

—JOHN DUNS SCOTUS —

THE EXAMINED REPORT
OF
THE PARIS LECTURE

REPORTATIO I-A

LATIN TEXT AND ENGLISH TRANSLATION

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PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

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The present translation combines the efforts of two generations, two traditions, and two approaches to the scholarly study of medieval texts. The life-long expertise of Fr. Allan Wolter, an outstanding Scotus scholar, is supplemented by the philological and hermeneutic approach of the younger generation of philologists. We believe that this collaboration contributes to the furtherance of Scotus studies.

This publication can be utilized as a tool both for scholars and for general readers interested in Duns Scotus, medieval philosophy, and medieval theology. It offers an accessible format in the English translation and leaves the more technical aspects of textual research to forthcoming critical editions.

We are proud to present this volume as a complement to the works in the Philosophical Writings of Blessed John Duns Scotus series previously published by The Franciscan Institute.

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Director, The Franciscan Institute
April, 2004

[Distinctio 3
Quaestio 1
Utrum Deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis
ab intellectu viatoris]

1 Circa distinctionem tertiam quaeritur primo utrum Deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris.

Videtur quod non:

III *De anima*:¹ sicut sensibilia ad sensum, sic phantasmata ad intellectum; sed sensus non sentit nisi sensibilia; ergo nec intellectus nisi phantasiabile; Deus autem non habet phantasma nec aliquid phantasiabile; ergo non potest cognosci ab intellectu viatoris.

2 Item, Philosophus II *Metaphysicae*:² sicut se habet oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ita intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt manifestissima in natura, quae sunt prima principia sive substantiae separatae, secundum Commentatorem; sed noctua non potest intueri solem; ergo nec intellectus viatoris cognoscere primam causam sive Deum nec aliqua alia a sensibilibus vel propria phantasmata habentibus.

3 Item, infinitum secundum quod tale est incognitum, I *Physicorum*,³ et II *Metaphysicae*:⁴ infinita non contingit intelligere; ergo infinitum intensivum nec extensivum contingit intelligere; sed Deus est infinitus; ergo etc.

4 Contra:

Philosophus VI *Metaphysicae*⁵ dicit quod metaphysica est theologia et circa divina principaliter; in consideratione etiam divinorum consistit felicitas, X *Ethicorum*.⁶

Distinctio 3

Question One

Is God naturally knowable by the intellect of a pilgrim*?

1 As regards distinction three the first question asked is whether God is naturally knowable by the intellect of a pilgrim.

It seems not. According to Bk. III *On the Soul*, as sense perceptibles are to the senses, so sense images are to the intellect; but the senses only perceive what is sensible; therefore the intellect only knows what can be imagined; but God has no sense image nor can God be imagined; therefore he cannot be known by the intellect of a pilgrim.

2 Also, according to the Philosopher in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*, as the eye of the owl is blinded by the light of the sun, so is our intellect blind to what is most manifest in nature, namely the first principles* or separate* substances, according to the Commentator. But owls cannot see the sun; therefore, neither can the mind of the pilgrim know the first cause or God, nor anything other than what is sensible or has a sense image of its own.

3 Also the infinite as such is unknowable according to *Physics* I and infinites cannot be intellectually grasped according to *Metaphysics* II; therefore what is either intensively or extensively infinite cannot be intellectually grasped; but God is infinite; therefore, etc.

4 To the contrary: the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VI, says that metaphysics is a theology and is mainly about the divine; also according to *Ethics* X, happiness consists in a consideration of the divine.

¹ Aristot., *De anima* III, c. 7 (431a 14-5).

² Aristot., *Metaph.* II (a), c. 1 (993b 9-11).

³ Aristot., *Physica* I, c. 4 (187b 7-8).

⁴ Aristot., *Metaph.* II (a), c. 2 (994b 22-3).

⁵ Aristot., *Metaph.* VI (E), c. 1 (1026a 19-23).

⁶ Aristot., *Eth. Nic.* X, c. 7 (1177a 12-7).

[I. — Status quaestionis]

5 Circa istam quaestionem, primo excludam distinctiones inutiles; secundo opiniones aliquas et eas reprobabo, tertio solvam quaestionem.

[A. — Art. 1: Excludit distinctiones inutiles]

6 In ista quaestione primo excludo distinctiones aliquorum inutiles. Quaedam distinctio est quod Deus potest cognosci privative vel negative.

7 Contra: quia aut concipitur praecise illa negatio in se aut ut dicta de aliquo positivo; non primo modo, quia sic non plus cognosceretur Deus quam chimaera: sic nullo modo Deus cognoscitur. Si secundo modo, quia de illo nos quaerimus, oportet quod sit aliquid positive notum de Deo.

8 Ex isto ergo sequitur corollarium, quia licet via remotionis sit utilis ad cognoscendum, tamen oportet habere aliquid positivum in fine deductionis ad quod statur.

9 Item, negatio non cognoscitur nisi per affirmationem, IV *Metaphysicae*⁷ et II *Perihermenias*;⁸ nulla enim propositio negativa est prima, quia non cognosco aliquid removeri ab isto, nisi quia prius praedicatur vel cognoscitur aliquid de eo, id est de subiecto cui repugnat illud remotum. Ergo si aliquid de Deo negative praedicatur vel cognoscitur, oportet quod hoc sit ratione alicuius positivi; ergo cognoscitur aliquid positivum.

10 Item, negationes non summe amamus, quia non est ibi praecise ratio amabilis; sed Deum summe amamus; ergo hoc erit ratione alicuius positivi.

11 Nec in ista quaestione oportet distinguere de 'quid est' et 'si est'; nec de 'si est vel quia est in intellectu' et 'in re', sive ut est quaestio de veritate propositionis vel ut est quaestio de esse Dei, quia idem sunt.

⁷ Aristot., *Metaph.* IV (Γ), c. 4 (1008a 15-8).

⁸ Aristot., *De interpr.* c. 14 (24b 1-7).

The Division of the Question

5 In regard to this question I first exclude useless distinctions; second, I cite certain opinions that I disagree with; third I give my answer to the question.

Article 1: Some useless distinctions

6 In this question I first discard useless distinctions that some make. One such is that God can [only] be known in a privative way or negatively.

7 On the contrary, either it is conceived precisely as a negation or it is conceived as negating something positive. It is impossible to conceive God in the first way, because one would no more have knowledge of God than of a chimera; and thus God would not be known as such. If one conceives God negatively in the second way, since this is what we are asking about, it is necessary that there be something positively known about God.

8 Hence, a corollary follows from this, for even though discarding the irrelevant is a useful way of knowing, nevertheless one has to have something positive in the end of one's deduction.

9 Also, a negation is only known by denying some affirmation, according to *Metaphysics* VI and *On Interpretation* II. For no negation is simply first, since I cannot know what must be denied about anything unless I first know something asserted about that subject that is inconsistent with it [and further] denied. Therefore if something is denied of God, it must be because of something positive; therefore something positive is known about him.

10 In addition, we cannot love negations most of all, because there is nothing lovable there; but we love God most of all; therefore it will be because of something positively known about him.

11 Nor must one in this question distinguish between 'what he is' and 'if he is,' or between 'if he is, or that he is conceptually' or 'really,' or whether the question is about the truth of a proposition or is a question of about the existence of God, because they are the same.

12 Sed contra: si est quaestio utrum Deus sit de esse propositionis sive de esse Dei, quod idem est secundum me, ergo oportet cognoscere extrema, et si debeo cognoscere esse de Deo vel hoc modo vel illo, oportet me habere aliquem conceptum de eo de quo quaero si est, quare in hoc nulla est distinctio.

13 Nec distinguendum est de scire naturali et supernaturali. Nec de cognitione Dei in creatura vel in se, quia aliud est principium a quo incipit discursus et aliud in quo stat; si ergo in cognitione Dei stat in creatura, non est aliud principium discursus et cognitum post discursum et per consequens nullam habeo cognitionem de Deo. Si autem post discursum sto in cognitione Dei, habeo propositum.

14 Est ergo mens quaestionis utrum aliquem conceptum simplicem possit intellectus viatoris naturaliter habere de Deo, in quo conceptu simplici cognoscitur Deus, qui sit proprius conceptus Dei.

[B. — Art. 2: Opiniones aliorum

1. — Opinio Thomae

a. — Expositio opinionis]

15 Et ad hoc, ut circa secundum principale, dicunt quidam⁹ quod obiectum intellectus coniuncti est quidditas rei materialis propter proportionem intellectus ad obiectum.

16 Triplex autem est potentia cognitiva, secundum doctorem istum:¹⁰ quaedam omnino materialis et materialiter operans, ut potentiae sensitivae; quaedam omnino immaterialis, ut potentia angeli; quaedam medio modo se habens, cuius obiectum est quidditas omnino materialis. Et in hoc differt a potentia superiori cuius obiectum est quidditas omnino immaterialis; sed in hoc conveniunt quod potentiae superiores cognitivae et mediae sunt immateriales in se, in quo differunt a potentia omnino materiali.

⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *STh* I, q. 84, a. 7 in corp.

¹⁰ Ibid., q. 85, a. 1 in corp.

12 Against [all such distinctions]. For if the question whether God exists is about the being of a proposition or about the being of God—which I hold to be the same—then it is necessary to know the terms [of the proposition], and if I have to know the being of God in this way or that way, I have to have some concept about him of which I ask: Does such exist? For that reason, there is no need for a distinction here.

13 Nor must one distinguish between natural* and supernatural knowledge, [for we are only interested in the former]; nor must one distinguish knowing God in a creature from knowing him in himself. For the starting point in which one begins the argument is different from that in which it ends; hence if the knowledge of God ends up with a creature, there is no difference between the beginning and end of the argument and as a consequence I have no knowledge of God. If however after reasoning, I end up with knowledge of God, I have what I propose.

14 Hence, the sense of the question is whether the intellect of the pilgrim can naturally have some simple concept about God, in which simple concept God is known, and which is a proper concept of God.

Article Two: The opinion of others

The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas Exposition of the opinion

15 As regards the second main point, certain ones say that the object of an embodied intellect is the quiddity* of a material thing* because the intellect is proportioned to its object.

16 The cognitive power is threefold, according to this teacher; one is completely material and operates in a material way, such are the sensitive powers; another is completely immaterial, as the angel's power; another is intermediate, whose object is the quiddity that is entirely material. And in this way it differs from the higher power whose object is entirely immaterial; but they agree in this that the higher cognitive power and that which is intermediate are in themselves immaterial, and on this count

Cum igitur Deus secundum aliquem conceptum proprium non cadat sub aspectu istius potentiae mediae, ergo non poterit concipi Deus secundum aliquem conceptum simplicem et proprium ab intellectu viatoris, eo quod secundum eum potentia cognitiva non extendit se nisi ad illud quod cadit sub per se obiecto eius; Deus non est huiusmodi; ergo nihil proprium concipimus de Deo.

[b. — Improbatio opinionis Thomae]

17 Contra istam opinionem arguo: licet conclusio in se sit tolerabilis, sed deductio de proportionem non; quia si ratio eorum concludat generaliter, aequè concludit de intellectu coniuncto in patria sicut hic, quia ibi anima coniungetur cum corpore: ergo ibi non habebimus conceptum proprium de Deo, quia intellectus erit ibi sicut hic materialiter operans.

18 Item, impossibile est potentiam per quemcumque habitum per se et perfecte operari circa non suum obiectum, patet de visu et auditu; ergo impossibile est intellectum per quemcumque habitum intelligere substantias immateriales, quia non continentur sub quidditate materiali.

19 Sed dices quod ratio procedit ex creditis et non ratione naturali, quia creditum est nos beatificari in substantiis immaterialibus.

20 Contra: probo per rationem naturalem. Nulla potentia cognitiva potest cognoscere aliquid sub ratione universaliori quam sit ratio sui primi obiecti, quia tunc illa ratio primi obiecti non esset sibi adaequata. Patet etiam in exemplo: visus non cognoscit aliquid sub ratione communiori quam sit ratio coloris vel lucis; sed intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit aliquid sub ratione universaliori quam sit ratio imaginabilis, quia cognoscit aliquid sub ratione entis, alioquin metaphysica non esset scientia intellectui nostro scibilis naturaliter, quod falsum est, quia licet consideret de substantiis sensibilibus tamen abstrahit ab eis in quantum sunt sensibilia; considerat autem de separatis a materia secundum esse.

they differ from a completely material potency.* Since God according to some proper concept does not fall under the scope of this intermediate power, therefore God could not be conceived according to some simple and proper concept by the intellect of the pilgrim, inasmuch as the cognitive power, according to him, extends only to that which falls under its object *per se*; God is not this sort of thing, therefore we conceive nothing proper about God.

Refutation of the opinion

17 Against this opinion I argue: although the conclusion is in itself tolerable, the deduction based on proportionality is not, for if the argument of these held generally, it would apply to the embodied intellect in heaven as it does here, for there the soul will be joined to the body: therefore there will be no proper concept of God there, because there it will be operating materially as it does here.

18 Also, it is impossible that any potency by means of any habit* should operate per se and perfectly regarding what is not its object. This is evident from the seeing and hearing; therefore it is impossible for the intellect through whatever habit [it will have in heaven] to know immaterial substance, because these are not contained under 'material quiddity.'

19 But you may say that the argument is based on what is believed and not upon natural reason, because it is believed that we shall be beatified in immaterial substances.

20 On the contrary: I prove this by natural reason. No cognitive power can know something under a more general notion than that of its primary object, because then that primary object would be inadequate. An example also makes this clear: vision does not know of anything that is more general than the notion of color or light; our intellect, however, naturally knows something under a more universal aspect than the notion of what is imaginable, because it knows something under the aspect of being; otherwise metaphysics would not be a science our intellect could know naturally, which is false, because although its thinking concerns sensible substances, nevertheless it abstracts from them in so far

21 Ad probationem sive congruentiam illorum de proportionem quam adducunt, dico quod non oportet quod proportio inter aliqua sit talis quod habeant similem modum essendi inter se, immo eo magis quod sunt dissimilia proportionantur, ut materia et forma, unum potentiale ad aliud actuale, et totum et pars, sicut perfectum et imperfectum, et inter causam et effectum, et huiusmodi. Nunc autem potentia non se habet ad obiectum sicut mobile ad motum, secundum unam opinionem, vel sicut terminans ad terminum, non sicut actum ad alium.

22 Et quando dicis de intellectu coniuncto quod habet idem obiectum quidditatem materialem, ergo separatus quidditatem immaterialem, respondeo quod non oportet quod quidditas¹¹ angeli sive intellectus angeli sit quidditas immaterialis eo quod essentia angeli non sufficit ad cognoscendum distincte quidditatem materialem; nulla enim potentia cognoscit per essentiam suam aliquid nisi si sit perfecta et omnino idem cum essentia ut in Deo. Unde sicut quidditates sensibiles vel materiales non sunt in essentia angeli secundum essentiam propriam, sic nec secundum cognoscibilitatem. Hic est ergo proportio inter potentiam et obiectum, quod obiectum sit terminativum operationis vel motivum, et potentia sit mobilis ab obiecto. Tale non est tantum quidditas materialis respectu intellectus, sed etiam quidditas immaterialis, ut dictum est, sicut oculus mobilis a colore vel luminoso: non oportet quod sit proportio talis quod unus oculus sit cognoscens colorem corporalem et alius oculus in specie vel numero sit cognoscens colorem incorporalem. Haec ergo opinio nimis parum tribuit intellectui nostro.

¹¹ *Lege*: quidditas ut obiectum angeli; *cf. lectio B*: quidditas obiectalis angeli.

as they are sensible; but its consideration is about what is separated from matter according to its being.

21 As for the proof based on the congruity of the proportionality which they adduce, I say that it is not necessary that the proportionality between some things be such that they both have the same mode of being among themselves; indeed the proportionality is more likely between dissimilar things, as with matter and form, one being potential, the other actual, or like the whole and part, as perfect and imperfect; and as is the case with cause and effect and such. Now, however, the potency is not related to the object as the mobile to the moved, according to one opinion, or as the terminating to the terminus, and not as the act with respect to the other.

22 And when you say that if the embodied intellect has material quiddity as its object, therefore the intellect apart from the body has immaterial quiddity [as its object], I respond that it is not necessary that the quiddity [known]¹ to an angel or the intellect of the angel be exclusively immaterial quiddity [simply] because the essence of the angel is insufficient for knowing a material quiddity distinctly; for no potency knows through its essence, unless it is perfect and completely the same as its essence, as in God. Indeed, just as sensible and material quiddities are not in the *essence* of the angel according to their proper essence, so neither are they according to cognoscibility. But in our case² [one speaks of] the proportionality between *potency* and object, [namely] that the object is the term and motive force of the operation and the potency is mobile with respect to the object. Such is not only the material quiddity with respect to the intellect, but also immaterial quiddity, as was said, just as the eye is moved by color or the luminous: it is not necessary that the proportionality be such that one eye would know corporeal color and another that differs in number or species would know incorporeal color. Therefore, this opinion attributes too little to our intellect.

¹ See note to the Latin text.

² Although the transition from the previous sentence to this one is not clearly articulated, the main idea of this paragraph is that the human intellect by its nature is not limited to material things: otherwise, the beatific vision would be impossible.

[2. — **Opinio Henrici Gandavensis**
a. — **Expositio opinionis**]

23 Alia est opinio¹² quae nimis tribuit intellectui nostro de cognitione Dei, ponens quod naturaliter possumus habere aliquem conceptum de Deo proprium per creaturas; sed distinguit ex parte obiecti cognoscibilis, quia aliquid potest cognosci dupliciter: per se et per accidens, in universali et in particulari. Distinguit etiam ex parte cognitionis sic: quod quaedam est cognitio naturalis et quaedam rationalis.

24 Cognitionem naturalem vocat cognitionem habitualement, qua intellectus habens obiectum sibi praesens potest actualiter cognoscere; sed rationalis dicitur, quando actu et perfecte cognoscit.

25 Per accidens non potest Deus a nobis cognosci, quia nihil est sibi accidens; sed Deus cognoscitur quasi per accidens, quia attributa sunt circa divinam naturam, secundum Damascenum.¹³ Nec in universali secundum praedicationem, quia quidditas Dei est singularis sive singularitas quaedam, sed in universali quod tantum analogice sibi est commune et creaturis, quasi tamen unum concipitur per similitudinem conceptuum, licet sint diversi conceptus.

26 In particulari autem non cognoscitur ex creaturis, quia creatura est peregrina eius similitudo, quia tantum conformis ei vel assimilata quoad aliqua attributa, quae non sunt ista natura in particulari. Sed cum nihil ducat in cognitionem alterius nisi per rationem similis, sequitur quod creatura non ducit in cognitionem Dei in particulari.

27 In universali ergo cognoscitur Deus tripliciter secundum istum; generaliter, generalius et generalissime; sed generalissime habet tres gradus et sic ponit quinque gradus cognitionis Dei in nobis. Primo ergo cognoscitur Deus imperfectissime quocumque ente cognito, in quantum quodlibet ens est quoddam vestigium creatoris. Secundo per abstractionem, relinquendo singularitatem et stando in entitate quasi analogice dicta de Deo et creaturis, et illud est indeterminabile privative. Tertio per abstractionem ab

The opinion of Henry of Ghent
Exposition of the opinion

23 Another opinion attributes too much to our intellect regarding the knowledge of God, claiming that we can naturally have some concept proper to God through creatures; but he distinguishes on the part of the object knowable, because something can be known in two ways: either per se or through accidents, or in general vs. in particular. He also distinguishes on the part of the knower in this way: some knowledge is natural, whereas some is rational.

24 He gives the name 'natural' to habitual knowledge, by which the intellect having the object present to itself can know it actually; but he calls knowledge rational, when [the intellect] knows perfectly and in act.

25 We cannot know God through accidents, because nothing is accidental to him; but God can be known, as it were, accidentally because there are attributes about the divine nature, according to Damascene. Neither can he be known in general according to predication, because the quiddity of God is singular or is a certain singularity,* but in general, what is only analogically common to him and creatures is conceived as though it were one because of the similarity of the concepts, although they are diverse concepts.

26 In particular, however, God is not known from creatures, because the creature is a foreign likeness of him, for it is only conformed to him or like him insofar as some attributes are concerned and they do not constitute this particular nature* as such. However, since nothing leads to the knowledge of another save by reason of their similarity, it follows that the creature does not lead one to knowledge of God in particular.

27 In a general way therefore God is known in three ways according to this teacher; generally, more generally, and most generally; but the most general has three degrees and thus gives rise to five degrees in which God can be known by us. In the first way God is known most imperfectly in whatever being is known, insofar as a being is a certain vestige of its creator. In the second grade by abstraction, leaving behind singularity and ending with an entity analogically predicable of God and creatures, and that is

¹² Henricus Gand., *Summa* a. 24, q. 6 in corp. (I, 141N-142V).

¹³ Damasc., *De fide orthod.* c. 4 [I, c. 4] (ed. Buytaert, 19; PG 94, 799).

illo indeterminabili privative, indeterminatum vel indeterminabile negative, scilicet intelligendo ens vel bonum in se subsistens, quod est ens per essentiam et non participationem etc. Quarto ulterius concipiendo Deum sub generalibus attributis, tamen cum quadam praeeminentia. Quinto concipiendo unum simplicissimum attributum ad quod omnia reducuntur, ut sub esse etc. Primam cognitionem de Deo quam habemus ex intentionibus entis vocant naturalem et habet tres gradus iam dictos.

[b. — Contra opinionem Henrici]

28 Contra istam opinionem quoad articulum qui dicit quod nihil est commune Deo et creaturis univoce, arguo sic: omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de duobus habet conceptum de quo est certus, alium ab illis de quibus est dubius: subiectum includit hoc praedicatum; aliter etiam de eodem esset certus et non certus. Sed intellectus viatoris est certus de Deo quod est ens, dubitando an sit ens creatum vel increatum et salvatur univoce in utroque; ergo conceptus entis est alter ab utroque et salvatur in utroque, ergo et conceptus univocus. Certum est enim quod ex conceptu dubio quidam posuerunt Deum esse solem etc.; non tamen dubitabant quin Deus esset ens; ergo etc.

29 Sed dices quod intellectus non habet conceptum entis tanquam unum de quo est certus, sed duos, qui duo propter proximitatem, convenientiam et analogiam eorum ad invicem videntur esse unus.

30 Contra: impossibile est concipere aliqua quae habent analogiam et ordinem ad invicem, nisi prius natura praecognoscantur illa ut distincta. Si ergo ens conceptum de Deo et creatura habet duos conceptus habentes ordinem et analogiam, oportet quod

in a privative way indeterminable. In the third grade by abstraction from that in a privative way indeterminable and ending with the negatively indeterminate or indeterminable, namely by thinking of being or the good as subsisting in itself, which is being essentially and not by participation, etc. The fourth degree goes further by conceiving God under general attributes, but with a special preeminence. The fifth degree by conceiving one most simple attribute to which all others are reduced, as under 'to be' etc. The first cognition about God that we have from the intentions* of being is called natural and have the three grades already mentioned.

Refutation of Henry's Opinion

28 Against this opinion as regard the article, which says that nothing is common to God and creatures univocally, I argue in this way. Every intellect that is certain about one concept and dubious about two,³ has the concept about which it is certain as other than that about which it is dubious: the subject includes this predicate; were it otherwise, one would be certain and uncertain about the same thing. But the intellect of the pilgrim is certain that God is a being, doubting whether it be a created being or uncreated, and the being is saved univocally in both; therefore the concept of being is other than both and is preserved in both; therefore it is a univocal concept. For it is certain that some having a dubious concept assumed God to be the sun, and the like, and nevertheless they did not doubt that God was a being, therefore etc.

29 But you claim that the intellect does not have the concept of being as one about which it is certain, but two, which two because of their likeness and closeness to one another, as well as their analogical character, seem to be one.

30 To the contrary: it is impossible to conceive some things, which have an analogical character and order to one another, unless one first knows these by nature as distinct. If then being—conceived of God and of a creature—had two concepts having an

³ Cf. the reading *de diversis* ("about other [concepts]") in the *Ordinatio*, instead of the present *de duobus*.

prius cognoscam Deum in se et creaturam in se et per consequens novi quod iste conceptus non est ille quam quod iste non attribuatur alteri, quia prius est unumquodque in se intelligi et cognosci quam alteri comparetur. — Maior probatur: quia sicut habentium ordinem essentialem et realem, unum realiter praesupponit aliud, ita et habentium ordinem in cognosci, unum in illo ordine praesupponit aliud.

31 Confirmatur ratio illa, quia illi duo conceptus entis qui conveniunt Deo et creaturis non minus differunt quam conceptus duorum individuorum in eadem specie; sed habens conceptus duos duorum individuorum in eadem specie, ex conceptu unius individui non facit conceptum alterius; ergo nec ex conceptu creaturae potest facere conceptum proprium Deo.

32 Item, intellectus habens conceptum proprium de aliquo obiecto potest illum distinguere a conceptu cuiuscumque alterius obiecti, quia intellectus concipiens aliquod obiectum secundum conceptum sibi proprium, concipit ipsum secundum conceptum impossibilem cuicumque alteri obiecto, ex quo est isti proprius; sed per conceptum entis quem habet intellectus noster de Deo non possumus ipsum distinguere a quolibet non ipso, ut ipsi concedunt; ergo conceptus entis dictus de Deo non est sibi proprius, sed communis univoce sibi et creaturae.

33 Item, illud ad quod conceptus creaturae attribuitur est simpliciter perfectius; ergo si propter attributionem conceptus creaturae ad Deum potest conceptus creaturae facere proprium conceptum de Deo, in quo intellectus in fine attributionis stet, sequitur quod conceptus Dei sic generatus in nobis sit perfectior conceptu creaturae. Sed hoc est impossibile, quia impossibile est quodcumque obiectum facere in intellectu nostro conceptum perfectiorem suo proprio conceptu quidditativo, sicut impossibile est quodcumque ens facere aliud ens nobilius eo, et praecipue ut tota causa eius, quia causa aequivoca naturaliter agens non potest effectum perfectiorem producere suo proprio effectui sibi simillimo et suae virtuti adaequato. Ergo cum obiectum sit

order and analogy, I would first have to know God in himself and the creature in itself, and as a consequence I would know that this concept is not that before [knowing that] this would not be attributed to the other, because one must first know something in itself before one can compare it to another. — The major is proved; because just as in things having an essential* and real order one thing really presupposes the other, so in things having an order in knowing one thing presupposes the other in that order.

31 This argument is confirmed because those two concepts of being which pertain to God and to creatures differ no less than the concepts of two individuals in the same species; but having two concepts of two individuals in the same species, one does not form the second concept from the first; therefore neither can one form a concept proper to God from a concept of a creature.

32 Also the intellect having a concept proper to some object can distinguish it from the concept of any other object, because the intellect conceiving some object according to the concept proper to it, conceives it according to a concept incompatible with any other object: this is why it is proper to it; but through the concept of being which our intellect has of God, we cannot distinguish him from anything which is not him, as they themselves concede; therefore the concept of being affirmed of God is not proper to him, but univocally common to him and to a creature.

33 Also that to which the concept of a creature is applied [i.e., God] is simply more perfect; therefore if because of the application of the concept of the creature to God, the concept of the creature could form a proper concept of God which the intellect obtains at the end of the application, it would follow that the concept of God thus generated in us would be more perfect than the concept of a creature. But this is impossible, because it is impossible that any object whatsoever should make a more perfect concept than the quidditative concept proper to itself, just as it is impossible for any being to make another being that is more noble than itself, and especially acting as the total cause of it, because an equivocal* cause acting naturally cannot produce a more perfect effect than that which is proper and most like itself and is equal to the power it has. Therefore since the object is an

aequivoca causa respectu sui conceptus proprii quiditativi, non potest conceptum perfectiorem alterius obiecti in intellectu nostro gignere.

34 Item, visio Dei, secundum aliquem certum gradum et finitum distat a conceptu illo proprio de Deo qui ponitur gigni in intellectu ab obiecto creato, cum visio sit creatura et actus finitus et limitatus; si ergo albedo potest facere in intellectu nostro conceptum proprium de Deo, fiat alia creatura a nobis cognoscibilis naturaliter quae tantum distet ab albedine in entitate sicut distat visio Dei ab ipso conceptu proprio de Deo qui habetur et imprimitur ex creatura in cognoscibilitate; ergo illa creatura imprimeret intellectui nostro visionem Dei; quod est impossibile, quia tunc esset naturaliter beatus.

35 Ultimo hoc probatur per auctoritates sanctorum: Augustini XV *De Trinitate*, cap. 3¹⁴ et Anselmi, libro *De libertate arbitrii*,¹⁵ ubi probat definitionem liberi arbitrii per hoc quod est posse peccare, quia non convenit Deo nec beatis. Cum igitur definitio indicat quiditatem ergo aliquis conceptus quiditativus est communis Deo et creaturae sicut conceptus liberi arbitrii et huiusmodi.

36 Item, Augustinus XV *De Trinitate*, cap. 3,¹⁶ probat Deum omnipotentem, vivum, immortalem; inquit: "Praeferimus mortalibus et non vivis" etc. Unde quia ista sunt meliora in creaturis, scilicet viva non-vivis et immortalia mortalibus, ideo arguit et concludit Augustinus esse vera de Deo; et si ista non essent in Deo et in creaturis eiusdem rationis, non esset argumentum ad propositum.

37 Item, remove imperfectionem creaturarum deveniendo ad perfectionem est aliquis modus cognoscendi Deum; ergo si perfectio quam nos acquirimus per cognitionem de Deo non est eiusdem rationis cum perfectionibus creaturarum, ergo in fine nullam habebimus scientiam de Deo nec erit habitudo essentialis creaturae ad creatorem.

¹⁴ Cf. infra n. 36.

¹⁵ Anselmus, *De libertate arbitrii* c. 1 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 207; PL 158, 489).

¹⁶ August., *De Trin.* XV, c. 4, n. 6 (CCSL 50A, 467-8; PL 42, 1061).

equivocal cause with respect to its proper quidditative concept, it cannot beget a more perfect concept of another object in our intellect.

34 Also, the vision of God is distant from that concept that is proper to God—which is assumed to be generated in the intellect by a created object—[only] to some certain and finite degree, since the vision itself is a creature and is a finite and limited act; if therefore whiteness could produce in our intellect a concept proper to God, there would be another creature naturally knowable by us, which would be to the same degree distant from the whiteness in being, to which degree the vision of God is distant in cognoscibility from the concept proper to God, which is impressed from a creature;⁴ therefore that [another] creature would impress on our intellect a vision of God; but that is impossible, because then [someone] would be naturally beatified.

35 Finally this is proved from the authority of the saints: Augustine in Bk. XV of *The Trinity*, chapter 3, and Anselm, in the book *On Free Choice* where he proves the definition of free choice through the ability to sin, because it does not pertain to God nor to the blessed. Therefore since the definition indicates the quiddity, therefore some quidditative concept is common to God and creature, such as the concept of free choice and the like.

36 Also, Augustine in Bk. XV of *The Trinity*, chapter 3 proves that God is omnipotent, living, immortal. He says: "We prefer these to mortal and non-living things," etc. Hence because these are better in creatures, namely, living than non-living and immortal than mortal, therefore Augustine argues and concludes that they are true of God, and if they were not in God and in creature according to the same meaning, the argument would not be relevant.

37 Also, removing the imperfection of creatures [and as a result] coming to perfection is one way of knowing God; therefore if the perfection which we acquire through the cognition of God is not of the same meaning as the perfections of creatures, therefore in the end we have no knowledge of God nor will there be an essential relationship of the creature to the creator.

⁴ In this case, from whiteness.

38 Magistri etiam et tractantes de Deo sive de his quae cognoscuntur de Deo et creaturis univocationem concedunt in doctrina, sicut patet, licet voce contradicant.

39 Item, hoc videtur esse intentio Philosophi II *Metaphysicae*:¹⁷ verissima principia, etc.

40 Ad illud quod non sit conceptus univocus quia Deus est quaedam singularitas, dicendum quod a Socrate, licet sit singularis, sunt abstrahibiles plures conceptus, licet Socrates non abstrahatur ab hoc Socrate; nec Deus ab hoc Deo, tamen aliquis communis conceptus potest abstrahi a Deo et creaturis.

[C. — Art. 3. Responsio Scoti]

41 Dico ergo ad quaestionem quod in intellectu creaturae et viatoris est possibilis haberi conceptus proprius de Deo, quia talem posset Deus creare in nobis sive in intellectu nostro infundendo lumen proportionale, ut dictum est in secunda quaestione huius primi, quem tamen non posset intellectus viatoris naturaliter ex creaturis acquirere et ideo non est Deus a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis secundum aliam cognitionem sibi propriam et definitivam sed tantum secundum aliquem communem conceptum quem extrahimus ex creaturis.

42 Quod declaratur sic: quadrupliciter contingit aliquid cognosci, uno modo secundum rationem suam propriam definitivam quae indicat suam propriam quidditatem, ut homo quando cognoscitur secundum propriam rationem humanitatis; alio modo quasi in universali ut in conceptu communi sibi et aliis, ut quando homo cognoscitur esse animal; tertio modo per accidens, ut quando cognoscitur hominem¹⁸ esse album; quarto in respectu ad aliud, ut cum dicitur 'homo est nobilissimus animalium'.

43 Sic potest Deus cognosci quadrupliciter: uno modo secundum suam rationem quidditativam ut secundum rationem deitatis, et isto modo non est naturaliter cognoscibilis a nobis, quia licet Deus posset creare in intellectu nostro repraesentativum sui sub ratione deitatis, non tamen potest hoc aliqua

¹⁷ Aristot., *Metaph.* II (a), c. 1 (993b 10-1).

¹⁸ *Rectius*: homo esse albus.

38 The masters also in treating of God or of those things that are known about God and creatures concede univocation⁵ in their teaching, as is evident, even if they deny it verbally.

39 Also, it seems to be the intention of the Philosopher in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*: principles are most true, etc.

40 To the claim that it is not a univocal concept, because God is a certain singularity, it must be said that from Socrates, although he is singular, several concepts can be abstracted, although Socrates does not abstract from this Socrates; nor does God [abstract] from this God, nevertheless some common concept can be abstracted from God and creatures.

Article Three: The reply of Scotus

41 Therefore I say to the question that in the intellect of a creature and pilgrim it is possible to have a concept proper to God, because God could create such in us or in our intellect by infusing a proportional light, as was said in the second question of this first book, which the intellect of the pilgrim could not acquire naturally from creatures and therefore God is not naturally knowable to us according to another sort of knowledge that is proper and definitive, but only according to some common concept which we draw from creatures.

42 That is made clear in this way: there are four ways in which something can be known: one way is according to a notion that is proper and definitive, which indicates its proper quiddity, as man when he is known according to the proper notion of humanity; another way is as a universal, as in a concept common to himself and others, e.g., when man is known to be an animal; the third way is adventitiously (*per accidens*), as when man is known to be white; a fourth way is in relationship to another, as when it is said 'man is the noblest of animals.'

43 Thus God can be known in four ways: one way is according to his quidditative meaning, as is the case when he is known according to the notion of deity, and in this way he is not naturally knowable by us, for although God could create in our intellect a representation of himself under the aspect of deity, no

⁵ That is, the state of being univocal or unambiguous.

creatura causare repraesentativum tale, quia sicut argutum est prius, impossibile est aliquod obiectum causare in nobis perfectius repraesentativum suo proprio representativo quo repraesentat se ipsum.

44 Contra, secundum haec dicta videtur quod de Deo non potest a nobis naturaliter haberi aliquis conceptus sibi proprius.

45 Responsio: dico quod loquendo de conceptu simpliciter simplici non resolubili in diversos conceptus non possumus habere de eo conceptum proprium, quin omnis talis a creatura abstractus sit sibi et creaturae univoce communis. Sed quia stando in tali conceptu non possumus distinguere ipsum a non ipso, per proprium conceptum possemus eum sic distinguere, sed talem conceptum simpliciter simplicem et communem contingit per alium conceptum — vel per alios conceptus simpliciter simplices communes sibi et creaturis — priorem¹⁹ determinare et sic fiet sibi proprius, ita quod nulli creaturae communis, licet a creaturis abstrahantur conceptus huiusmodi.

46 Exemplum: ens est conceptus simpliciter simplex dictus de Deo et creatura; iste conceptus, determinatus per aliquem conceptum alium aequae communem, ut bonitatem, actualitatem, et necesse esse simul et coniunctim, fit proprius Deo et nulli creaturae conveniens, ut ens, bonum, actus purus et necesse esse est Deus; et iste est magis proprius ad quem possumus attingere in vita ista, nullum tamen definitivum conceptum vel exprimens quiditatem istam deitatis, ut deitas est, possumus naturaliter habere in vita ista, quia secundum Philosophum II *Posteriorum*,²⁰ licet quaelibet pars definitionis sit in plus quam definitum, totum tamen sive partes simul sumptae sunt in aequae.

[III. — Ad argumenta principalia]

47 Ad primum argumentum principale²¹ dicendum quod vera est auctoritas quando dicitur 'sicut sensibilia ad sensum sic phantasmata ad intellectum', quoad primam motionem, sed non

¹⁹ Priorem: sic *codd.*; *melius*: prius.

²⁰ Aristot., *Anal. Post.* II, c. 13 (96a 32-4).

²¹ Cf. *supra* n. 1.

creature could cause such a representation. For, as was argued earlier, it is impossible that some object cause in us a more perfect representation than what is properly representative of itself.

44 To the contrary: according to this statement it would seem that naturally we could not have any concept proper to God.

45 Response: I admit that, if we are speaking of a concept that is absolutely simple, and cannot be split up into diverse concepts, we cannot have a proper concept of God without every concept of this sort abstracted from a creature being univocally common to himself and the creature. But since we cannot distinguish him from what is not him if we remain with such a concept, we must be able to distinguish him through a concept that is proper, but this takes place only after another concept—or other concepts that are unqualifiedly simple and common to him and creatures—first qualifies such a simply* simple common concept and thus it becomes proper to God, so that it is not common to any creature, although such concepts are all abstracted from creatures.

46 For example: 'being' is a simply simple concept affirmed of God and a creature; this concept, qualified by means of some other equally common concept, such as goodness, actuality, and necessary existence simultaneously joined to it, is proper to God and inapplicable to any creature: e.g., 'a being that is good, pure act and has necessary existence' is God. And this is just about as proper a concept as we can have of him in this life, for we cannot in this life have naturally any definitive concept, which is expressive of this quiddity that is deity, as deity. For according to the Philosopher in Bk. II of *Posterior Analytics*, although each part of the definition is more than what is defined, nevertheless the parts taken together are equal to it.

Reply to the Initial Arguments

47 To the first argument [n. 1] at the beginning it must be said that the authoritative statement is true when it is said 'as sense perceptibles are to the senses, so the sense images are to the intellect' as regards that, which first moves it. But it is not true of the operation which follows this, because the sense is not able to

quoad operationem sequentem illam, quia sensus non est abstractivus sicut intellectus, quia cognoscendo albedinem potest ab eo abstrahere conceptum entis et in illo intelliget commune aliquid Deo et creaturae. Et si addat sibi aliud abstractum, ut summum ens vel aliquid huiusmodi, habebit conceptum proprium Dei ex coniunctione conceptuum simplicium.

48 Hoc etiam patet in exemplo: si cognoscam pentagonum et alias figuras sub propriis rationibus suis, non tamen cognosco triangulum, possum a pentagono et aliis figuris abstrahere conceptum communem figurae — qui licet sit abstractus a pentagono ita tamen convenit triangulo sicut pentagono a quo abstrahebatur — et ex ordine figurarum abstraham²² a figuris primitatem et ex coniunctione primitatis cum figura concludam de triangulo ipsam esse figuram primam — quia isti conceptus, scilicet primitatis et figurae, licet in se sint communes, simul tamen iuncti constituunt naturam trianguli et nullius alterius figurae — ipsius tamen trianguli rationem definitivam et propriam quidditatem non indicat, quia illam oportet inquirere per definitionem trianguli.

49 Ita est in proposito. Cognitio vero Dei qua cognoscitur per viam causalitatis et eminentiae in respectu ad creaturas non potest esse propria eius cognitio nec est prima nobis possibilis, quia prius necesse est cognoscere absolutum cui convenit talis respectus quam respectum, ut prius oportet cognoscere Deum esse tale ens cui convenit respectus causalitatis vel eminentiae, quam cognoscere istum respectum in eo. Nec cognitio per accidens est prima nobis naturaliter possibilis, quia cognitio accidentis supponit cognitionem substrati ipsi accidenti vel quasi-accidenti. Unde cognitio Dei sub ratione bonitatis, veritatis et huiusmodi, non est eius prima cognitio nobis naturaliter possibilis, quia isti conceptus sunt quasi-accidentales, eo quod non naturam, sed quae circa naturam Dei sunt, significant, secundum Damascenum; et ideo naturaliter praecognoscitur illud cui istae

²² *Lege*: si abstraham.

abstract as the intellect is, for the latter in knowing whiteness can abstract the concept of 'being' from it and in it one knows something common to God and to a creature. And if one adds to this another abstract notion, such as 'the highest being' or something of this sort, one will have a concept proper to God from the combination of simple concepts.

48 This is also evident from an example: If I know a pentagon and other figures through conceptions that are proper to them, but do not know a triangle, I can abstract from a pentagon and from other figures the common concept of 'figure,' which, although it is abstracted from a pentagon, nevertheless pertains to a triangle to the same extent that it does to the pentagon from which it was abstracted. And if from the order that exists among figures I abstract the notion of 'first' and from the combination of 'first' and 'figure' I conclude about a triangle that 'this is the first figure'—because these concepts, namely, of 'first' and 'figure,' though in themselves both are common notions, nevertheless joined together constitute the nature of a triangle and no other figure—still this does not indicate the definitive and proper quiddity of a triangle, for one has to find that through the definition of a triangle.

49 And so it is in the case at hand. However, the knowledge of God, which one knows by way of causality and eminence with reference to creatures, cannot be proper knowledge of him. Neither is such the first thing that we are able to know [about God], because it is first necessary to know what the absolute is to which these relationships pertain before one knows what the relationship is. Thus it is first necessary to know that God is the sort of being to which the relationships of causality and eminence pertain before one knows that they do pertain to him. Neither is accidental knowledge the first that is naturally possible for us, because the knowledge of what is accidental presupposes the substrate that underlies the accident or quasi-accident. Hence the knowledge of God under the aspect of goodness, of truth and the like is not the first knowledge of him that is naturally possible for us to have, because these concepts are quasi-accidental, to the extent that they do not signify, according to Damascene, the nature but what is 'about the nature.' And, therefore, that, to

proprietates quasi-accidentales conveniunt, sed non illud secundum propriam rationem eius et quidditativam. Ergo relinquitur quod secundum rationem communem, acceptam quidem a creaturis, et sibi quodammodo — ut dictum est — propriam, in quantum conceptus de se communes simul iuncti illi naturae tantum conveniant.

50 Ad illud²³ quando dicitur de oculo noctuae, etc., multae sunt hic solutiones, et illa Commentatoris parum vel nihil valet; sed exemplum est verum de cognitione possibili oculo corporali; non enim habet nisi cognitionem intuitivam et sic est simile ad propositum de oculo et intellectu. Sicut oculus enim nycticoracis non potest solem cognoscere intuitive, sic nec intellectus noster potest Deum videre naturaliter intuitive.

51 Ad aliud²⁴ quando dicitur quod infinitum est incognitum sive ignotum in quantum huiusmodi, dicendum quod infinitum cuius ratio est in potentia absolute est ignotum et non cognoscibile secundum rationem vel modum suae infinitatis ab aliquo intellectu etiam divino, scilicet accipiendo alterum post alterum; istud tamen infinitum non sub ratione infinitatis vel secundum modum in semper accipiendo, sed quasi omnia simul accipiendo sic cognoscitur ab intellectu infinito; Deus autem non est huiusmodi infinitum, sed in actu, et ideo habet rationem cognoscibilis etiam a nobis.

52 Ad auctoritatem Philosophi de II *Metaphysicae*,²⁵ quod non est processus in cognoscendo unum post aliud in infinitum, dico quod Philosophus probat ibi quod processus in causis non est in infinitum, accipiendo unam post alteram et hoc non potest intellectus cognoscere in infinitum, et cum tu probas quod propter proportionem entium vel mobilium ad infinitum motorem, dico quod infinitum habet proportionem motivi ad mobile secundum cognitionem finitam.

²³ Cf. supra n. 2.

²⁴ Cf. supra n. 3.

²⁵ Cf. supra n. 3.

which these quasi-accidental properties belong, is naturally presupposed, but not [known] according to its proper quidditative conception. Therefore we are left with that common notion, taken indeed from creatures, and—as was said—somehow proper to him, insofar as concepts, of themselves common but simultaneously combined, agree only with that nature.

50 To that [argument in n. 2] when it is said that 'the eye of an owl, etc.' there are many solutions, and that given by the Commentator is of the least or no value whatsoever. But the example is true so far as what the eye of a body can know. For it has only intuitive* knowledge, and thus the analogy is relevant regarding the eye and the intellect. For just as the eye of the owl cannot know the Sun intuitively, so neither can our intellect naturally intuitively see God.

51 To the other [n. 3], when it is said that the infinite is not known or is unknown as such, it must be said that the infinite whose notion consists absolutely of nothing but potency is unknown and not able to be known according to the way and manner of its infinity by any intellect, even one that is divine, namely, by receiving one [part] after another. However, such infinite—not under the notion of infinity, or in the manner of receiving [part by part] continuously, but, as it were, by receiving simultaneously all [in its entirety]—in this way is known by the infinite intellect. God however is not infinite in this way, but in actuality, and therefore he has a knowable aspect also for us.

52 To the authoritative statement of the Philosopher in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*, [n. 3] that there is no process *ad infinitum* in knowing one thing after another, I say that the Philosopher proves there that it is a process in the order of causes, taking one after another, that is not *ad infinitum*, and the intellect cannot know something in this way *ad infinitum*, and when you use as a proof the proportionality of beings or mobiles to an infinite mover, I say that the infinite has a proportionality of the mover to the mobile according to knowledge that is finite.

[Quaestio 2

Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum]

53 Utrum Deum esse sit per se notum.

Videtur quod sic:

Illud quo maius cogitari non potest est per se notum; sed Deus est huiusmodi, secundum Anselmum;²⁶ ergo etc. — Probatio maioris, quia oppositum praedicati repugnat subiecto.

54 Item, veritatem esse est per se notum, IV *Metaphysicae*;²⁷ Deus est veritas; ergo haec est per se nota 'Deus est'.

55 Item, propositiones habentes evidentiam ex entitate terminorum secundum quid, scilicet ex hoc quod sunt in intellectu, habent necessariam veritatem et per se notam; ergo multo magis propositiones habentes evidentiam ex entitate simpliciter, sicut Deum esse; huiusmodi sunt per se notae.

56 Contra:

Dixit insipiens in corde suo 'Non est Deus'.

[I. — Ad quaestionem]

57 Responsio: hic primo ostendo quid est propositio per se nota, scilicet quae est quae habet evidentem veritatem ex suis terminis ut sui sunt; unde in propositione per se nota non excluditur terminorum notitia, quia nulla propositio est nota sine cognitione terminorum; sed in ratione causae vel veritatis evidētis istius propositionis per se notae excluditur quaecumque alia veritas complexa.

58 Illa est igitur nota per se quae non habet evidentiam ex altera propositione notiori in veritate, sed ex suis terminis intrinsecis ut sui sunt.

59 Et dico 'ut sui sunt' vel conceptus confusi ut confusi sunt vel distincti ut distincti sunt. Non enim sunt idem termini definitio et definitum, quia definitum prius notum est quam definitio, eo

²⁶ Anselmus, *Proslogion*, c. 5 (ed. F.S. Schmitt I, 104; PL 158, 229).

²⁷ Cf. Aristot., *Metaph.* IV (Γ), c. 4 (1006b 8-10).

Question Two

Is God's existence known per se?

53 Is it self-evident that God exists?

It seems that it is:

That greater than which nothing can be conceived is known of itself; but God is such according to Anselm; therefore etc. — Proof of the major: because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.

54 Also, it is known per se that truth exists, Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*. God is truth; therefore this is known per se: 'God exists.'

55 Also, propositions having evidence from the existence of the terms in a qualified sense, namely from the fact that they exist in the intellect, have truth that is necessary and known per se; therefore all the more so propositions that have evidence by reason of existence in an unqualified sense, such as "that God exists," are known per se.

56 To the contrary: *The fool says in his heart 'There is no God.'*⁶

To the Question

57 Response: Here I show first what a self-evident or per se proposition is, namely that which has evidence from its terms as they stand;⁷ hence in a proposition that is per se known, knowledge of the terms is not excluded, since no proposition is known without knowledge of its terms; but what is excluded as a cause or as evidence of its truth is any other complex* or propositional truth.

58 Hence what is known per se does not derive its evidence from another proposition that is better known as a truth, but is known by reason of its intrinsic terms as they stand.

59 And I say 'as they stand' meaning 'indistinct or confused* concepts as indistinct,' or 'distinct as distinct.' For the definition and the defined are not the same terms, because the defined is known before the definition, because the indistinct and confused

⁶ Psalm. 13:1 or 52:1.

⁷ Or 'as such,' 'in their present function': see below, n. 59 for clarification.

quod confusum et confusa sunt prius nota, I *Physicorum*;²⁸ unde nomen definiti importat rem in intellectu modo confuso et conceptu confuso; sed per definitionem importatur conceptus distinctus circa eandem rem; et ideo aliquid potest esse per se notum secundum unum terminum, scilicet secundum definitum quod non erit notum secundum definitionem.

60 Item, definitio est medium in demonstratione et definitum erit conclusum, et ideo dixi 'ut sui sunt', scilicet confuse, si sunt concepti confuse, et distincte, si sunt concepti distincte. Unde definitio ut est medium non est ut sic declarativum vel magis evidens quoad nos quam subiectum definitum; sed propositio maior vel minor est magis evidens conclusionem.

61 Distinctio autem non est ad propositum qua dicitur quod propositio potest esse nota per se vel per se noscibilis; sufficit enim quod sit per se noscibilis ex terminis quantum est de se, licet non actualiter cognoscatur.

62 Similiter de noto quoad nos et in se, quia sufficit quod propositio sit de se nota, si sit intellectus cognoscens, evidentia enim patet ex habitudine terminorum. Exemplum de syllogismo qui nullo indiget ut appareat necessarius, I *Priorum*.²⁹ Haec autem evidentia est ex habitudine principiorum sive propositionum ad conclusionem quae est necessitas habitudinis, et sic in propositione per se nota est evidentia et quaedam habitudo terminorum.

63 Quando ergo quaeritur de ista propositione 'Deus est' an sit per se nota, intelligendo de Deo in se et de esse Dei in se, dico quod propositio est per se nota intellectui habenti distinctam notitiam terminorum et ita nota sicut ista 'omne totum est maius sua parte'.

64 Sed si intelligas 'an sit per se nota ex his quae concipimus de Deo ex creaturis', non est propositio per se nota; sic enim nec Deus nec esse est a nobis cognoscibile, secundum quod tales conceptus abstrahantur de Deo ex creaturis, immo est propositio demonstrabilis. Quidquid enim convenit alicui primo et per se

things are known first, according to Bk. I of the *Physics*; hence the name of the defined implies that the thing in the intellect is present in a vague manner and by an indistinct concept; but the definition implies the distinct concept of the same thing; and therefore something can be known per se according to one term, namely the defined which will not be known by way of definition.

60 Also, the definition is a middle term in a demonstration, and the defined will be in the conclusion, and therefore I have said 'as they stand,' namely indistinctly, if they are conceived indistinctly, and distinctly if they are conceived distinctly. Hence the definition as middle term is not as manifest or more evident so far as we go than the defined subject; but the major or minor proposition is more evident than the conclusion.

61 But the distinction where it is said that the proposition can be known per se or knowable per se does not apply to the case at hand; for it suffices that it be knowable from its terms insofar as it is of itself, although it may not be actually known.

62 It is the same as regards something knowable to us and in itself, for it suffices that the proposition be of itself knowable, if the intellect were only aware of it; for the evidence is there from the relationship of the terms. An example is the syllogism, which needs nothing to appear [logically] necessary, according to Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics*. But this evidence is from the relationships of principles or propositions to the conclusion, which is a necessity* of relationship, and thus in a proposition that is known per se the evidence is a certain relationship of terms.

63 When therefore it is asked of this proposition 'God exists' whether it is known per se, understanding it of God in himself and of the existence of God in it, I say that the proposition is known per se to an intellect having distinct* knowledge of the terms and it is known just as [clearly] as this one: 'Every whole is greater than its part.'

64 But if you mean 'Is [God's existence] known per se from those things that we conceive of him from creatures?' this is not a per se known proposition; for in this way neither God nor that he exists is knowable by us according to such concepts of God as we abstract from creatures, rather the proposition is one that can be demonstrated. For whatever pertains to something primarily and

²⁸ Aristot. *Physica* I, c. 1 (184a 21-2).

²⁹ Aristot., *Anal. Priora* I, c. 1 (246b 22-4).

potest esse medium ad demonstrandum propter quid de omni eo quod est sub eo, sive per rationem eius potest demonstrari propter quid et de superiori particulariter et de particulari universaliter. Exemplum de triangulo cui convenit primo et per se habere tres, ita quod per naturam trianguli et quiditatem eius possum demonstrare particulariter de figura habere tres et universaliter de isoscele et de omni contento sub triangulo. Cum ergo esse primo et per se conveniat huic essentiae, ergo per conceptum eius possum demonstrare esse de omni creatura tanquam ex per se nota in se; sed quia nobis non est illud notum esse divinum in se, ideo potest demonstrari de Deo demonstratione quia, et hoc per esse quod concipimus ex creaturis. Quod probo: quia quemcumque conceptum habemus proprium de Deo, ut summum ens vel bonum vel aliquid tale, primo concipimus extrema antequam formemus propositionem, et in illo priori composita propositione, propositio non est per se nota.

65 Item, nullum conceptum simpliciter simplicem habemus de Deo, ut probatum est prius; ergo omnes conceptus de Deo sunt resolubiles, sed nihil resolubile est per se notum, quia conceptus resolubilis non potest cognosci nisi prius cognoscantur per se partes illius conceptus coniungi, et sic quaecumque propositio est resolubilis nisi coniungi tales terminos sit per se notum. Unde sicut quaecumque ratio de se falsa de nulla est vera, sic quaecumque propositio quae de se est resolubilis, de nullo est per se nota ex terminis, quia habens conceptus non simplices.

[A. — Instantiae quaedam]

66 Ex his excludo quasdam instantias quibus probatur Deum esse per se notum sic: actu operans esse est per se notum; Deus est huiusmodi; vel da oppositum. — Similiter, veritatem esse est

per se can be a middle term for demonstrating the reason why anything that falls under it is a fact, whether the demonstration can give the reason why a broader term applies to a particular case, or why a particular term has a universal application. Take a triangle for example: it pertains to it primarily to have three angles and it has such per se, therefore through the nature and quiddity of a triangle I can demonstrate that that particular figure has three such angles and that universally an isosceles [triangle] has them and all that is contained under 'triangle.' Hence since being primarily and per se pertains to this [particular] essence, therefore through its concept I can demonstrate being or existence (*esse*) of every creature as known per se in itself; but because this divine being is not known to us in itself, therefore it [i.e., being or existence] can be demonstrated of God by a demonstration* of simple* fact, and this through the being or existence we conceive from creatures. Which I prove: because whatever proper concept we might have about God, such as 'highest being' or 'good' or some such thing, we first conceive the terms before we form the proposition, and in that [instant,] prior to the composition of the proposition, the proposition is not known per se.

65 Likewise, we do not have an unqualifiedly simple concept of God as was proved earlier, therefore all concepts of God are separable [into component parts], but nothing that can be separated in this way is known per se. For concepts with separable parts cannot be known unless one first knows per se that the parts of these concept are joined, and so any proposition whatsoever is separable unless one knows per se that such terms are joined. Hence just as any notion that is false in itself is not true of anything, so any proposition which of itself can be separated, is not known of anything per se from its terms, because of having concepts that are not simple.

Certain Objections

66 From these I exclude certain objections which prove that God's existence is per se known in this way: the fact that what is actually operating exists is known per se; God is such; or prove

verum et per se notum; Deus est veritas; ergo etc. — Similiter, ens summum summe est cognoscibile et per se notum; Deus est huiusmodi etc. — Item, necesse esse est per se notum; Deus est huiusmodi.

[B. — Solutiones instantiarum]

67 Respondeo: si esset propositio per se nota, oportet primo cognoscere conceptum subiecti per se notum et coniunctionem subiecti et praedicati esse notam in entitate. Sic ergo oportet quod conceptus terminorum sint per se noti; sed isti non sunt noti per se, sed probati et demonstrati, eo quod non sunt conceptus simplices.

68 Ad primum,³⁰ dico quod propositio maior est per se vera, sed non est per se nota. Ad probationem, dico quod non est per se notum quod praedicatum repugnat evidenter subiecto; unde licet repugnet, non tamen evidenter repugnat.

69 Ad illud quando dicitur ens summum esse est per se notum, dico quod iste conceptus entis summi est resolubilis, et ideo oportet ipsum esse unicum in re in extremis antequam concludatur de hoc ente summo, scilicet de Deo.

70 Ad aliud³¹ quando dicitur quod veritatem esse est per se notum, concedo: 'ergo Deum esse per se notum', fallacia consequentis. Non enim sequitur 'aliquid est notum per se de superiori; ergo est per se notum de inferiori'; Deus autem in minori assumitur hic sub veritate.

71 Ad probationem dico quod non sequitur ex suo opposito: ergo verum est veritatem non esse; sed bene sequitur sic: non verum est veritatem esse. Ulterius ergo si non est verum veritatem esse, aut intelligis de veritate in re vel in intellectu, et tunc oportet aliquid esse in re correspondens veritati propositionis vel aliquid

the opposite. — Likewise, that truth exists is true and known per se; God is truth, therefore etc. — Likewise, the highest being is able to be known in the highest way and is known per se; God is such; therefore etc. — Also, what exists necessarily is known per se; God is such.

Answer to the Objections

67 I respond: if it were a per se known proposition, it would be necessary that the concept of subject be known per se, and the connection of the subject and predicate would be known to be there.⁸ In this way then the concepts of the terms are known per se; but these are not known per se; but these [need to be] proved and demonstrated, inasmuch as they are not simple concepts.

68 To the first, [n. 53] I say that the major proposition is true per se, but it is not known per se. As for the proof, I say that it is not known per se that the predicate is clearly repugnant to the subject; therefore, although it is repugnant, it is not evidently repugnant.

69 As to when it is said that the highest being is known per se to exist, I say that this concept of the highest being is separable [into parts] and therefore it must be known that the parts refer to one thing in reality before one may reach any conclusion about this highest thing, namely, about God.

70 To the other [n. 54] when it is said it is known per se that truth exists, I concede: [but to infer from this] 'therefore, God is known per se' is a fallacy of consequent. For it does not follow 'something is known per se about a higher [concept], therefore it is known about what falls under it'; but here in the minor God is assumed to come under truth.

71 As for the proof, I say that from its opposite, this does not follow, 'hence it is true that truth does not exist,' but what does follow in this way is 'it is not true that truth exists.' Furthermore, if it is not true, then, that truth exists, either you understand this of truth in reality or truth in the intellect, and then it is necessary that something exist in reality that corresponds to the truth of

³⁰ Cf. supra n. 53.

³¹ Cf. supra n. 54.

⁸ The Latin has *in entitate* ('in entity'), but *entitas* means the relation according to which it can be said of a thing that it is there or it exists.

in intellectu; sed hoc destruitur per praecedentem propositionem, scilicet quando dicitur 'veritas non est'.

72 Ad illud quod dicitur³² de necesse, dico quod non sequitur, si est necesse esse quod sit notum esse, quia omnes propositiones de primo modo dicendi per se sunt magis necessariae quam de secundo, non tamen sunt magis notae, sive quod sint per se notae, quia nulla est per se nota nisi resolvendo terminos in suas definitiones, quae est magis in se notus conceptus quam conceptus nominis; sed nobis magis notus confusus, I *Physicorum*.³³ Unde talis conceptus evidenter ostendit unionem sui et habitudinem ad entitatem, quando scilicet termini concipiuntur secundum quid et confuse, ut in toto et in parte, unde statim notum est per se quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed non sic est de terminis compositis simpliciter et distincte; licet sint magis necessariae, non tamen magis nobis notae.

[Quaestio 3

Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in qualibet creatura]

73 Utrum vestigium Trinitatis sit in qualibet creatura.

Videtur quod non:

Effectus non repraesentat suam causam nisi secundum quod est ab ea. Omnis autem creatura est a Deo in quantum unus, non

³² Cf. supra n. 55.

³³ Cf. supra n. 59.

the proposition, or that there is something in the intellect. But this is denied by the proposition that precedes, namely when it is said 'there is no truth.'

72 To what is said [n. 55] about 'exists necessarily,' I say that it does not follow, if something 'exists necessarily,' that this is known [per se] to exist. For all propositions in the first mode* of necessary predication* are more necessary than those in the second mode,* but they are not more readily known, or known per se. For nothing is known per se except by resolving the terms into their definitions, [a definition]⁹ being a concept better known in itself than the concept of the name. But for us, a confused concept is better known, according to Bk. I of the *Physics*. Hence a concept evidently displays its unity and the relationship or aptitude to what exists [*ad entitatem*], when it is of such a kind that the terms are conceived in a qualified sense and confusedly, as in a whole and in part; hence it is immediately known per se that any whole is greater than its part. But this is not the way composite terms [are conceived]; although they are more necessary, they are not better known to us.

Question Three

Is there a vestige of the Trinity in every creature?

73 In every creature is there a vestige of the Trinity?

It seems not:

An effect represents its cause only according to the way in which it stems from it. But every creature is from God insofar as

⁹ The Latin has *quae* which appears to refer back to 'definitions,' but the verb indicates that the subject is singular, namely, a definition. The definition, used as the middle term, is better known than what is simply named, viz. the subject.