

Test

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Physica

Prooemium Sancti Thomas ad Physicam

Quia liber physicorum, cuius expositioni intendimus, est primus liber scientiae naturalis, in eius principio oportet assignare quid sit materia et subiectum scientiae naturalis. Sciendum est igitur quod, cum omnis scientia sit in intellectu, per hoc autem aliquid fit intelligibile in actu, quod aliquo modo abstrahitur a materia; secundum quod aliqua diversimode se habent ad materiam, ad diversas scientias pertinent. Rursus, cum omnis scientia per demonstrationem habeatur, demonstrationis autem medium sit definitio; necesse est secundum diversum definitionis modum scientias diversificari.

Since the book of the *Physics*, whose exposition we intend, is the first book of natural science, it is necessary to note in the beginning what the matter or subject of natural science is. Know therefore that since every science is in the intellect, something comes to be intelligible in act because it is somehow abstracted from matter. So that things belong to diverse sciences insofar as they are related to matter in diverse ways.

Sciendum est igitur quod quaedam sunt quorum esse dependet a materia, nec sine materia definiri possunt: quaedam vero sunt quae licet esse non possint nisi in materia sensibili, in eorum tamen definitione materia sensibilis non cadit. Et haec differunt ad invicem sicut curvum et simum. Nam simum est in materia sensibili, et necesse est quod in eius definitione cadat materia sensibilis, est enim simum nasus curvus; et talia sunt omnia naturalia, ut homo, lapis: curvum vero, licet esse non possit nisi in materia sensibili, tamen in eius definitione materia sensibilis non cadit; et talia sunt omnia mathematica, ut numeri, magnitudines et figurae. Quedam vero sunt quae non dependent a materia nec secundum esse nec secundum rationem; vel quia nunquam sunt in materia, ut Deus et aliae substantiae separatae; vel quia non universaliter sunt in materia, ut substantia, potentia et actus, et ipsum ens.

Know therefore that there are some things whose being depends on matter that cannot be defined without matter: but there are other things which although they can only exist in sensible matter, sensible matter is not part of their definition. And these [two kinds of things] differ as “curved” and “snub”. For the snub is in sensible matter and is necessarily defined by sensible matter because the snub is a curved nose. Of this sort are all natural things such as man and stone. Curved, on the other hand, although it only can exist in sensible matter nevertheless such matter is not found in its definition. Of this sort are all mathematical

such as numbers, magnitudes and figures. But there are certain things which depend on matter neither according to their being nor according to their notion: either since they never are in matter (e.g. God and the separate substances) or they are not universally in matter (e.g. substance, potency and act, and being itself).

De huiusmodi igitur est metaphysica: de his vero quae dependent a materia sensibili secundum esse sed non secundum rationem, est mathematica: de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est naturalis, quae physica dicitur. Et quia omne quod habet materiam mobile est, consequens est quod ens mobile sit subiectum naturalis philosophiae. Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalia autem sunt quorum principium est natura; natura autem est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est; de his igitur quae habent in se principium motus, est scientia naturalis.

Metaphysics is about such things. Mathematics is about those things that depend on sensible matter according to being but not according to notion. Natural [philosophy], which is named physics, is about those things which depend on matter not only according to being but also according to notion.. And because everything that has matter is mobile, it follows that mobile being is the subject of natural philosophy. For natural philosophy is about natural things; natural things, however, are those whose principle is [a] nature; nature is a principle of motion and rest in that in which it is; therefore, natural science is about those things which have in themselves a principle of motion.

Sed quia ea quae consequuntur aliquod commune, prius et seorsum determinanda sunt, ne oporteat ea multoties pertractando omnes partes illius communis repetere; necessarium fuit quod praemitteretur in scientia naturali unus liber, in quo tractaretur de iis quae consequuntur ens mobile in communi; sicut omnibus scientiis praemittitur philosophia prima, in qua determinatur de iis quae sunt communia enti in quantum est ens. Hic autem est liber physicorum, qui etiam dicitur de physico sive naturali auditu, quia per modum doctrinae ad audientes traditus fuit: cuius subiectum est ens mobile simpliciter. Non dico autem corpus mobile, quia omne mobile esse corpus probatur in isto libro; nulla autem scientia probat suum subiectum: et ideo statim in principio libri de caelo, qui sequitur ad istum, incipitur a notificatione corporis. Sequuntur autem ad hunc librum alii libri scientiae naturalis, in quibus tractatur de speciebus mobilium: puta in libro de caelo de mobili secundum motum localem, qui est prima species motus; in libro autem de generatione, de motu ad formam et primis mobilibus, scilicet elementis, quantum ad transmutationes eorum in communi; quantum vero ad speciales eorum transmutationes, in libro Meteororum; de mobilibus vero mixtis inanimatis, in libro de mineralibus; de

animatis vero, in libro de anima et consequentibus ad ipsum.

But, since those things which follow something common ought to be determined beforehand and separately, lest it is necessary to repeat [them] many times in treating all the parts of that common [thing]. It was necessary to put forward one book in natural science which treats those things which follow mobile being in common; just as first philosophy, which determines those things which are common to being as being is put before all the sciences. Here, however, is the book of the *Physics*, which is also called *On Physics or Natural Hearing*, since it was given to the hearers through the mode of teaching. The subject [of this book] is mobile being, simply speaking. I do not say, however, “mobile body,” since that every mobile [being] is a body was proved in this book. No science, however, proves its subject: and therefore, immediately in the beginning of the *De Caelo*, which follows on this book, he begins from knowledge of body. Upon this book follow other books of natural science in which he treats the kinds of mobile [things]: in the *De Caelo*, [he speaks about things] mobile according to local motion, which is the first species of motion; in the *De Generatione*, about motion towards form and about the first mobile things, the elements, which respect to their changes in common; but with respect to the [elemental] changes in particular, [he speaks about these] in the *Meteororum*; in the *De Mineralibus*, [he speaks about] unsouled mixed bodies while in the *De Anima* and the following books he speaks about ensouled mixed bodies.

Prooemium Aristotelis ad Physicam

Text

(184a.) π π μ π π μ , , (μ , μ π π μ), π π μ π π .

When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles, conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates to its principles.

π μ μ π μ μ π . μ μ π . π π π μ μ π μ . ' μ

π μ μ \cdot μ π
 π μ

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not 'knowable relatively to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So in the present inquiry we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature. Now what is to us plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars;

μ π μ μ \cdot

for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it, like parts.

π π (184b.) π μ π μ \cdot μ π μ
 μ

Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round', means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyses this into its particular senses. imilarly a child begins by calling all men 'father', and all women 'mother', but later on distinguishes each of

π μ π π π π μ \cdot

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Commentary

Huic autem libro praemittit philosophus prooemium, in quo ostendit ordinem procedendi in scientia naturali. Unde duo facit: primo ostendit quod oportet incipere a consideratione principiorum; secundo quod inter principia oportet incipere a principiis universalioribus, ibi: innata autem et cetera.

The philosopher begins this book with a prooemium in which he shows the order one should proceed in in natural science. Whence, he does two things: first he shows that it is necessary to begin form the considertaion of principles; second that among principles it is necessary to begin from more universal principles when he says "it is natural, however . . ."

Primo ergo ponit talem rationem. In omnibus scientiis quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa, intellectus et scientia procedit ex cognitione principiorum, causarum et elementorum; sed scientia quae est de natura, habet

principia, elementa et causas; ergo in ea oportet incipere a determinatione principiorum.

Therefore, he begins with an argument: in all sciences of which there are principles or causes or elements, understanding and science proceed from knowledge of [these] principles, causes and elements; but the science of nature has principles, causes and elements; consequently, in this science it is necessary to begin from the determination of the principles.

Quod autem dicit intelligere, refertur ad definitiones; quod vero dicit scire, ad demonstrationes. Nam sicut demonstrationes sunt ex causis, ita et definitiones; cum completa definitio sit demonstratio sola positione differens, ut dicitur in I Poster.

When he says “understanding”, this refers to definitions; but when he says “knowing,” this refers to demonstrations. For, just as demonstrations are from causes, so also definitions; since a complete definition only differs from a demonstration by the position [of the terms], as is said in the first book of the Posterior Analytics.

Per hoc autem quod dicit principia aut causas aut elementa, non intendit idem significare. Nam causa est in plus quam elementum; elementum enim est ex quo componitur res primo et est in eo, ut dicitur in V Metaphys., sicut litterae sunt elementa locutionis, non autem syllabae: causae autem dicuntur ex quibus aliqua dependent secundum suum esse vel fieri; unde etiam quae sunt extra rem, vel quae sunt in re ex quibus non componitur res primo, possunt dici causae, non tamen elementa. Principium vero importat quendam ordinem alicuius processus; unde aliquid potest esse principium, quod non est causa: sicut id unde incipit motus est principium motus, non tamen causa; et punctum est principium lineae, non tamen causa. Sic igitur per principia videtur intelligere causas moventes et agentes, in quibus maxime attenditur ordo processus cuiusdam; per causas autem videtur intelligere causas formales et finales, a quibus maxime dependent res secundum suum esse et fieri; per elementa vero proprie primas causas materiales.

By saying “principles, causes and elements” he does not intend to signify the same thing. For cause is [found] in more [things] than element; for element is that from which a thing is composed first and is in [that thing], as is said in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. For example, letters are the elements of speech and not syllables. Cause names [those things] on which something depends either for being or coming to be; whence [those] things can be called causes which are outside [the effect] or are in it [but] from which it is not first composed, but not elements. But principle implies a certain order of some process; whence something

can be a principle which is not a cause: just as that from which motion begins is a principle of the motion but not a cause; and a point is a principle of a line but not a cause. So, therefore, by he seems to understand moving and agent causes by principle in which the order of some process is attended to most of all. By cause he seems to understand formal and final causes, on which things depend most for their being and coming to be; but by elements [he seems to understand] the first material causes [most properly].

Utitur autem istis nominibus disiunctim et non copulativum ad designandum quod non omnis scientia per omnes causas demonstrat. Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam formalem; metaphysica demonstrat per causam formalem et finalem praecipue, et etiam agentem; naturalis autem per omnes causas.

He uses these names disjunctively and not conjunctively in order to indicate that not every science demonstrates through all [these] causes. For mathematics demonstrates through the formal cause alone. Metaphysics chiefly demonstrates through the formal and final [causes] and the agent cause as well. Natural Philosophy, however, demonstrates through all the causes.

Primam autem propositionem rationis inductae probat ex communi opinione, sicut et in libro *Poster.*: quia tunc quilibet opinatur se cognoscere aliquid, cum scit omnes causas eius a primis usque ad ultimas. Nec oportet ut aliter accipiamus hic causas et elementa et principia quam supra, ut Commentator vult, sed eodem modo. Dicit autem usque ad elementa, quia id quod est ultimum in cognitione est materia. Nam materia est propter formam; forma autem est ab agente propter finem, nisi ipsa sit finis: ut puta dicimus quod propter secare serra habet dentes, et ferreos oportet eos esse ut sint apti ad secandum.

He proves the first proposition of [this] argument from common opinion as he also does in the *Posterior Analytics*. Since everyone thinks he knows something when he knows all its causes from the first causes all the way to the last ones. Nor is it necessary that we take causes and principles otherwise than [we took them] above, as the Commentator does, but in the same way. He says, however, “even to the elements” since that which is last in knowledge is matter: for matter is for the sake of {propter} form; form however is from the agent for the sake of {propter} the end, unless it itself is the end: as when we say that the saw has teeth for the sake of {propter} cutting and that they must be iron that they may be appropriate {sint apti} for cutting.

Deinde cum dicit: innata autem etc., ostendit quod inter principia oportet praedeterminare de universalioribus: et primo ostendit hoc per rationem;

secundo per quaedam signa, ibi: totum enim et cetera. Circa primum ponit talem rationem. Innatum est nobis ut procedamus cognoscendo ab iis quae sunt nobis magis nota, in ea quae sunt magis nota naturae; sed ea quae sunt nobis magis nota, sunt confusa, qualia sunt universalia; ergo oportet nos ab universalibus ad singularia procedere.

Next, when he says: "it is natural, however", he shows that among the principles it is necessary to determine the more universal [principles] beforehand. First he shows this by an argument and secondly by certain signs, there: "for the whole." About the first he gives the following argument: it is natural for us that we proceed in our knowledge from those things which are more known to us into those which are more known by nature {magis nota naturae}; but, those which are more known to us are confused, of which sort are universals; therefore we must proceed from universals to singulars.

Ad manifestationem autem primae propositionis, inducit quod non sunt eadem magis nota nobis et secundum naturam; sed illa quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam, sunt minus nota secundum nos. Et quia iste est naturalis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis; inde est quod oportet nos devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae. Notandum autem est quod idem dicit nota esse naturae et nota simpliciter. Simpliciter autem notiora sunt, quae secundum se sunt notiora. Sunt autem secundum se notiora, quae plus habent de entitate: quia unumquodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens. Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu: unde ista maxime sunt cognoscibilia naturae.

To manifest the first proposition, he induces [??] that the same things are not more known to us and [more known] according to nature; but that those which are more known according to nature are less known according to us. And since the natural way or order of learning is this, that one is brought from [things] more known to us to [things] unknown to us; thus is it that we must proceed {devenire} from [things] more known to us to [things] more known by nature {notiora naturae}. Note, however, that it is the same to say that [something] is 'known by nature' {nota naturae} and 'known simply'. However, [those] are more known simply which are more known according to themselves. Those are more known according to themselves which have more being: since each thing is knowable insofar as it is a being. [Those things], however, are more beings that are more in act: whence such things are most knowable by nature {maxime cognoscibilia naturae}.

Nobis autem e converso accidit, eo quod nos procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibilibus, quae

sunt materialia, et intelligibilia in potentia: unde illa sunt prius nobis nota quam substantiae separatae, quae sunt magis notae secundum naturam, ut patet in II Metaphys. Non ergo dicit notiora naturae, quasi natura cognoscat ea; sed quia sunt notiora secundum se et secundum propriam naturam. Dicit autem notiora et certiora, quia in scientiis non quaeritur qualiscumque cognitio, sed cognitionis certitudo.

To us, however, it happens conversely: we proceed in understanding from potency into act and the principle of our knowledge is from sensibles, which are material things, intelligible in potency. Whence such things are more known to us than separate substances, which are more known according to nature as is clear in book two of the Metaphysics. He does not, therefore, call them more known by nature as if nature should know them; but since they are more known according to themselves and according to their proper nature. He says, however, more known and more certain since in the sciences, one does not seek just any sort of knowledge but certain knowledge.

Ad intellectum autem secundae propositionis, sciendum est quod confusa hic dicuntur quae continent in se aliqua in potentia et indistincte. Et quia cognoscere aliquid indistincte, medium est inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum, ideo, dum intellectus noster procedit de potentia in actum, primo occurrit sibi confusum quam distinctum; sed tunc est scientia completa in actu, quando pervenitur per resolutionem ad distinctam cognitionem principiorum et elementorum. Et haec est ratio quare confusa sunt primo nobis nota quam distincta.

To understand the second proposition, know that those things are here called “confused” that contain in themselves something in potency and indistinctly. And since to know something indistinctly is a mean between pure potency and perfect act, therefore, when our intellect proceeds from potency into act, first there occurs to it something confused and then something distinct; but science is completed in act when it is brought by resolution to a distinct knowledge of principles and elements. And this is the reason why confused things are known to us before distinct things.

Quod autem universalia sint confusa manifestum est, quia universalia continent in se suas species in potentia, et qui scit aliquid in universali scit illud indistincte; tunc autem distinguitur eius cognitio, quando unumquodque eorum quae continentur in potentia in universali, actu cognoscitur: qui enim scit animal, non scit rationale nisi in potentia. Prius autem est scire aliquid in potentia quam in actu: secundum igitur hunc ordinem addiscendi quo procedimus de potentia in actum, prius quoad nos est scire animal quam hominem.

That, however, the universals are confused is manifest, since the universal contains in itself its species in potency and since he who knows something in universal knows it indistinctly; his knowledge is then distinguished [?? made distinct ??] {distinguitur} when each thing potentially contained in the universal is known in act: for he who knows animal only knows rational in potency. Knowing something in potency is prior to knowing it in act: therefore, according to the order of teaching in which we proceed from potency to act, animal is known before with respect to us than man [is].

Contrarium autem huic videtur esse quod dicit philosophus in I Poster., quod singularia sunt magis nota quoad nos, universalia vero naturae sive simpliciter. Sed intelligendum est quod ibi accipit singularia ipsa individua sensibilia: quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, quia sensus cognitio, quae est singularium, praecedit cognitionem intellectus in nobis, quae est universalium. Sed quia cognitio intellectualis est perfectior, universalia autem sunt intelligibilia in actu, non autem singularia (cum sint materialia); simpliciter et secundum naturam universalia sunt notiora. Hic autem singularia dicit non ipsa individua, sed species; quae sunt notiores secundum naturam, utpote perfectiores existentes et distinctam cognitionem habentes: genera vero sunt prius nota quoad nos, utpote habentia cognitionem in potentia et confusam.

What the Philosopher says in book one of the *Posterior Analytics*, that singulars are more known with respect to us but universals more known but universals [are more known] by nature or simply seems to be contrary to this. But one should understand that there he takes the sensible individual itself to be the singular: which are more known with respect to us since the knowledge of sense, which is of singulars, precedes in us the knowledge of intellect, which is of universals. But since intellectual knowledge is more perfect, universals are intelligible in act, but not singular (since they are material); simply and according to nature, universals are more known. Here, however, he does not call the individual itself singulars, but the species; which are more known according to nature, as existing more perfectly and having distinct knowledge: but genera are more known with respect to us, as having knowledge in potency and confused.

Sciendum autem quod Commentator aliter exponit. Dicit enim quod ibi, innata autem est etc., vult ostendere philosophus modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, quia scilicet demonstrat per effectus et posteriora secundum naturam: ut sic quod ibi dicitur, intelligatur de processu in demonstrando, et non in determinando. Cum autem dicit, sunt autem nobis etc., intendit manifestare, secundum eum, quae sunt magis nota quoad nos et minus nota secundum naturam, scilicet composita simplicibus, intelligens composita per

confusa. Ultimo autem concludit quod procedendum est ab universalioribus ad minus universalia, quasi quoddam corollarium.

Know that the Commentator exposes this in another way. For he says that, there, “it is natural,” the Philosopher wants to show the mode of demonstration of this science, since it demonstrates through effects and things posterior according to nature: so that what is said there is understood about the process in demonstration and not in determination. When he says, “They are for us”, [the Philosopher] intends to manifest, according to [the Commentator], that they are more known with respect to us and less known according to nature, namely composed [more known] than simples, understanding “composed” for “confused.” Last, however, he concludes that one ought to proceed from more universal things to less universal things as a certain corollary.

Unde patet quod eius expositio non est conveniens, quia non coniungit totum ad unam intentionem; et quia hic non intendit philosophus ostendere modum demonstrationis huius scientiae, hoc enim faciet in secundo libro secundum ordinem determinandi; iterum quia confusa non debent exponi composita, sed indistincta; non enim posset concludi aliquid ex universalibus, cum genera non componantur ex speciebus.

Whence it is clear that his exposition is not fittings, since he does not combine the whole into a single intention; and since the Philosopher does not here intend to show the mode of demonstration [belonging to] this science: for he does this in the second book according to the order of determination; again, since ‘confused’ ought not be explained as ‘composite’, but ‘indistinct;’ for something something be concluded from [such] universals since genera are not composed from species.

Deinde cum dicit: totum enim etc., manifestat propositum per tria signa. Quorum primum sumitur a toto integrali sensibili: et dicit quod totum sensibile est notius secundum sensum; ergo et totum intelligibile est notius secundum intellectum. Universale autem est quoddam totum intelligibile, quia comprehendit multa ut partes, scilicet sua inferiora; ergo universale est notius secundum intellectum quoad nos.

Next when he says: “for the whole, etc.” he shows the matter at hand through three signs. The first of which is drawn from the sensible integral whole: and he says that the sensible whole is more known according to sense; therefore, also, the intelligible whole is more known according to intellect. The universal is a certain intelligible whole, since it contains many things as parts, namely its inferiors; therefore the universal is more known to us according to intellect.

Videtur autem haec probatio inefficax, quia utitur toto et parte et comprehensione aequivoce. Dicendum est autem quod totum integrale et universale conveniunt

in hoc, quod utrumque est confusum et indistinctum. Sicuti enim qui apprehendit genus, non apprehendit species distincte sed in potentia tantum, ita qui apprehendit domum, nondum distinguit partes: unde cum ratione confusionis totum sit prius cognitum quoad nos, eadem ratio est de utroque toto. Esse autem compositum non est commune utrique toti: unde manifestum est quod signanter dixit supra confusa, et non composita.

This proof seems ineffective since it uses whole, part and containment equivocally. One should say, however, that integral and universal whole agree in this, that each is confused and indistinct. For just as he who apprehends the genus does not apprehend the species distinctly but in potency alone, so he who apprehends the house does not yet distinguish its parts: whence, since the whole is known before the parts because of its confusion, there is the same argument from each whole. The being composed, however, is not common to each whole: whence it is manifest that he expressly said ‘confused’ above, and not ‘composed.’

Deinde cum dicit: *sustinent autem etc.*, ponit aliud signum de toto integrali intelligibili. Definitum enim se habet ad definientia quodammodo ut totum integrale, in quantum actu sunt definientia in definito; sed tamen qui apprehendit nomen, ut puta hominem aut circulum, non statim distinguit principia definientia; unde nomen est sicut quoddam totum et indistinctum, sed definitio dividit in singularia, idest distincte ponit principia definiti. Videtur autem hoc esse contrarium ei quod supra dixit; nam definientia videntur esse universaliora, quae dixit prius esse nota nobis. Item si definitum esset notius nobis quam definientia, non notificaretur nobis definitum per definitionem: nihil enim notificatur nobis nisi ex magis notis nobis. Sed dicendum quod definientia secundum se sunt prius nota nobis quam definitum; sed prius est notum nobis definitum, quam quod talia sint definientia ipsius: sicut prius sunt nota nobis animal et rationale quam homo; sed prius est nobis notus homo confuse, quam quod animal et rationale sint definientia ipsius.

Next when he says “they sustain, however”, he gives another sign from the intelligible integral whole. For the thing defined stands to the defining [principles] in a certain way as an integral whole, insofar as definitions are in act in the thing defined; but, nevertheless, he who apprehends the name (for example, ‘man’ or ‘circle’) does not immediately distinguish the defining principles; whence the name is as a certain whole and something indistinct but the defining [principles] divides into the singulars, that is it gives the principles of the thing defined distinctly. However, this seems to be contrary to what he said above. For the defining [principles] seem to be more universal, and [he said before that more universal things] were more known to us. Again, if the thing defined were more

known to us than the defining [principles], the thing defined would not be made known to us by the defining [principles]: for something is made known to us only from what is more known to us. But it ought to be said that defining [principles] are, in themselves, more known to us than things defined; but the thing defined is known to us before [it is known] that such things are definitive of it. Just as animal and rational are known to us before man; but man is known to us confusedly before it is known that animal and rational are definitive of it.

Deinde cum dicit: et pueri etc., ponit tertium signum sumptum ex universaliori sensibili. Sicut enim universalius intelligibile est prius notum nobis secundum intellectum, ut puta animal homine, ita communius sensibile est prius notum nobis secundum sensum, ut puta hoc animal quam hic homo. Et dico prius secundum sensum et secundum locum et secundum tempus. Secundum locum quidem, quia cum aliquis a remotis videtur, prius percipimus ipsum esse corpus quam esse animal, et hoc prius quam quod sit homo, et ultimo quod sit Socrates. Et similiter secundum tempus puer prius apprehendit hunc ut quendam hominem, quam ut hunc hominem qui est Plato, qui est pater eius: et hoc est quod dicit, pueri primum appellant omnes viros patres et feminas matres, sed posterius determinant, idest determinate cognoscunt, unumquodque. Ex quo manifeste ostenditur quod prius cognoscimus aliquid sub confusione quam distincte.

Next when he says: "and boys, etc." he gives a third sign taken from the more universal sensible. For just as the more universal intelligible is known before to us according to intellect, (for example, animal than man), so the more common sensible is known before to us according to sense (for example, this animal than this man). And I say before according to sense both according to place and according to time. According to place because when someone appears from remote [distances] we perceive him to be a body before [we perceive him to be] an animal, and [an animal] before a man, and last that he is Socrates. And similarly, according to time, the boy apprehends this as a certain man than this man, Plato, who is his father: and this is what he says, boys first call all men fathers and women mothers, but afterwards they determine, that is they know determinately, each. From which it is manifestly shown that we know something under confusion before [we know it] distinctly.