Question 11 The question is on the teacher. And there is first a question about whether man can teach an be called master, or only God. And it seems that God alone may teach and be called the teacher. Mt. 23:8: One is your teacher; and it precedes: Do not be called Rappi: about which the Gloss: lest you attibute divine honor to men, or usurp what is God's for yourselves. Therefore to be a teacher and to teach seem to belong to God alone. Moreover, if a man teaches, it is not except through some sign: sinfe if he seems to teach by some thing (for example if someone asking what is walking, he should walk, nevertheless this does not suffice to teaching unless some sign is added as Augustine shows in \emph{Libro de Magistro} by that which brings many things together into the one thing, whence it would not be know in respect of which demonstration of the thing comes to be; wheter regarding substance, or one of its accidents. But one cannot come to knowledge of things by signs, since knowledge of things is better than that of signs; since knowledge of signs is ordered to knowledge of things as to an end: But an effect is not better than its cause. Therefore noone can realte to another knowledge of any things and thus cnoone can teach anyone. Moreover, if the signs of any things are proposed to anyone by a man; either he to whom they are proposed knows the thngs whese signs they are, or he does not. If he knowns the things, he is not taught about them. Yet if he does not know, having been ignorant of the things, neither can the significations of the signs be known; because he who does not know the thing which a stone is, cannot know what the name "lapis" signifies. The signification of the sign unknown, someone cannot also teach someone [about the thing]. If, therefore, he does for teaching nothing other than propose a sign, it seems that man cannot be taught by man. Moreover, teaching is nothing other than causing knowledge \{scientiam\} in another in some way. But the subject of knowledge \{scientiae\} is the intellect; yet sensible signs, in which way alone it seems that man can teach, do not come to the intellective part, but stand in the sensitive power \{potentia\}. Therefore man cannot be taught by man. Moreover, if knowledge \{scientia\} is caused in one man by another; either knowledge \{scientia\} was in the learning one, or not. If it was not, and caused in man by another; therefore one man created knowledge \{scientia\} in another, which is impossible. If however it was present before; either it was present in perfect act, and thus cannot be caused, because what is, can not come to be; or it was according to seminal account \{ratio seminalis\}: yet seminal accounts can be led to act by no created power, but are sown into the nature by God alone, as Augustine says in Genes. ad litteram. Therefore it is left that one man can teach another in no way. Moreover, knowledge is some accident. Yet an accident does not change subjects. Since, therefore, teaching seems to be nothing oter than transmission of knowledge from a teacher into a disciple, therefore one man cannot teach another. Moreover, the gloss on \emph{Romans 10:17}, "faith is from hearing" says: "although God teaches within, the herald announces without". Yet knowledge is caused interiorly in the mind, not in sense, exteriorly. Therefore man is taught by God alone, and not by another man. Moreover, Augustine says in \emph{Lib. de magistro}: "Only God has his seat in heaven, who theaches truth in the earth; other man, thus, are to the chair as a farmer to the tree." A Farmer, however, is not the tree's maker, but the planter of it. Therefore neither can man be called the teacher of knowledge, but disposer to knowledge Moreover, if a man is true teacher, it is necessary that he teache the truth. But whoever teaches the truth, illuminates the mind, since truth is the mind's light. Therefore a man will illuminate a mind, if he he will teach. Vut this is false, since God is he who illumines every man comming into this world \emph{John 1:9}. Therefore one man cannot truly teach another. Moreover, if one han should teach another, it is necessary that he makes him actually knowing from being able to know. Therefore it is necessary that his knowledge be led from ability into actuality. What is led from ability into act, is necessarily changeable. Therefore knowledge, or wisdom, will be changed; which is against Augustine in \emph{Lib. 83 Quaestionum} who says that wisdom coming to a man is not changed, but changes the man. Moreover, knowledge seems to be nothing other than the description of things in the soul, since knowledge is called the making-similar of the knowing to the known. But one man cannot describe the similitudes of things in another's soul: for thus he would work interiorly in him; which only belongs to God. Therefore one man cannot teach another. Moreover, Boethius says in the book \emph{De consolatione}, that the mind of man is raised to knowledge through teaching alone. But that which excites the intellect to knowing does not make it know; just as one who excites someone to seeing coporally does not make him see. Therefore one man does not make another know; and thus he is not properly said to teach him. Moreover, the certitude of an idea \{cognitio\} is required for knowledge \{scientia\}; otherwise, it is not knowledge \{scientia\} but opinion or credulity, as Augustine says in the book \emph{De Magistro}. But one man cannot make certitude in another through the sensible signs which he proposes: for what is in sense, is less-direct \{obliquum\} to that which is in the intellect; yet certitude is always made by somthing more direct \{rectum\}. Therefore one man, etc\dots Moreover, nothing is required for knowledge except the intelligible light and species. But neither can be caused in one man by another: since it is necessary that the man create something, since simple forms of such do not seem able to be produced except through creation. Therefore man cannot ause knowledge in another, and neither can he teach. Moreover, nothing can form the mind of man except God alone, as Auguatine says. But knowledge is a certain form of the mind. Therefore only God can cause knowledge in the soul. Moreover, as guilt is in the soul, so is ignorance. But only God purges the mind of guilt: \emph{Isaiah 43:25} "I am \dots who removes your iniquities for my own sake." Therefore only God purges the mind of ignorance; and thus only he teaches. Moreover, since knowledge \{scientia\} is a certain \{as in certitude\} idea \{cognitio\}, one takes knowledge \{scientia\} from him by whose speach it is made certain. Yet someone who hears a man speaking is not made certain from this [as a man speaking]; otherwise it would be necessary that everything which is said to a person by anyone, should established as certain for him. Yet he is only made certain insofar as he hears truth saying that it is so interiorly, which truth he even consults about those things which he hears from a man. Therefore man does not teach, but the truth which speaks within--which truth is God. Moreover, noone learns by the speech of another that which, asked before speech, he would have responded with. But the student, before the master speaks to him, the interogated could respond about the things which the teacher proposes: for he would not be taught from the speech of the teache, unless he should understand them to stand as the master proposes. Therefor one man cannot be taught through the speech of another man. On the contrary there is what is said in \emph{II Timothy 1:11}: in which it is posited "I am the announcer \dots and teacher of the peoples." Therefore man can both be and be called a teacher. Moreover, \emph{II Timothy 3:14}: "But you remain in these things which you have learned, and which have been credited to you." Gloss: "from me as from a true teacher;" and thus is shown as before. Moreover, \emph{Matthew 23:8-9}, it is also said: "onne is your teacher, and one is your father." But that god is th father of all does not exclude that man can truly be called father as well. Therefore, neither is it excluded that man can truly be called teacher \{magister\}. Moreover, \emph{Romans 10:15}, about this: "How beautiful above mountains \&c." the gloss says: 'those are the feet who illuminate the Church." Yet it is said about the apostle. Since, therefore, to illumine is the act of a teacher, it seems that teaching is applicable to men. Moreover, as is said in \emph{IV Meteorology}, "each than has been perfected when it can generate a similitude of itself. But knowledge \{scientia\} is a certain perfection perfected understanding \{cognitio\}. Therefore, a man who has knowledge cahn teach another. Moreover Augustine in the book \emph{Contra Manich.} says that "as the earth, which before sin was watered by a ountain, after sin required rain descending from the clods; thus the human mind, which is signified by the earth, was made fertile by a font of truth before sin, but after sin it required the teaching of others, like rains descending from the clouds." Therefore, at least, man is taught by man after sin. [54198] De veritate, q. 11 a. 1 co. Responsio. It ought to be said, that in the same three things diversity of opinions is found: in the leading of formes into being, in the acquisition of virtues, and in the acquisition of knowledge. For certain people say, that all sensible forms are from an extrinsic agent which is a substance or separated form, which is the giver of forms or the agent intelligence; and that all inferior natural agents are only as preparing the material to receiving of a form. Similarly, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that the habit of hanesty does not cause our action; but action sed actio prohibet eius contrarium, et adaptat ad illum, ut accidat hic habitus a substantia perficiente animas hominum, quae est intelligentia agens, vel substantia ei consimilis. Similiter etiam ponunt, quod scientia in nobis non efficitur nisi ab agente separato; unde Avicenna ponit in VI de naturalibus, quod formae intelligibiles effluunt in mentem nostram ab intelligentia agente. Quidam vero e contrario opinati sunt; scilicet quod omnia ista rebus essent indita, nec ab exteriori causam haberent, sed solummodo quod per exteriorem actionem manifestantur. Posuerunt enim quidam, quod omnes formae naturales essent actu in materia latentes, et quod agens naturale nihil aliud facit quam extrahere eas de occulto in manifestum. Similiter etiam aliqui posuerunt, quod omnes virtutum habitus nobis sunt inditi a natura; sed per exercitium operum removentur impedimenta, quibus praedicti habitus quasi occultabantur; sicut per limationem aufertur rubigo, ut claritas ferri manifestetur. Similiter etiam aliqui dixerunt quod animae est omnium scientia concreata; et per huiusmodi doctrinam et huiusmodi scientiae exteriora adminicula nihil fit aliud nisi quod anima deducitur in recordationem vel considerationem eorum quae prius scivit; unde dicunt, quod addiscere nihil est aliud quam reminisci. Utraque autem istarum opinionum est absque ratione. Prima enim opinio excludit causas propinquas, dum effectus omnes in inferioribus provenientes, solis causis primis attribuit; in quo derogatur ordini universi, qui ordine et connexione causarum contexitur: dum prima causa ex eminentia bonitatis suae rebus aliis confert non solum quod sint, sed et quod causae sint. Secunda etiam opinio in idem quasi inconveniens redit: cum enim removens prohibens non sit nisi movens per accidens, ut dicitur VIII Physic.; si inferiora agentia nihil aliud faciunt quam producere de occulto in manifestum, removendo impedimenta, quibus formae et habitus virtutum et scientiarum occultabantur: sequetur quod omnia inferiora agentia non agant nisi per accidens. Et ideo, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, via media inter has duas tenenda est in omnibus praedictis. Formae enim naturales praeexistunt quidem in materia, non in actu, ut alii dicebant, sed in potentia solum, de qua in actum reducuntur per agens extrinsecum proximum, non solum per agens primum, ut alia opinio ponebat. Similiter etiam secundum ipsius sententiam in VI Ethicorum, virtutum habitus ante earum consummationem praeexistunt in nobis in quibusdam naturalibus inclinationibus, quae sunt quaedam virtutum inchoationes, sed postea per exercitium operum adducuntur in debitam consummationem. Similiter etiam dicendum est de scientiae acquisitione; quod praeexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus, quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur per species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa, sicut dignitates, sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unius, et huiusmodi, quae statim intellectus apprehendit. In istis autem principiis universalibus omnia sequentia includuntur, sicut in quibusdam rationibus seminalibus. Quando ergo ex istis universalibus cognitionibus mens educitur ut actu cognoscat particularia, quae prius in universali et quasi in potentia cognoscebantur, tunc aliquis dicitur scientiam acquirere. Sciendum tamen est, quod in rebus naturalibus aliquid praeexistit in potentia dupliciter. Uno modo in potentia activa completa; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum sufficienter potest perducere in actum perfectum, sicut patet in sanatione: ex virtute enim naturali quae est in aegro, aeger ad sanitatem perducitur. Alio modo in potentia passiva; quando, scilicet, principium intrinsecum non sufficit ad educendum in actum, sicut patet quando ex aere fit ignis; hoc enim non poterat fieri per aliquam virtutem in aere existentem. Quando igitur praeexistit aliquid in potentia activa completa, tunc agens extrinsecum non agit nisi adiuvando agens intrinsecum, et ministrando ei ea quibus possit in actum exire; sicut medicus in sanatione est minister naturae, quae principaliter operatur, confortando naturam, et apponendo medicinas, quibus velut instrumentis natura utitur ad sanationem. Quando vero aliquid praeexistit in potentia passiva tantum, tunc agens extrinsecum est quod educit principaliter de potentia in actum; sicut ignis facit de aere, qui est potentia ignis, actu ignem. Scientia ergo praeexistit in addiscente in potentia non pure passiva, sed activa; alias homo non posset per seipsum acquirere scientiam. Sicut ergo aliquis dupliciter sanatur: uno modo per operationem naturae tantum, alio modo a natura cum adminiculo medicinae; ita etiam est duplex modus acquirendi scientiam: unus, quando naturalis ratio per seipsam devenit in cognitionem ignotorum; et hic modus dicitur inventio; alius, quando naturali rationi aliquis exterius adminiculatur, et hic modus dicitur disciplina. In his autem quae fiunt a natura et arte, eodem modo ars operatur, et per eadem media, quibus et natura. Sicut enim natura in eo qui ex frigida causa laborat, calefaciendo induceret sanitatem, ita et medicus; unde et ars dicitur imitari naturam. Et similiter etiam contingit in scientiae acquisitione, quod eodem modo docens alium ad scientiam ignotorum deducit sicuti aliquis inveniendo deducit seipsum in cognitionem ignoti. Processus autem rationis pervenientis ad cognitionem ignoti inveniendo est ut principia communia per se nota applicet ad determinatas materias, et inde procedat in aliquas particulares conclusiones, et ex his in alias; unde et secundum hoc unus alium dicitur docere quod istum decursum rationis, quem in se facit ratione naturali, alteri exponit per signa et sic ratio naturalis discipuli, per huiusmodi sibi proposita, sicut per quaedam instrumenta, pervenit in cognitionem ignotorum. Sicut igitur medicus dicitur causare sanitatem in infirmo natura operante, ita etiam homo dicitur causare scientiam in alio operatione rationis naturalis illius: et hoc est docere; unde unus homo alium docere dicitur, et eius esse magister. Et secundum hoc dicit philosophus, I posteriorum, quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire. Si autem aliquis alicui proponat ea quae in principiis per se notis non includuntur, vel includi non manifestantur, non faciet in eo scientiam, sed forte opinionem, vel fidem; quamvis hoc etiam aliquo modo ex principiis innatis causetur. Ex ipsis enim principiis per se notis considerat, quod ea quae ex eis necessario consequuntur, sunt certitudinaliter tenenda; quae vero eis sunt contraria, totaliter respuenda; aliis autem assensum praebere potest, vel non praebere. Huiusmodi autem rationis lumen, quo principia huiusmodi nobis sunt nota, est nobis a Deo inditum, quasi quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis in nobis resultans. Unde, cum omnis doctrina humana efficaciam habere non possit nisi ex virtute illius luminis; constat quod solus Deus est qui interius et principaliter docet, sicut natura interius et principaliter sanat; nihilominus homo et sanare et docere proprie dicitur modo praedicto. To the first it ought to be said that because the lord\dots To the first it ought to be said that understanding of things\dots To the third it ought to be said that those things about which we are taught by signs, we know in some way, and we are ignorant of them in some way\dots To the fourth it ought to be said that the intellect takes the intelligible intentions from sensible signs which are received from the sensitive power \{potentia\}\dots To the fifth it ought to be said\dots To the sixth it ought to be said\dots To the seventh it ought to be said\dots To the eighth it ought to be said\dots To the ninth 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Secondly there is a question whether anyone can be called the teacher of himself And it seems that he can Because the action ought rather to be attributed to the principal cause than to the instrumental. But the cause like the principal cause of the caused knowledge in us is the acting \{agens\} intellect. Yet man, who teaches exteriorly, is the cause like the instumental cause proposing to the agent intellect the instruments by which it is led to knowledge. Therefore the acting intellect teaches more than the exterior man. If, therefore, he who speeks exteriorly is, because of that exterior speech, called the teacher of him who hears; much more should he who hears be caulld teacher of himself because of the light of the acting intellect. Moreover, no one learns something except insofoar as he comes through to the certitude of understanding. But the certitude of understanding belongs to us through a principle naturally known in the light of the agent intellect. Therefore, it is appropriate most of all to the agent intellect to teach; and therefore as the preceeding. Moreover, to teache more prooperly pertains to God than to man; whence \emph{Matthew, 23:8}: "One is your teacher." But God teaches us insofar as he gives light to our reason, by which we can judge about all things. Therefore, the action ought to be chiefly attributed to that light; and thus as before. Moreover, to know something through invention is more perfect than to learn from another as is clear in \emph{I Ethicorum}. If, therefore, the name of 'teacher' is taken from the mode of acquiring knowledge by which someone learns knowledge {scientia} from another, that one is the master of the other; much more should the name of 'teacher' be taken from the way of tacking knowledge by invention {inventio}, that someone should to himself be called the teacher of himself. Moreover, just as someone is introduced to virtue by another and by himself, thus someone is led to knowledge both by learning by himself and learning from another. But those who come to the works of the virtues without an exterior insitution or law-giver is said to be to be a law to himself; \emph{Romans 2:14}: when a person who does not have the law, naturally does [those things] which are of the law, they are a low to themself. Therfore alse he who acqires knowledge by himself ought to be called the teacher of himself. Moreover, the teacher is the cause of knowledge, as the doctor is of health as has been said. But the doctor heals himself. Therefore someone can teach themself. On the Contrary is what the Philosopher says in \emph{VIII Physics}, "that it is impossible that the teaching one learn; since the teaching one necessarily has knowledge, but the learning one does not." Therefore it cannot be that someone teaches himself, nor cah he be called his own teacher. Moreover, teacher \{magisterium\} implies a relation of authority \{superpositionis\}, as does lord. But such relations cannot exist in anyone towards himself: for someone is not the father to himself, nor is he lord. Therefore neither can he be called teacher of himself. Response. It ought to be said that without doubt someone can come to understanding of many [previously] unkown things, by means of the light of reason placed in himself, withhout the supporting exterior teacher, as is clear in everyone who acquires knowledge through invention; and thus in a certain way someone is the cause of knowing to himself; nevertheless he cannot, on account of this, be properly called teacher of himself, nor be said to teach himself. For in natural things we discover two modes of the active \{agentium\} principle, as is clear from the Philosopher in \emph{VII Metaphysics}. For a certain thing is the agent which has in itself everything that in the effect is caused through it either, in the same way, as in univocal agents, or in an even more perfect way \{eminentiori\}, as in equivocal agents. But certain agents exist in which what they make \{aguntur\} does not exist beforehand except in part; as motion causes health, or a warm medicine in which heat is found either actually or virtually causes health; heat, however, is not the complete health, but is a part of it. In the first agents, therefore, the account of the action has been perfected; not, however, in agents in the second way, since, according to this [way], something which/[insofar as it?] is in act acts; whence, since it is not in act the effect led in except in part, it will not be a perfect agent. Teaching, however, implies the perfected action of knowledge in the teacher or master; whence it is necessary that he who teaces or is the master, has the knowledge which he causes in the other, explicitly and perfectly, as it is acquired in the learner \{addiscente\} through teaching. When, however, knowledge is acquired by someone through the intrinsic principle, that which the acting cause of knowledge does not have the knowledge acquired except in part: namely, insofar as it has the seminal notions of knowledge \{ratio seminalis scientiae\} which are common principles; and therefore, properly speaking, the name of teacher or master cannot be derived \{trahi\} from such causality. To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that the acting intellect, although it is more principally the cause than the exterior teacher in some respect, nevertheless, knowledge does not exist beforehand in it completely as it does in a teacher; whence the account does not follow. To the second, therefore, it ought to be said similarly to the first. To the third, therefore, it ought to be said that God knew explicitly all things which a man is taught through him, whence the account of master \{magister–teacher\} can be suitably attributed to him; it is otherwise, however, about the agent intellect, by the account which has now been given. To the fourth, therefore, it ought to be said that although the mode of acquiring knowledge through invention may be more perfect on the part of the one receiving knowledge, insofar as it show him to be more able \{habilior\} towards [acquiring] knowldege \{sciendum\}; nevertheless, on the part of causing knowledge, the mode through teaching is more perfect: because the teacher, who knows the whole science explicitly, can lead more easily to knowledge than one can be led by himself, insofar as he knows beforehand the principles of the knowledge in a certain community (universality, or is this more like in a certain study?) \{communitate\} To the fifth it ought to be said that in this way law stands in matters of action as principles in the speculative, not however as a teacher does; whence it does not follow that if someone is a law to himself that he can be a teacher for himself. To the sixth it ought to be said that the doctor heals insofar as he has health not in act, but in the understanding of art; but a teacher teachers insofar as he actually has knowledge. Whence he who does not have health in act can cause health in himself from [the health] he has in the understanding of his art; but it cannot be that someone hav knowledge and not have it that it could be taught thus by himself.