggot.' For if to activate an effect, it suffices that the active perfection [of the agent] be at times of the same sort as what comes to be in the effect, how much more does a more excellent sort of active perfection suffice? Every equivocal agent is in act with respect to its effect in this way. Not that it has a similar act formally—for then it would not be an equivocal [but a univocal] agent—but it has that act virtually, because it possesses something more excellent formally.

83 But to what is it in potency and to what is it in act?

Reply: it is in potency to the end-term of its movement, and it is in act by reason of the active principle it possesses that is related equivocally to that term or end-product.

84 But what if 'potency' be taken to mean the relationship to the principle, as explained in the third and fourth questions on this Bk. IX?⁹⁹ Either it refers to the relationship of the principle to what issues from it [i.e. the principiatum] or else it refers to the other active principle [i.e. the form] in the sense these are distinguished

⁹⁷Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁹⁸Cf. supra, qq. 1-2, nn. 23-34 and 39-48.

⁹⁹Cf. supra, qq. 3-4, nn. 15-38.

in the solution to article two of the third question.¹⁰⁰ If 'potency' refers to the principiatum, insofar as this is called 'act,' then I concede that nothing essentially the same is both in potency and act, for no single essence produces itself effectively, and the same is true for any sort of principle. Nevertheless, the same supposit can have in itself two natures of which one is the active principle and the other, the principiatum [which issues from the principle], and in this sense it is in potency—that is 'potent' through its active principle—and actualized, or in 'act,' because of the principiatum. But in this way it is not customary to take 'act' for what has actualized.

85 [19] But if 'potency' refers to the relationship of one principle [i.e., matter] to act [i.e., the form] as to the other intrinsic principle, then to hold that both cannot exist in one supposit is to maintain that no supposit can be effected in this fashion, and hence no supposit will be composed of one principle, called potential, and the other principle, called act—which is false.

86 Finally, if 'potency' refers to the relationship of the passive principle to the active principle, which is said to be in act, namely, active, this is not called 'act.' And then to say that no single thing is both in potency and act is nothing more than expressing in different words the fact that nothing identical is both active and passive. And this is not an a priori proof, but is begging the question by taking the same thing under different terms as a proof of itself.

87 To the confirmation¹⁰¹ about the contrariety of agent and patient: although it is evident from what we said to the first argument in question six¹⁰² that 'action' is taken strictly, and in this sense, as we have just said, nothing acts upon itself; nevertheless it can be said that just as an agent makes the patient like itself when its action ends, so it can be contrary to it at the beginning of the action. But whenever it acts equivocally, it does not make the patient like itself formally, but only virtually. For so far as its formal existence or being is concerned, such an effect [only] imitates its cause, and does not become just like it, properly speaking. And thus

¹⁰⁰Cf. supra, qq. 3-4, n. 25-28.

¹⁰¹Cf. supra, n. 8.

¹⁰²Cf. supra, q. 6, n. 14.

in the beginning [the agent] is virtually contrary to the patient to the extent that it has in its power or virtue the other form that is formally contrary to [the present] form of the patient. And this sort of contrariety suffices for the action. For it is only in this way that vicious acts are contrary to the virtuous habit, which they corrupt, as is evident from Bk. II of the *Ethics*.¹⁰³

88 [20] This answer—which consists in this: 'what is active, that is in virtual act, is the same as what is formally in receptive potency to what this virtue refers'—is challenged for three reasons.

89 [First criticism] First, in this way:¹⁰⁴ anything in act through something formally, can in no way be in potency to a similar act before it is actualized, and therefore neither can something that is in virtual act according to something, be in potency to that act formally. The antecedent is evident, because then two acts of the same species could exist in the same thing.

90 The implication is proved:¹⁰⁵

[First], because the act in which it is virtually the other, is more perfect than that formal [act] that is in its power; therefore it perfects the subject more, and thus destroys its potency toward that formal act, even more than the formal act itself would do [if present].

91 [Second], it would seem futile to take on that formal perfection already possessed virtually, for what receives it becomes no more perfect through the formal perfection than before.

92 Third, then God would seem to be in potency to receive many perfections which are not in him formally, but only virtually. The

¹⁰³Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* II, ch. 2, 1104a 14-17: "...we see in the case of strength and of health...both excessive and defective exercise destroys strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys health."

¹⁰⁴Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI q. 7 (PhB III, 151): "Praeterea, sicut impossibile est quod illud activum quod est formaliter tale quale debet facere passivum sit illud passivum et se ipsum faciat formaliter tale, ita impossibile est quod illud quod est virtualiter tale quale debet facere passivum sit illud passivum et faciat se ipsum formaliter tale."

¹⁰⁵Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI q. 7 (PhB III, 151): "Ita enim contra rationem eius quod virtualiter est tale quale debet facere passivum, formaliter est quod ex quo iam est tale eminentiori et perfectiori modo, quia est principale agens quod faciat se tale minus perfecto modo."

sun too would seem to be in passive potency to the forms it can generate, which it possesses in some way virtually.

93 [Second criticism] Secondly this argument is proposed. Anything active regards its corresponding patient in general, and hence anything *per se* possessing this passive characteristic, as was proved above in the solution to the third article.¹⁰⁶ None of these [agents] assumed to be active with respect to themselves have any active function as regards patients of the same sort other than themselves. Therefore, neither are they active as regards themselves. Proof of the minor: Hot water put in contact with something else that can be cooled, does not cool it but heats it; therefore it is no more truly active as regards itself than as regards another. Similarly, the cognitive and appetitive potencies do not cause acts of knowledge or appetite in another potency able to receive such.

94 This reason is confirmed, for where the agent is obviously equivocal, as the sun is with respect to what can be generated, the equivocal nature of the agent does not alter the general characteristic manner in which it acts, which seems to be that it acts only upon something other than itself and does so with respect to any other patient whatsoever within reach. Now the sun does not change itself to take on the form of a maggot, but rather changes other matter, and does this to any other that is equally disposed to receive it and is within reach.

95 To this second,¹⁰⁷ when it is argued that an equivocal agent would act on another as upon itself, there is this reply. When an essential order exists between two effects of the same agent, neither of which is the cause of the other, such an agent cannot cause the posterior effect without first causing the prior effect, at least by a priority of nature. An example of this would be causing the first part of a ray before causing what follows, assuming that the ray as a whole is caused immediately by the luminous object as a cause.¹⁰⁸ Now the effect to be caused in the agent having the active perfection and the effect to be caused in something other than the agent are related in this fashion. Thus in the case of the water that

¹⁰⁶Cf. supra, n. 24.

¹⁰⁷Cf. supra, nn. 93-94.

¹⁰⁸Scotus adopts the common theory that light rays are propagated instantaneously through the translucent medium.

has been heated this relationship obtains. It cannot cool something else unless it has first cooled itself.

96 However, this reply is inadequate, because water causes the coldness in another as an effect of its own coldness, though not through itself.¹⁰⁹ Secondly, this reply is inapplicable to the cognitive and appetitive powers. Therefore, look for another answer based on the fact that the assumption is true of an agent acting by a transient action, rather than an immanent action.

97 [Third criticism] The third argument takes the form of an objection. According to the aforesaid response,¹¹⁰ one would have to say that anything that acts upon itself does so as an equivocal agent, for instance, it is the wood that heats itself, not the fire which is only a *sine qua non* [condition], as some¹¹¹ assume the object with respect to the potency to be only a *sine qua non* condition for its act.

A confirmation of this: act and potency are no more incompatible in one thing than in another. Therefore, if act can coexist with potency anywhere, then they are compatible wheresoever they maybe found. And if anywhere their incompatibility is denied, then it should be denied everywhere. And then there would seem to be nothing one could use to disprove that anything whatsoever, if it is in potency to something, is also sufficiently in act in its regard as to be able to actualize it.

98 For the same reason, they add, the most universal metaphysical principles¹¹² should never be denied in a particular case, because of

¹⁰⁹That is, not *qua* substance, but as having the quality of coldness.

¹¹⁰Cf. supra, n. 95.

¹¹¹Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI q. 7, ad 1 (PhB III, 158): "Quis enim probabit quod ignis generet ignem ex aqua? Dicitur enim quod in aqua est forma substantialis ignis virtualiter quae tamen non efficit se in actum nisi praesente igne ut causa sine qua non. Quis enim probabit lignum vel corpus aliquod calefieri ab igne? Immo dicitur quod se ipsum calefacit, praesente igne ut causa sine qua non. Idem dici poterit de actibus omnium potentiarum animae, ut patet inducendo"; cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 415 (III, 252).

¹¹²Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI q. 7 (PhB III, 170): "Tamen ad praedictas dubitationes dissolvendas primo supponimus quod, quia aliqua principia esse certissima oportet, alioquin nihil etiam posset per ea investigari communia ergo illa principia metaphysicae, quae quodammodo est omnis scientia, debent in qualibet scientia speciali supponi, et ideo quia ex metaphysica hoc scire debemus quod unum et idem non potest esse in actu et potentia et quod illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid

some incidental special difficulty. For if they may be denied in one instance, they may be universally denied, and so because of ignorance about one conclusion, principles and many other conclusions would be denied. For instance, if one, for some unknown reason, admitted the same thing could be both white and not white, he would simply deny a first principle, because the grounds for the denial is the same in the one case as in the other.

99 [22] [Reply to the first and third criticisms] To these apparent difficulties one could reply:

To the first:¹¹³ the implication is not valid. For whatever be the notion assigned to acts of the same kind, in the antecedent, it does not hold for acts of a different sort, in the consequent.

100 As for the first proof,¹¹⁴ one may grant that if we take both acts precisely, namely the virtual and the formal, the virtual act [being really identical with the substance or nature] is more perfect than the formal [which is an accident or coeval property]. But when that [virtual act] is limited, it is not so perfect that it excludes from the subject any potency as regards the formal act, because that formal act, as distinct from the virtual, does represent some perfection, and the subject would not be perfected in that proper degree were it to have that perfection only virtually.

101 Applying this to the second proof,¹¹⁵ we could say that the lesser perfection is not superfluous to what has greater perfection to begin with, unless that greater perfection would confer every measure of perfection that subject would have if it possessed both the greater and the lesser perfection at once. And this never happens where the major perfection is finite. For every limited perfection is less than what results from its combination with the other.

102 What clearly confirms these remarks is the fact that any substance whatsoever taken simply is a more perfect being than any of its accidents whatsoever, taken precisely. Still the act of substance does not remove its potency to [receive] an accident, nor is

non potest se reducere ad actum secundum illud"; similarly Joannes Sapiens, *Quaestio* (BFS IX, 443); cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 516 (III, 306).

¹¹³Cf. supra, n. 89.

¹¹⁴Cf. supra, n. 90.

¹¹⁵Cf. supra, n. 91.

the accident superfluous to it, for substance with accident is more perfect than substance alone.

103 The answer to the third proof¹¹⁶ is evident, because God's virtual act is infinite, and hence—to assume the impossible—if a formal act existed in God he would not be more perfect, because finite added to the infinite equals nothing more than the infinite alone.

As for what is added about the sun, I reply that in general there is nothing in the nature of a virtual and formal act that would prevent them existing in the same thing, because then they would be everywhere incompatible. Still one can be in something to which the other is repugnant from some other reason, but not because it has another act. Just as in the case at hand, being hot is formally incompatible with the sun since it is a quality that is proper to a corruptible body, and consequently the sun is not a subject that has a capacity for it. Neither is fire capable of having whiteness, which is a quality proper to a compound. But it is not because it is virtually hot that the sun and heat are [formally] incompatible, as is clear from the case of Saturn, which is assumed to be virtually cold. It is no more capable formally of receiving the quality heat than is the sun. All arguments of this sort, consequently, are instances of the fallacy of giving as the cause what is not the cause. For every case where one of these acts is present, and the other is excluded, the reason for its impossibility is not because the other is in it, but for some other special reason, which if it were there without the other act, there would still be the cause of the same impossibility.

104 From this [the answer] to the third is evident, namely that objection,¹¹⁷ for I admit that such and such an act, as a virtual act and a potency to formal act, are in no subject completely opposed to one another, for then they would be everywhere incompatible. However, one of them can be incompatible with some third in which the other exists; whereas toward another third they are not [repugnant], and to a still other third both are repugnant. And due

¹¹⁶Cf. supra, n. 92.

¹¹⁷Cf. supra, n. 97.

to this sometimes neither can be present, sometimes both, sometimes this without that, sometimes the other way round.

105 [23] As for the contention¹¹⁸ that there would be no basis for proving wood does not heat by itself, but is heated by fire—I reply: it seems our adversaries for lack of argument in support of their thesis shed the role of opponent and assume that of respondent by maintaining the impossible.¹¹⁹ For now the controversy is directed to arguing against such a solution by proving that wood does not heat itself. And I say for this, I might not take my argument from the assumption of incompatibility of the aforesaid acts in the same subject, but develop it on other grounds. And these premises would not militate against my contention that in other situations, things do move themselves.

106 As for what is added about metaphysical principles,¹²⁰ it is true that they are most universal, and that none of them suffers an exception in a particular instance. For the mark of true statements is that they are clearly illustrated in manifest instances. But how can that be called a principle from which so many absurdities follow? I don't believe Aristotle could have assumed any proposition to be,—not a first—yeah, not even a tenth principle, which has in so many particular instances such obviously absurd consequences. Also, if this be a first metaphysical principle, viz. if nothing the same can be both in virtual act and in potency to the formal act, of which this virtual act is the effective principle—if, I say, this be a first metaphysical principle, I know it is not inscribed in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. If those who hold it have another metaphysics, how is it that they alone have the sort of intellect that can grasp the terms of this 'principle,' which everybody else is unable to comprehend? For if these others could grasp the terms and it were like a first principle, they would immediately accept it, and yet many not only reject it as a principle, but consider it as simply false because of its many counterinstances.

¹¹⁸Cf. supra, n. 97.

¹¹⁹The role of 'opponent' and 'respondent' are taken from the medieval tradition governing scholarly disputation. See the treatise *De obligationibus*.

¹²⁰Cf. supra, n. 98.

107 [24][Concerning the third argument for the common view] To the third main argument¹²¹ for the first opinion regarding opposite relations¹²² we must reply as we did in the solution to the third question on this Bk. IX, article 2.¹²³ The relationship of producer to product is different than the relation of active to passive principles, both of which are 'principles' of one and the same product. The first two relations never coexist in the same supposit, for 'nothing begets itself';¹²⁴ if it did, it would exist when it did not exist. What is more, these two relations are never based in one and the same limited nature, because no finite nature communicates the whole of its undivided self to the supposit produced. Now the other two relations [viz. active to passive and passive to active principle] can at times be found in the same supposit, and be rooted in one nature, because, in their interrelationship in this way, one does not depend essentially, but only accidentally, upon the other, the one as doing something, the other as receiving something from the first, but not its existence as such. In the first [two] relationships [viz. of producer to product and vice versa], the produced in the case of creatures depends upon its producer [essentially or] for being that which it is. Now it is impossible that the same nature be essentially dependent upon itself, but it is not impossible for the selfsame thing to depend upon itself for some accidental or qualified perfection.

108 [An alternative answer] Another possible reply is that whenever two opposing real relations are found in the same thing, two prior disparate relations are present, (for instance, a dual respect to the principle as regards the same principiatum) that the mutual relationship of one principle to the other principle, perhaps, follows.—But this answer, however, presupposes two doubtful points: one, that these disparate relations are prior to the opposed relationship; the other, that their prior presence somehow makes

¹²¹Cf. supra, n. 9.

¹²²Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 517-520 (III, 307-309), cf. supra n. 76.

¹²³Cf. supra, qq. 3-4, nn. 19-28.

¹²⁴Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* I, ch. 1, n. 1 (PL 42, 820; CCL 50, 28): "Nulla enim omnino res est quae se ipsam gignat ut sit"; Duns Scotus, *De primo principio* ch. 2, concl. 1 (ed. M. Mueller, p. 10): "... nulla omnino res essentialem ordinem habet ad se"; *Theoremata* theor. 19, n. [1] (ed. Vives V, 74b): "Nihil est causa sui ipsius."

possible the coexistence of the opposed relationships. For if they were incompatible *per se*, even the disparate relations would not remove that incompatibility.

109 Therefore, it could be said that just as a nature completely unlimited [such as the divine nature] could be the foundation for primarily opposed relationships of producing and produced [such as constitute the divine persons], although not those of caused and caused, (for then the same thing would depend upon itself essentially), so also a nature that is in some respects unlimited could be the foundation of two of these secondary opposite relationships which are less opposed to one another [than those of 'begetting' and 'begotten' in the divine nature]. But if any nature, receptive of some perfection, is also assumed to be active with respect to it, then it is also presumed to be in some sense unlimited to the extent that it prepossessed that perfection virtually. Therefore, etc.

110 [Two objections to the alternate answer] Against this it is argued:¹²⁵ [1] that all opposites include contradictories, therefore, if opposite relationships coexisted in the same subject, contradictories would exist in the same thing.

111 Also, [2] according to *Physics* II,¹²⁶ matter never coincides with the other causes, neither in the same individual nor in the same species.¹²⁷

¹²⁵Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 2 (PhB IV, 19); Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 25, q. un., n. 6 (XIX, 230).

¹²⁶Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 7, 198a 22-26: "Now the causes being four, it is the business of the physicist to know about them all, and if he refers his problems back to all of them, he will assign the 'why' in the way proper to his science—the matter, the form, the mover, 'that for the sake of which.' The last three often coincide; for the 'what' and the 'that for the sake of which' are one, while the primary source of motion is the same in species as these"; Averroes, *Physics* II, com. 70 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 35rb): "Quod oportet naturalem dare in responsione ad quare omnes causas quattuor, quoniam in scientia naturali apparet materia et in quo est materia sunt omnes causae... et intendit per illa tria: agens et formam et finem sicut diximus."

¹²⁷Thomas, *Physics* II, lect. 11 (II, 88a): "Materia vero non est nec idem specie nec idem numero cum aliis causis"; Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VIII, q. 2 (PhB IV, 23); cf. Duns Scotus, *Theoremata*, theor. 19 (ed. Vivès V, 73b): "Causae non coincidunt necessario possunt tamen coincidere aliquae aliquando."

112 [Reply to these objections] To the first,¹²⁸ it can be said that relatives qua relatives are not incompatible, but their foundations may be so if an essential dependence exists among them.

113 Another answer given is that things other than contradictories are only formally opposed in the abstract, especially if—as some claim¹²⁹—it is not a contradiction that contraries should exist at the same time.

114 To the second:¹³⁰ understand it of matter 'ex qua,' not of 'in qua,' and of any efficient whatsoever.¹³¹ Or if it be of matter of any sort, then the efficient cause is understood as univocal, but [do not say that matter and efficient cause never] coincide where both terms are understood in general. Aristotle seems to have said enough about matter 'ex qua,' which he assumed to be one of the [intrinsic] causes of natural things.

115 [25][Other arguments against self-movement] As for the other arguments adduced for specific applications of the first opinion,¹³² these are refuted by what has been said earlier,¹³³ but some proofs touched upon some matters to which we will have to reply.

116 [Re light and heavy bodies] When its proponents cite Aristotle's statement from *Physics* VIII¹³⁴ about the heavy and light, this can be expounded briefly with reference to the heavy insofar as naturally mobile, and not insofar as it has an active principle of moving; for then it is in accidental potency to moving, just as a knower is to knowing theoretically. Just how in reality one and the same thing can be the active principle and that 'by which' this is naturally mobile, and yet differ conceptually, was explained in the question on seminal reasons in Bk. VII.¹³⁵ The reasons given in

¹²⁸Cf. supra, n. 110.

¹²⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 17, p. 2, q. 2, n. 242 (V 255): "...contraria in summo sunt impossibilia in eodem, in gradibus remissis non."

¹³⁰Cf. supra, n. 111.

¹³¹For the discussion of these terms see supra, Bk. IX, q. 13, nn. 4-9. The matter 'ex qua' is that out of which something is made, whereas the 'in qua' refers to that which receives the form and coexists with it. Here, the self-moving subject is the secondary matter 'in qua' the motion occurs.

¹³²Cf. supra, nn. 10-22.

¹³³Cf. supra, nn. 45-73.

¹³⁴Cf. supra, nn. 13 and 46-52.

¹³⁵Cf. supra, Bk. VII, q. 12, nn. 29-31, 40-42 and 45-59.

Physics VIII do not simply disprove that a heavy body does not move itself, but only that it does not do so by a univocal sort of action or as an animal does, since it lacks a principle for bringing motion to a halt. Neither does it move itself to different contrary states as does the animal. Thus these arguments [of Aristotle] do infer something true, and are to be understood in connection with his eventual solution that follows, just as in other passages where he first presents arguments and only later settles the matter definitively.

117 [Re animal movement] As for what is added about the movement of animals,¹³⁶ we could very well admit that one part that is locally at rest, when altered however, locally moves another adjoining part by pushing it, and then is in turn moved by the pull of the first part that was pushed, and thus the motion by the moved occurs only by means of parts and these pulling and pushing parts represent two parts of the heart, and not a higher and lower part of the body as in jumping, as was proved above.¹³⁷

118 Later on Aristotle's views on semen in *On Animal Generation*, Bk. I¹³⁸ are cited. His remarks can be expounded as referring to the certain excellence of the male seed, and not that this alone is active [for if the female were not active in generation] how would the fetus sometimes resemble the mother?¹³⁹ Also, the semen of both male and female are of the same species, and action is a consequence of the form. Also, according to *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 6,¹⁴⁰ a male horse and a female ass are in some sense a mule.

119 [Re cognitive powers] The reply to those things that are brought up about cognitive potencies¹⁴¹ is clear, if one assumes that both the power and the object are active with regard to the act of knowing.

¹³⁶Cf. supra, nn. 14 and 53-55.

¹³⁷Cf. supra, nn. 54-55.

¹³⁸Cited above in n. 16; see also supra, n. 61.

¹³⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 4, q. un., nn. [3-4 and 16-17] (ed. Vivès XIV, 183-184 and 200).

¹⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 8, 1033b 33-1034a 2: "...unless something happens contrary to nature, e.g. the production of a mule by a horse. And even though these cases are similar, for that which would be found to be common to horse and ass, the genus next above them, has not received a name, but it would doubtless be both, in fact something like a mule."

¹⁴¹Cf. supra, nn. 17-20 and 60.

120 What is said about the common accident¹⁴² does not militate against cognitive powers if one holds the aforesaid view.

121 [Re the will] In the following question¹⁴³ an answer will be given to their claims about the rational appetite,¹⁴⁴ and it will be shown how it is a sufficient cause of its common accidents [viz. volitions].

122 As for the authority of Aristotle from *On the Soul* III,¹⁴⁵ one can say, where the rational appetite is concerned, that it is moved metaphorically, but it moves itself effectively. Neither is it inappropriate that in this short statement, 'moves' is used equivocally, for many examples of such equivocal use may be found in his books. In *Physics* I:¹⁴⁶ "The primary contraries are not derived from anything else, nor from each other, but everything has to be derived from them." Now how can [the preposition] 'from' be taken univocally, if the proofs for each of these members be carefully studied?

123 This reply is confirmed from *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 4:¹⁴⁷ 'It moves as loved and desired,' namely, as an end. But this is to move metaphorically. For the end as end is not efficient. Therefore movement corresponding to it [the end] is metaphorical movement.

124 And in this way Averroes's comment [36] on Bk. XII cited above¹⁴⁸ may be answered. What he says is false [viz. "if qua end"] Neither does he expound Aristotle in this matter, for Aristotle neither here nor anywhere else can be found assuming that what is loved moves in two ways, namely properly and metaphorically. Look up what we have said on this matter in Bk. VI in the question 'On the true.'¹⁴⁹

[IV.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

125 Reply to the arguments at the beginning:

¹⁴²Cf. supra, n. 20.

¹⁴³Cf. infra, q. 15, nn. 22-29 and 35-41.

¹⁴⁴Cf. supra, nn. 21-22 and 62.

¹⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 21.

¹⁴⁶Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 5 188a 27-30.

¹⁴⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 7, 1072b 3-4.: "The final cause produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved."

¹⁴⁸Cf. supra, n. 22.

¹⁴⁹Cf. supra, Bk. VI, q. 3, nn. 22 and 15-19.

To the citation from Aristotle here,¹⁵⁰ it is evident that it solves itself. For it contains the phrase 'insofar as a thing is an organic unity,' for Aristotle did not wish to say that nothing moves itself, but he added the qualification 'insofar as.' And he understands 'a thing is an organic unity' to mean the same thing, as is clear from his proof: "for it is one and not two different things." And similarly in the definition of active potency, he does not claim absolutely that it is a power 'of changing another,' but adds 'or insofar as it is other.'

126 To the second,¹⁵¹ I say that once the term is had, the action ceases.¹⁵² Also, even when the agent does not have this, it can be stopped from acting by a stronger contrary force. Also, if it is not the total active cause of the action, but requires a co-operating cause, if the latter is absent, no action results. Also, an agent will not act if it lacks [the subject matter] in or on which or [the object] about which [it acts]. Again, if some other action is naturally presupposed and does not occur, then the agent will not act. Finally, if it is a free agent, it is able of itself to refrain from acting. The reason an agent does not always move itself could be any one of these six reasons. An example of the first would be a heavy body at the center of the earth. An instance of the second would be boiling water that fails to cool itself in the presence of a warming fire. The third is illustrated in the case of cognitive powers, on the view that both object and power are active [in cognition]. An example of the fourth and fifth combined would be the fact that if nothing is known, then normally nothing is willed. A sample of the sixth is the will, which need not choose what the intellect shows it. And so the solution in general to this argument is clear.

¹⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 1-2.

¹⁵¹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

¹⁵²Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, ch. 7, 324b 16-17: "...habentibus autem presentibus adhuc generatur aliquid, sed est iam"; cf. *supra*, Bk. V, q. 1, n. 24.